Gunn and Berry (1989, this issue) show courage. They are amongthe few researchers to face, with objectivity, the benefits literature on early intervention (EI) or Infant-Stim for Down Syndrome (DS) children. They find it wanting. Others before them have also raised the EI program efficacy issue, most notably Piper and Pless (1980), Harris (1981), Gibson and Fields (1984), Cunningham (1984, 1986), Dunst (1985), Sloper, Glenn and Cunningham (1986), Piper (1986), Weisenfeld (1987), Gordon (1987), and Gibson and Harris (1988). Notwithstanding, the effectiveness of Infant-Stim for DS infants and children continues to be vigorously supported by parent groups and career-invested professionals. By so insulating the Infant-Stim enterprise from critical evaluation, program accountability has degenerated to mere curriculum delivery system monitoring while the internal defence structure of the converted appeals increasingly to quasi-ideological positions. Yet early intervention, much more than Infant-Stim or early behavioral intervention, has enjoyed wide endorsement. There are successful surgical methods for cardiac and speech related problems, medical management for middle ear infection, vision defects, thyroid disorder, and muscular hypotonia. General health, greater alertness and increased longevity for members of the syndrome are also evident as a result of appropriate diet, guided physical activity, and watchful parenting for respiratory and other immuno-system disease risks. These «hard sciences» early interventions have produced a generation of young DS persons who project a more positive image to parents and public than did the DS child or adult during those times when «usual» treatments were not undertaken, all or most DS children were in institutions, and early mortality approached 50 percent. By comparison, the paucity of verifiable short term and more durable gains attributable solely to compensatory education techniques, especially for the cognitive and linguistic growth domains of the DS child, has generated various reformulations of Infant-Stim outcome goals to reflect whatever gains are most evident. Examples of the new enterprise of program benefits revisionism include a «system of maturational intervention» (Buckley & Sacks, 1987), a «functional model of effects assessment» (Simeonsson 1982), the «social systems benefits model» (Dundst, 1985; Zigler, 1983), an «ecological enhancement approach» (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Marfo & Kysela, 1985) and a «personal life satisfactions concept» (Landesman, 1986). The later may prove to be the most attractive alternative if the cognitive growth goals of Infant-Stim are not eventually met by more sophisticated behavioural or biological intervention. Of these alternatives to the traditional benefits objectives for Infant-Stim, Gibson and Harris