<div>Cooperation lies at the core of multiagent systems (MAS) and multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL), where agents must navigate between individual interests and collective benefits. Advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS), like collision avoidance systems and adaptive cruise control, exemplify agents striving to optimize personal and collective outcomes in multiagent environments. The study focuses on strategies aimed at fostering cooperation with the aid of game-theoretic scenarios, particularly the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, where agents aim to optimize personal and group outcomes. Existing cooperative strategies, such as tit-for-tat and win-stay lose-shift, while effective in certain contexts, often struggle with scalability and adaptability in dynamic, large-scale environments. The research investigates these limitations and proposes modifications to align individual gains with collective rewards, addressing real-world dilemmas in distributed systems. By analyzing existing cooperative strategies, the research investigates their effectiveness in encouraging group-oriented behavior in repeated games. It suggests modifications to align individual gains with collective rewards, addressing real-world dilemmas in distributed systems. Furthermore, it extends to scenarios with exponentially growing agent populations (<i>N</i> → +∞), addressing computational challenges using mean-field game theory to establish equilibrium solutions and reward structures tailored for infinitely large agent sets. Practical insights are provided by adapting simulation algorithms to create scenarios conducive to cooperation for group rewards. Additionally, the research advocates for incorporating vehicular behavior as a metric to assess the induction of cooperation, bridging theoretical constructs with real-world applications.</div>
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