'T IS usual nowadays to classify ethical theories into naturalistic and non-naturalistic. Durkheim's views do not fall readily into either category. = zIt is true that he sets out to study morality d'apres 1 mAhode des sciences positzves . But this does not mean that he proposes to reduce moral judgments to expressions of subjective desires or preferences either of the individual or the group. It is true again that in his view moral rules come from society and have society for their object. But society is not to be interpreted naturalistically. It is the home of ideals and these have a reality of their own different from the reality of the facts with which the natural sciences are concerned. Again and again he explains that he does not propose to derive morality from science but to make a scientific study of morality, which is quite another matter } 1 Such a science is not confined to a study of the means or techniques by which human ends are achieved. It must deal, he tells us, with the ends themselves and with the basis of the obligations they impose. It has thus a double task, first to describe the facts of the moral life and discover their conditions and consequences, and secondly, by eliciting the ideals which in a confused manner they embody, to afford guidance for future conduct. The method is positive in the sense that the ideals are not to be laid donvn cr priori but to be disengaged from the facts of the moral life. That ethical theory must begin with the facts, that is to say, with the moral judgJments actually found in societies, will hardly be disputed. That it is legitimate to study the conditions, psychological and social, in which they arise, change or decay and the influence they exert on conduct or social institutions, is again not open to doubt. The problem remains, however, in what *vays the ideals implicit in actual moral codes can be elicited and by rhat methods or criteria their validity can be tested. Durkheim insists that ve must not begin, in the manner attributed by him to the philosophers, by assuming a single moral principle which can be intuitively grasped and then applied to particular situations. Actual morality, as we find it in any given society, consists of collections of special rules which prescribe the conduct regarded as fitting in each of the spheres of human life, e.g. the domestic, the professional, the political. These do not form a unified system deducible from