THE SUBJECTIVITY OF THE THEOLOGIAN When freedom is really understood, it is not the power to be able to do this or that, but the power to decide about oneself and to actualize oneself.1 -Karl Rahner AOD DEAL OF the very best theological writing in the past few years has had to do with method in theology, the taSik of theology, and the relation of the theologian to the church.2 I take these to be issues in fundamental theology or, perhaps better, issues fundamental to theology. The question raised here falls in the same arena: why and to what extent is self-reflection vital to theological reflection? In order to answer my question I must risk the charge that I am willing to return theology to a private and pietistic exercise, for I am convinced that some attempts, otherwise entirely praiseworthy, to support theology's public and academic character run the opposite risk of abstracting theology from its existential practice and conditions. I fear that theology 1 Foundations of Christian Faith (New York: S.eabury Press, 1978), p. 88. •For important statements from a variety of perspeclives, see: P. Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) I; Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Seabury Press, 1972); Schubert Ogden, "The Task of Philosophical Theology" in Robert Evans, ed., The Future of Philosophical Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster PreGs, 19'71) pp. 55-84, and "What is Theology ?" in Journal of Religion 44 (1978), pp. 22-•W; Van A. Harvey, "The Alienated Theologian," in Evans, pp. 113-148; David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order (New York: Seabury Press, 1975); Gordon Kaufman, An Essay on Theological Method (Missoula, Montana: Scholars' Press, 1973); John Connolly, "The Task of Theology," Proceedmgs of the Catholic Theological Society of America 29 (1974), pp. 1-58; Karl Rahner, "Reflections on Methodology in Theology," in Theological Investigations (New York: Seabury Press, 1974) 11:68-114; Robert Doran, Subject and Psyche: Ricoeui·, Jung, and the Search for Foundations (District of Columbia: University Press of America, 1977); Thomas Omen, " The Preunderstanding of the Theologian," read at the Karl Rahner Symposium, Marquette University, 1970. 194 THE SUB.TECTIVITY OF THE THEOLOGIAN 195 may become the speech of professors who do not realize that they are confessors as well. On the other hand, while I both recognize the ecclesial roots of theology and rejoice in its connection with and service to the ecclesial community, I am equally concerned that the roots and service not be taken to relieve theologians of personal and individual responsibility for believing what they believe and, especially, for unsparing criticism of it. I fear that theologians may become once again mere spokespersons for the ecclesial community and its liturgical and administrative leaders. The concern that dictates this essay, then, is that the theologian not evaporate in the cloud of demands on the part of the academy for abstraction from the personal conditions of faith and belief or in the cloud of the church's demands for the sacrifice of critical intelligence in its service.3 This essay, therefore, is in part about the believing of the theologian. At the outset, however, I wish to make one point in order to avoid misunderstanding. Belief is in one important way absolutely unimportant to theology.4 What I believe to 3 I think that theology answers for itself its questions on its methods, tasks, and relations with the church, including the relation between theology and beliefs. The assumption I made throughout this essay and nowhere herein argue is this: the intellectual autonomy of theology is inviolable just as it is in any other science or discipline. Theology is not subject to " authority " any more than is philosophy or philology. I am aware that this position has considerable implications for the theology of revelation and Catholic thrologies of church office and order. One of the concerns of this paper is to suggest that theology is nonetheless religious and to propose that its link to the church be other than that of authority and obedience. 4 The nature of belief and believing is itself a complex issue. I am taking belief here in a rather commonsensical and traditional sense, an assertion...
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