Duration In Office Research Articles

ASSESSMENT OF COMPETENCES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

The Government of the Republic of Lithuania is a state governance body that changes every four years. Good state governance is also essential for politicians to gain the trust of the citizens living in the country. The importance of state governance is critical because it depends on the wellfunctioning functions of government. Since the beginning of the restoration of independence, seventeen governments have completed their terms, and the eighteenth government is currently in power. The paper analyses the composition of the last ten governments in Lithuania (1999-2022) and the appointment of individuals to ministerial positions, categorising them as either politicians or specialists in their respective fields. Out of the ten governments analysed, it was discovered that eight consisted of politicians serving as ministers, while the other two had specialised ministers. The 17th government of Saulius Skvernelis had the highest number of specialist ministers. The majority of ministers in the 9th to 15th governments had backgrounds in law or economics. Political ministers are the dominant type in Lithuania and can be considered more stable and successful. These ministers are capable of withstanding political pressure, engaging with the public, and handling a variety of diplomatic situations. Specialist ministers, on the other hand, excel in their specific fields but are better suited for lower levels of government to support political ministers. These ministers tend to be less stable, experiencing more frequent changes during their tenure. Professional specialists face challenges in political work, as effectively identifying societal and workplace issues becomes more difficult due to factors such as communication, public interaction, reform drafting, and decision-making. The 15th government led by Andrius Kubilius was the most successful in terms of stability and duration in office.

Government expenditure and longevity of African leaders

This study examines the effect of government's military, education and health expenditure on the longevity of Sub-Saharan Africa state leaders. This research is particularly important in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, a region where public expenditure on education and health is relatively low despite these sectors having been long identified in the economic literature as pillars of economic development. The study uses a survival model with a sample of 81 office periods from 37 Sub-Saharan Africa countries for the period 2000 to 2017. Potential endogeneity is addressed using instrumental variables. The data shows that, after 10 years in office, government expenditure per capita on the military increases on average while it decreases for education and health. Furthermore, autocratic leaders spend more on the military than democratic ones, and the reverse for education and health expenditure. Although the data shows a positive correlation between military expenditure and leaders’ longevity, the regression analysis does not identify a causal effect of military spending on duration in office. The analysis also shows that education and health expenditures do not influence duration in office. This latter finding points to the necessity of reforming governance in the region in order to better align leaders’ incentives with the social needs of the general population.

Public popularity as a part of the job description? Dismissing unpopular ministers

Are unpopular ministers more likely to be forced out of office than their colleagues in Cabinet? This study examines the relationship between ministers’ unpopularity and their duration in office. By examining opinion polls on the popularity of ministers in Denmark in the period 1978 to 2019, the analysis shows that when Danish Prime Ministers choose to dismiss ministers, they dismiss ministers who are relatively less popular than their colleagues in the Cabinet. Statistical analyses show that less popular ministers have a higher probability of being dismissed. This is particularly true for ministers outside the inner circles of Cabinet. These results suggest that opinion polls on ministers’ individual popularity have been neglected in political science so far and should be considered in future studies of cabinet governments.

Abe Shinzō’s Lasting Impact: Proactive Contributions to Japan’s Security and Foreign Policies

Abe Shinzō’s long duration in office brought to Japan strategic vision, international respect, and a forward-leaning commitment to strengthen Japan’s defenses and uphold the major tenants of the international order. This article examines Abe’s achievements in the security and foreign policy domains. Specifically, it examines his domestic achievements in establishing the National Security Strategy and National Security Council, reinterpreting Japan’s ability to exercise its right to collective self-defense, passing a suite of security legislation, and strengthening of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. It also examines Abe’s foreign policy achievements of increasing Japan’s international presence and global role, expanding Japans’ strategic ties, creating and exporting a strategic framing vision called the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, and helping to establish the grouping of four maritime democracies called the Quad. The article argues that Abe’s desire for Japan to play a larger, more proactive role helped leave Japan—and the region—in a stronger place.

How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector

AbstractDo past employment characteristics of central bank governors affect financial regulation? To answer this question, we construct a new data set based on curriculum vitae of all central bank governors around the world in 1970–2011. We interpret work experiences as indicators of preferences toward deregulation. Over the average duration in office (5.6 years), a governor with financial sector experience is associated with three times more deregulation than a governor without experience in finance. Similar results hold for past experience at the IMF; in contrast, past experience at the BIS and the UN are associated with less deregulation.

Prime ministerial careers in the European Union: does gender make a difference?

ABSTRACTThis article presents empirical findings on two questions: what are the ‘political stepping stones’ on the way to the prime ministerial post? Are there any differences between female and male prime ministers on their way to the chief executive? These questions are primarily linked to the literature on women’s recruitment in top political offices. The data for this analysis stem from unique biographical records of 76 prime ministers in those 10 member states of the European Union where women have been in prime ministerial positions from 1979 to 2015. Consistent with theoretical expectations, the empirical findings show that there is indeed a gender difference in the pathways to the prime ministerial post. Female prime ministers are predominantly recruited in centre-right parties. They have more political experience in parliament and cabinet than their male counterparts, but a shorter duration in office once becoming prime minister.

Introducing a legal mandate for basic medical education accreditation in Korea.

Introducing a legal mandate for basic medical education accreditation in Korea.

Political leader survival: does competence matter?

We examine whether economic and military competence of political leaders affect their duration in office. We introduce leader heterogeneity in the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and derive the hypothesis that in the presence of a revolutionary threat, economic competence is negatively related to political survival, but that the effect is moderated by the size of the winning coalition. As military and economic competence are negatively correlated, the opposite holds for military competence. We present empirical estimates using proxies for military and economic competence in a parametric Weibull duration model that support our theoretical predictions.

Framed: America's fifty-one constitutions and the crisis of governance

1 Introduction 2 Of Compromise and Constitutions 3 What is the pint of preambles? 4 How does a differ from ? 5 Elections and a Republican form of government 6 Bicameralism 7 If two opinions are good, is a third opinion (with the power of most of the time absolutely to kill the decision of the first two opinion-makers) even better? 8 Presidentialism (and ) 9 So what, precisely, does one get, as a constitutional matter, upon being elected president? 10 Presidential duration in office, the possibility of impeachment, and the role of the vice president 11 Divided government 12 How a judiciary do we really want? 13 On the judiciary (and Supreme Court) as guardian of the Constitution 14 Federalism 15 Amendment 16 Emergency Powers 17 Conclusion Notes Index

Federalist No. 71: Does Duration in Office Provide Vigilant Autonomy in the Regulatory Process?

Federalist No. 71 contains a strong defense of duration in office as a source of “cool and sedate reflection” by the executive. According to Alexander Hamilton’s argument, duration in office is essential for the vigilant autonomy needed to faithfully execute the laws. The author examines this argument within the context of government regulation, using the recent financial crisis and consumer safety as examples of the limits of stability and autonomy for creating vigilant autonomy.When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.—Federalist No. 71

The Political Survival of Foreign Ministers

The survival of governments ultimately depends on the survival of its components. These components are politicians whose goal is to stay in office. There has been extensive research on the survival of leaders, but not on the survival of other politicians in government; and even less on how the survival of one affects the survival of the others. The purpose of this article is to take the first step in this direction by analyzing and precisely measuring the impact of the tenure of leaders on the tenure of foreign ministers. This article provides a systematic and formal investigation of the variables that affect the duration in office of foreign ministers. The investigation is based on a new data base on the tenure of more than 7,500 foreign ministers spanning three centuries. Although evidence shows that political institutions have significant impact on the tenure of foreign ministers, internal coalition dynamics such as affinity and loyalty toward a leader, uncertainty, and time dependence are better predictors of their political survival.

On the Duration of Political Power in Africa

It is often underlined that African oil-producing countries are politically unstable as a result of the role that this resource can play in political incentives. Based on data documenting the duration in office of heads of state of 26 African countries (North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa), this study reveals a surprising twist on the conventional wisdom: The purported instability of African oil-producing countries does not appear to extend to the executive branch of the state. Conversely, using survival analysis, this research suggests a positive link between oil rents and the duration in office of African leaders. Findings also reveal that other mineral rents do not exhibit the same stabilizing effect. The author's interpretation of these results is grounded in an analysis of the practicalities of oil investment and the strategic aspect of oil.

An economic theory of leadership turnover

In an infinite-horizon stochastic model, a coup not only disciplines a dictator's policy towards a group of “kingmakers”, but also enables a kingmaker to become a dictator. Greater competition for the dictator's position, a lower impact of the dictator's policy on the kingmakers, or lower risks of staging a coup raises the benefit of a coup relative to its opportunity cost and so raises the probability of a coup. Since periodic shocks affect the efficacy of the dictator's policy, a bad enough shock makes it too costly for even talented dictators to avert a coup. More talented dictators are able to survive more negative shocks, so the worst shock in a dictator's reign is informative about the probability of a coup. Conditional on the worst shock, the probability of a coup is independent of a dictator's duration in office. The unconditional probability declines with duration.