Dynamic Game Model Research Articles

How does fiscal policy affect the green low-carbon transition from the perspective of the evolutionary game?

The implementation of effective fiscal policy is an inevitable choice to help green low-carbon transition and strengthen the construction of ecological civilization. This paper constructs a dynamic model of the tripartite evolutionary game among the central government, the local government and the high pollution and high carbon emission (Double-high) enterprises. Accordingly, we examine the impact of the central government's regulatory mechanism and local government's implementation intensity on green and low-carbon transition. Taking Comprehensive Demonstration Cities of Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Fiscal Policies as the entry point of the study, a staggered differences-in-differences model is used for empirical evaluation, which reveals the effect of fiscal policy on green and low-carbon transition. The theoretical modeling shows that the strategies of Double-high enterprises are affected by the interaction between the central government and local governments, and there is diversity in the strategy stability and equilibrium state of each subject. Under the premise that the central government pays attention to the motives of enterprises and local governments, the fiscal subsidies, tax incentives and penalties of local governments, as well as the supervision, reward and punishment mechanisms and transfer payments of the central government, directly shape the impact of fiscal policy on green and low-carbon transition. The empirical results show that effective fiscal policy can promote green low-carbon transition, in which fiscal decentralization has a moderating role. Finally, the paper emphasizes the importance of the leading role of the central government and the implementation capacity of local governments, as well as the key role of internal changes within firms in addressing the relationship between emissions reduction and development.

Research on the mechanism of government subsidy on enterprise innovation based on industry-university-research collaboration

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical examination of the relationship between government subsidies, enterprise innovation, and Industry-University-Research (IUR) collaboration. The study begins with a theoretical analysis of the impact of government subsidies on IUR collaboration and enterprise innovation, employing a dynamic game model. Secondly, the research sample comprises A-share listed enterprises in China, and the theoretical findings are validated through empirical methods. Moreover, this study investigates the mediating influence of IUR collaboration and the heterogenous impacts of government subsidies. Research has shown that government subsidies can facilitate enterprises in establishing IUR collaboration, enhancing the extent of IUR collaboration, and effectively stimulating enterprises to participate in innovation. Government subsidies have a more pronounced impact on non-state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and enterprises in eastern regions in terms of incentivization. By enhancing IUR upgrade, government subsidies can offset the shortcomings in limited Research and Experimental Development (R&D) funding and inadequate technical reserves of non-high-technology enterprises. This could result in an improvement in the quality of innovation and the performance of the subsidized enterprises.

Dynamic pricing strategy for content products considering consumer fairness concerns and strategic behavior

PurposeThe development of the digital age has made data and information more transparent, enhancing the strategic perspectives of both buyers (strategic waiting) and sellers (price fluctuations) in their decision-making. This research investigates the optimal dynamic pricing strategy of the content product developer in relation to their consideration of consumer fairness concerns to elucidate the impact of consumer fairness concerns on the dynamic pricing strategy of the developer.Design/methodology/approachThis paper assumes that monopolistic content developers implement a dynamic pricing strategy for the content product. Through constructing a two-period dynamic pricing game model, this research investigates the optimal decisions of the content developer, contingent upon their consideration or disregard of consumer fairness concerns. In the extension section, the authors additionally account for the influence of myopic consumers on these optimal decisions.FindingsOur findings reveal that the degree of consumer fairness concerns significantly influences the developer’s optimal dynamic pricing decision. When a developer offers content products with lower depth, there is a propensity for the developer to refrain from incorporating consumer fairness concerns into a dynamic pricing strategy. Conversely, in cases where the developer offers a high-depth content product, consumer fairness concerns benefit the developer. Furthermore, our analysis reveals a consistent benefit for the developer from the inclusion of myopic consumers.Originality/valueFew studies have delved into the conjoined influence of consumer fairness concerns and strategic behavior on dynamic pricing strategy. Our findings indicate that consumer fairness concerns can enhance the efficiency of the value chain for content products under specific conditions. This paper not only enriches the existing literature on dynamic pricing by incorporating consumer fairness concerns theoretically but also offers practical insights. The outcomes of this research can guide content product developers in devising optimal dynamic pricing strategies.

Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Food Safety Regulation under Time Delay Effect

This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game dynamic model with a time delay effect to analyze the interactions among food enterprise, government regulatory, and food inspection agencies in managing food safety risks. This model enables government regulatory agencies to more accurately assess and predict food safety risks, thereby implementing more effective preventative measures, ensuring the maximization of policy effectiveness and reducing food safety incidents. The results emphasize the significance of recent company performance by showing that regulatory and inspection entities’ strategic decisions are significantly impacted by delay effects from food companies. This study also shows that negative self-feedback intensity drives food enterprises to develop safer products and encourages tighter government oversight. Recommendations include improving consumer reporting channels, changing government incentives and penalties, allocating resources efficiently, and advancing information technology to decrease the effects of time delays and improve food safety management. Governments can improve food safety regulation by using strategic insights from numerical simulations.

Optimal government subsidy strategy for fresh agricultural products supply chain under adverse weather: a two-stage dynamic game model

ABSTRACT To investigate the effects of various government subsidies on the decision of agricultural products supply chain under adverse weather, this paper depicts the random profit function of adverse weather affecting the output of fresh agricultural products. Then, both the centralised and decentralised decision-making models are set with various government subsidies, i.e. no subsidy, output subsidy, procurement subsidy, one-time subsidy to company and one-time subsidy to farmer. Through comparative analysis and numerical analysis, we explore the effects of adverse weather and different government subsidies on the supply chain decisions including planting effort, procurement price and retail price.

Dynamic Modeling of Environmental Subsidies

In this research, the intertemporal optimal management of subsidies offered by the environmental regulator and the dynamic conflict between two groups of economic agents involved in environmental quality are discussed. First the environmental model is examined in its optimal control management form with two state variables. The analysis of the improved model, inspecting the social planner’s decision (policy) variable, the variable which influences not only environmental quality but the national budget stock, reveals that is dependent on the growth of the national budget stock. A negative growth rate leads to the long run saddle point equilibrium, while an incremental growth rate, but less than the model’s discount rate, leads to an interesting complicated limit cycle equilibrium, for which under certain parameter values the orbit’s phase portrait can be drawn. For the dynamic game model between the social planner and natural resource exploiters, the equilibrium conditions are examined. It is rather a richer than the point equilibrium for which the cyclical strategies have great importance. Therefore, the conditions for that rich equilibrium are found. As a continuation, the paper concludes that the equilibrium condition is that the players’ discount rates are both greater than the national budget interest rate. Finally, the certain values of the equilibrium strategies and national budget stock are provided.

Sensitivity analysis for a dynamic macroeconomic policy game in a monetary union

In this paper, we examine the sensitivity of the results of an earlier paper which presented and analyzed a dynamic game model of a monetary union with coalitions between governments (fiscal policy makers) and a common central bank (monetary policy maker). Here we examine alternative values of the parameters of the underlying model to show how the earlier results depend on the numerical parameter values chosen, which were obtained by calibration instead of econometric estimation. We demonstrate that the main results are qualitatively the same as in the original model for plausible smaller and larger values of the parameters. For the few cases where they differ, we interpret the deviations in economic terms and illustrate the policies and their macroeconomic effects resulting from the change to the parameter under consideration for one of these cases.

The Complexities in the R&D Competition Model with Spillover Effects in the Supply Chain

This study aims to investigate the research and development (R&D) competition within the supply chain, focusing on two aspects: R&D competition at the manufacturing level and competition in pricing strategies. This paper establishes a dynamic game model of R&D competition, comprising two manufacturers and two retailers, with both manufacturers exhibiting bounded rationality. The key findings are as follows: (1) an increase in the adjustment speed positively affects the chaotic nature of the R&D competition system, leading to a state of disorder. This chaotic state has adverse implications for manufacturing profitability. (2) The spillover effect exhibits a positive relationship with the level of chaos in the R&D competition system. A greater spillover effect contributes to a more turbulent environment, which subsequently impacts the profitability of manufacturers. (3) R&D cost parameters exert a positive influence on the stability of the R&D competition system. When the system reaches a state of equilibrium, an escalation in the R&D cost parameters poses a threat to manufacturer profitability. (4) Retailer costs play a detrimental role in the stability of the R&D competition system. As retailer costs increase, there is a decline in R&D levels, thereby diminishing manufacturer profitability. (5) To mitigate the chaotic state, we propose the implementation of the time-delayed feedback control (TDFC) method, which reflects a more stable state in the R&D competition system.

Research on collaborative innovation cooperation strategies of manufacturing digital ecosystem from the perspective of multiple stakeholders

The digital ecosystem has hastened the fusion of manufacturing and digital technology in realizing product and service value. However, due to the coordination dilemmas within the digital ecosystem such as risk sharing, competition and cooperation among stakeholders, this study aims to explore the collaborative innovation cooperation strategies of multiple stakeholders, and to investigate the interaction effects of differential incentives on each other's strategies. By constructing a dynamic differential game model, this study solves the optimal innovation efforts, digital servitization levels and innovation benefits under different cooperation intensities, and analyzes the influence of various factors on the total innovation benefits of the digital ecosystem. It is found that under different decision-making modes, the influence of incentive subsidy coefficient and cost-sharing coefficient on the innovation efforts and innovation benefits of multiple stakeholders is different. Under the decentralized decision-making mode, the incentive mechanism positively promotes the innovation efforts of both parties of cooperative enterprises, while the local government is not affected, while under the centralized decision-making mode, the incentive mechanism positively affects the innovation efforts and innovation benefits of all three parties. Specifically, under the Stackelberg game, both the innovation efforts and innovation benefits achieve Pareto improvement, while under the cooperative game, the total system innovation benefits reach Pareto optimality and the optimal strategy is realized. In addition, an optimal range exists for the benefit distribution coefficient and the policy guidance coefficient. Furthermore, factors like the cooperative benefit impact coefficient, innovation capability coefficient, and policy guidance coefficient have a positive effect on the total system innovation benefits. Conversely, factors like the discount rate, technology decay coefficient, and innovation input coefficient inhibit the growth of the total system innovation benefits. The value provides theoretical support for collaborative innovation cooperation in the digital ecosystem, thus facilitating the progress of digital transformation in manufacturing.

An improved dynamic game analysis of farmers, enterprises and rural collective economic organizations based on idle land reuse policy

Land use is a crucial symbol of sustainable development. Rural homestead idleness is problem that is caused by market failure and related to the national economy and people's livelihood. (1) Background: Developing countries should use idle land to develop their economies. The government has introduced various land policies for the reuse of idle residential land to improve the land utilization rate. (2) Methods: This paper investigates players' behavior in reusing rural homesteads based on an improved dynamic game model. An improved tripartite evolutionary game model is developed by introducing principal-agent theory, which is the major contributor to behavioral investigation. MATLAB2022a is used to simulate the analysis to propose countermeasures and suggestions for optimizing homestead reuse. (3) Results: In this paper, it was found that disputes among participants about the sharing of reuse costs and the distribution of potential benefits constituted a potent system of explanatory coordinates that effectively revealed the hidden logic of homestead reuse. The government can strengthen incentives by providing dynamic subsidies linked with individual behavior. (4) Conclusions: Regardless of the initial probability, players will jointly reuse homesteads in the end. Local governments and rural collective economic organizations play an important role in reusing homesteads, so the carrot-and-stick approach supervised by local government is the key to maintaining the stability of cooperation. Moreover, under the concept of sustainable development, governments of all countries actively release the policy of reusing idle land to promote the utilization of resources.

Research on pricing models for technology‐trading platforms with different business models: A two‐stage dynamic game model

AbstractUsing the differences in user attribution and profitability among different business models employed by technology‐trading platforms, a two‐stage dynamic game pricing model was constructed considering three pricing strategies. The research found that (1) in the information‐intermediary business model, technology‐trading platforms should adopt a two‐stage pricing model that first emphasizes transaction fees followed by mixed system charges. (2) In the one‐stop service business model, technology‐trading platforms can achieve higher returns by comprehensively using big data analysis to tailor mixed fees. (3) The traditional information‐intermediary platform can adopt a pricing model with mixed system charges to transition to a one‐stop service platform.

Mutual conversion mechanisms for environmental interest products to jointly enhance synergistic effect between power, CET and TGC markets in China

The construction of mutual conversion mechanisms for environmental interest products (EIP) is crucial to enhance connectivity and promote the synergistic development among multiple market systems including power, carbon emissions trading (CET) and tradable green certificate (TGC). In this paper, static and dynamic TGC‑carbon allowance (CA)-Chinese certified emission reduction (CCER) conversion mechanisms are designed from the perspective of physical and economic values. Based on the multi-agent dynamic game model considering Weber-Fechner's law, the transaction behavior for various generation companies (GENCOs) and power purchasers in power, CET and TGC markets under different conversion mechanisms are analyzed. The results demonstrate that TGC-CA-CCER conversion mechanisms further expand the transaction space for low-carbon GENCOs, and effectively reflect the differentiated value of each EIP in diverse scenarios and time periods. Compared with other conversion mechanisms, the dynamic TGC-CA-CCER conversion mechanism based on physical values has better economic as well as environmental benefits, and enhances the competitiveness and liquidity of markets, which is the optimal solution to realize the mutual conversion of EIP. These insights can make up for the research gap of mutual conversion mechanisms on different EIP and provide mechanism options for realizing favorable interaction among power, CET and TGC markets.

A four-party evolutionary game analysis of carbon emission reduction behavioral strategies in the shipping industry

Abstract Global warming and the urgency of environmental issues have brought the issue of carbon emissions in the shipping industry to the forefront. Taking the government, port enterprises, shipping companies, and social and environmental organizations as research subjects, this study delves into the key challenges of carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry. By constructing a complex and dynamic evolutionary game model and conducting data simulations with the help of MATLAB 2016b, we analyze in detail the strategic choices of each party on the emission reduction issue and explore the impact of these choices on the evolution of the system. In this study, we find that the government plays a crucial role in emission reduction regulation. Regulatory strategy and intensity have far-reaching impacts on the development of the whole system, and a flexible and intelligent regulatory system will promote active emission reduction by all parties. In addition, the reputation mechanism of social and environmental organizations plays a significant role in motivating all parties to take the initiative to adopt emission reduction strategies. In terms of economic incentives, we find that the government needs to provide differentiated support according to the characteristics of different enterprises, so that all parties can work together to move towards the emission reduction target. Through this study, we present a comprehensive game analysis of carbon emission reduction in the shipping industry and propose practical recommendations that are valuable to the shipping industry and environmental managers. These findings provide strong policy and action support for realizing the decarbonization of the shipping industry.

Complex Characteristics and Control of Output Game in Cross-Border Supply Chains: A Perspective of Inter-Chain Competition

In this paper, an output dynamic game model of intertwined supply chains operating in two different countries is established. The Nash equilibrium point of the model and its stable region are obtained using nonlinear dynamic principles. The complex properties of the system, such as stability, period-doubling bifurcations, and chaos, are investigated using numerical simulations. Our results suggest that the level of output and the system’s profits undergo bifurcation and chaos with an increase in the output adjustment speed. An interesting phenomenon occurs in that higher tariffs lead to the expansion of the stable range of the supply chain in the product-exporting country. The chaotic behavior of the system is sensitive to the value of the initial level of output. In supply chain competition, each supply chain firm should make suitable adjustments to the speed of output. To maintain the stability of domestic markets, excessive tariffs should be avoided. It is essential that each supply chain firm evaluates the potential impacts of different initial output values when making initial decisions. Using the method of delayed feedback control, the chaotic behavior of the system can effectively be controlled. These findings offer valuable and novel insight into inter-chain competition in supply chain networks.

Electricity–gas multi-agent planning method considering users’ comprehensive energy consumption behavior

With the advent of the energy Internet and the swift growth of unified energy systems, the comprehensive energy demand of users has gradually become a problem that cannot be ignored for the planning of integrated energy systems. Aiming at this problem, this paper suggests a multi-agent planning approach for electricity and gas, considering users’ holistic energy consumption behavior. First, utilizing a combined subjective and objective weighting method, this study establishes a utility model for users’ energy consumption characteristics. The analysis of comprehensive energy consumption behavior is conducted through an evolutionary game. On this basis, the planning revenue model for electricity grid and gas network investors is formulated, and the game mechanism of different investors is analyzed. A dynamic game model of electricity–gas multi-agent planning considering comprehensive energy consumption behavior is proposed. Ultimately, the model is resolved using an iterative exploration approach. The validity and efficacy of the proposed method are confirmed through a simulation example.

Deep Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Stock Trading

In this study, the authors explore how financial institutions make decisions about stock trading strategies in a rapidly changing and complex environment. These decisions are made with limited, often inconsistent information and depend on the current and future strategies of both the institution itself and its competitors. They develop a dynamic game model that factors in this imperfect information and the evolving nature of decision-making. To model reward transitions, they utilize a combination of t-Copula simulation of a non-stationary Markov chain, probabilistic fuzzy regression, and chaos optimization algorithms. They then apply deep q-network, a method from deep reinforcement learning, to ensure the effectiveness of the chosen strategy during ongoing decision-making. The approach is significant for both researchers across fields and practical professionals in the finance industry.

Optimal Trade‐In and Pricing Strategy under Strategic Consumers and Sequential Innovation

With the growing emphasis on the advancement of the circular economy, companies are investigating various approaches, such as trade‐in strategies, to stimulate consumption and support the circular economy. Although there is a substantial amount of research on trade‐ins, there is a scarcity of multistrategy studies on upgrade programs. In order to address this deficiency, we created four two‐period dynamic game models that utilize strategic consumer and product sequential innovation as the basis for examining company pricing and strategic decision‐making. Our research shows that a single rollover upgrade program can generate significant revenues when there is a high level of product innovation and consumers are strategic in their decision‐making. On the other hand, a dual rollover upgrade program can target a bigger range of customers who are looking to replace their current products. If the product is not highly innovative or strategically important for consumers, the profit advantage of the upgrade program with a single rollover is lost. In such cases, the upgrade program with a dual rollover not only ensures revenue but also helps to increase the size of the customer group who are more willing to replace their products.

Can energy saving and emission reduction policies promote green transformation of industrial enterprises--The Case of China.

In the context of the continued advancement of the green economy transition, the proactive pursuit of carbon emissions reduction and the early attainment of carbon neutrality goals have emerged as essential components in promoting high-quality economic development. Not only does it contribute to the creation of a community of human destiny, but it is also vital to the realization of sustainable development for human civilization. A dynamic evolutionary game model, which encompasses the interactions among government, enterprises, and the public, was constructed to examine the inherent impact mechanisms of the behavior of three players on the development of a green economy under the context of energy saving and emission reduction subsidies. The results showed that the incentive and punishment mechanisms served as effective tools for harmonizing the interests of system members. Within the mechanisms, the public demonstrated a higher sensitivity to rewards, while enterprises exhibited greater responsiveness to fines. Consequently, the government could influence the behavior of enterprises by incentivizing the public to serve as a third-party inquiry and oversight body. Simultaneously, the government could encourage enterprises to expedite green technology innovation by employing a combination of incentive and punishment mechanisms.

A differential game of water pollution management in the trans-jurisdictional river basin

Strengthening cooperation of water pollution management in the trans-jurisdictional river basin is of great significance for ensuring water security and deepening the construction of ecological civilization. Therefore, this paper established a dynamic differential game model of pollution management in the trans-jurisdictional river basins composed of upstream and downstream governments and sewage enterprises, calculated the strategic equilibrium solution of multi-stakeholders, analyzed the changes of strategy selection of different stakeholders under cost and non-cost sharing, and simulated strategy selection of stakeholders under multi-scenarios. The main findings are as follows: (1) Cost sharing policy enhances the governance efforts level of all stakeholders and increases social welfare. (2) The selection of governance strategies by multiple stakeholders has an interactive influence which is affected by the cost–benefit relationship of each stakeholder. The proportion of cost sharing and incentives affect the variation of the utility of the upstream government, downstream government, and sewage enterprises in cooperation. (3) The increase in the attenuation coefficient of governance utilities and the governance costs of the three parties will reduce the level of water pollution management efforts of the three parties. (4) The increase of marginal utility and social welfare effect will enhance the level of governance efforts. (5) The cost sharing ratio of the downstream government has an impact on the governance efforts of the upstream government. (6) Downstream government rewards, corporate social reputation, and external influence coefficient of regional river pollution management has an important impact on the level of governance efforts of sewage enterprises. Based on the above conclusions, this paper puts forward suggestions from the perspectives of cooperation strategies, reward and punishment mechanisms, and the application of advanced technology and equipment to help strengthen cooperation of water pollution management in the trans-jurisdictional river basin.

Dynamic Game Analysis of New Business Subjects for Rural Revitalization Development

Abstract The development of new business subjects is an important force for the implementation of rural revitalization strategy, which is of great significance for the realization of agricultural modernization. This paper constructs a dynamic game model of the tripartite business subjects of the government, enterprises, and farmers, focuses on the evolutionary game process of the new business subjects to promote the development of rural revitalization, carries out the dynamic game analysis of the model at the macro level, micro level, macro and micro level and multi-level, and performs numerical simulation on it. Then, taking the development of new management subjects in a certain place as an example, the game model is used for example verification, and the optimization path of new management subjects to promote the development of rural revitalization is further proposed. The results show that among the eight evolutionary paths (1, 1, 1) is the optimal choice for new management subjects to promote rural revitalization and development, and when the government is highly supportive, the enterprises actively cooperate, and the farmers participate in generating the operation, the interests among the subjects can be maximized. The benefits of new business subjects at the equilibrium benefit point in the example analysis are close to the actual situation, reflecting the effectiveness of the game model. The role of new business subjects in promoting the development of rural revitalization should be optimized by gathering modern production factors, improving the mechanism of interest relations, establishing new urban-rural relations, guiding large-scale operations, and cultivating talents.