Earnings Management Behavior Research Articles

The Impact of Ownership Structure on Earnings Management: The Case of Vietnam

This study is conducted to investigate the impact of ownership structure on earnings management in emerging countries and Vietnam as the case study. In this research, we explore how three components of ownership structure, including ownership concentration of managers, foreign ownership ratio, and state ownership ratio, influence earnings management. In addition, we also consider whether ownership structure influences profit management during financial constraints. REM, FEM, GLS, and GMM regression methods are employed for processing data. The results show that ownership structure with foreign ownership has a positive effect on earnings management, whereas one with a proportion of state ownership has a contradicting effect. While the degree of ownership concentration does not affect the profit management, in the context of financial restrictions, the ownership ratio has an impact on the management of earnings. Control variables in the model such as firm size, financial leverage, growth rate, profitability, and audit quality, all have an impact on earnings management. The results could, potentially, be the basis to help firms in restricting earnings management behavior.

Earnings management when firms face mandatory contributions

PurposeIn this paper, we aim to answer two questions. First, whether firms manipulate reported earnings via pension assumptions when facing mandatory contributions. Second, whether firms alter their earnings management behavior when the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) mandates disclosure of pension asset composition and a description of investment strategy under SFAS 132R.Design/methodology/approachOur basic approach is to run linear regressions of firm-year assumed returns on the log of pension sensitivity measures, controlling for current and lagged actual returns from pension assets, fiscal year dummies and industry dummies. The larger the pension sensitivity ratios, the stronger the effects from inflated ERRs on reported earnings. We confirm the early results that the regression slopes are positive and highly significant. We construct an indicator variable DMC to capture the mandatory contributions firms face and another indicator variable D132R to capture the effect of SFAS 132R. DMC takes the value of one for fiscal years during which an acquisition takes place and zero otherwise. D132R takes the value of one for fiscal years after December 15, 2003 and zero otherwise.FindingsOur sample covers the period from June 1992 to December 2017. Our key results are as follows. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on DMC is 0.308 (6.87). Firms facing mandatory contributions tend to set ERRs at an average 0.308% higher. The estimated coefficient (t-statistic) on D132R is −2.190 (−13.70). The new disclosure requirement under SFAS 132R constrains all firms to set ERRs at an average 2.190% lower. The estimate (t-statistic) on the interactive term DMA×D132R is −0.237 (−3.29). When mandatory contributions happen during the post-SFAS 132R period, firms tend to set ERRs at 0.237% lower than they would do otherwise in the pre-SFAS 132R period.Originality/valueWhen firms face mandatory contributions, typically firm experience negative stock market returns. We examine whether managers manage earnings to mitigate such negative impact. We find that firms inflate assumed returns on pension assets to boost their reported earnings when facing mandatory contributions. We also find that managers alter earnings management behavior, in the case of mandatory contributions, following the introduction of new pension disclosure standards under SFAS 132R that become effective on December 15, 2003. Under the new SFAS 132R requirement, firms need to disclose asset allocation and describe investment strategies. This imposes restrictions on managers' discretion in making ERR assumptions, since now the composition of pension assets is a key determinant of the assumed expected rate of return on pension assets. Firms need to justify their ERRs with their asset allocations.

Impact of Intellectual Capital on Earnings Management: Financial Statement Fraud In Indonesia

Many previous studies have interpreted the concept of intellectual capital based on one's values. However, if the company's management uses their intelligence intellectually to commit fraud by manipulating earnings in financial reports, this condition is certainly interesting to discuss further. This research method includes comparative quantitative. The research test applied descriptive statistics, normality test, multicollinearity test, t test, model feasibility test (F test) and multiple linear regresssscions. A total of 70 companies were in accordance with the research criteria during the 11 years of observation. Based on the numbers, the observations were made on 770 data. The results of this study concluded that intellectual capital as measured by using the value added method of intellectual capital (capital employed efficiency, human capital efficiency and structural capital efficiency) was proven to have a significant effect on earning management behavior or financial statement fraud in the company's financial statements.

Accounting for inventory costs and real earnings management behavior

Prior research finds that managers engage in inventory overproduction to inflate current earnings despite the fact that overproduction is associated with significant economic costs. Additionally, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 151 (SFAS 151) limited the fixed costs that can be capitalized to inventory in periods of low production, thereby introducing a penalty for underproduction by requiring firms to expense unallocated overhead in the current period. Because periods of underproduction often follow periods of overproduction, and because SFAS 151's emphasis on the subjective determination of normal capacity can erroneously categorize overproducing firms as underproducers in subsequent years, we posit that SFAS 151 makes overproduction less desirable than before. Therefore, we posit that management's propensity to use overproduction to meet earnings benchmarks should decrease after the adoption of SFAS 151. Consistent with expectations, we find a lower propensity to use overproduction to meet benchmarks following SFAS 151. These results challenge the view that SFAS 151 inadvertently encouraged overproduction.

The Impact of CEO Narcissism Behavior on Firm Performance through Earnings Management

The purpose of this study is to see if Narcissistic CEO behavior patterns lead to earnings management. This study looks at the signs of Narcissistic CEO management practices and how they relate to company performance in 19 Manufacturing Companies listed on the IDX from 2017 to 2019. There are 57 people in the sample. The method of research used in this study was quantitative research with a causal approach. The SPSS test tool for Windows 24.0 is used to test hypotheses by using Path analysis. The findings, CEO narcissism, impact earnings management behavior, but it also impacts company performance through earnings management practices or actions. The CEO is the custodian of data and has the power to make decisions, including policies. The accounting will make every effort to portray good performance through a positive image and profit achievement as expected by investors as an indicator of performance measurement; as a result, CEOs with high self-confidence will use accounting policies to practice earnings management by adding profit figures as needed and the investors' wishes or lowering the profit rate as necessary to achieve the desired results.

The Impact of CEO Narcissism Behavior on Firm Performance through Earnings Management

The purpose of this study is to see if Narcissistic CEO behavior patterns lead to earnings management. This study looks at the signs of Narcissistic CEO management practices and how they relate to company performance in 19 Manufacturing Companies listed on the IDX from 2017 to 2019. There are 57 people in the sample. The method of research used in this study was quantitative research with a causal approach. The SPSS test tool for Windows 24.0 is used to test hypotheses by using Path analysis. The findings, CEO narcissism, impact earnings management behavior, but it also impacts company performance through earnings management practices or actions. The CEO is the custodian of data and has the power to make decisions, including policies. The accounting will make every effort to portray good performance through a positive image and profit achievement as expected by investors as an indicator of performance measurement; as a result, CEOs with high self-confidence will use accounting policies to practice earnings management by adding profit figures as needed and the investors' wishes or lowering the profit rate as necessary to achieve the desired results

The Inventory Control System’s Weaknesses Based on the Accounting Postgraduate Students’ Perspectives

The decisions made by the management in recording the amount of selling inventory in the year before the real year are as important as determining and defining the economic order size in the inventory management system. However, studies on accounting management, accounting education, and even operational management did not sufficiently discuss and evaluate such procedures to consider whether or not manipulations, frauds, or mistakes were made by the management. An obvious understanding to determine this kind of action by the managers considered as a vital element to the accounting education is represented in the recent study on the accounting postgraduate students by identifying their opinions in determining and describing whether the inventory management is weak or not and there are violations or not. The recent study is considered qualitative conducted by asking questions to 32 accounting postgraduate students regarding to the weaknesses of inventory management. The findings show that inventory management was not appropriately conducted and there were several problems and violations made by the sales managers. The other findings show that management inventory was used by the sales managers to sell the inventory in line with promoting their interests as they apply an earning management behavior. The findings also demonstrate that such case is not considered as a fraud but as a manipulation behavior.

Sustainability measures and earnings management: evidence from Greek municipalities

PurposeThis study analyses the engagement of Greek municipalities in earnings management activities through the manipulation of their accrual accounts. It aims at identifying whether discretionary accruals are associated with certain financial sustainability measures calculated through financial statement numbers.Design/methodology/approachTo test the hypotheses, the annual financial data of Greek municipalities for the period 2011–2018 are used. The final sample corresponds to an unbalanced panel data sample that includes 1,565 yearly observations. Total accruals and discretionary accruals modelling are based both on the aggregate Jones model and the modified Jones model.FindingsThe findings provide evidence that Greek municipalities engage in earnings management practices through the manipulation of accruals. Moreover, there is corroborative evidence that financial sustainability indicators, such as indebtedness, liquidity and efficiency ratios, are related to the magnitude of earnings management, while earnings management behaviour during the year preceding the municipal elections is more intense.Originality/valueThe paper expands the literature in earnings management in local governments by analysing the relation of financial sustainability indicators to this behaviour.

The Influences Of Status Quo And Endowment Biases On Earnings Management

This study investigates the effects of status quo and endowment biases on earnings management behaviors. This research conducts a survey method in 2018. The sample comprises of 74 accounting students at a business school in Indonesia. The main variables are measured by questionnaires with 1 to 7 scale. The hypotheses are examined by multiple regression technique. The findings reveal that status quo and endowment biases positively influence earnings management actions. This research provides two contributions. This study attempts to link status quo and endowment biases to earnings management behaviors. This contributes additional theoretical explanations of earnings management behaviors among accountants. Research conclusions can be utilized to determine the suitable psychological aspects of accountants for earnings management decisions.

Corporate Governance, Audit Quality, Family Ownership and Earnings Management

This study aimed to obtain empirical evidence regarding the influence of corporate governance and audit quality on earnings management measures, as well as their relationship with the effect of family ownership. Research on earnings management has been widely conducted, but research in family firms is still limited, while based on previous observational data, 95% of companies in Indonesia are family firms. In addition, the difference in the concept of corporate governance in developing countries compared to developed countries is crucial in relation to company supervision patterns. Earnings management practices carried out by company management can be caused by the occurrence of information asymmetry in which management as an agent has more information related to the company than the company owner. This information asymmetry is used by managers to mislead other parties with the aim of increasing their managerial career or compensation. Implementing the corporate governance mechanism is a way to reduce earnings management. Another factor affecting earnings quality is audit quality. This study took a sample of manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the 2017- 2018 period. 152 sample data were tested. This study used secondary data obtained from annual reports of companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. Moderated regression analysis (MRA) was used. Corporate governance had no effect on earnings management and audit quality had a significant effect on earnings management behavior. Family ownership was able to strengthen the effect of audit quality in determining earnings management actions.
 Keywords: corporate governance, audit quality, earnings management, family ownership

Determinants of earnings management in Spanish SMEs and its relationship with CSR: the relevance of sector life cycle stage

PurposeThis paper addresses the link between earnings management (EM) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).Design/methodology/approachData were collected from 317 Spanish SMEs to perform: (1) bivariate analysis between EM, CSR and some firm-factors (i.e. size, sector, sector life cycle stage, corporate age, family ownership, profitability and financial risk); and (2) multiple regression analysis for a better understanding of EM behavior and test the influence of sector life cycle stage variable.FindingsResults emphasize the relevance of the sector life cycle stage as an explanatory factor. Firms operating in sectors that are growing or declining in terms of sales are more proactive to EM than those with consolidated sales levels. Stratified regression analysis also confirms that the stage of the industry life cycle influences the EM-CSR relationship. Only for SMEs with stable sales in maturity sectors, lower interest in EM can be significantly explained by higher CSR performance. Firms with regular sales levels show a more outstanding socially responsible commitment and are less pressured to legitimize their operational decisions and therefore show lower levels of EM involvement.Originality/valueThis paper makes a twofold contribution. On the one hand, it examines the relationship between EM and CSR, focusing on SMEs' context, in which EM study could be considered incipient. On the other hand, the controversial empirical evidence on the significance and sign of EM and social responsibility link could be explained by the stage of the life cycle of the sector in which each company operates.

Tunnelling in asset‐injecting private placements: evidence from China

AbstractFollowing the reform of shareholder structures in China, the country’s listed companies have seen a boom in asset injection using private equity placements. However, because of continuing weaknesses in corporate governance structures and accounting regulations on related‐party transactions, it is possible for controlling shareholders to ‘tunnel’ listed companies through unsound private placements. We find that manipulation of the discount rate offered in private placements, accompanied by earnings management behaviour, is used by controlling shareholders to ‘tunnel’ listed companies during the private placement and asset‐injecting process.

Ownership pattern, board composition, and earnings management: evidence from top Indian companies

This paper empirically examines the linkage between ownership pattern, board composition and earnings management of Indian firms using the system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) by considering panel data 364 non-financial firms from 2017 to 2019, comprising of 1092 firm-year observations. The study also uses Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects model to compare the results with the system GMM in examining board composition–earnings management relation. The study reveals that board independence and diligence of independent directors do not play any role in curbing earnings management. Also, busy independent directors and persons with multiple directorships are not necessarily useful in arresting earnings management. However, earnings management practice is more prevalent in firms where the same person enjoys the power of a CEO as well as chairman. An increase in promoters' shareholding also leads to an increase in earnings management. While earnings management is not influenced by FII shareholding, it increases with the increase in DII shareholding. This study is important for several reasons. First, since this study considers the period after the implementation of a new financial reporting system in India (popularly known as IND-AS), the findings of this study reflect the earnings management behavior of Indian firms in light of new financial reporting practices. Second, the study considers the period when significant governance initiatives are taken after the implementation of the New Companies Act, 2013. This study contributes to the literature by addressing the recent governance norms and aligning the relevant policy implications accordingly. The findings of this study reveal a clear understanding as to which board level and governance parameters are useful in constraining earnings management and disclosing quality earnings by companies in an emerging market context. The outcomes are also explained further for relevant policy implications. Board of directors, managers, investors, regulators, and policymakers can find these outcomes useful for making critical governance-related decisions. Finally, the study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on what board level and governance parameters are useful in constraining firms' earnings management in an emerging economy under the regime of new financial reporting practices.

Audit Partner Gender, Leadership and Ethics: The Case of Earnings Management

Our study examines whether gender-diverse engagement partners constrain unethical earnings management behavior in a French mandatory joint audit setting. The investigation of the joint audit setting, by raising concerns about audit team organization and management, provides new insights into how gender-diverse audit partners contribute to the effectiveness of audit decision-making, resulting in reduced earnings management. The need for effective collaboration and communication between joint auditors may foster a transformational leadership style on the part of audit engagement partners. In this regard, we argue that better interaction between male and female lead audit partners confers a comparative advantage on gender-diverse audit partners compared to all-male audit partners. In line with our expectation, our empirical results show that gender-diverse audit partners are negatively associated with discretionary accruals of client firms. Gender-diverse audit partners are also found to constrain earnings management irrespective of whether clients hire one or two brand-name audit firms. Finally, we find that the pervasiveness of earnings management declines when client firms switch from all-male audit partners to gender-diverse audit partners. Our findings underline the importance of considering audit partner gender by policy makers in contexts where joint audits are required or in countries that are considering introducing joint audits.

Do fair value measurements affect accounting-based earnings quality? A literature review with a focus on corporate governance as moderator

This structured literature review of 48 archival-based studies investigates the influence of fair value measurements on earnings quality and stresses the moderating impact of corporate governance. We focus on accounting-based earnings quality measures that have several advantages for investigating agency-related earnings management behavior compared to market-based measures (e.g. value relevance studies). Fair value measurements are not restricted to specific industries, periods, circumstances, or items in our sample. Based on the applied earnings quality measure, the reviewed articles are structured into five categories: (1) earnings persistence and predictive ability, (2) discretionary accruals, (3) target beating and properties of analysts’ forecasts, (4) earnings variability, and (5) other earnings quality measures. We indicate three key findings: first, fair value measurements show mixed earnings quality; second, lower-level fair value measurements decrease earnings quality; and third, corporate governance measures enhance earnings quality. After that, we deduce six research questions for future research. We show possible extensions to previous research designs in methodology and settings. Future research should also focus on corporate governance variables to a greater extent, especially compensation and board structures. Thereby, we suggest extending the neoclassical view with behavioral aspects.

The Impact of Earnings Management and Managerial Ability on Management Compensation

We contribute to the extensive literature on earnings management by examining the impact of earnings management behaviour on executive compensation conditioned on managerial ability. We find that managers with better abilities are associated with more accrual earnings management, less real earnings management, and better mapping of accruals into cash flows. Boards of directors reward this behaviour with better compensation under the perception that accrual earnings management is part of superior managers’ skills and should be incorporated in their reward contracts. The results show that managerial ability is a crucial input for assessing the costs and benefits of executives’ behaviour in their contracts with firms.

The Motivation of Earnings Management Practices in Indonesia Companies: Board of Directors Perspective

This study provides evidence about underlying motivation the director encouraged practice of earnings management. Directors of manufacturing companies in Indonesia was to be sample in this research whose companies are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). This research explores fourth types of motivation where are bonus motivation, political motivation, debt covenant motivation, and taxation motivation. The research method carried out using quantitative methods by questionnaire. Sample study used board of directors in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). Research method analyzed by multiple regression. The results of this study reveal that the four of motivations have effect on earnings management practices. The evidence also shows that the highest directors motivation for earning management is come from political cost motivation. Then, it followed by bonus motivation, taxation motivation and debt covenant motivation. The fact is an overview the regulation condition in Indonesia plays important role in being intervention of financial statements presented by the company, while bonus motivation is also significant for young directors in conducting earnings management practices on Indonesia companies.

Earnings management and firms' investment behavior: The threshold effect of ROE

This paper, on the basis of a sample of Chinese listed firms, investigates the relationship between both real and accrual-based earnings management activities and firms' capital investment behavior. We apply the threshold model proposed by Hansen (1999) and find firms managing earnings can either over or underinvest, depending upon firms' return on equity (ROE) level. The study results show an inverted relationship between earnings management and firms' investment, which changes from negative to positive with ROE rising beyond certain threshold levels. We also find that the level of ROE affects whether managers use real and accrual manipulations jointly or as substitutes in affecting firms' investment. Our evidence is important because it sheds new light on the relationship between earnings management activities and firms' investment behavior by showing that ROE may act as an important determinant in this relationship. This finding has important implications for policymakers such as the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) as it shows that the regulatory benchmarks they set may have a significant impact on firms' investment behavior.

Are more able managers good future tellers? Learning from Japan

Baik et al. (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.

Are More Able Managers Good Future Tellers? Learning from Japan

Baik, Farber, and Lee (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.