Eduard Shevardnadze Research Articles

Autocrats and peaceful resignation in the post-Soviet space: is there a political culture explanation?

ABSTRACT When faced with large-scale dissent, autocracies often use repression. However, in some cases, autocrats resign peacefully, raising the question of why they do not prioritise the survival of their regime. I investigate a culture-related explanation I term “moderating” theory – that high levels of a country's support for democracy have a “moderating” cognitive effect on autocrats' decision-making – in two case studies: Georgia and Armenia. In 2003, President Eduard Shevardnadze (1995-2003) of Georgia peacefully stepped down following a large-scale electoral protest. In Armenia 2018, Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan (2008-2018) abandoned his position without using military force when faced with mass dissent.

არგუმენტაციული სტრუქტურების ანალიზი: არგუმენტაციის სქემები ქართულ პოლიტიკურ ზეპირმეტყველებაში

Our daily verbal communication – official, formal, informal, about general, professional, or private topics – represents our subjective opinions that mostly include reasoning and arguments which we use in order to prove our point. The linguistic realisation (verbalisation) of our personal position always requires the use of extraordinary syntactic-pragmatic structural elements, such as arguments that add credibility to the statement. The study of argumentative structures allows us to identify the linguistic cues that turn a regular expression into an argumentative statement. Understanding those cues in a particular language helps the speakers improve their communication skills.Researching argumentative structures in the context of natural language processing has become a very active process over the past few years. One of the main focuses is on the computational processing of argumentative texts, which significantly increases the feasibility of automatic processing and the semantic analysis of large volumes of text data. This paper aims to describe and reveal argumentation structures in the spoken Georgian language. The research data comes from a sub-corpus of the Georgian National Corpus, the Georgian Political Text Corpus. The database is thematically diverse and contains politicians’ speeches and TV debates, specifically:● public speeches of the Presidents of Georgia and other politicians (Zviad Gamsaxurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, Mikheil Saakashvili, Noe Jordania, Giorgi Kvirikashvili, Shalva Natelashvili)● recordings of Parliament and TV debates (Parliament sessions, political TV shows).The corpus of political texts not only contains thematically diverse materials but is also quite representative from a quantitative point of view: This article analyses the constituent parts of an argumentative text such as premises and reasoning and their connections, with the aim to generally characterise the argumentative structures in Georgian on the basis of Janier and Saint-Disier 2019.1) Arguments based on analogy:Premise 1: Case C1 is similar to case C2.Premise 2: A is true (false) in case C1.Conclusion: A is true (false) in case C2. 2) Arguments based on negative consequences:Premise 1: If an action leads to bad consequences, everything else being equal, it should not be exerted.Premise 2: If action A is exerted, bad consequences will occur.Conclusion: A should not be exerted.3) Arguments based on expert opinions:Premise 1: E is a reliable authority in the domain S.Premise 2: A is a proposition contained in S.Premise 3: E asserts that A.Conclusion: A is true.4) Arguments based on examples:Premise 1: Example 1 is an example that supports claim P.Premise 2: Example n is an example that supports claim P.Conclusion: Claim P is true.5) Arguments based on positions to know:Premise 1: Source A is in a position to know something about domain S which contains proposition P.Premise 2: A asserts that P (in domain S) is true (false),Conclusion: P is true (false)6) Arguments based on popular opinions:Premise 1: Everybody does X.Premise 2: X is a good thing to do.Conclusion: X must be the right thing to do.7) Arguments based on causes and effects:Premise 1: Doing X will cause Y to occur, or if X occurs then Y will occur.Premise 2: X is done, or X occurs.Conclusion: Y will occur

The Bleeding Wound: The Soviet War in Afghanistan and the Collapse of the Soviet System by Yaacov Ro’i

This author’s prolific scholarship combines nuanced argumentation with an encylopedic knowledge of late-socialist Soviet society, notably in the realms of foreign relations, nationalities policy, and religion. In this exhaustively researched book, Ro’i turns his attention to the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989), a conflict that Eduard Shevardnadze, the USSR’s last foreign minister, termed “a sin” in a 1990 speech to the Supreme Soviet (115). Although a number of excellent monographs on the subject have been published in recent years, Ro’i offers something new. In 1992/3, when a conflict that killed at least 15,000 Soviet soldiers and more than a million Afghans was recent news, he and a small team of interviewers conducted surveys and interviews with hundreds of former Soviet citizens, most of them war veterans, across eleven Soviet republics and among emigrés in Israel. Incorporating elements of qualitative and quantitative data and analysis, the result is a source base rich and unique in its combination of detail and raw emotion.The Bleeding Wound is a magisterial survey of the war’s intersection with important trends in the Soviet 1980s. The assessment of Russian political scientist Dmitrii Ol’shanskii whom Ro’i quotes at the outset summarizes the book’s argument: “The truth about Afghanistan emerges only in a polyphony of varying points of view grounded in authentic knowledge” (5). Ro’i seeks to study “the ways that the war encompassed various aspects of late Soviet government and society” through the lens of “a number of topics that were of paramount importance in the 1980s” (306)—official (civilian and military) attitudes toward the various stages of the war, the behavior and treatment of Soviet soldiers, ethnic relations in the Red Army, Soviet popular culture, veterans (afgantsy), and glasnost’. The book is organized according to ten thematic chapters, two providing a detailed chronology, three focusing on the military, and two engaging with media and public opinion. The final three chapters analyze the challenges confronting returning afgantsy, the position of Central Asian Muslims in the Red Army, and the political activity of afgantsy during and after the Soviet collapse.One area in which the book breaks new ground concerns its focus on Central Asian Muslims. Historically speaking, the Central Asian republics and Afghanistan hold much in common. The long-standing conventional wisdom is that the Soviet leadership sought to capitalize on these affinities by deploying Central Asian soldiers in the initial part of the war, only to pull them back because they were too sympathetic to locals, too Muslim, or insufficiently “internationalist.” Ro’i’s interviews and survey data allow him to paint a more complex picture. For example, his Central Asian respondents rated the need to intervene in Afghanistan much higher than did Russians, other Slavs, and Muslims from Russia and the Caucasus. In the early part of the war, 56 percent of Central Asian subjects affirmed the USSR’s “need” to intervene, compared to 31 percent of Russians (169). By contrast, in the same period, Central Asians scored lowest on the “moral right” to intervene compared to the same groups (173). Results like this one lead Ro’i to highlight the limitations of such surveys, and to rely instead on interviews with forty-four veterans and fifty civilians from the region. He identifies racism and Islamophobia as reasons behind doubt (in the USSR and Washington) about the Central Asians’ patriotism (260): “Careful scrutiny of the evidence demands that we refrain from drawing conclusions about widespread Central Asian disloyalty to the Soviet Union (261).” Rather than making sweeping generalizations, Ro’i brings his Central Asian informants to life by skillfully deploying colorful vignettes, such as one about a Tajik soldier who met Afghans who had known his parents. These and other accounts help to lighten the mood of a work that can make for harrowing reading (260).Jam-packed as it is with data and dense analysis, The Bleeding Wound may intimidate non-specialist readers. But Ro’i’s gift for weaving a galaxy of sources, and many different methodologies, into one elegant narrative, makes this book unique. It is both an excellent introduction for the more intrepid general reader and, more obviously, a key reference work about the Afghan War and the Soviet 1980s.

Gruusia-Abhaasia sõja (1992–1993) retseptsioon eesti meedias sõja ajal ja järel

In the minds of Estonians Abkhazia is associated mainly with Estonians living there. When the Georgian-Abkhazian war broke out in August 1992, the Estonian state evacuated about 170 Estonians and their families from Abkhazia in the autumn of the same year. The reception of the war itself in the Estonian media was low and related to the situation of Estonians there, but the motives and direct causes of the war and the development of war events were also examined. One Baltic News Service journalist observed the evacuation of Estonians and wrote about the events of the war on the spot, but most of the authors operated in Estonia and used various sources. In today’s context, it may seem surprising to what extent materials from Russian information channels were used, but at that time it was understandable: Russia covered events in its border countries more actively than Western agencies. Materials translated directly from Russian newspapers were also published in the Estonian press. The choice of sources also influenced the framing in which the events of that time were mediated. The coverage of the war in the Estonian media has undergone significant developments over the decades. The articles published during the war presented the events in a neutral way, rather sympathizing with the Abkhazians than the aggressor. While in the first half of the war the fighters of the Confederation of Mountain People of the Caucasus were presented as allies of the Abkhazians, the articles published at the end of the war sometimes included Russians, although the contribution of the Russians was not explained. However, even at the end of the war, the coverage remained largely neutral, conveying the views of both Georgians and Abkhazians. From the middle of 1994, the reception of the war began to change, which was related to Georgia’s international self-assertion. Reports from international organizations increasingly highlighted the issue of Georgian war refugees and Georgia’s claim to territorial integrity. This was also reflected in the Estonian media, where Abkhazians were increasingly called separatists without the right to independence. However, until the end of the 1990s, some articles were published that also provided Abkhaz views on events. Estonia had taken a clear direction towards integration with the West, but there was no clear understanding of Georgia’s orientation, which also influenced the attitudes of Estonian media towards Georgia-Abkhazia relations. Georgia’s leader, Eduard Shevardnadze, maneuvered between the West and Russia, pushing Abkhazia into an economic blockade and concluding agreements with Russia, while seeking integration with NATO and the European Union. The situation changed dramatically after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, when Mikhail Saakashvili, who had come to power, began to move unequivocally on the path of Western integration. At the same time, Georgia’s relations with Russia deteriorated. Georgia, a small brave country in conflict with Russia, suddenly became Estonians’ ally and friend. The common enemy unites, and when Saakashvili’s rhetoric gained a firm foothold in Georgia’s territorial integrity, Abkhazia was clearly positioned in the Estonian mainstream media as a separatist Russian puppet. Retrospectively, the reception of the Georgian-Abkhazian war changed – the pluralistic approach of the 1990s was replaced by the Georgian version. In this connection, the portrayal of the role of the Russians in the war also changed: peace mediators in the early 1990s or postcolonial implementers of the divide et impera principle now became allies of the Abkhaz. After the Law of Occupied Territories was adopted in Georgia on 23 October 2008, the concept “occupied Georgian territory” as an epithet of Abkhazia appeared in the Estonian media. As Russia continues to be in the position of a negative external “stranger” for the Estonian media, Russia’s relations with Georgia continue to influence our media attitudes towards Abkhazia and interpretations of the Georgian-Abkhazian war.

The Presidential Institute in Georgia: Subjective Understanding of Political Needs and Institutional Transformations

This paper discusses the formation of the Presidency as an institution and the presidential rule in Georgia, as well as some attempts by leaders in power to change and strengthen the Presidency. Until 2010, changes in the Presidency had been meant to strengthen the institution, but the 2010 constitutional changes made prime minister the head of the executive branch and significantly limited the powers of the president. This paper discusses the process of establishing the Presidency according to the terms of three Presidents of Georgia—Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikheil Saakashvili. The process of power formation is discussed within Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of social capital and social space/fields. The analysis focuses on the context, importance of personal capital, interaction with socially relevant actors/agents, steps taken to strengthen the personal power, development of media content, and the impact of procedural changes on the institutional sustainability.

Reliability of the Narrative in the Memoirs of Eduard Shevardnadze Regarding Talks with Deng Xiaoping on Soviet-Chinese Territorial Issues

Reliability of the Narrative in the Memoirs of Eduard Shevardnadze Regarding Talks with Deng Xiaoping on Soviet-Chinese Territorial Issues

Zviad gamsaxurdias p’olitik’uri p’ort’ret’isatvis (gazet niu-iork t’aimsshi 1991-1993 c’lebshi gamokveqnebul p’ublik’aciebze daqrdnobit /ზვიად გამსახურდიას პორტრეტისათვის გაზეთ „ნიუ-იორკ ტაიმსში“ 1991-1993 წლებში გამოქვეყნებულ პუბლიკაციებზე დაყრდნობით [For the political Portrait of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (bazed on Articles Published in “New York Times” in 1991-1993

Unfortunately, in the years before the restoration of Georgia’s state independence and at the first stage of this historic event, the role of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the leader of the Georgian people’s national liberation struggle has been mostly portrayed in a negative way in Georgia-related articles in the New York Times, while the country was striving in the direction of restoring state independence. This circumstance has primarily occurred because the authors of the above-mentioned publications were not properly aware of the situation in our country at that time and received the necessary information in this regard mainly from the Moscow bureau of the New York Times. In terms of assessing the circumstances in our country, the situation is starting to change for the better after the arrival of Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia. From this time on, the authors of newspaper articles no longer refer to Georgia as a separatist republic, neither do they identify those in power at the time in our country as separatist leaders. Such a radical change in the attitude of American journalists and political scientists towards this phenomenon was, first of all, because the Soviet Empire had long since officially dissolved and mention of union republics in old terms made no sense. Based on the above materials, we can conclude that the then-existing negative attitude of American political scientists and journalists towards Georgia and its first president has significantly aggravated and further intensified the processes that have substantially hindered a real solution to the problem of restoring our state independence.საკვანძო სიტყვები: საქართველოს უახლესი ისტორია, საბჭოთა კავშირის პოლიტიკა საქართველოში, ზვიად გამსახურდიას მოღვაწეობა, ამერიკული პრესა.Keywords: Contemporary history of Georgia, The policy of the Soviet Union in Georgia, The work of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, The American Press.

SHEVARDNADZE'S DIPLOMATIC CAROM OF 1983 YEAR

Even in the conditions of the Soviet Empire, the conquered Georgia did not forget its condition and consequently, unilaterally violated “Treaty of Georgievsk” by Russia. Georgia did not miss the opportunity, took advantage of the moment and used the Kremlin's instructions to protect the country's interests, showed the world political community that Georgia should not be considered a politically written-off country. Eduard Shevardnadze took political points from the conqueror Russia, as well created the illusion of effectively carrying out the Kremlin's task, and at the same time avoided the solemn celebration of the annexation. That is, he literally caught two rabbits - fulfilled the task of the Kremlin and paid tribute to the Georgian cause.

Політична трансформація Грузії у постбіполярний період

The article studies the process of political transformation of Georgia since the declaration of its independence. The author`s hypothesis is that Georgia's political transformation should lead to the democratization of its political regime, which in this study is seen as a process of departure from the former Soviet practices of the political system. That is, political transformation is a multidimensional process of gradual departure from socialism. The author analyses a number of factors of the political regime change, from the first democratic government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, which began the process of political transformation of Georgia, the coming to power of Eduard Shevardnadze, and his resignation in a result of mass protests called “colour revolution”, leading to the election victory of Mikheil Saakashvili, whose political force, the United National Movement, was replaced by the Georgian Dream. Also, the study examines the features of the political regime in Georgia, examines the process of establishment and development of power relations, and identifies the main trends and links that directly influenced the process of development of the political system since 1991. The aim of the study is to identify the main reasons that hindered the process of democratization of Georgia, contributing to the understanding of the patterns of democratic development of the country's political system. The main methods used are empirical, problemchronological, and case study method. The author concludes that Georgia's political transformation can be characterized by a combination of authoritarian and democratic tendencies. The country's transformation process has not been simple and homogeneous, and the on-going process of democratization in Georgia is the result of the collapse of the Soviet system, which can now be described as an incomplete transition to a consolidated democracy. However, given Georgia's aspirations to become a member of NATO and the European Union, resolving the problem of secessionist regions on the path to building a democratic state is extremely important.

SHEVARDNADZE'S GEOSTRATEGIC CARAMBOLA

Search for Geopolitical Strategy for Georgia means finding a special road to a civilized future that will be in line with the country's historical and cultural specificity and uniqueness. After the unfavorable conditions, there was created a short but very profitable term implementing its geopolitical and geostrategic interests. Everything depended on the ability of the Georgian politicians, how much they would you be able to determine, understand and mobilize the situation. In this case Georgian diplomacy was appropriate. The government which was in a very difficult position soon clarified the situation and was able to use this chance as much as possible. Accordingly, the country received an impressive geopolitical dividend. Georgian diplomacy achieved great success in the geopolitical context. The factor of the President of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, played a major role, he created a desirable background for Western politics in Georgia with his authority in world politics and great political activity.

NATO Enlargement—Was There a Promise?

NATO Enlargement—Was There a Promise?

Collective memory and reputational politics of national heroes and villains

The politics of memory plays an important role in the ways certain figures are evaluated and remembered, as they can be rehabilitated or vilified, or both, as these processes are contested. We explore these issues using a transition society, Georgia, as a case study. Who are the heroes and villains in Georgian collective memory? What factors influence who is seen as a hero or a villain and why? How do these selections correlate with Georgian national identity? We attempt to answer these research questions using a newly generated data set of contemporary Georgian perspectives on recent history. Our survey results show that according to a representative sample of the Georgian population, the main heroes from the beginning of the twentieth century include Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Ilia Chavchavadze, and Patriarch Ilia II. Eduard Shevardnadze, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, and Vladimir Putin represent the main villains, and those that appear on both lists are Mikheil Saakashvili and Joseph Stalin. We highlight two clusters of attitudes that are indicative of how people think about Georgian national identity, mirroring civic and ethnic conceptions of nationalism. How Georgians understand national identity impacts not only who they choose as heroes or villains, but also whether they provide an answer at all.

Лидер в грузинской политике

Based on a comparative analysis, the article considers the political activities of the national leaders (Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, Mikhail Saakashvili and Bidzina Ivanishvili) in the transitional period of Georgia. Through their personal qualities, the authors analyze the role of charismatic leaders and their place in the Georgian politics.

THE ARCHIVAL SITUATION OF GEORGIAN CINEMA

The Archival Situation of Georgian Cinema Jerry White (bio) [End Page 10] Although Georgian cinema enjoyed some international attention from the late 1950s to the 1980s, it is no longer a central part of broad arguments about world cinema. That is even more true of the country’s silent-era filmmaking, which, when it is discussed at all, is too often consigned to being a quaint subsection of Soviet cinema. But the archival situation in Georgia is unusual, and moreover, it is rapidly changing: sometimes for the good, sometimes for the bad. As I try to show here, a lot of good work is being done there, but it is impossible to ignore the serious material deprivation that defines most of the country’s cinematic institutions. To put it in a post-Soviet way, this makes the question “what is to be done?” seem nearly impossible to answer. [End Page 11] SOME RECENT HISTORY The republic of Georgia (known in Georgian as Sakartvelo) has a long history of being dominated by neighboring Russia, having been a quasi-imperial possession since 1800.1 In the immediate aftermath of the 1917 revolution, the country enjoyed three years of independence, first as part of the short-lived Transcaucasian Federation (also including Armenia and Azerbaijan, it lasted for a few months of 1918), and then as the social-democratic Menshevist state of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (which lasted until the Bolsheviks invaded in 1921). The successor state was the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, which, like other Soviet socialist republics, lasted until 1991. Among Soviet republics, the cinematic situation of Georgia was quite solid. Its regional film studio (known as Georgian Film Studio or Sakhkinmretsvi) was second only to Ukraine’s in terms of films produced and resources available, and the 1950s saw the emergence of a group of internationally well-regarded auteurs. These included Tengiz Abuladze and Rezo Chkheidze (who often worked together, most famously on the 1955 film Magdana’s Donkey) as well as Mikhail Kalatozov (Mikhail Kalatozishvili, who began making films in Georgia before directing such classics of Soviet cinema as 1957’s The Cranes Are Flying and 1959’s The Letter That Was Never Sent, to say nothing of his film maudit of 1964, I Am Cuba), Otar Iosseliani (whose Georgian films Falling Leaves and Once Upon a Time There Was a Singing Blackbird were widely acclaimed and who has worked in France since 1984), and Sergei Parajanov (who was born in Tbilisi and made films there as well as in Armenia and Ukraine). This sense of international excitement about Georgian cinema persisted well into the 1970s and 1980s; the February 1977 issue of Films and Filming featured Derek Elley’s laudatory article “Light in the Caucasus,”2 and 1988 saw the Centre Georges Pompidou’s publication (as part of its “cinéma/pluriel” series) of Jean Radvanyi’s comprehensive and equally laudatory anthology Le cinéma géorgien.3 Three years later, Georgia would be independent again. The early years of independence, though, were difficult, beginning with a coup that was directly followed by a three-year civil war. That civil war was mostly fought over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where ethnic conflict would also lead to a short but still traumatic war with Russia in 2008 (during this later conflict, Georgian forces had to pull back, and Russian forces continue to occupy these areas). By the time the civil war ended, Eduard Shevardnadze (who had served as Gorbachev’s final foreign minister) was president. The Shevardnadze regime was marked by political instability and continual anxiety about (mostly low-level) corruption; its breaking point came during the 2003 parliamentary elections, which were widely seen as having been rigged in favor of [End Page 12] pro-Shevardnadze parties. This led to the peaceful Rose Revolution, wherein after massive protests, Shevardnadze stepped down and the Columbia-educated Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president in 2004. In the parliamentary elections of 2012, partially because of widespread accusations of (again, mostly low-level) corruption and police brutality, as well as because of lingering anger about the 2008 war (where Saakashvili was seen by some as overly provocative toward Russia), Saakashvili...

Georgia: A Political History Since Independence by Stephen Jones (review)

SEER, 91, 4, OCTOBER 2013 932 an appearance on page 280, and there is no reflection of the intense conflict between him and Mikhail Gorbachev. There is nothing substantial on the problem of finding an adequate political vehicle for the moving aspirations for human dignity and social justice. Given the exhaustion of ideologicallyinspired programmes of social renewal, the emancipatory movement in all the Soviet republics in the end took national forms. This was accompanied by spatial representations of the future, such as ‘the return to Europe’, or the even the more vacuous ‘return to civilization’. What does ‘citizenship’ mean in this context and what should be its institutional forms? Repentance is indeed important, but Russia is not the only country that could do with a bit more humility and engage in penance for past misdeeds. The foreign policy vision presented here is naive in the extreme, and we know now how other countries did not hesitate to take advantage of the country’s weakness. There is nothing here on the ‘quality of freedom’, including its economic and social ramifications. Political freedom in the Russian case for many led to new forms of economic servitude, the loss of social rights, the erosion of what Catholic social philosophy would call ‘the dignity of labour’, and a catastrophic decline in foreign policy coherence. In other words, there are many different roads to the temple, and there are many different temples. As a study of the metaphysics of freedom this is a moving and brilliant book; but as a study of the decomposition of power and the attempts to create a new political order, it is deeply wanting. School of Politics and International Relations Richard Sakwa University of Kent Jones, Stephen. Georgia: A Political History Since Independence. I. B. Tauris, London and New York, 2012. xxii + 376 pp. Maps. Illustrations. Timeline. Notes. Bibliography. Index. £35.00. Reviewing Jonathan Wheatley’s Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution, I noted that the work read like ‘a manual on how not to build a functioning state, following the steps by which Georgia’s three successive leaders (the late Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, Mikheil Saak’ashvili) have managed in the space of twenty years to ruin what was probably the most prosperous and vibrant of the USSR’s fifteen unionrepublics ’ (SEER, 88, 2010, 4, pp. 784–86). Why, one might wonder, would even Georgians feel comfortable there, let alone resented and disaffected minorities keen to determine their own destinies? Jones’s competence in the language allows him to marshal many Georgian materials to amplify and update the depressing saga. So packed with information is the volume that many will be tempted to believe that it must provide definitive (if often painful) answers to every REVIEWS 933 imaginable question about its theme. The book, however, suffers from, frankly, ill-informed coverage of especially the crucial issue of Abkhazia. This is hardly surprising as, eschewing trustworthy sources, Jones relies heavily on, and indeed recommends, Svetlana Chervonnaja’s Conflict in the Caucasus, a vanity-publication from 1994 so reeking of pro-Georgian propaganda that it should never receive favourable mention in any work with academic pretensions; I would also advise caution in approaching (parts of) another of Jones’ recommendations — Svante Cornell’s 2001 Small Nations Great Powers. My review (Asian Affairs, 32, 2001, 2, pp. 196–99) warned that it represents ‘an absolute distortion of reality in the treatment afforded to Abkhazia’ (p. 197). It is grossly misleading to suggest that Abkhazia’s problems with Georgian overlordship were engendered either by the élites (pp. 43, 44, 218, 223 & 234), the local Russian organization Slav Home (p. 95) or ‘Russia’s post-imperialist ambitions’ (p. 13); if the reference on page 43 to ‘the bloody demonstrations in Abkhazia in 1989–90’ primarily concerns the fatal clashes on 15–16 July 1989, then, pace Chervonnaja/Jones, the pre-planning was entirely Georgian. Jones properly acknowledges the damage done by ‘chauvinistic statements from Tbilisi’ (p. 43) but fails to recognize that the problems in the secessionist areas were essentially reactions to Tbilisi’s long-standing (mis)behaviour, culminating from the late 1980s in the real dangers inherent in the rhetoric and actions of the...

A New Chance for Georgian Democracy

Something amazing happened in Georgia’s 1 October 2012 parliamentary elections. The government lost and it gave up power, aside from the now-weakened presidency that it will hold for another year. A new coalition known as Georgian Dream ran under the leadership of Georgia’s richest man, the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, and won 85 seats in the unicameral, 150-member Parliament. Georgia’s post-Soviet background and circumstances make the 2012 opposition win and subsequent orderly handover of power truly remarkable. Indeed, among the “competitive authoritarian” regimes found in what used to be the USSR, it is nearly unheard of. Georgia is lucky to be getting a fourth chance at democracy, after the opportunities under Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990–92), Eduard Shevardnadze (1992–2003), and Saakashvili faded. But this chance remains a fragile one.

Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Politics by Jonathan Wheatley (review)

784 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO changing positions. The fateof Eduard Shevardnadzeas ForeignMinister, forinstance, and thecomplications to hisrolecausedbyEvgeniiPrimakov's actions during Iraq'sattack onKuwaitandShevardnadze's belief that helacked Gorbachev's support, are telling. In thisgripping book,Grachevmakesclaimsthatsomespecialists on the USSR in theWestmightdispute.For example,he characterizes theUSSR as 'an apparently all-powerful, one dimensional totalitarian universe'(p. xii) whichis an interpretation thathas been hotlycontested in debatesamong Western politicalscientists datingback to the1970s.In addition, one cannot help but notethatit wouldhave been a welcomeadditionifGrachevhad reflected uponhowhisremarks mayhavebeeninfluenced byhisownformer political roles,preferences and allegiances. The questionhe doesnotaskis to whatextentdid his own positions and politicsshape his appraisalsand the quotationsthathe selectedforscrutiny. But thesemethodological concerns of a social scientist shouldnot detractfromthebook's overallgood value, particularly indiscussions ofdifferent positions on theunification ofGermany andthesignificance ofKuwait.Thisaccountisone thatdeserves theattention ofstudents ofpolitics, international relations and history. Hughes Hall University ofCambridge Mary Buckley Wheatley, Jonathan.Georgia from National Awakening toRoseRevolution: Delayed Transition inthe Former Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Politics. Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2005. ix + 252 pp. Map. Notes. Appendix. Bibliography. Index.£55.00. Findingnot a singleGeorgian-language sourcelistedin the Bibliography, I approachedthisworkwithsomeapprehension, butthetextis reassuringly comprehensive initsaccountoftheperiodunderreview and(mostly) judicious in itsjudgements. However,someexplanation ofthetranscription employed would have been usefuland mighthave helped the authoravoid some inconsistencies. For instance,Georgia's south-western provinceof Ach'ara (the apostrophemarkingglottalization) becomes Adjara, but the surname Gh'ant'uriaappears simplyas Chanturia;the movementCh'q'ondideli is renderedGhkhondideli, thoughthe surnameQ'arq'arashviliemergesas Karkarashvili. Naturally,such linguistic infelicities will not troublemost readers, whowillprobably be absorbedinwhatisvirtually a manualon how notto builda functioning state,following thestepsbywhichGeorgia'sthree successiveleaders (the late Zviad Gamsakhurdia,Eduard Shevardnadze, MikheilSaak'ashvili) havemanagedinthespaceoftwenty yearstoruinwhat was probablythemostprosperous and vibrant oftheUSSR's fifteen unionrepublics . The bookwasapparently completed inearly2005,whenSaak'ashvili was onlya yearintohisfirst term, wellbeforehismismanagement brought disasteron his people (notto mentionSouth Ossetia)in August2008 and causedplaintive callsfrom oppositionists aboutthecountry's continuing lack REVIEWS 785 ofdemocracy. This explainswhythefinalassessment is less damningthan would be anticipatedtoday,even allowingforhis high-profile crackdown on corruption and reigning in thenotorious bribe-taking traffic-police: 'the development ofdemocracy[.. .] dependsto a largeextenton society's own capacityto define itsowninterests and to act in theirdefence- a capacity which, as we haveobserved, remained weakinGeorgia.On whether progress is beingmade in thisdirection, thejuryis stillout' (p. 226). Needinga theory againstwhichtoframe hisnarrative, Jonathan Wheatley defines whathe meansbya regime thus:'A regime is defined bya) thediversity and characteristics ofthoseactorswhobelongtothepolitical eliteas well as therules, bothinformal andformal, thatgovern decision-making within the elite,b) thecapacityofthepolitical elitetopenetrate society either bymeans ofrepression orbylegitimization ofone form oranother, and c) theextent to whichordinary individuals and socialforces independent ofthestateare able toinfluence statedecision-making' (pp.3-4).He thendefines thekeychallenge forthebook as '[understanding how and whypoliticalregimes changeand theway structures and actorsinteract to bringabout institutional change' (p. 7); relevant too are 'critical phases'. The tragedy of9 April1989,whenRussiantroops violently dispersed demonstrators paralysing thecentreofTbilisi,is one defining moment - twenty died.ThoughGeorgianintolerance towards non-Georgians was alreadywell entrenched, thiseventcertainly buttressed thegrowth ofnationalism. From thelate1980sGeorgiahaswitnessed endlesssequencesofcreation, fragmentation ,break-upof, and realignments among, a mind-boggling numberof political movements andparties, whichWheatley meticulously charts. Though theperiod1989-95,whichsaw theriseand fallof Gamsakhurdia, warsin SouthOssetia,Mingreliaand Abkhazia,and theentrenchment ofShevardnadze (in theguiseofborn-again Christian) as Georgianleader,is deemed one oftransition, democracy did notresult (p. 69). After winning the 1995presidential election,Shevardnadzestrengthened the Ministry of InternalAffairs (his originalpower-basebeforebecoming PartyBoss in 1972)and stoodatop a pyramid ofinstitutionalized corruption (p. 107)thatbenefitted his own family (p. 112).Apparentpoliticalpluralism 'had little todo withdemocracy', being'notdemocratic pluralism, butbureaucratic pluralism! (p. 134).All (Washington especially) who have shown(orcontinueto show)themselves so gullible to Georgianblandishments shouldnote thissalutary assessment which,thoughappliedto thelate 1990s,is stillrelevant :'Whileshamelessly pursuing hisownprivategoals,in publictheGeorgianofficial wouldusetherhetoric ofdemocracy and thefree market inmuch thesame way as hispredecessors (or evenhimself) had previously parroted communist slogans. However, thisrhetoric wasmoredesigned toconvince the international donorcommunity thantowinan increasingly cynicalGeorgian public'(p. 130),or again: 'thepublicly-espoused politicalplatform ofparties shouldbe understood as no morethanwindowdressing, devisedto convince the populationthatthe partyreallycared forthemor to show western governments thatGeorgiareally was democratic' (p. 158). 786 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO Wheatley's treatment oftheAbkhazianand SouthOssetianconflicts sometimes tooreadily reflects theGeorgianperspective. One examplemustsuffice: he acceptsthattheNationalGuardleaderTengizK'it'ovaniwas responsible forsparking theAbkhazianwar by entering thecapitalSukhum'whenhis mandatewas merelyto establishcontrolover the railwaysand highways' (p. 73). The onlyproblemwiththis(widelyaccepted)interpretation is that attackson rail-traffic in 1992...

Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist Countries: Comparative Perspectives on the Fourth Wave

The democratic breakthroughs and revolutions of 1998-2004 for Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine constituted a second phase of their transformation as postcommunist states. All five countries experienced different national revolutions that prevented the simultaneous pursuit of nation-state building and democracy immediately after communism's collapse. After the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state, Slovakia had to come to terms with being an independent state that would coexist with a large Hungarian minority. Croatia's war of independence monopolized the first half of the 1990s and the Serbian threat only receded after the re-taking of Krajina in 1995. From 1988-99, Slobodan Milo?evic dominated Serbia. His plans for a greater Serbia, which ultimately led to NATO's bombing campaign in 1999, resulted in unprecedented war crimes, chaos, and havoc in the former Yugoslavia. Georgia entered the post-Soviet era dominated by ethnic nationalism that led to civil war and the loss of two separatist enclaves. Ukraine was a leading country seeking the dismantling of the USSR in 1991, and 91 percent of Ukrainians overwhelmingly endorsed a referendum on independence. But national independence came without democracy as the state was hijacked until 2004 by the former sovereign turned centrists, under Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma. Throughout the 1990s, Ukraine's elites felt threatened by internal threats from the anti-state and antireform communists, who were the largest political force until the 2002 elections, and externally from Russia, which refused to recognize Ukraine's borders until 1997-99.The democratic opposition perceived the Slovak '98 OK Campaign as Slovakia's opportunity to complete the Velvet Revolution that escaped the country in 1989-90 and remove Vladimir Mec iar's populist nationalism that had, until then, dominated postcom-munist Slovakia. The Croatian opposition also sought to distance itself from the nationalist 1990s in favor of returning to Europe through domestic democratic reforms. Georgia's opposition sought to overcome a failed and dismembered state, amid deep levels of stagnation under Eduard Shevardnadze. Georgian analyst Nodia believes that our revolution in 2003 reminded us of the Eastern European revolution of 1989 when a new generation of non-communist elites came to power.1 A similar sense of unfinished revolution permeated Ukraine's Orange Revolution that, for its leaders and supporters, represented the democratic conclusion to the national revolution of 1991.This article is divided into two sections. The first section analyzes ten causal factors that contribute to democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in Slovakia, Croatia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine. These factors differ in their degree of intensity for all five states. The absence of all, or some, of these factors will prevent successful democratic revolutions in Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, and other CIS states. The ten factors include the existence of a competitive authoritarian state facilitating space for the democratic opposition, to Europe civic nationalism that assists in civil society's mobilization, a preceding political crisis, a pro-democratic capital city, unpopular ruling elites, a charismatic candidate, a united opposition, mobilized youth, regionalism, and foreign intervention. The second section discusses developments following democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in the five states. The section is divided into four themes: the new regimes' ability to deal with the legacies of the past, divisions in the democratic opposition, return of the ancien regime, and progress in democratization.Democratic Breakthroughs and RevolutionsNine factors have been important to the success of democratic breakthroughs and revolutions in postcommunist states. These include a competitive- (i.e. semi-) authoritarian state facilitating space for the democratic opposition; to Europe civic nationalism that assists in mobilizing civil society; a preceding political crisis that weakened the regime's legitimacy; a pro-democratic capital city; unpopular ruling elites; a charismatic candidate; a united opposition; mobilized youths; and regionalism and foreign intervention (Russia or the EU). …

THE ABKHAZIAN–GEORGIAN CONFLICT AND THE ISSUE OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS

In November 2003, mass protests against electoral fraud toppled Eduard Shevardnadze's government in Georgia leading to the inauguration of a new generation of politicians, most having little memory of the Soviet past and a Western education. International mass media transmitted the images of victorious masses in this bloodless coup known as the ‘Rose Revolution’. The future president of Georgia, 36-year-old Mikheil Saakashvili, announced the arrival of a new era in Georgian history, pledging to establish the rule of law, boost the country's democratic credentials, and restore Georgia's sovereignty over the country's entire territory. The population showed euphoric confidence in his ability to fulfil these promises. Coups and the ousting of a government was not a new phenomenon for the South Caucasian republic. Power succession in Georgia usually involved turbulence, unlike the peaceful pattern found in neighbouring Azerbaijan and Armenia. Still, this ‘revolution’ was considered to be something very special, and many expectations, locally and internationally, were connected to it. Evidently, it was not the format of change that was so important, but rather the symbolic meaning ascribed to it, and the indication that a new revolutionary wave had evolved that would drastically change the geopolitical map of Eurasia. The Caucasus and Georgia have become the most dynamic and contentious areas, where many seeds of the future regional order have taken root. Ethnic relations and ethnic conflicts played and continue to play a decisive role in this process. Since the end of the 1980s, ethno-territorial conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have become the most conspicuous aspect of Georgia's new political reality, damaging stability, developmental prospects and economic self-sufficiency. A particularly sensitive issue is that of Abkhazia, due mainly to an immense number of forced migrants, ethnic Georgians who greatly outnumbered the Abkhazians prior to the conflict but are now displaced, living with the hope of returning to their homes in Abkhazia. However, the constellation of a number of factors makes it less probable that this conflict will be resolved any time soon.

Primakov Redux? Putin's Pursuit of "Multipolarism" in Asia

When he was Russia's foreign minister and then prime minister under Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, Yevgeny Primakov attempted to build a international order in response to what he (and many others) perceived as the unipolar world order being built by the United States. Vladimir Putin, who became Russia's president at the end of 1999, initially continued this foreign policy course. In the wake of September 11, 2001, however, he appeared to abandon it in favor of close cooperation with the United States. With the emergence of differences between Washington and Moscow over a number of issues, Putin has reverted to building a multipolar international order. Putin has been making this effort primarily in Asia and only secondarily (at best) elsewhere.This article explores why Putin has revived Primakov's multipolar policy, examines why he is pursuing it primarily in Asia, and assesses how effective this policy has been and can be. First, something needs to be said about what Primakov's multipolar policy consisted of and why Putin seemed to abandon it in the wake of September 11.Primakov's Multipolar PolicyIn the latter part of the Gorbachev era and the first two years of the Yeltsin era, Moscow and Washington enjoyed unprecedented close relations. The conviction that America was not a threat helped induce Gorbachev to peacefully retreat from the Marxist empire that had been built up in Eastern Europe and the third world. Yeltsin strongly sought American and other Western advice and support for the ambitious marketization project he set in motion in Russia right after the breakup of the Soviet Union. There was a general expectation in Russia that after being adversaries in a predominantly bipolar world for so long, Washington and Moscow would now work together to manage the world.1This general Russian expectation was not met, however. Nor were a number of specific Russian expectations regarding the United States. The Russians expected massive American economic assistance and were disappointed at the amount Washington actually gave. The Russians expected that in response to Moscow voluntarily disbanding the Warsaw Pact, Washington would disband NATO. When this did not happen, Moscow expected that NATO would not expand into the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. This expectation also was dashed. Russians were disappointed in Washington's criticism of and lack of support for Moscow's efforts to suppress the Chechen rebels. In addition, after Moscow expressed strong objection to any American intervention in the former Yugoslavia against Serbia, the Russian public as well as the Russian elites were enraged that the United States intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo, and even bombed Serbia.2These and other Russian disappointments with the United States did not occur all at once, but over a period of several years. Early on in the post-Soviet era, these disappointments resulted in many Russians, including both Primakov and the Eurasianists, concluding that instead of rewarding Moscow for the many concessions that it had made (for example, peacefully withdrawing from Eastern Europe and the third world), Washington was taking advantage of them to expand its own power. To stop this, Moscow must stand up to Washington instead of continuing to make concessions to it, as Gorbachev-era Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the Yeltsin era's first Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev were said to have done.3Post-Soviet Russia was not strong enough to do this by itself. However, many other countries also opposed American hegemony. Primakov hoped that Russia could emerge as the leader of an alliance of such countries. The list of countries that the Russian press regarded as actual or potential members of this alliance varied, but usually included China, India, Iran, Iraq (under Saddam), Syria, Serbia (under Milosevic), most of the CIS countries, and even France and Germany. Primakov seemed willing to build as broad and inclusive alliance of countries as possible. …