Effects Of Land Use Regulations Research Articles

The Investment Incentive Effects of Land Use Regulations

This paper provides an overview and synthesis of the results from recent studies of how different types of land use regulations affect land development incentives. The presentation is nontechnical and focuses on uncovering general principles for the dynamic effects of such policies. It explains why the risk of regulation leads to faster development of unregulated land and how the effect on structural densities reflects the underlying pattern of growth in the demand for land by competing uses. It also discusses how the general pattern of timing and density responses for regulated property reflect the same growth patterns in demand.

The Spatial Effects of Land Use Regulations A Missing Link in Growth Control Evaluations

Abstract This article presents an approach for analyzing the likely spatial effects of land use regulations and growth controls. Planners need to identify such effects to evaluate the success of different measures and their implications for economic growth and citizen welfare. The approach, which relates the preferences and willingness-to-pay of recent home buyers in the regulated area (serving as a proxy for potential buyers) to the controls' price effects, is applied in the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area in Maryland. The results show that growth controls need not necessarily be regressive nor lead to greater sprawl. Moreover, how growth control programs are administered may have ramifications for the magnitude of effects and who is likely to be affected.

Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law

UNDER the takings clause of the Constitution, the state is required to pay just compensation whenever it takes private property for public use. Yet the explicit command of the Fifth Amendment does not foreclose asking whether, on balance, this rule is a good thing. If pressed on the question, most economists and lawyers would, we believe, conclude that the government should pay for the property that it takes. The argument, especially that of economists, might be that forcing the government to pay for the resources it gets promotes efficiency.' In a world lacking any compensation requirement, the obvious fear is that private investors will be inhibited by the thought that government will snatch away or unthinkingly destroy the fruits of their venture. The fears of what will happen at the end of the process work themselves into the calculation of property owners at the beginning of that process, so that too little capital will be invested in productive enterprises. The compensation requirement thus serves the dual purpose of offering a substantial measure of protection to private entitlements, while disciplining the power of the state, which

The Interjurisdictional Effects of Growth Controls on Housing Prices

Institute of University of I ' Business and California at I Economic Research Berkeley FISHER CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER SERIES WORKING PAPER NO. 84-83 THE INTERJURISDICTIONAL EFFECTS OF GROWTH CONTROLS ON HOUSING PRICES L By These papers are preliminary in nature: their purpose is to - stimulate discussion and LAWRENCE KATZ comment. Therefore, they . KENNETH T_ ROSEN are not to be cited or quoted in any publication without the ex- press permission of the author. WALTER A. HAAS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS _