Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Politics by Jonathan Wheatley (review)

Abstract

784 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO changing positions. The fateof Eduard Shevardnadzeas ForeignMinister, forinstance, and thecomplications to hisrolecausedbyEvgeniiPrimakov's actions during Iraq'sattack onKuwaitandShevardnadze's belief that helacked Gorbachev's support, are telling. In thisgripping book,Grachevmakesclaimsthatsomespecialists on the USSR in theWestmightdispute.For example,he characterizes theUSSR as 'an apparently all-powerful, one dimensional totalitarian universe'(p. xii) whichis an interpretation thathas been hotlycontested in debatesamong Western politicalscientists datingback to the1970s.In addition, one cannot help but notethatit wouldhave been a welcomeadditionifGrachevhad reflected uponhowhisremarks mayhavebeeninfluenced byhisownformer political roles,preferences and allegiances. The questionhe doesnotaskis to whatextentdid his own positions and politicsshape his appraisalsand the quotationsthathe selectedforscrutiny. But thesemethodological concerns of a social scientist shouldnot detractfromthebook's overallgood value, particularly indiscussions ofdifferent positions on theunification ofGermany andthesignificance ofKuwait.Thisaccountisone thatdeserves theattention ofstudents ofpolitics, international relations and history. Hughes Hall University ofCambridge Mary Buckley Wheatley, Jonathan.Georgia from National Awakening toRoseRevolution: Delayed Transition inthe Former Soviet Union. Post-Soviet Politics. Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2005. ix + 252 pp. Map. Notes. Appendix. Bibliography. Index.£55.00. Findingnot a singleGeorgian-language sourcelistedin the Bibliography, I approachedthisworkwithsomeapprehension, butthetextis reassuringly comprehensive initsaccountoftheperiodunderreview and(mostly) judicious in itsjudgements. However,someexplanation ofthetranscription employed would have been usefuland mighthave helped the authoravoid some inconsistencies. For instance,Georgia's south-western provinceof Ach'ara (the apostrophemarkingglottalization) becomes Adjara, but the surname Gh'ant'uriaappears simplyas Chanturia;the movementCh'q'ondideli is renderedGhkhondideli, thoughthe surnameQ'arq'arashviliemergesas Karkarashvili. Naturally,such linguistic infelicities will not troublemost readers, whowillprobably be absorbedinwhatisvirtually a manualon how notto builda functioning state,following thestepsbywhichGeorgia'sthree successiveleaders (the late Zviad Gamsakhurdia,Eduard Shevardnadze, MikheilSaak'ashvili) havemanagedinthespaceoftwenty yearstoruinwhat was probablythemostprosperous and vibrant oftheUSSR's fifteen unionrepublics . The bookwasapparently completed inearly2005,whenSaak'ashvili was onlya yearintohisfirst term, wellbeforehismismanagement brought disasteron his people (notto mentionSouth Ossetia)in August2008 and causedplaintive callsfrom oppositionists aboutthecountry's continuing lack REVIEWS 785 ofdemocracy. This explainswhythefinalassessment is less damningthan would be anticipatedtoday,even allowingforhis high-profile crackdown on corruption and reigning in thenotorious bribe-taking traffic-police: 'the development ofdemocracy[.. .] dependsto a largeextenton society's own capacityto define itsowninterests and to act in theirdefence- a capacity which, as we haveobserved, remained weakinGeorgia.On whether progress is beingmade in thisdirection, thejuryis stillout' (p. 226). Needinga theory againstwhichtoframe hisnarrative, Jonathan Wheatley defines whathe meansbya regime thus:'A regime is defined bya) thediversity and characteristics ofthoseactorswhobelongtothepolitical eliteas well as therules, bothinformal andformal, thatgovern decision-making within the elite,b) thecapacityofthepolitical elitetopenetrate society either bymeans ofrepression orbylegitimization ofone form oranother, and c) theextent to whichordinary individuals and socialforces independent ofthestateare able toinfluence statedecision-making' (pp.3-4).He thendefines thekeychallenge forthebook as '[understanding how and whypoliticalregimes changeand theway structures and actorsinteract to bringabout institutional change' (p. 7); relevant too are 'critical phases'. The tragedy of9 April1989,whenRussiantroops violently dispersed demonstrators paralysing thecentreofTbilisi,is one defining moment - twenty died.ThoughGeorgianintolerance towards non-Georgians was alreadywell entrenched, thiseventcertainly buttressed thegrowth ofnationalism. From thelate1980sGeorgiahaswitnessed endlesssequencesofcreation, fragmentation ,break-upof, and realignments among, a mind-boggling numberof political movements andparties, whichWheatley meticulously charts. Though theperiod1989-95,whichsaw theriseand fallof Gamsakhurdia, warsin SouthOssetia,Mingreliaand Abkhazia,and theentrenchment ofShevardnadze (in theguiseofborn-again Christian) as Georgianleader,is deemed one oftransition, democracy did notresult (p. 69). After winning the 1995presidential election,Shevardnadzestrengthened the Ministry of InternalAffairs (his originalpower-basebeforebecoming PartyBoss in 1972)and stoodatop a pyramid ofinstitutionalized corruption (p. 107)thatbenefitted his own family (p. 112).Apparentpoliticalpluralism 'had little todo withdemocracy', being'notdemocratic pluralism, butbureaucratic pluralism! (p. 134).All (Washington especially) who have shown(orcontinueto show)themselves so gullible to Georgianblandishments shouldnote thissalutary assessment which,thoughappliedto thelate 1990s,is stillrelevant :'Whileshamelessly pursuing hisownprivategoals,in publictheGeorgianofficial wouldusetherhetoric ofdemocracy and thefree market inmuch thesame way as hispredecessors (or evenhimself) had previously parroted communist slogans. However, thisrhetoric wasmoredesigned toconvince the international donorcommunity thantowinan increasingly cynicalGeorgian public'(p. 130),or again: 'thepublicly-espoused politicalplatform ofparties shouldbe understood as no morethanwindowdressing, devisedto convince the populationthatthe partyreallycared forthemor to show western governments thatGeorgiareally was democratic' (p. 158). 786 SEER, 88, 4, OCTOBER 2OIO Wheatley's treatment oftheAbkhazianand SouthOssetianconflicts sometimes tooreadily reflects theGeorgianperspective. One examplemustsuffice: he acceptsthattheNationalGuardleaderTengizK'it'ovaniwas responsible forsparking theAbkhazianwar by entering thecapitalSukhum'whenhis mandatewas merelyto establishcontrolover the railwaysand highways' (p. 73). The onlyproblemwiththis(widelyaccepted)interpretation is that attackson rail-traffic in 1992...