Reviewed by: John Ruskin and the Ethics of Consumption Judith Stoddart (bio) John Ruskin and the Ethics of Consumption, by David M. Craig; pp. x + 422. Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2006, $60.00, £36.95. In his 1899 reflection on contemporary consumerist theory entitled "The Moral Aspect of Consumption," Charles S. Devas, an admirer of John Ruskin, provided a cautionary note to Ruskin's maxim in Unto This Last (1860) that "THERE IS NO WEALTH BUT LIFE. Life including all its powers of love, of joy, and of admiration" (essay IV, par. 77). In Ruskin's economy, Devas noted, "beans and bacon . . . get mixed up with parental love; and although in many a humble household the former may be the visible expression of the latter . . . such a dissolving of the material into the immaterial is wholly unnecessary to the ethical treatment of economics, and may lead us to curious results" (International Journal of Ethics, 10.1 [1899]: 42). Devas's example gestures to the mixed heritage of Ruskin's notion of economics, derived from the Greek ideals of household economy, paternalist social models, Christian values, and an eighteenth-century vocabulary of sentimental virtues. But if Devas worried that Ruskin's conflation of moral, ethical, and economic practices was a distraction from the work of the marginalist school—which in the 1870s provided the groundwork for what Devas characterized as an ethical revolution in economic theory—David Craig suggests in John Ruskin and the Ethics of Consumption that Ruskin's mixed vocabulary is the source of his strength. It is precisely, Craig contends, where Ruskin links an account of value to a language of virtues that he offers important economic lessons. The value of beans and bacon, Craig might respond to Devas, is mixed up with parental love, if parental love is to be understood in a broad, communitarian sense. In a Ruskinian ethics of consumption, the purchase of a commodity involves a sympathetic act of projection through which we "cross over into other people's lives and endeavors" (315), imagining not only the conditions under which laborers and producers toiled, but their opportunities, sufferings, and choices. Craig traces the evolution of Ruskin's theory of virtue from his early aesthetic writings to his economic treatises. Key terms of that theory, such as "love" and "delight," which first appear in Modern Painters (1843–60), have been misread as references to subjective inner feelings; Craig resituates them within a Christian teleological ethics where they signify "outwardly directed 'affections'" that need to be "ordered properly" toward a good end (48). Over time Ruskin became less certain that he could define a coherent "metaphysics of the good" (289), but he never lost his belief that character development toward an end is the defining feature of a good life. With its focus on [End Page 106] impersonal market forces and individual choice, classical economics—represented in Craig's book by J. S. Mill—provided no mechanism for what Craig calls the "pedagogy of character" (115). Despite his often trenchant critiques of classical economy, Karl Marx, suspicious of the ideological underpinnings of any teleological system, also failed to outline a practical pedagogy. John Ruskin and the Ethics of Consumption usefully stages a dialogue between Ruskin and Mill as well as Marx to show where their emphases diverge. Craig shares both Mill's and Marx's recognition that capitalism can productively disrupt normative systems of value and hierarchy. And yet, he argues, communities do, in practice, adopt "binding" systems of value that structure the choices they make. Ruskin's increasing awareness of culture as a constructed system, a constantly changing set of interconnections, choices, and actions, makes him a more practical critic than Mill or Marx precisely because he intervenes at the level of what Jurgen Habermas would call the lifeworld. The Ruskin who emerges from Craig's book looks, in fact, something like a proto-Habermasian critic (although Craig never mentions Habermas), who "calls individual consumers to a searching vision of their own sense of good lives, the common good, shared goods, and the 'binding' practices requisite to them—a vision that if acted upon deliberately can find and persuade other people of...
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