Dutch Security Research Articles

Grotius’s Contribution to the Law of Secured Credit

Abstract Over the centuries, Grotius’s writings on onderzetting (rights of hypothec) have been widely cited, particularly in the Netherlands and South Africa. This article investigates the originality and lasting impact of Grotius’s contributions to this field. The article follows the layout of the chapter on hypothecs of Grotius’s Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechts-geleertheyd. It examines Grotius’s translation of hypotheca as onderzetting, the structure of his Inleiding, the distinctions between various kinds of hypothec, and contemporary requirements for the creation of hypothecs. It then explores the right to follow encumbered assets into the hands of third parties and analyses the enforcement of hypothecs, priority issues in cases of competing hypothecs, and reflects on Grotius’s influence on Dutch security rights. In summary, although Grotius’s insights were largely derivative, often echoing interpretations of earlier scholars, they illustrate Grotius’s deep understanding of the influence of Germanic and Roman law on Roman-Dutch security rights. Grotius had a lasting impact on legal scholarship and practice because he was the first to provide a scholarly systematization of Roman-Dutch law within the framework of Justinian’s Institutes and firmly placed the rights of hypothec in the book on property rights of his Inleiding.

‘Due to the Special Circumstances…’: Dutch Legislation Relating to Internal and External Threats, 1914–1920

ABSTRACT Dutch security policy was based on the unshakeable premise of strict armed neutrality in any subsequent European conflict. In no way could pretexts be given to belligerents to actively involve the Netherlands in a European war. International law and internal legislation restricting the behaviour and freedoms of citizens were, next to the army, to be the main lines of defence. Parliamentary control had to remain intact. However, the legislation, already prepared before 1914, proved insufficient, especially after 1917, to deal with the growing dangers, including ideological ones. New legislation, especially directed against perceived internal and external Bolshevik threats, gave the state new powers over both aliens and its own citizens that had been thought unthinkable a short time before. Except over intelligence services, however, Parliament continued to have the final say.

The Effectiveness of Blue-Light-Emitting Glasses in Security Guards Exposed to Night Shift Work on Work-Related and General Fatigue: A Randomised Controlled Cross-Over Study.

This study aimed to evaluate the effectiveness of glasses that emit blue light in reducing the need for recovery, general fatigue, and stress levels in security guards who work night shifts. Light manipulation is seen as a promising strategy to mitigate complaints related to shift work, such as sleepiness and impaired cognitive performance. In a randomized controlled cross-over study design, 86 Dutch security guards used light-emitting glasses (exposure duration: 30 min) during night shifts in a five week period versus a five week control period without glasses. Measurements (Need for Recovery Scale; Checklist Individual Strength; stress level assessed by a fitness tracker) were performed at baseline, at five weeks, and again at 11 weeks. The chronotype was measured at baseline as a potential covariate. A mixed model for repeated measure analyses showed no significant reduction in the need for recovery, nor a reduction in general fatigue scores, during the intervention period. Paired Samples T-Test analyses showed no significant changes in stress levels for the intervention period. Conclusively, blue light exposure using light-emitting glasses for security guards during night shifts showed no directly measurable effect on the reduced need for recovery, overall fatigue, and stress levels.

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Precarious State of a Double Agent during the Cold War

While scholarly literature has paid attention to human intelligence professionalism from the perspective of the agent handler, we know relatively little about the precarious positions in which (double) agents often find themselves and what their ensuing needs from their handlers consist of. This article suggests that (double) agents desire a reciprocal, affect-based relationship with their handlers, involving trust and gratitude, more than just a negotiated relationship based on (financial) agreements. This article explains the importance of such a relationship. The main source of this research consists of original, in-depth oral history interviews with former double agent “M.” He operated from the 1960s through the 1990s for the Dutch Security Service and the Central Intelligence Agency against the East German Ministerium für Staatssicherheit. The article analyzes the varying degrees of appreciation that these services showed for his work, and it investigates their consequences on the psychological well-being of the double agent.

The Construction of Secret Intelligence as a Masculine Profession

The vast majority of intelligence history focuses on operations and executive decisionmaking rather than attending to, among other topics, analytical work or day-to-day organizational activities in the full (hierarchical) breadth of agencies. Especially in the studies on the Cold War period, one of the major implications of this research focus is that women, in so far as they are not part of top leadership or critical to operations, are excluded from analysis. This article argues that, during the Cold War period, security and intelligence services were constructed as a masculine profession. The article advances three professional standards that were constructed as masculine: a sense of responsibility, female support, and full-time availability. Empirically, this research focuses on the Dutch Security Service (in-depth interviews and archival research).

British Naval Power and its Influence on Indonesia, 1795–1942: An Historical Analysis

In Indonesian history, Britain has never been considered a prominent player in the politics of the archipelago. From an Indonesian perspective, the British presence only lasted a brief five years (1811–1816) during short-lived interregnum regime led by Thomas Stamford Raffles (1781-1826). This began with the British seizure of Java from the Franco-Dutch administration of Marshal Daendels (1808-11) and his successor, General Janssens (May-September 1811), and ended with the formal return of the colony to the Netherlands on 19 August 1816. However, as this article demonstrates, Britain has had a long-lasting and decisive influence on modern Indonesian history, dating from the time when the archipelago entered the vortex of global conflict between Britain and Republican France in the 1790s. The presence of the British navy in Indonesian waters throughout the century and a half which followed Britain’s involvement in the War of the First Coalition (1792-97) dictated inter alia the foundation of new cities like Bandung which grew up along Daendels’ celebrated postweg (military postroad), the development of modern Javanese cartography, and even the fate of the exiled Java War leader, Prince Diponegoro. in distant Sulawesi (1830-55). This British naval presence had pluses and minuses for the Dutch. On the one hand, it was a guarantor of Dutch security from foreign seaborne invasion. On the other, it opened the possibility for British interference in the domestic politics of Holland’s vast Asian colony. As witnessed in the 20th-century, the existence of the Dutch as colonial masters in the Indonesian Archipelago was critically dependent on the naval defence screen provided by the British. When the British lost their major battleships (Prince of Wales and Repulse) to Japanese attack off the east coast of Malaya on 10 December 1941 and Singapore fell on 15 February 1942, the fate of the Dutch East Indies was sealed. Today, the vital role played by the Royal Navy in guaranteeing the archipelago’s security up to February 1942 has been replaced by that of the Honolulu-based US Seventh Fleet but the paradoxes of such protection have continued.

The Dutch Strategic and Operational Approach in the Indonesian War of Independence, 1945-1949

The Indonesian War of Independence (1945–1949) and the Dutch attempt to combat the insurgency campaign by the Indonesian nationalists provides an excellent case study of how not to conduct a counter-insurgency war. In this article, it is reasoned that the Dutch security strategic objective – a smokescreen of autonomy while keeping hold of political power – was unrealistic. Their military strategic approach was very deficient. They approached the war with a conventional war mind-set, thinking that if they could merely reoccupy the whole archipelago and take the nationalist leaders prisoner, that it would guarantee victory. They also mistreated the indigenous population badly, including several mass murders and other war crimes, and ensured that the population turned against them. There was little coordination between the civilian and military authorities. Two conventional mobile operations, while conducted professionally, actually enlarged the territory to be pacified and weakened the Dutch hold on the country. By early 1949, it was clear that the Dutch had lost the war, mainly because the Dutch made a series of crucial mistakes, such as not attempting to win the hearts and minds of the local population. In addition, the implacable opposition by the United States made their war effort futile.

VI. Netherlands Defence and Security Policy: Coping with the ‘New Normal’?

Life for European defence planners has, regrettably, become relatively straightforward since 2014. From 1990 to 2014, security and defence policy development in the Netherlands – informed by both a transatlantic and European mind-set – tended to closely follow NATO and EU thinking. Future risks to European interests, and Dutch interests, were associated with the arc of instability: that would be the future operational environment for which the Dutch military needed to prepare. The main focus of Dutch security and defence policy up to 2014 was the promotion of the rule of international law and the deployment of the armed forces in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations around the world. Internal debates ensued within the Ministry of Defence leadership about spending priorities. The Ministry of Defence is forced to limit its ambitions to restore the combat readiness of units, their personal equipment, combat-support capabilities, and weapon systems, all of which have suffered from years of intense deployments and increased wear and tear.

Generating distrust through intelligence work: Psychological terror and the Dutch security services in Indonesia, 1945–1949

In insurgent wars, gaining reliable intelligence is of essential importance to both sides of the conflict. This paper examines the functioning of Dutch intelligence and security services in the Indonesian decolonization war (1945–1949), focusing in particular on their practices of arresting people to be questioned or interrogated. On the basis of interrogation reports produced by the various intelligence and security services, it argues that the arrest and interrogation practices of the intelligence apparatus itself should be seen as a form of violence. These practices created a psychological terror that forced ‘ordinary’ citizens to choose a side, exposing them to retribution from the other. The consequence was increasing social distrust, with potentially long-lasting effects.

Paddenstoelen, prikkeldraadversperringen en sleepnetten

Since intelligence and espionage are so secret by nature, discussing itproves to be rather difficult. Debates about intelligence therefore tend to be fought with metaphors. Using Johnson’s and Lakoff’s idea that metaphors provide conceptual frameworks and thus have real-world effects, as well as Butler’s idea of performative power, this article has explored the most widely used metaphors in Dutch intelligence history.The Dutch security services have been depicted, in a wide variety of images, broadly as remnants of the past (ruins or ‘anachronisms’),as spies on wooden shoes, as a stowaway of democracy, and as a state within the state. Since the civil servants and politicians almost always felt the need to respond to these metaphors, by providing explanation, nuance, and facts – or by introducing a competing metaphor – it isargued that these metaphors have real-world effects, showing how the security service was positioned in politics and society.

Recurring Tensions between Secrecy and Democracy: Arguments about the Security Service in the Dutch Parliament, 1975–1995

There is a recurring tension between secrecy and democracy. This article analyzes the continually ambiguous relations between intelligence and security agencies and their parliamentary principals. I present a novel conceptual framework to analyze political relations influenced by secrecy. I draw on Albert Hirschman's concepts of exit, voice and loyalty and Max Weber's ideal types of the ethics of conviction and responsibility. The focus is a case study of the Dutch parliament and Security Service between 1975 and 1995. The analysis demonstrates how parliament can deal constructively with the secret services. This depends both on party-political responses to secrecy and strategic responses on the part of the secret services to deteriorating relationships with parliament.

Noblesse Oblige

In the late 1990s the Dutch government under Labour minister-president Wim Kok decided to pursue a replacement for the main strike fighter of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNAF), the F-16. From very early on, there was a strong preference for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). This position has held through the subsequent seven governing coalitions, even though the political balance on the issue has fluctuated over time. Politicians have presented the decision to participate in the JSF development program as an entirely separate issue from that of replacing the F-16. Every government since 1996 has insisted in public that the one issue does not necessarily lead to the other, even though this has become an increasingly untenable division to maintain.Since the beginning, the Dutch commitment to the JSF has been driven by a coalition of military, governmental, and industrial interests that have sought to keep the project on track in the face of increasing parliamentary opposition and budget cuts. RNAF wants to secure cutting-edge US military technology in order to remain in the front rank of NATO forces. The Dutch defence ministry came to support this position as part of its aim to maintain a flexible multi-task military, despite declining resources. The Dutch aerospace industry was attracted by the possibility of major contracts and combining with the US high-tech sector at a time when the business climate was poor. The broader context for these positions has been set by the traditionally close relations between the Netherlands and the United States, where the transatlantic outlook of Dutch security policy fits closely with US interests in maintaining the Netherlands as a useful ally.It is difficult (if not impossible) to fully reconstruct the decision-making process in the Netherlands. A network of governmental, non-governmental, and quasi-govemmental bodies have made the process less than transparent, if not opaque. Lockheed Martin, the principal manufacturer of the JSF, has conducted a determined lobbying campaign in alliance with the Netherlands Industrial Fighter Aircraft Replacement Platform (NIFARP). The ministries of economic affairs and of defence in the Netherlands have been assisted by various advisory bodies that coordinate the acquisition process and long-term planning with the private sector. This has included the Defence Material Organization and the Commission for Military Production, linked together through the Interdepartmental Coordination Group and coordinating with industry through the JSF Industry Support Team (JIST). The American think-tank Booz Allen Hamilton and consultancy RAND Europe have also played key roles. Since 2005 the Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) has provided annual independent assessments based on direct access to all government sources, but their reports are advisory only and have no direct impact on the decision-making process.1Making use of official documents, media reports, and interviews with key participants, we offer insights into the central variables involved and the specific periods during which these variables were decisive for moving the project along. Three periods have been identified-1996-2000, 2002, and 2006-2008-each one representing a particular constellation of inputs, agents, and outcomes. While the pro-JSF coalition has remained intact, external variables, such as the impact of the financial crisis on public spending, have come to play an increasingly important role.PHASE I: 1996-2000Both international and national factors fed into the initial push for the JSF. As part of the NATO strike force above Bosnia (1994-1995) and Kosovo (I999) RNAF proved to be a fully capable outfit alongside its American colleagues, and the Dutch pilots were now considered part of the unofficial A-team within NATO. On the national level in 1996, the year that Lockheed Martin and Boeing were given the task of developing next-generation Joint Advanced Strike Technologies (JAST, the basis for the JSF program), the Dutch aerospace industry was in turmoil due to the bankruptcy of Fokker, one of the pioneers of aircraft manufacturing. …

The perpetual adversary: how Dutch security services perceived communism (1918-1989)

The perpetual adversary: how Dutch security services perceived communism (1918-1989)

Geheim gewroet in het duister? - Percepties en maatregelen ten aanzien van veiligheidsdiensten in Nederland, 1918-1989

In this article we scrutinize the construction of complex threat perceptions and security conceptions in relation to the introduction of security measures by the security services. We find that for most of the history of the Dutch security services, political control and interference was limited to the decision to establish or shut down an institution, driven by security considerations, interests, and opportunities. In the meantime it was up to the security service itself to interpret threats, to set priorities, and to decide on working methods. But apart from detecting threats, civil servants of the security service had other interests as well, for example to convince others of the necessity of their activities and to secure their budgets. This creation of policy behind closed doors was contested from the 1960s on. But it was only twenty years later, when the threat perceptions of the security service and the minister responsible diverged irreconcilably, that the Dutch government actively intervened.

Dutch Security Rights in Aircraft and Engines

Dutch Security Rights in Aircraft and Engines