Economic Forum Research Articles

What Hath Copenhagen Wrought? A Preliminary Assessment

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol list of the industrialized countries and the emerging market economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The precise reference should be to “Annex B” of the Kyoto Protocol; “Annex I” refers to the UNFCCC document of 1992. But the two lists overlap almost completely, and “Annex I” is universally used to refer to both. 2. For the text of the Accord, see: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf. 3. Copenhagen Accord submissions data from the UNFCCC and the U.S. Climate Action Network. Emissions data from the World Resources Institute Climate Analysis Indicators Tool; includes land-use changes. These top 12 include the EU-27 but no member states separately. The 17 members of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) include these 12, plus South Africa. France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are MEF members, separately from the EU. 4. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19637. 5. For a presentation of a comprehensive and potentially effective architecture for global climate policy, see the Harvard Project's Discussion Paper by Olmstead and Stavins: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19553. 6. For example, the World Resources Institute (WRI). See: http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/02/addingcountries-emission-reduction-targets. 7. For an important realization of such an ideal, see Bosetti and Frankel's Harvard Project Discussion Paper: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19568. 8. The CDM has approved a small number of projects involving afforestation or reforestation, as contrasted with avoided deforestation, which is more difficult to implement on a project basis. The Harvard Project has addressed these and related issues in its research: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18634. 9. See UNFCCC reports on COP-15: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awg10/eng/17.pdf, pp. 18–32 (AWG-KP report on COP-15, Jan. 28, 2010; pp. 34–37 and elsewhere (AWG-LCA report on COP-15, Feb. 5, 2010). 10. See Harvard Project Discussion Paper: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/18580. 11. See the Harvard Project's Issue Brief on CDM reform: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19523. 12. Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, Tuvalu, and Venezuela. 13. The G-20 turned its attention to climate change policy, from a nearly exclusive focus on finance, in its Pittsburgh meeting in September 2009.

Is the Asia‐Pacific Partnership a viable alternative to Kyoto?

AbstractThe Kyoto Protocol has failed: horizontally because it failed to secure commitments from important players; vertically because of the lack of delivery of outcomes among those who did accede to it. The Asia‐Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate represents a useful way forward, both as a non‐treaty agreement that contains a promising non‐binding sectoral approach to minimizing emissions by seven parties accounting for more than half global emissions, and as an exercise in ‘minilateralism’ where understanding can develop among the key players. It has provided an important building block upon which to build other initiatives, such as the Major Economies Meeting of the US Bush administration and now the Major Economies Forum of the Obama administration. These arenas with 17 members offer opportunities not possible in full multilateral arenas such as Framework Convention on Climate Change, where sheer numbers simply slow processes and help produce lowest common denominator responses. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance

Climate Change: Governance Challenges for Copenhagen

Climate change has been described as diabolical policy problem ... harder than any other issue of high importance that has come before our polity in living memory. (1) To deal with it effectively involves many different policy areas. These include not only the obvious ones like energy, but also others such as macroeconomic and fiscal policy, food security, health, water, trade, biodiversity, and even immigration. The financial implications of climate change--impacts, adaptation, and mitigation--are huge and growing. There is a need for massive deployment of technology, a sector notoriously difficult to regulate. Climate change also involves time frames unknown in public policy. There is currently no overall governance arrangement to integrate all these dimensions. The Bonn-based UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) secretariat, with its mandate defined by the existing convention and the Kyoto Protocol, can easily be seen as too narrow in scope and expertise, and too small to cope with the scale and complexity of this global challenge. It is often pointed out that the international institutional framework is sectorally based, whereas climate change is inherently a cross-sectoral issue. Another weakness is that the Annex I/non-Annex I distinction on which the convention, the protocol, and, to a large extent, the negotiations under the Bali Road Map are based has outlived its usefulness. The Bali Road Map negotiations have softened this distinction a little by referring to developed and developing countries, but even this cannot adequately reflect the range of responsibilities and capabilities among countries. By 2050, the horizon we need to work toward if the world is to come to grips with global warming forty-two years after the start of the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period, the evolution of the world's major economies will have rendered these dualities irrelevant. There is also much concern about the lack of effectiveness and efficiency of some of the existing institutions, as can be seen by the criticism directed at the Global Environment Facility (GEF) by developing countries, and by concerns about aspects of the Clean Development Mechanism, which had been voiced in the negotiations. If new institutions were to be formed, therefore, they almost certainly would not replicate the current arrangements. Indeed, the same could be said of sustainable development in general; (2) advocacy of new and stronger governance arrangements is widespread, with some opinion favoring a new world environment organization under UN auspices as the way forward. The core challenge of mitigation, or emissions reduction, would ideally be addressed first by the small number of countries that represent 80 percent of global emissions, represented in the Major Economies Forum (MEF), a sort of climate G-20, rather than through the UN process where close to 200 countries need to be corralled into agreement. After all, the action taken by fewer than twenty countries will determine whether or not global greenhouse gas concentrations can be limited to 450 parts per million [CO.sub.2] equivalent or lower, so that there is an even chance of limiting global warming to 2 degrees above preindustrial levels. The G8 has given useful impetus to global action on climate change, but its role is limited because it is not sufficiently representative of the developing economies. If the MEF did not already exist, inevitably a similar grouping would have emerged sooner or later. This is not to say that a MEF-brokered agreement on reducing global emissions would be enough in itself. The small, the poor, and the vulnerable, who represent numerically by far the largest number of countries, are in a position to demand that their needs be catered to in any future climate agreement. In particular, no agreement can afford to overlook a large-scale response on adaptation for these countries that have contributed little to global emissions and now find themselves at the forefront of expected impacts of climate change. …

A Role for Legislators

are living in a world that is facing multiple global challenges: the economic downturn, climate change, energy security, poverty, and ecosystem breakdown. Each of these challenges requires an unprecedented political response, a daunting prospect when viewed together. Our main difficulty is not that these challenges are insoluble--they are not. Instead, it is the fact that we are facing these modern-day challenges while using institutional frameworks and governmental structures that were designed for a post-World War II equilibrium. The existing international bodies responsible for tackling these current challenges are separate, disparate, and not sufficiently joined up. have the Group of 20 (G-20), the International Monetary Fund, and World Bank for the financial crisis; the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), G8, and Major Economies Forum for climate change; the International Energy Agency (IEA), and G8 for energy security; the UN Development Programme and World Bank for poverty; and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity for ecosystems. Each of these organizations is doing important work, but many are working with considerable constraint on issues that require a unified policy response. As a result, we have disconnected institutions responding to an interconnected An Interconnected World The interconnections between countries, regions, economies, and cultures are multiplying. Within national governments, the interconnections between policies across portfolios of energy, environment, transport, security, and foreign policy are increasing. Indeed, the recent financial crisis is a perfect illustration, beginning with the irresponsible lending of money to private homeowners in the United States and leading to a near global financial meltdown. This inter-connectedness has resulted in increased unemployment, increased national debt, reduced trade, and exacerbated poverty, which have reduced the ambition to tackle climate change. The current crisis has shown us, quite clearly, how a national or regional economic downturn can quickly and easily turn global and demand policy responses across a range of geographical and ministerial disciplines. serves as a warning that responses to the biggest global environmental challenges such as climate change or ecosystem loss cannot be tackled by environment ministers in isolation, but instead require enlightened policy interventions across the full range of ministerial portfolios from energy to economics and from finance to transport. Fundamentally, we require continued political leadership from the top of government, without which there is little hope of achieving meaningful solutions. Global Responses Meeting global challenges successfully will require unprecedented global coordination across the major economies. National and regional action is part of the solution, but to be successful, the right institutions and global governance structures will be needed in combination with political leadership from the major economies. have limped along over the past twenty to thirty years with institutions designed for a postwar world that are slow to respond and increasingly out of alignment with the challenges of the day. In parallel, on global governance, the G8 group of industrialized countries is increasingly being questioned as the political constellation best placed to deal with global issues. The debate around institutions and global governance is not new, but has been given political impetus by the comments of Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva who, when referring to the G-20 summit in Washington, DC, in 2008, said: We are talking about the G20 because the G8 doesn't have any more reason to exist; emerging economies have to be taken into consideration in today's globalised world. (1) Many observers see the move away from the G8 and toward the G-20 as inevitable. As the former UK G8 Sherpa to Tony Blair in 2005 and 2006, Lord Michael Jay, who was also the architect of the Glen-eagles G8 summit, said: It is hugely significant that at a time of global financial crisis it was the G20 that met in Washington and not the G8. …

TUNISIA: Economic Forum

Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical SeriesVolume 45, Issue 11 p. 18047C-18048A TUNISIA: Economic Forum First published: 23 December 2008 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6346.2008.02033.xRead the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume45, Issue11January 2009Pages 18047C-18048A RelatedInformation

The Myth of the Multitude: The Endogenous Demise of Alter-globalist Politics

Approaches to protests at global economic institutions and Social Forum events have focused on their counter-hegemonic potential and the commonality articulated through such metaphors as “one no, many yeses” and “we are everywhere”, in which the diversity of activism is contained within a common understanding of the system to be rejected. Recent trends, however, suggest that these assessments are far from satisfactory, and oblivious to the fragility and precariousness surrounding such global subjectivity. This paper explores the existing literature supportive of such political activity, and introduces alternative approaches that question the claims of activists to global political significance, probing the pluralistic global subject imagined in images of a global multitude in a critical fashion. It then reports back to the notion of global society, considering how continuing injustices and difficulties within alter-globalist spaces prevent the creation of ethical identifications with marginalised peoples.

TRENDS AND PRIORITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LATVIAN BANKING SERVICES IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGING KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY: CASE OF E-BANKING

1. Introduction The concept of 'new economy' or the knowledge-based economy has recently become a very popular term. It is one of the main aims in the Lisbon Strategy - make Europe the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion by 2010 (Lisbon Strategy 2000). Development of the knowledge-based economy is especially important for the EU new accession countries as it will help to break through the transition period from centralized forms of economic organization (Final Report of the Knowledge Economy Forum 2002:5). Latvia is not an exception - as any other member state it has developed national Lisbon program for the years 2005-2008 where the creation of knowledge-based economy is among one of the priorities (Skribane, Neiders 2006). Thus, although Latvia has not yet achieved all goals set up in this program, it is possible to argue that the process of knowledge- based economy started to emerge here. The concept of 'new economy' in the financing sector is closely connected with changes in supply and demand in the service market caused by the usage of new technologies. Unlike traditional economy, knowledge-based economy is based not only on material values, but for mostly on information and knowledge as the main asset. Rapid development of IT and Internet are creating opportunities to perform more effectively and swiftly, stimulating rapid productivity growth as well as reducing entrepreneurship costs, which, in turn, lead to satisfying consumer needs and increasing the new type demand (Rifkin 2001). 'New economy' overall is characterised by a growing significance of the service-sector and an increase of the value added in this area of an inland economies. Latvia with her rapid development of market economy was not an exception: it was accompanied by an increase of value added in service-sector and its share in GDP. Changes of the GDP structure since 1996 display clearly that one of the main growth factors has been the increase of the service sector with an extension of input from 56.0[degrees]10 in 1995 till 72.9[degrees]10 in 2004 (LR Ekonomikas Ministrija 2004). Retail sector is a dominating branch in Latvian service industry. However, a special role in the expansion of service sector belongs to financing (banking, insurance, leasing deals and other services provided by finance firms). This special role is characterized not only by its share of GDP (>5%), but also by its nature. The uniqueness of financial sector is determined by several factors. For instance, financial services are provided not only to the end consumers (households that are not creating further value added in industrial and service sectors) but also to other entrepreneurships, thus being repeatedly involved in the value adding process. Moreover, financial services are stimulating stability and development of other national economy sectors (for example, lending services are providing reinforcement of other industries, while insurance services are safeguarding the security of transactions). Furthermore, stability of the financial sector is an indicator of the general economic development affecting foreign investors' decisions, thereby regulating investment flow and activities of the economical collaboration models, which are essential foundations for the conversion in retail, industry and construction branches. In the last years Latvia has reached a proportion between service and real sector in the total share of GDP (70:30), typical of many western countries, but it was mainly due to consistent and rapid expansion of retail (its share in GDP has reached 18.1 % and in 2003 it grew by 11.3[degrees]10). Growth of the real sector is smaller, beside that investment in R&D comprise only about 0.4[degrees]10 of GDP (EU average is 1.8[degrees]10). From these data it can be concluded that the backwardness of the real sector compared with the service sector and consequent structural imbalance will lead to the consistently growing share of service sector, wherewith new, growing needs of the real sector betterment emerge. …

The Worldwide Class Struggle

A trademark of our times is the dominance of neoliberalism in the major economic, political, and social forums of the developed capitalist countries and in the international agencies they influence-including the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, and the technical agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, and UNICEF. Starting in the United States during the Carter administration, neoliberalism expanded its influence through the Reagan administration and, in the United Kingdom, the Thatcher administration, to become an international ideology. Neoliberalism holds to a theory (though not necessarily a practice) that posits the followingThis article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Patient opinion of urologists’ reimbursement

Objectives To determine patient assumptions and opinions of the billing and reimbursement process in an urban urologic practice. Healthcare policy and physician reimbursement has been discussed in political and economic forums; however, few studies exist that reflect a patient’s perspective of reimbursement issues. Methods An anonymous, voluntary 11-question survey was given to 825 patients during a 10-week interval. The instrument measured patient perceptions on the amounts (in percentages) that would, and should, be covered by insurance carriers and collected by their urologist. It also measured the time frames perceived for these events to occur. Our aim was to evaluate their knowledge of office urologic reimbursement. Results Overall, 532 patients (75%) surveyed believed their insurance would cover 80% to 100% of their bill. A total of 309 patients (49%) thought their urologist would receive 80% to 100% of the bill, and 383 (60%) thought they should receive that level of compensation ( P <0.0001). Respondents with prior surgical contact thought their urologist would ( P = 0.004) and should ( P = 0.01) be reimbursed at a greater level than those without prior surgical contact. When asked about the time to reimbursement, 340 (73%) thought their doctor would be paid within 6 weeks compared with 453 (95%) who thought their urologist should be paid within that time ( P <0.0001). Conclusions The survey responses demonstrated patients’ convictions that their urologists should be reimbursed in a timely manner. Additional studies examining both patient and healthcare provider perspectives are needed to better educate both of these groups on the medical billing and reimbursement process.

Low Back Pain, Health Status, and Quality of Life in Older Adults: Challenge and Opportunity

The medical literature about low back pain (LBP) is extensive for good reason. LBP is the most common condition in pain medicine and spine specialty practices, but also commonly presents in other specialty practices, such as rheumatology and neurology, as well as in primary care practice. Moreover, unlike many other serious medical problems, the discussion about LBP and its treatment extends beyond medicine to legal and economic forums and even into the political arena. This wider consideration occurs because of LBP's impact on the societal burden of rising health care costs. LBP accounts for more work-related disability than any other health condition, causing it to be the single most costly health problem in the United States and the most costly health burden to businesses. Moreover, LBP is at the center of business-labor disputes over the rights of workers to obtain compensation and medical care once injured on the job versus the rights of businesses to avoid paying compensation to workers who have been injured but then recovered. These disputes spill over into the politics of every state, where workers' compensation programs are administered, and even into economic theory [1,2]. Understandably, its economic salience is the principal reason why most LBP research has focused on working age adults. This research has paid off. Although LBP remains a serious occupational health problem, we have made great strides in learning how to prevent low back injury at work, how to treat acute …

Economic policy forum explaining and forecasting exchange rates with order flows

Economic policy forum explaining and forecasting exchange rates with order flows

Economic policy forum explaining and forecasting exchange rates with order flows

Economic policy forum explaining and forecasting exchange rates with order flows

Hydrogen Economy Forum in Russia

Hydrogen Economy Forum in Russia

Competition and Confusion in the Discourse on Organized Crime in Russia

Throughout 1990s, crime was a familiar topic in Russian, Western, and international political and economic forums. The reasons for this are partially known. Not only had end of bipolar context undermined a vision of world based on a stable form of international order, but it had also prompted emergence of new concerns linked to opening of borders and internal disintegration of numerous post-Communist states, particularly Russia. The loss of its familiar foe and appearance of new threats connected with post-Communist space helped to integrate expressions Russian mafia or red mafia into U.S. rhetoric about national security. (1) Rather than deconstruct Western discourse regarding red mafia threat, aim of this article is to understand how such a topic emerged in Soviet and post-Soviet contexts before spreading to Western world. This article will examine how problem related to crime in Russia was constituted and how it has contributed to shaping Western beliefs. Particular attention is paid to how knowledge about crime accumulated in Russia, which sources were used, and, more precisely, how so-called scientific knowledge could feed, confirm, or invalidate discourse on this topic by political actors. Research on Russian crime has been carried out since late 1980s: numerous publications, doctoral dissertations, journal articles, and symposiums have been devoted to topic. The aim of assessment of such material is not to judge research conducted, but to understand how specialized knowledge related to crime has come about. The term problem is used here in reference to Murray Edelman's work. It implies a distressing situation that constitutes a political issue owing to differences among its definitions, the diversity of meanings ... stemming from range of concerns of different groups, each eager to pursue courses of action and call them solutions. (2) A problem focuses upon a name for an undesirable condition or a threat to well-being. The governmental activities such a focus rationalizes comprise a sequence of ambiguous claims and actions that change and are frequently inconsistent with one another because they are responses to different group interests. (3) Edelman, in introduction to French-language edition of one of his works published in 1991, suggests that his positions, which initially applied to industrially advanced democratic countries, are likely to be heuristically relevant for study of post-Communist countries insofar as construction of social problems relies principally on development of media and greater public access to political information. (4) The approach that I wish to apply to discourse on crime as an objective social fact should not lead to excessive relativism. The wish to understand way political discourses and actions related to this form of delinquency are produced cannot entail denial of existence or seriousness of heterogeneous practices involved in different definitions given to organized crime. (5) Yet, from my point of view, to use expression crime is not to validate it or suggest that it refers to an indisputably constituted social phenomenon, (6) but merely recognizes that literature, discourse, budgets, and specialized law-enforcement agencies are explicitly associated with it. Moreover, importance granted to analysis of discourse in an article devoted to knowledge about Russian crime does not imply a lack of interest in their possible expression as practices. (7) In Russia, crime is a recently constituted issue, using scarce sources. It is based on cognitive references that were confused by competing and confused meanings of term mafia in Soviet context. In late 1980s, crime or mafia problem had already become a significant political stake in struggle that opposed hard-liners to reformers. …

The global elite of power

In this paper, the author discusses contradictions in the contemporary process of globalization related to its current proponents (participants). The first part of the papers tries to solve the enigma of the key participants and social forces shaping the globalization, so it discusses the tree rival theories: the theory of classes, oligarchy and elite of power. The author chooses the third theory of the global elite of power. Its theoretical foundations range from classic theories of elite (Pareto Mosca, Weber) to Mill's famous elite of power. However, the trans-national elite of power is an entirely new social entity. The global elite of power is firmly established in the economic sphere, in the ownership and management of global means of production and capital, and in the use of global labor force. It is characterized by a highly articulated status culture or "class consciousness" - the cosmopolitan "Davos-culture". It represents more a network of groups than one monolithic entity, so it should be discussed synthetically. The second part analyses a collective portrait of the global elite of power in which the outstanding place is occupied by the owners and top managers of trans-national corporations and banks (whose capital highly surpasses the wealth of many countries in the world) together with them, there is the political elite (the leaders of the G-7 Group and the rulers of the trans-national organizations like MMF, World Bank, Security Council of the UN,NATO). The intellectual elite, like "The Trilateral Committee" or "Economic Forum" occupies a less conspicuous, but not insignificant place. The third part discuses the current role of the dominant (authoritarian) wing of the global elite of power, and the fourth points to the alternative possibilities and potential participants in the democratization of the global world order. The concluding, fifth part points to the historical situation in which the democratic alternative although necessary, is almost powerless. Due to the un-intended consequences of the activities of the global elite of power, future of the world society is quite uncertain.

Asia's Economic Forum Taking Shape

Asia's Economic Forum Taking Shape

Economic policy forum does money still matter?

Economic policy forum does money still matter?

Gesundheitsreform: Ende der Krise oder Krise ohne Ende?

Abstract The German Statutory Health Insurance System (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung) has been in a continuous reform process for the past twenty years. Therefore this economic policy forum is assigned to the question: Health reform: End of the crisis or never-ending crisis? Eckhard Knappe and Stefan Horter argue that this reform process was mostly dominated by the model of a cost-containment policy. Most health economists are not in favour of a global cost-containment policy, because it cannot solve the structural deficiencies within the system. As a result they recommend a further strategy of deregulation so that competitive processes will be enforced. Moreover Knappe and Horter show that this in turn will be more responsive to the preferences of the insured and patients and sets incentives for insurers and health-providers to follow efficiency goals in a static and dynamic way in order to mitigate the future burden of the demographic changes. Karl W. Lauterbach, Stephanie Stock and Thomas Evers determinate the thesis that medical innovation and future demographic changes will lead to increased prevalence of chronic diseases and thus to a strong increase of health expenditures are well established, putting the health care system into a permanent financial crisis. This article demonstrates that such a crisis will not necessarily occur in Germany. There is evidence that prevention measures and disease management programs can induce significant cost savings for highly prevalent chronic diseases like diabetes mellitus, colon-carcinoma, ischemic heart diseases, and cerebrovascular diseases. The cost savings could result from delayed onset of chronic disease (due to prevention) and fewer complications (due to disease management) for such diseases. 20% of all health care costs are caused by 20% of the insured, mostly due to chronic disease. Despite these implications, a final conclusion about the future health expenditures cannot be drawn. Switzerland often conceives of itself as a special case, and with regard to health care, it may well be one determines Peter Zweifel. In his article he argues that individuals have free individual choice of social health insurers and can express their preferences in the public domain rather directly, while competition in health care is fostered both by the new Law on Health Insurance of 1994 (LHI 94) and the new Law on Cartels of 1996. He discusses the objectives of the players involved in the promulgation of the LHI 94 and points out its inherent contradictions. Furthermore, Zweifel concludes by sketching additional future reforms that hold the promise of serving the objectives of insureds and patients by improving the ratio of expected benefits to cost in Swiss health care.

China's ''Omnidirectional Diplomacy'': Cooperation with all, Emphasis on Major Powers

In the first half of 2001, China's relationship with the two economic power houses, the US and Japan, was anything but smooth. Tomoyuki Kojima, professor of political science and dean of policy management at Keio University describes the principle of China's foreign policy as ''omnidirectional'' diplomacy. The strained relations with the US and Japan, however, were contradictory to this principle which emphasizes international cooperation with a focus on world powers. In the following article, he examines the main reasons for China's problems with both countries. At the time of writing, Shanghai is to host the 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in October, China is poised to enter the World Trade Organization and Beijing had also won the bid to host the 2008 Olympics. As China becomes more and more internationalized, Kojima argues that the emphasis on cooperation will be perceived as having been of vital importance.

Zur Rentenproblematik: Lösungswege und Reformvorschläge

Abstract This economic policy forum is assigned to the problems of pensions. Eckart Bomsdorf remarks that the pension scheme system in Germany will be stretched to its limit in the future. Like in many other highly developed countries, the reason for this is the demographic development. The number of people who receive pensions is increasing, while the number of contributors is stagnating or even decreasing. The latest pension reforms try to counteract this development. They will work until 2010, after this, however, these measures will not be sufficient to secure Germany’s pension system. Some additional measures can make the statutory pension system in Germany fit for the future. Increasing the retirement age and a new pension formula, which takes the demographic development into consideration sufficiently, are of particular importance. In his contribution, Axel Börsch-Supan states that after the Pension Reform 2000 has successfully passed both chambers of the German parliament, the German pension system still rests mainly on an expanding pay-as-you-go financing mechanism. He argues that the long-run stabilization of the German pension system will need further reform steps with three main elements: (1) A reformed pay-as-you-go pillar which is actuarially fair, features a transparent national account set-up, and freezes contribution rates; (2) A deeper second funded pillar which is based on US 401(k)-style grouped accounts that finances the impending aging burden; (3) An internally consistent regulatory framework for the German capital market including uniform taxation of all retirement savings according to the EET principle. The topics of Friedrich Breyers contribution are often neglected elements of the pension reform: dependents relief and pension splitting within the social security system. The reform introduces the choice of splitting, where each spouse receives half of the total pension claims, which both have acquired during the marriage. The author asks whether the method of income tax splitting should be applied to the health insurance as well as the pension system in order to strengthen the equivalence principle. It is shown that only with mandatory splitting in the pension system the preferential treatment of married couples as opposed to singles would be eliminated.