Economic Model Of Crime Research Articles

INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC MODELS OF CRIME

This introduction to the IER symposium on economic models of crime briefly reviews the articles in this issue and tries to put them in the context of the current research on the economics of crime.

Restorative justice: an alternative approach to juvenile crime

This paper examines “restorative justice,” a new approach to the problem of juvenile crime, from an economic point of view. Advocates assert that the personal, social, and economic harms inflicted by many juvenile crimes are more adequately repaired through mediated face-to-face conferences between victims and offenders than through the conventional disposition of juvenile cases. Parallels between this conception and key elements of the “economic model of crime” are reviewed, followed by an application of the concept of social capital to this process. We conclude with a brief review of early empirical evidence suggestive of the promise of this new approach.

Crime, Copyright, & the Digital Age

This essay, which will appear as a chapter in a collection entitled What Is a Crime? Criminal Conduct in Contemporary Society, edited by the Law Commission of Canada (forthcoming 2004, UBC Press), describes and evaluates efforts to criminalize digital copyright infringement in the United States in Canada. Part II relates the history of criminal copyright legislation and enforcement in the two nations. That history reveals a longstanding legislative and administrative reluctance to impose criminal punishments on copyright infringers. It also shows, however, that in recent decades legislatures have become more willing, in the face of new technological threats and industry pressure, to expand the scope and severity of criminal copyright offences. This has culminated in two novel responses to the threat of digitization: the criminalization of non-commercial infringement and the prohibition (enforced by criminal as well as civil sanctions) of technologies enabling the circumvention of protections against unauthorized copying. Part III explores the impact of digitization on the economics of copyright enforcement. It describes the weakening of civil enforcement mechanisms wrought by digitization and canvasses the normative debate surrounding the appropriate scope of copyright protection for digital works. I note the extent of copyright protection on the ground depends heavily on the availability and efficacy of remedies and argue that criminal law principles should play a prominent role in determining the extent to which those remedies are criminalized. Part IV attempts to articulate limiting principles for the application of criminal penalties to copyright infringement. Section A canvasses moral theories of criminalization, including approaches grounded on analogy, consensus, and harm. While these theories generate useful insights, especially on the interaction between law and shared social norms, none provides a compelling argument for or against the criminalization of copyright infringement. Section B turns to economic analysis. The standard economic model of crime predicts that optimal deterrence can be achieved by adjusting enforcement and punishment levels. Econometric and socio-legal research reveals, however, that under certain conditions deterrence may not be achievable. I argue that this is likely to be the case for certain types of copyright crime, including non-commercial online file sharing and technological circumvention. This failure of deterrence results from strategic interactions often associated with digital copyright infringement, including low visibility, widespread disobedience, risk aversion, substitution effects, and most importantly, disjunction between criminal punishments and social norms. Under these conditions, criminalization is likely to be ineffective and harmful. Part V concludes, recommending restraint regarding the expansion of criminal copyright law.

HOW USEFUL IS THE ECONOMIC MODEL OF CRIME IN ASSISTING THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM?

This article considers whether the economic model of crime can be applied to terrorist activity. It concludes that the model does explain both secular and religiously motivated terrorism: policy‐makers wishing to reduce terrorist activity should aim at devising policies which increase costs and/or decrease benefits to change terrorist incentives. The ‘war’ should continue as long as the probable costs to society incurred by terrorist activity are greater than the costs of abatement.

Crime and Economic Incentives

In economic models of crime, changing economic incentives alter the participation of individuals in criminal activities. We critically appraise the work in this area. After a brief overview of the workhorse economics of crime model for organizing our discussion on crime and economic incentives, we first document the significant rise of the economics of crime as a research field and then go on to review the evidence on the relationship between crime and economic incentives. We divide this discussion into incentives operating through legal wages in the formal labor market and the economic returns to illegal activities. Evidence that economic incentives matter for crime emerges from both.

An Economic Analysis of Drug Use and Crime

This paper aims to demonstrate how economists approach the investigation of the relationship between drug use and criminal activity. The economic model of crime does not treat criminal activity as deviant behavior, but it considers it as a reaction of individuals to prices and incentives. Drug use has a place in this framework because, in addition to a potential pharmaceutical effect, drug use may affect criminal behavior because of the interaction between drug prices, drug consumption and drug profits. The paper presents statistical problems in uncovering causal relationships between crime and its determinants.

Reduziert das Cannabisverbot den Konsum harter Drogen?

Zusammenfassung Viele Gesellschaften setzen ihre Gesetze zur Prohibition von Cannabisprodukten (z.B. Haschisch, Marihuana) und harten Drogen (z.B. Heroin, Kokain) mehr oder weniger rigoros durch. Die Cannabisprohibition wird dabei häufig damit begründet, daß ihre Durchsetzung den Konsum harter Drogen vermindert. Der Beitrag untersucht die Gültigkeit dieser These unter Verwendung von Standardannahmen der Prohibitionsbefürworter. Zur Modellierung des Konsumeinstiegs wird dazu die ökonomische Theorie der Kriminalität mit einigen empirischen Befunden der Drogenforschung kombiniert. Unter der Annahme eines sequentiellen Einstiegs in den Konsum weicher und harter Drogen zeigt eine formale Analyse, daß eine verstärkte Durchsetzung der Cannabisprohibition zu einem erhöhten Konsum harter Drogen führen kann. Sie zeigt zudem, daß eine unzureichend differenzierte Bestrafung des Konsums weicher und harter Drogen die Zahl der Konsumenten harter Drogen vergrößern kann. Insgesamt weist die Analyse damit auf Inkonsistenzen in der Standardargumentation zugunsten der Cannabisprohibition hin.

CRIME, DETERRENCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN ENGLAND AND WALES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*

ABSTRACTThis paper uses aggregate data from 42 police‐force areas over 12 years to test predictions of Becker's economic model of crime. The effects of measures for deterrence on the incidence of three types of acquisitive criminal activity (burglary, theft, robbery) in England and Wales are explored. Mixed support for the Becker model emerges. The growth in unemployment is seen to impact positively on two of the three types of criminal activity examined. Per capita household income is seen to have a negative effect on the recorded rates of burglary and theft, but there is some evidence that the income variable is a proxy for the effects of unemployment. Poor housing conditions and the relative youth of the population were also found to play a role in the determination of criminal activity.

Optimal criminal procedure: Fairness and deterrence

The economic of that has emerged in recent decades concerns itself largely with (Becker, 1968; Stigler, 1970). In its most basic form, the first establishes that increases in the expected punishment for deter some criminal acts at the margin, and then asks how resources should be allocated to enforcement in order to minimize the social costs of crime, including enforcement costs. Refinements of the have gone on to explore such questions as, what is the optimal form of punishment, a fine or imprisonment (Polinsky and Shavell, 1984)? And what is the optimal trade-off between the probability and the magnitude of punishment (Shavell, 1987)? While of is surely an important social concern, in the treatment of accused offenders is equally important. Indeed, this concern is clearly reflected in the structure of the criminal justice system in the U.S. by the numerous safeguards, many constitutional, that have arisen to protect the rights of defendants, as well as the popularly held belief that punishments of convicted offenders should fit the crime (Adelstein, 1979; and Wittman, 1974). Yet, consideration of has been largely absent from economic models of crime, despite the fact that economic analysis has much to say about it. In particular, since unfairness arises in the criminal process mainly as a result of imperfect and costly information, economic analysis can be utilized to characterize the optimal trade-off between the various aspects of fairness. For instance, an important question of relates to the incidence of errors by the criminal process--namely, conviction of truly innocent defendants (type I errors), and acquittal of truly guilty defendants (type II errors). Presumably, both impose some costs on society, therefore how should resources be allocated to minimize these costs? The in this paper answers this question. Specifically, section II develops a of the criminal justice system based on which focuses solely on the treatment of offenders after a has been committed. The fairness model thus adopts an ex post view of the criminal. In contrast, the standard deterrence model views the criminal from an ex ante perspective--that is, what is the best means of deterring his or her crimes (if at all)? It thus relies on a behavioral of the rational criminal 's choice to commit a crime. A simple version of such a is developed in section III. Section IV then grafts the onto the model. The impor-

Some Determinants of Property Crime: Economic Factors Influence Criminal Behavior But Cannot Completely Explain the Syndrome

Abstract. An empirical analysis of the property crimes, robbery, burglary and larceny, is presented for all 120 counties in Kentucky. While this analysis is based on an economic model of crime, certain sociological and legal variables are included as well in the system of equations. Overall, the empirical results support prior studies’findings with the exception that a quadratic relationship is found to exist between urbanization and each of the property crimes. Furthermore, neither the economic nor the non economic influences measured appear more important for affecting crime rates. Specifically, results indicate that the level of poverty, the degree of tourism, the presence of police, the unemployment rate and the apprehension rate all affect property crimes. In contrast, the length of sentence, the degree of industrialization, the level of public assistance payments and the proportion of youth in the county have no affect on property crime rates in these areas.

CRIMES BY YOUTH: DETERRENCE AND MORAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW

We use a decision theory framework to evaluate the extent to which crimes by youth are explained by the “economic model of crime.” We expand the model from the usual formulation including deterrence effects to investigate the impact of earned income and income supplements on individuals' crime participation. Additionally, we evaluate variables representing the forces of moral compliance and family attitudes. We find that moral compliance has a moderating effect on the decision to commit crimes, even by persistently criminal individuals.

Clemency in economic and retributive models of punishment

The Royal Prerogative of Mercy is an ancient right traditionally bestowed upon sovereigns, and vested in the common law. In Canada, this right as applied to murderers was preserved in the criminal code. The code did not specify criteria under which clemency might be granted, nor were the authorities required to explain or defend its use. Prior to the last legal executions in Canada (1962), it appears that the Royal Prerogative was utilized on a case-by-case basis; between 1963 and the de jure end of capital punishment in Canada in 1976, it was used by the various governments to impose a de facto policy of abolition.’ The primary purpose of this study is to examine the historical use in Canada of the Royal Prerogative in the context of different theories of punishment. Two theories in particular invite interest: retributive theory, and the economic theory of punishment. According to John Rawls,’ retribution rests on the simple proposition that wrong-doing merits punishment. Two principal tenets are that the offender should suffer in proportion to his guilt, and that the severity of the punishment depends upon the depravity of the act. The costs imposed upon the convicted offender should approximate the direct costs of the crime. The intention of providing a deterrent is not a purpose of punishment in retributive theory per se. Thus a justification for capital punishment is provided for those who do not believe, or are not sure, that a deterrent effect exists.’ The economic theory of punishment is one part of the economic model of crime. Society is assumed to attempt to minimize the social cost of crime, which includes the direct harm of offenses, plus the indirect costs which include the expense of a protection system (police, prisons, etc.). Crime is viewed as an externality-generating activity, and, consistent with the economic theory of externalities, the state attempts to induce the offender to internalize the externality by threatening to impose a cost. Central to the model is an incentive response, i.e., the assumption that some prospective offenders might be deterred from their felonious enterprises by an appropriate increase in the perceived expected cost of punishment. The economic model, then, is essentially forward-looking, whereas the retributive model, which examines the particulars of individual crimes to determine moral culpability, is backward-looking. These two views of punishment suggest some differences in the organization of society’s legal system, as well as in its actual administration. With respect to capital punishment, an ungraded definition of murder with a centralized commutation body is particularly desirable from the economic standpoint. This gives the authorities maximum flexibility to respond to a change in some exogenous shock to the system. To be more concrete, suppose that the optimal response is perceived to be an increase in the proportion of murderers who are executed.4

Introduction to Testing the Economic Model of Crime

Introduction to Testing the Economic Model of Crime

WOMEN AND CRIME: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

This paper analyzes the determinants of female participation in criminal activities through the use of an economic model of crime. The model is tested empirically on 1970 state data on female arrests and the results are generally consistent with the theoretical predictions. The major findings are that the probability of arrest and the probability of conviction have significant deterrent effects on female property crime, the labor force participation rate of married women has no effect and the average number of preschool children in husband-wife families has a negative and significant effect. The decrease in the average number of preschool children per husband-wife family that took place between 1960 and 1970 is shown to have accounted for more than half of the increase in female property crime that occurred during that decade.

An Economic Model of Crime and Police: Some Empirical Results

Crime and police are two interdependent phenomena; yet, they are often analyzed separately. This paper develops a simultaneous model of crime causation, police output and demand for police and therefore incorporates this inter dependence. It was found that relative illegal wages have a strong positive influence on crime, but police activity can retard crime. Further, police labor is positively related to police output and property crimes are more important than other types of felonies in increasing the demand for police.