In tax law we generally do not question the utility and function of rules. As a matter of convenience and, perhaps, as a matter of conviction, we usually assume that law determines outcomes in a more or less linear fashion. This assumption of tax law's determinacy allows us to get on with the business of tax and with the theory of tax. If the rules are determinate, it is appropriate to consider how the rules apply to a given case and to consider whether the rules should be changed to bring about some improvement in legal outcomes. In an earlier article, I broadly defended tax law's determinacy while suggesting that we should have greater acceptance in our rule making for the inevitable role of judgment in the application of law to facts.' In that article I took particular note of two aspects of tax thought that can contribute to indeterminacy: the rule maker's search for "symmetry and wholeness in the law," and the planner's search for "certainty and narrow truth."
Read full abstract