Ecocentric Ethics Research Articles

The Leading Canadian NGOs’ Discourse on Fish Farming: From Ecocentric Intuitions to Biocentric Solutions

The development of the aquaculture industry in Canada has triggered a conflict of a scope never seen before. As stated in Young and Matthews’ The Aquaculture Controversy, this debate has “mushroomed over the past several decades to become one of the most bitter and stubborn face-offs over industrial development ever witnessed in Canada” (Young and Matthews in The aquaculture controversy in Canada. Activism, policy and contested science. UBC Press, Vancouver, p 3, 2010). It opposes a wide variety of actors: from industrial investors, scientists, politicians and environmentalists to Native associations and communities, citizens groups and local stakeholders. The opposition is fierce between those in favor of a flourishing and modern aquaculture of industrial nature and those who fear the dreadful consequences of such an industry. In particular, the possible implementation of biotechnology innovations, such as a genetically modified salmon, has made this debate coextensive with the GMO debate, thus multiplying the opposition’s spectrum of arguments against the industry. Throughout the debate, Canadian environmental NGOs like the Suzuki Foundation and Greenpeace Canada have assumed leadership over the opposition to aquaculture development with certain success. Their participation in the debate features numerous ethical concerns related to environmental health, a respect for wilderness and local human communities. Such a position can be associated overall with a form of ecocentric ethics or concern. Nevertheless, a careful examination of the technical solutions proposed by these NGOs reveals their embeddedness in biocentrism. Through the example taken from the Canadian debate on aquaculture development, this paper aims to highlight the conceptual difficulty of enacting ecocentric ethical positions beyond formal arguments. Because ecocentrism implies a true paradigm shift, not only in mentality, but also in the way we conceive our technical interventions in nature, biocentrism remains an important practical method to enact ethical positions related to environmental concerns in public debates.

Social dreaming and ecocentric ethics: sources of non-rational insight in the face of climate change catastrophe

The article considers the role of dreams as social, rather than individual, phenomena and suggests that as such they may serve as resources for ‘future imaginings’ with respect to potentially devastating consequences of climate change (and other transgressions of planetary boundaries). Adopting a socio-analytical perspective, it contemplates the possibility of a societal level ‘cosmology episode’ caused by catastrophic climate change; a critical point of rupture in the meaning-making process which leaves local rationalities in ruin. Drawing on a ‘representative anecdote’, the article finds allegorical parallels between the cultural collapse of a traditional indigenous culture and the impending threat of ecocrisis currently facing humanity. The possibilities of seeing and imagining offered by collective forms of dreaming are explored alongside development of a non-anthropocentric ethics. Our focus is on ways of sensing, thinking and talking about climate change that are less dependent on a rational conscious subject. The article thus enquires into what cultural means or resources might be available to (post)modern Western societies that, like the shamanic dream-vision of certain traditional cultures, might enable them to draw on non-anthropocentric sensibilities and organize responses to an impending cultural crisis. We conclude by offering Gordon Lawrence’s social dreaming matrix as one possible medium through which to imagine and see beyond climate change catastrophe.

Household food waste in Nordic countries: Estimations and ethical implications

This study focuses on food waste generated by households in four Nordic countries: Finland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Based on existing literature we present (A) comparable data on amounts and monetary value of food waste; (B) explanations for food waste at household level; (C) a number of public and private initiatives at national levels aiming to reduce food waste; and (D) a discussion of ethical issues related to food waste with a focus on possible contributions from ecocentric ethics. We argue that reduction of food waste at household level, which has an impact on issues such as climate change and unjust distribution of food resources, needs to be based on an appreciative and relational understanding of nature and food and not only on economic and moralizing arguments. This is done by drawing on an ecocentric perspective where food is seen as one of the areas where new narratives need to be developed to establish cultural habits replacing a focus on affluence and individual choice with a focus on participatory embeddedness in a more-than-human lifeworld.

Ecotourism, Animals and Ecocentrism: A Re-examination of the Billfish Debate

The aim of this paper is to discuss the topic of who, or what, is deserving of moral consideration in nature as this applies to the emerging discourse on tourism, animals and ethics. The paper focuses primarily on deep green or ecocentric ethics, and more specifically, on how this perspective differs from other theories of environmental ethics—especially animal liberation—when it comes to the treatment of animals used for tourism. The debate on billfishing as ecotourism is resurrected for the purpose of explaining (i) why it is important to understand key differences between ecocentric and animal liberation ethics; and (ii) how both theories could have been used to better inform the billfishing debate that took place over a decade ago. The paper concludes with a call for the continued use of environmental ethics theory in clarifying whether certain human- animal practices should be viewed as ecotourism or not.

A Jamesian Approach to Environmental Ethics

James's moral philosophy is a valuable resource for environmental philosophy because it reveals and impugns some deep, unhelpful assumptions about the relationship between moral theory and the moral life. In particular, James's ethics demonstrates that the debates in environmental ethics are better regarded as disputes about ideals of the kind of self and world we want, rather than as disputes over abstract propositions about the intrinsic of nature.1. IntroductionAmong the classical pragmatists, William James might not seem to be best the candidate to contribute to current environmental ethics debates. Besides sporadic remarks about non-human animals and experiences of nature, he says little that would lead one to believe that he was concerned with issues like the intrinsic of nature. His writings on pragmatism espouse a human-centered account of truth according to which those beliefs that satisfy human needs or, as James puts it, agreeably lead us, count as true. And, in the Philosopher and Moral Life, he explicitly says that the essence of good is the satisfaction of demand. If one confines one's attention to the that essay, it is easy to attribute to him a kind of desire -satisfaction utilitarianism according to which the best action is the one that maximizes as many demands as possible. Among its claims, this essay defends the following two normative propositions:1) EG: The essence of good: Whatever satisfies a demand is a good.2) JONT: James's objective normative truth: We are morally obligated to satisfy as many demands as possible. Or, among our available actions, we should take the one that frustrates the fewest demands.Given these claims, it would be easy to think of James's ethics as an early version of the many preference utilitarianisms developed in the twentieth century. Such views are prominent in economic and public policy. Sagoff criticizes one such approach - contingent valuation - on the grounds that it treats moral beliefs as preferences. The idea, in brief, is that environmental managers or policy-makers should include the preferences of environmentalists into the mix of those players who might have a stake in some environmental issue such as development or pollution. One might determine what policy would satisfy the most preferences by, for example, doing surveys about what environmentalists might be willing to pay to go to a park versus what developers might pay to develop it. The error, Sagoff argues, is treating moral beliefs as preferences.1 For one thing, a belief that it is morally obligatory to preserve a bit of untouched nature is typically not a desire for anything like the welfare of the believer. Even more fundamentally, moral beliefs are not mere preferences but rather conclusions of arguments that offer more or less persuasive reasons. Thus, to treat moral convictions as mere preferences to be included with other consumer wants in a maximizing decision procedure is to make a fundamental category mistake. The very content of the moral beliefs of many environmentalists are about the objectively intrinsic of nature. This moral belief contradicts the idea that decisions about nature are simply decisions about how to satisfy the most preferences possible. James's definition of the good in terms of demand satisfaction appears vulnerable to Sagoff s criticisms. Moreover, it would seem that James's ethics is at odds with the mainstream eco -centric environmental ethical theories that would be used to defend moral beliefs about the intrinsic of nature which, according to Sagoff, are not to be treated as mere preferences or desires. Most such ecocentric ethics defends two basic claims: the of non-sentient nature and the of wholes such as ecosystems and species. James's ethics appears to reject these claims. He seems to be an individualist about the locus of moral values - it is the desires of individuals that count. And, he seems to reject the notion that non-sentient nature has intrinsic value, at least if that claim is read as value independent of conscious valuers. …

Should dingoes die? Principles for engaging ecocentric ethics in wildlife tourism management

Ethics underlie all our decisions and actions. The aim of this paper is to, first, highlight the sorts of ethical positions that inform wildlife management and, second, to propose a different set of ecocentric ethical principles that not only provide for a more authentic visitor experience of nature, but also enhance the long-term survival of wildlife. An ecocentric approach involves locating people in, rather than separate from, nature, and so is not possible in locations such as zoos where barriers are physically constructed and maintained between people and wildlife, but should be more compatible with wildlife tourism that is based in rather than on nature. Focusing on wildlife tourism based in nature, seven principles derived from the literature are applied to a case study of dingo management on Fraser Island in Queensland, Australia. The case study demonstrates that recognising the intrinsic value of wildlife and developing a sense of moral obligation and moral reasoning toward the wildlife tourism experience can have positive outcomes for both people and wildlife. If management strategies work within a precautionary principle, acknowledge the interconnectedness between people and nature, and accept that wildlife belongs in nature, then a more ecocentric ethic is possible. This requires managers to engage in a reflexive process with regard to their own ethical position to facilitate the practical application of an ecocentric approach.

Environmental ethics: An African understanding

Global concerns about the current environmental cri sis have culminated into some controversial environmental ethical theories, i.e., normative env ironmental ethics, sentientist ethics, biocentric ethics, ecocentric ethics and eco-feminist ethics. One of the fundamental underlying features connecting these environmental ethical theories is their grounding in Western perspectives and cultural experiences. Given that environmental conc erns are global concerns, and that the imperative of environmental ethics is challenging t hose life-threatening concerns, critical explorations of environmental ethics need to go bey ond the Western horizon. But with respect to the African perspective to environmental ethics and the people’s cultural understanding of the environmental crisis, little has been done in this penultimate area. However, Segun Ogungbemi and Godfrey Tangwa have pioneered philosophical discussions on environmental ethics from an African vantage point. Hence, Ogungbemi defends what he calls “ethics of nature-relatedness,” while Tangwa proposes “eco-bio-communitarianism” as a definitive theory of an African orientation to environmental ethics. This paper is therefore a contribution to the consolidation of an African orientation to environmental ethics thro ugh a critique and reconstruction of some of the misrepresentations of the African perspective to th e environment, implicit in the arguments of Ogungbemi and Tangwa.

Towards a Multidimensional, Environmentalist Ethic

There has been a process of moral extensionism within environmental ethics from anthropocentrism, through zoocentrism, to ecocentrism. This article maps key elements of that process, and concludes that each of these ethical positions fails as a fully adequate, environmentalist ethic, and does so because of an implicit assumption that is common within normative theory. This notwithstanding, each position may well contribute a value. The problem that then arises is how to trade off those values against each other when they conflict. The solution here proposed is to employ multidimensional isovalue-contours along with a multidimensional practicability-frontier. This would result in a rich, value-pluralist environmentalist ethic that enjoined different outcomes to those enjoined by purely anthropocentric, zoocentric or ecocentric ethics.

An African Understanding of Environmental Ethics

Global concerns about the current environmental crisis have culminated in some controversial environmental ethical theories, among which are normative environmental ethics, sentientist ethics, biocentric ethics, ecocentric ethics and eco-feminist ethics. One of the underlying features connecting these environmental ethical theories is their grounding in Western perspectives and cultural experiences. Given that environmental concerns are global, and that the goal of environmental ethics is to address those concerns, critical explorations of environmental ethics need to go beyond the Western horizon. Nevertheless, very few African scholars have investigated the African people’s understanding of the current environmental crisis, and the African perspective on environmental ethics. However, Segun Ogungbemi and Godfrey Tangwa have pioneered philosophical discussions on environmental ethics from an African point of view. Ogungbemi defends what he calls “ethics of nature-relatedness”, while Tangwa proposes “eco-bio-communitarianism”. This paper is a contribution to the consolidation of an African orientation in environmental ethics through a critique and reconstruction of the African perspective on the environment as presented, separately, by Ogungbemi and Tangwa. Key Words Environmental ethics; ethics of nature-relatedness; eco-bio-communitarianism

The Ethical Basis for Sustainable Human Security: A Place for Anthropocentrism?

The deep and lasting changes to human behaviour that are required to address the global environmental crisis necessitate profound shifts in moral foundations. They amount to a change in what individuals and societies conceive of as progress. This imperative raises important questions about the justification, ends, and means of large-scale changes in people’s ethics. In this essay I will focus on the ends—the direction of moral change as prescribed by the goal of sustainable human flourishing. I shall present a meta-ethical critique of anthropocentrism and propose that only an ecocentric ethic can support the sustainable flourishing of humanity. This proposition does not necessarily contradict itself. My claim will be that the values subsumed under the broad concept of anthropocentrism are categorically counterproductive, informing an undesirable concept of “progress”. I support this claim with two lines of argument. On the one hand, the end values of anthropocentrism are shallow and the “flourishing of humanity” is ill-defined. The conceptual constraints of anthropocentrism itself preclude a more concise definition which would take into account the utter dependence of the flourishing of humanity on the health of ecological support structures. On the other hand, pursuing the values that inform the actions of anthropocentrists (which may be identical with the “flourishing of humanity”) leads to unintended and undesirable outcomes, even from the view of the anthropocentrist herself. Those problems are not encountered with an ecocentric ethic, and the conceptual steps necessary to adopt it are not insurmountable.

Nature Connoisseurship

Environmentalists who seek to protect wild nature, biodiversity and so on for its own sake manifest a disposition to value the interesting at least on par with the useful. This disposition toward the interesting, which provides the affective and cognitive context for the discovery of intrinsic values in nature and the elaboration of ecocentric ethics, does not arise simply from learning about nature but is part of a more general socially inculcated cultural system. Nature connoisseurship exhibits formal parallels with art connoisseurship. The abstraction-oriented cultural system which prizes ‘disinterested interest’ is characteristic of culturally rich fractions (or subdivisions) of the middle class in modern Western societies. Valuing nature for its own sake (like valuing, for its own sake, the domination of nature) is not a ‘natural’ response to nature but a disciplined cultural accomplishment.

Nature Connoisseurship

Environmentalists who seek to protect wild nature, biodiversity and so on for its own sake manifest a disposition to value the interesting at least on par with the useful. This disposition toward the interesting, which provides the affective and cognitive context for the discovery of intrinsic values in nature and the elaboration of ecocentric ethics, does not arise simply from learning about nature but is part of a more general socially inculcated cultural system. Nature connoisseurship exhibits formal parallels with art connoisseurship. The abstraction-oriented cultural system which prizes ‘disinterested interest’ is characteristic of culturally rich fractions (or subdivisions) of the middle class in modern Western societies. Valuing nature for its own sake (like valuing, for its own sake, the domination of nature) is not a ‘natural’ response to nature but a disciplined cultural accomplishment.

The role of ethics in the management of New Zealand's wild mammals

Ethical concern for the welfare of sentient animals is increasingly accepted within animal‐based sciences. Wildlife researchers and managers in New Zealand have attempted to define specific ethical responsibilities towards introduced pests of conservation values. Animal welfare guidelines developed for captive and domestic animals have been found unsuitable for this new context. Marks’ (1999) recent recommendation that we should adopt an ecocentric ethic that always relegates animal welfare to a secondary concern is shown to provide an incomplete methodology. We propose a more comprehensive framework for considering ethical responsibility to pest species based on a review of contemporary bioethics. This framework is adapted and demonstrated specifically for New Zealand's introduced wild ungulates. Under this framework some contemporary assumptions must be questioned (e.g., justifying recreational hunting through the provision of an ecologically therapeutic role). We recommend continued and comprehensive processes of ethical consideration in management decision‐making for other introduced wild mammal species.

An apology for ethics in defence of sustainability and integrity

Which are major debates in environmental ethics and why is necessary to put upside down the traditional anthropocentric/non- anthropocentric debate? Ecocentric ethic is not an anti-human position, and it has to become the global ethic: it's not a matter of economics but it's the common good, in a Socratic sense.

On Human Population Growth, Natural Selection, and the Tragedy of the Commons

In two recent issues of Conservation Biology , Gehrt (1996) and Kay (1997) discussed some aspects of the “human population problem.” Gehrt advocated the promotion of education and ecocentric ethics to change human population growth and behavior. Kay suggested, on the other hand, that a human population problem does not exist because the real problem is evolution by natural selection. Therefore, neither education nor ethics can offer solutions. I comment on both contributions and correct some misconceptions, especially one about “the laws of evolution.” More specifically, I want to address (1) what the human population problem consists of and (2) whether it really is a problem of natural selection.

Deep Ecology and Liberalism: The Greener Implications of Evolutionary Liberal Theory

Liberalism and Deep Ecology are usually regarded as mutually exclusive. However, the “evolutionary” tradition of liberal thought, rooted in David Hume and Adam Smith, and including Michael Polanyi and F. A. Hayek, provides a foundation for their reconciliation. Linkage is through Hume and Smith's conception of sympathy, which today means empathy. For Hume, sympathy extends into the animal realm. Sympathy is essential for certain scientific work, and provides an foundation for both liberal and ecological ethics. Deep ecologists such as Arne Naess use the same concept. Linkage is first to biocentric ethics, and then, through examining natural beauty and, via Michael Polanyi's tacit knowledge, ecocentric ethics. The work of Hayek suggests how modern society might be harmonized with the requirements of nature. This deepens J. Baird Callicott's pioneering approach, uniting it with Lewis Hinchman's recent analysis. Liberalism's and Deep Ecology's foundations both benefit from their mutual integration.

Human-Centered or Ecocentric Environmental Ethics?

Human-Centered or Ecocentric Environmental Ethics?

The concept of intrinsic value and transgenic animals.

The creation of transgenic animals by means of modern techniques of genetic manipulation is evaluated in the light of different interpretations of the concept of intrinsic value. The zoocentric interpretation, emphasizing the suffering of individual, sentient animals, is described as an extension of the anthropocentric interpretation. In a biocentric or ecocentric approach the concept of intrinsic value first of all denotes independence of humans and a non-instrumental relation to animals. In the zoocentric approach of Bernard Rollin, genetic engineering is seen as a morally neutral tool, as long as the animal does not suffer as a result of it. Robert Colwell who defends an ecocentric ethic, makes a sharp distinction between wild animals and domesticated animals. Genetic manipulation of wild species is a serious moral issue, in contrast to genetic manipulation of domesticated species which is no problem at all for Colwell. Both authors do not take the species-specific nature (or “telos”) of domesticated animals seriously. When domestication is seen as a process between the two poles of the wild animal and the human construct (which can be patented), the technique of genetic manipulation can only be seen as a further encroachment upon the intrinsic value of animals. At the level of molecular biology, the concept of an animal's telos loses its meaning.

Nós e os outros animais: Especismo, Veganismo e Educação Ambiental

Neste artigo são apresentados alguns fundamentos epistemológicos para a construção de uma educação ambiental (EA) crítica, explorando as fronteiras entre EA e paradigmas nãoantropocêntricos como parte de uma reflexão transformadora da relação sociedadenatureza. Os argumentos desenvolvidos mostram que, no âmbito de uma nova perspectiva genuinamente não-antropocêntrica, devemos considerar os interesses dos animais nãohumanos não apenas por questões de ordem ética tout court – ou seja, pelo seu valor intrínseco como “sujeitos de uma vida” – mas também porque essa nova postura traria resultados positivos no que tange à sustentabilidade em suas diversas dimensões. Para tanto, discute-se a interface entre EA e os conceitos de especismo e veganismo – ligados ao ideário do chamado “abolicionismo animal” – como conceitos-chaves para a construção de uma ética ecocêntrica.