A good deal of attention has been given recently to the changing pattern of relationships within NATO, one conspicuous symptom of which has been the efforts of France to convert the NATO alliance into a much more loosely knit association than hitherto. At the same time, there has been comparatively little awareness of developments affecting NATO's counterpart to the East : the Warsaw Pact military alliance, which embraces the Soviet Union and six of her East European neighbours. The fact is, however, that during the past five years or so a number of important changes have been taking place in both the character and potential of the Warsaw alliance. Before discussing these developments and some of their political and military implications, it may be useful to recall briefly the main lines of Soviet policy towards the Warsaw Pact military alliance during the earlier years of its history. At its inception in May 1955, the Warsaw Pact appeared to be mainly a Soviet political-propaganda answer to the inclusion of West Germany in NATO rather than a serious effort to integrate the military activities of the Eastern bloc countries on a multilateral basis. The Soviet Union already had bilateral military arrangements with the various Pact countries, and her own military forces both those garrisoning East Europe and those deployed behind the borders of the Soviet Union herself were clearly counted upon to carry the burden of any military undertakings in Europe in which the Soviet Union might become involved. Although the territory of East Europe was important to Soviet security for geographic and strategic reasons, the actual contributions expected of the other Pact armed forces to military operations in the European theatre whether defensive or offensive were apparently of secondary importance in Soviet eyes. The development of command arrangements for conducting modern theatre warfare on a joint basis received little attention; no joint exercises were held, and the Joint Command of the Warsaw Pact, headed by a Soviet officer, remained largely a paper organization with even less real work on its hands than the Political Consultative Committee, the Pact's policy organ. The latter apparently functioned less as a genuine policy-making body than as a forum for pre-