Duncan Snidal Research Articles

Why the Quad is not NATO: the indo-American impediments to its intergovernmental structure

ABSTRACT In the post-COVID19 global order, rising geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe and East Asia reflect the boiling tensions States face on multiple fronts. Within this, the United States is on two fronts as a major player and supporter of its allies that are directly facing hostility. Since the start of 2020, China’s hard, military power maneuvering in the South China Sea, deteriorating political relations with Japan and Australia, and the Himalayan standoff against India have seemingly further substantiated the need for the formulation of The Quad, a proposed quadrilateral arrangement with a varying mandate of operations. The proposed structure would constitute India, Japan, Australia, and the United States.The grouping has repeatedly been touted as not as “anti-China.” However Chinese interpretation of the mutual intent has equated them to being an “Asian NATO.” Keeping this in mind, I draw upon Duncan Snidal and Felicity Vabulas’ works on Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and considers the inherent pitfalls that states may incur while negotiating through the contours of such a structure. Particularly in regards to strategic autonomy, asymmetry in resource contribution and control, and agreeing on a set of fundamental driving philosophies that are certain enough to tie the parties together for the foreseeable future. I focus on contemporary international relations theory, secondary research in the subject countries’ Indo-Pacific policies, and the more significant geopolitical trends of securitization in Asia.

The Governor’s Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals and Agents. Edited by Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. 320p. $99.00 cloth, $35.95 paper.

The Governor’s Dilemma: Indirect Governance Beyond Principals and Agents. Edited by Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. 320p. 35.95 paper. - Volume 20 Issue 1

International Organizations as Orchestrators. Edited by Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 450p. $98.00 cloth, $35.99 paper.

International Organizations as Orchestrators. Edited by Kenneth W. Abbott, Philipp Genschel, Duncan Snidal, and Bernhard Zangl. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 450p. 35.99 paper. - Volume 15 Issue 3

Orchestrating experimentation in non-state environmental commitments

ABSTRACTA striking development in climate governance is the emergence of systems for non-state actors to make voluntary commitments alongside state undertakings. Because these commitments involve diverse actors carrying out diverse activities in diverse settings, they provide unprecedented opportunities for experimentation and learning. Yet voluntary commitment systems (VCS) rarely promote experimentation and provide few systematic learning mechanisms. Based on work with Duncan Snidal, an argument is made for a more strongly experimental approach. First, VCS should encourage designed, controlled policy experiments consistent with scientific standards. Second, even where formal experiments are infeasible, VCS should treat commitments as informal experiments, orchestrating them to promote innovation, comparability, analysis and systematic learning. Collaborative initiatives and other governance organizations can act as orchestrators, encouraging and supporting formal and informal experimentation through persuasion, technical and material assistance, recognition, third-party assistance and other incentives.

Orchestrating Experimentation in Non-State Environmental Commitments

A striking development in climate governance is the emergence of systems for non-state actors to make voluntary commitments alongside state undertakings. Because these commitments involve diverse actors carrying out diverse activities in diverse settings, they provide unprecedented opportunities for experimentation and learning. Yet voluntary commitment systems (VCS) rarely promote experimentation and provide few systematic learning mechanisms. I argue, based on work with Duncan Snidal, for a more strongly experimental approach. First, VCS should encourage designed, controlled policy experiments consistent with scientific standards. Second, even where formal experiments are infeasible, VCS should treat commitments as informal experiments, orchestrating them to promote innovation, comparability, analysis and systematic learning. Collaborative initiatives and other actors can act as orchestrators, encouraging and supporting formal and informal experimentation through persuasion, technical and material assistance, recognition, third-party assistance and other incentives.

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. Edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xv, 680. Index. $125, cloth; $44.99, paper.

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. Edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. Pp. xv, 680. Index. $125, cloth; $44.99, paper.

The International Financial Architecture and the Limits to Neoliberal Hegemony

Unlike neoliberalism, [the] new financial architecture recognises the limits of a disembedded global economy. Yet, rather than seeking to rein in the forces of liberalisation by re-embedding intern...

The Group of Seven

It is entirely appropriate to question whether the Group of Seven (G7) should even feature in this Global Monitor series. The series has provided updates, commentary and analysis of institutions in...

Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission

Why do powerful states often channel coercive policies through international organizations (IOs)? The article explains this phenomenon by theorizing the political advantages of working through a neutral institution, defined as one with heterogeneous and representative member preferences. The argument centers on the notion of strategic information transmission. IO involvement sends information about the coercer's intentions and the consequences of the coercive policy to foreign leaders and their publics, information that determines the level of international support offered to the coercing state. The logic helps explain why the United Nations Security Council plays a unique role in approving and disapproving the use of force. A case study of the 1990–91 Gulf War shows how these information transmission mechanisms work in practice and that the rationalist information argument provides more traction than a legitimacy-based alternative explanation.For valuable comments on earlier drafts, I would like to thank Charles Glaser, Peter Gourevitch, Lloyd Gruber, Darren Hawkins, Keith Krehbiel, David Lake, Charles Lipson, Daniel Nielson, Kenneth Schultz, Duncan Snidal, Michael Tierney, Daniel Verdier, Erik Voeten, and Joel Westra, as well as participants in the PIPES workshop at the University of Chicago and the conference on Delegation to International Organizations at the University of California, San Diego. I also thank Lisa Martin and two anonymous reviewers for constructive suggestions. I am grateful to Matthew Scherbarth for research assistance and to the Mershon Center at Ohio State University for financial assistance.

Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism

Why do countries comply with international agreements? While scholars have done rigorous work to address compliance and enforcement in an international game, less analytical attention has been paid to domestic mechanisms of compliance. However, because international agreements have domestic distributional consequences, there exist domestic sources of enforcement. In this article, I develop an analytical framework of domestic accountability, where I identify specific channels of influence through which domestic constituencies can influence national compliance. Using a game theoretic model, I show that a government's compliance decision reflects the electoral leverage and the informational status of domestic constituencies. This framework further provides a theoretical rationale for why and how international institutions may influence states' compliance through domestic mechanisms. The European acid rain regime offers an empirical illustration of the domestic constituency argument.I have benefited from the generous help of many colleagues and friends in the course of this research. I would particularly like to thank the editor-in-chief of IO, anonymous reviewers of this article, as well as William Bernhard, Paul Diehl, Daniel Drezner, James Fearon, Robert Keohane, Charles Lipson, Ronald Mitchell, Robert Pahre, Duncan Snidal, Detlef Sprinz, Milan Svolik, and Pieter van Houten. Nazli Avdan provided valuable research assistance. MacArthur Foundation, the U.S. Institute of Peace, Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, and the Research Board at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign sponsored various phases of this research.

International Relations Theory and the India–Pakistan Conflict

International Relations Theory and the India–Pakistan Conflict

Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM)

What has changed since William Riker's statement was written? No doubt Political Science has made considerable headway in going beyond traditional methods. For example, social choice theory, formal models of party systems, and statistical methods for analyzing electoral and roll-call data have made it possible to make scientific progress in the study of democratic institutions and party systems.The authors thank Chris Achen, John Aldrich, Bill Bernhard, Norman Bradburn, Brian Humes, Mark Jones, Richard Lempert, Phil Shively, Joan Sieber, Duncan Snidal, and Paul Wahlbeck for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. They also thank Henry Brady and Jennifer Hochschild for their comments and assistance through this process. We dedicate this paper to the memory and scientific accomplishments of EITM Workshop participant Richard McKelvey.

AVOIDING TRAGEDY IN POWER POLITICS:

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Acknowledgments Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Program on International Politics, Economics, and Security (PIPES), University of Chicago, in December 1999, and at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association in August 2002. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Clifford Bob, Daniel Drezner, Charles Kupchan, Charles Lipson, Tony Messina, David Nickles, Duncan Snidal, Al Tillery, Alexander Wendt, and several anonymous Security Studies reviewers.

Relative Gains Concerns when the Number of States in the International System Increases

Realists argue that relative gains concerns make cooperation more difficult than liberal institutionalists expect. In response, Duncan Snidal has argued that when the number of states increases, the problem of relative gains concerns is generally attenuated. The author contends that current analysis of the impact of increasing the number of states is contingent on two implicit and inaccurate assumptions. Relative gains concerns, rather than being relative “absolute” gains concerns, are relative “percentage” gains concerns, and currently, an increase in the number of states is caused by the breakup of a state. Using these new assumptions, the author shows that when the number of states increases, the negative impact of relative gains concerns can continue under many conditions to inhibit cooperation. The results have specific predictions about changes in the likelihood of cooperation due to state breakup, such as the Soviet Union, and state merging, such as the European Union.

Introduction

Previous articleNext article No AccessIntroductionJack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. PosnerJack L. Goldsmith Search for more articles by this author and Eric A. Posner*Professors of Law, University of Chicago. We thank Duncan Snidal for helpful comments on this introduction and Alexander Thompson for helpful analysis of the conference papers. We also thank John Ferejohn, Robert Keohane, Richard Posner, and Robert Powell, who participated in the conference as commentators. Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Legal Studies Volume 31, Number S1January 2002Rational Choice and International Law Sponsored by The University of Chicago Law School Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/340084 Views: 33Total views on this site Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref © 2002 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Aidan Hehir Introduction: ‘R2P Has Begun to Change the World’, (Jun 2018): 1–28.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90536-5_1Aidan Hehir Norms and Mass Atrocities, (Jun 2018): 149–181.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90536-5_6

Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration

Drawing on the analytical framework developed by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal in the Rational Design project, I seek to shed light on the striking institutional differences among the various methods of international commercial dispute resolution for private parties. These methods include recourse to public courts and more frequently to private international courts, such as the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce or the London Court of International Arbitration, as well as recourse to so-called ad hoc arbitration and alternative dispute-resolution techniques, such as conciliation and mediation. The key institutional dimensions along which these methods of international dispute resolution vary are (1) procedural and adaptive flexibility, and (2) centralization of procedural safeguards and information collection. I explain why different methods of international commercial dispute resolution are selected. I argue that these methods respond to the varying institutional needs of different types of disputes and disputants. Such needs can be explained in terms of the severity of the enforcement problem, uncertainty about the preferences or behavior of contractual partners, and uncertainty about the state of the world.

Institutions for Flying: How States Built a Market in International Aviation Services

In the aftermath of World War II, states created a complex set of bilateral and multilateral institutions to govern international aviation markets. National governments concluded bilateral agreements to regulate airport entry and capacity and delegated to the airlines, through the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the authority to set fares and the terms of service in international markets. The resulting mixture of public and private institutions produced a de facto cartel that lasted for more than thirty years. Consistent with the Rational Design framework put forth by Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, I argue that the institutions states created reflect the bargaining and incentive problems generated by international aviation markets. This case provides support for four of the Rational Design conjectures and slightly contradicts three others.

Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement

Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal conjecture that the conditions of membership in international institutions will grow more restrictive as a response to uncertainty about state preferences. Membership criteria will act as a signaling device—states more committed to cooperation will be willing to meet the criteria, whereas those less committed to cooperation will not. The recent enlargement of NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact members Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic illustrates this logic. The potential candidates for admission had to meet standards with respect to democratization, civilian control over the military, and the resolution of border and ethnic disputes with neighbors. These criteria served to identify the more cooperative potential members and to encourage cooperative behavior among those who aspired to membership. However, NATO enlargement came at a price. Although trust was built and cooperation fostered between the East European states that gained membership, trust was broken and cooperation harmed between NATO and Russia. This unfortunate outcome represents a dilemma that arises in the expansion of a security community: While expanding the security community enlarges the zone of peace and mutual trust, it may generate fear among those still on the outside, who view it as a potentially hostile alliance. I present a game-theoretic analysis of this dilemma and analyze the conditions under which it arises.

The Many Faces of International Legalization

The legalization of international relations is a highly variable phenomenon. “Legalization” includes a wide range of normative and institutional arrangements, from “hard” international legal rules enforceable in judicial or quasi-judicial fora, through “soft law” of various types, to arrangements that share some characteristics of law, but are not legally binding. This essay summarizes research -- undertaken jointly with Duncan Snidal of the University of Chicago -- that is part of an interdisciplinary project joining political scientists specializing in international relations with several legal scholars. The project is designed to identify and analyze the causes and effects of the “legalization” of international politics, with an emphasis on the effects of legalization within domestic political systems. We posit that legalization is a form of institutionalization defined along three dimensions: obligation, precision and delegation. In our theory, each of these three attributes is a matter of degree and gradation, and each can vary independently. We illustrate a multidimensional continuum, ranging from the complete absence of law, where none of the attributes exist, through various forms of “quasi” and “soft” legalization to “hard law” where all three properties are maximized. The central puzzle in analyzing legalization is why different types of legalization are utilized in different circumstances. Our first steps toward an answer are organized in three broad functional categories: levels of legalization as rational responses to the contracting environment, soft legalization as a way to limit “sovereignty costs” of states, and types of legalization analyzed from the perspective of non-state actors.

Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains, Edited by Elinor Ostrom and Robert Keohane

Introduction - Robert O Keohane and Elinor Ostrom PART ONE: THEORETICAL PUZZLES The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships - Oran R Young The Politics of Scope - Duncan Snidal Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems - Lisa L Martin PART TWO: EVIDENCE FROM THE LABORATORY Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution - Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley and James Walker Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts PART THREE: EVIDENCE FROM THE FIELD Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action - Elinor Ostrom The Conditions for Successful Collective Action - Gary D Libecap Self-interest and Environmental Management - Kenneth A Oye and James H Maxwell Heterogeneities at Two Levels - Ronald B Mitchell State, Non-state Actors and Intentional Oil Pollution