Dualism Of Practical Reason Research Articles

자율운항선박 인공지능의 윤리문제에 대한 소고 - 사고 알고리즘을 중심으로 -

Ship is divided into four stages depending on whether the crew is on board and whether remote controllers are controlled, and fully Autonomous Ships will make optimal decisions based on algorithms designed by designers without human intervention. However, due to the characteristics of Artificial Intelligence such as autonomy and unforeseeability, the decision of a fully autonomous ship cannot always be expected to be ethical. However, Artificial Intelligence should make decisions that reflect human values. Especially in situations where the risk of conflict is unavoidable so called accidental algorithm, it should be able to explain what principles and criteria Artificial Intelligence makes decisions and these decisions should be reasonably accepted by society. This discussion of the ethical issues of Artificial Intelligence is the most active in the field of self-driving cars. However, there is a limitation that human values are difficult to have consistency and universality. In particular, in ethical dilemma situations, "Dualism of Practical Reason" makes decisions different from rational and ethical judgments, and standards for ethical behavior are also recognized differently depending on regional, cultural, and economic situations. As a result, while recognizing the need for ethical guidelines for Artificial Intelligence, it is skeptical about establishing specific standards. Because the ethical dilemma situation of self-driving cars cannot be predicted and fully responded to the real problems that will arise in the process of use. However, coming up with countermeasures after the problem occurs is only a measure to remedy the damage that has occurred in reality and is not a way to solve the fundamental problem. In particular, Maritime Autonomous ships operating in waters all around the world must make decisions that are reasonably accepted by world society. Therefore, Ethical guidelines, including accidental algorithms, should be prepared by the International Maritime Organization and reflected their legal system in individual countries. In the entire process from the development stage to the use stage, program developers and stake-holders will have to comply with Ethical standards and respond to Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships’s ethical issue through complementary work based on accumulated information.

E. E. Constance Jones on the dualism of practical reason

ABSTRACT E. E. Constance Jones (1848–1922), a regular contributor to Mind and the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, and the author of several textbooks and a monograph, worked in both philosophical logic and ethics. The current paper focuses on Jones’ central contribution to ethics – her response to Sidgwick’s “dualism of practical reason”. Sidgwick held that practical reason has an allegiance to two distinct ‘methods’: self-love and benevolence. Yet, while both methods are independently rational, they may potentially come into conflict. This, for Jones, presented “the most important difficulty of the system of [Sidgwick’s] Universalistic Hedonism”. Jones returned to this problem a number of times in the course of her career. We discuss the evolution of her thinking on this problem and argue that her work presents an original and promising line of response to the dualism that worried Sidgwick.

The Dualism of Practical Reason: The Profoundest Problem of ethics

The aim of this article is to discuss and revisit what Sidgwick called the profoundest problem of ethics: the dualism of practical reason. I argue that Crisp’s dual source view provides a good solution for the dualism via the small cost principle showing that we have to balance agent relative and agent neutral reason in a kind of a rational “negotiation” between our egoistic and our altruistic motivations. I suggest, however, that in order to justify his solution it is necessary to go beyond Sidgwick establishing a limit for the acceptance of egoism as a legitimate method of ethics. I propose also that the dualism is not only the profoundest problem of ethics, but also one of the more serious, it is the biggest contemporary ethical puzzle of humankind, and whose practical solution is of paramount importance for the future of life on earth.

Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason, Evolutionary Debunking, and Moral Psychology

AbstractSidgwick's seminal textThe Methods of Ethicsleft off with an unresolved problem that Sidgwick referred to as the dualism of practical reason. The problem is that employing Sidgwick's methodology of rational intuitionism appears to show that there are reasons to favour both egoism and utilitarianism. Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer offer a solution in the form of an evolutionary debunking argument: the appeal of egoism is explainable in terms of evolutionary theory. I argue that like rational prudence, rational benevolence is subject to debunking arguments and so problematic, but also – and more importantly – that debunking arguments are irrelevant in the debate over the dualism of practical reason on the view of reason and rational intuitionism that Lazari-Radek and Singer embrace. Either both egoism and utilitarianism are debunked, or neither are. If I am right, Sidgwick's dualism is left standing.

Evolution and Impartiality

Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that evolutionary considerations can resolve Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason, because such considerations debunk moral views that give weight to self-interested or partial considerations, but cannot threaten the principle Universal Benevolence. I argue that even if we grant these claims, this appeal to evolution is ultimately self-defeating. Lazari-Radek and Singer face a dilemma. Either their evolutionary argument against partial morality succeeds, but then we need to also give up our conviction that suffering is bad; or there is a way to defend this conviction, but then their argument against partiality fails. Utilitarians, I suggest, should resist the temptation to appeal to evolutionary debunking arguments.

The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason

Evolutionary accounts of the origins of human morality may lead us to doubt the truth of our moral judgments. Sidgwick tried to vindicate ethics from this kind of external attack. However, he ended The Methods in despair over another problem—an apparent conflict between rational egoism and universal benevolence, which he called the “dualism of practical reason.” Drawing on Sidgwick, we show that one way of defending objectivity in ethics against Sharon Street’s recent evolutionary critique also puts us in a position to support a bold claim: the dualism of practical reason can be resolved in favor of impartiality.

DESIRES, VALUES, REASONS, AND THE DUALISM OF PRACTICAL REASON

AbstractIn On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that facts about reasons for action are grounded in facts about values and against the view that they are grounded in facts about the desires that subjects would have after fully informed and rational deliberation. I describe and evaluate Parfit's arguments for this value‐based conception of reasons for action and find them wanting. I also assess his response to Sidgwick's suggestion that there is a Dualism of Practical Reason. Parfit seems not to notice that his preferred value‐based conception of reasons for action augurs strongly in favour of a view like Sidgwick's.1

Consequentialism, Demandingness and the Monism of Practical Reason

A central challenge facing those attracted to consequentialism, and to other impartialist ethical views, is to do justice to our twin intuitions that our ethical theory should be impartial in some important sense but also that it should not be unrealistically demanding. I consider one seemingly attractive solution, advocated by Roger Crisp, which lies in proposing a dualism of practical reason, within which impartial reasons for action compete with partial reasons grounded in the interests of the moral agent. I argue that this proposal goes wrong in misconstruing the relationship between reasons and requirements, and develop an alternative framework, with a single source of reasons for action, which retains the strengths of Crisp's account, but avoids the counter-intuitive implications.

The Significance of the Dualism of Practical Reason

Sidgwick argued that utilitarianism and egoism were in conflict, that neither theory was better justified than the other, and concluded that there was a ‘dualism of practical reason’ and all that remained to him was ‘universal scepticism’. The dualism argument introduced by Sidgwick is an extremely powerful sceptical argument that no theory of ethics is rationally required: it cannot be shown that a moral sceptic or an egoist ought to accept the moral theory, otherwise she is unreasonable. I explain two ways in which the significance of the dualism argument has been underestimated. First, I suggest that a hybrid theory such as utilitarianism with an egoist bias is not (as is sometimes thought) a solution to the dualism. Second, I argue that the dualism argument is not restricted to a conflict between hedonic egoism and utilitarianism, but applies to any attempt to show that a theory of ethics is rationally required.

What is Sidgwick’s Dualism of Practical Reason?

Sidgwick's ‘Dualism of Practical Reason’ has attracted the attention of many interpreters, and the Dualism itself seems to be an historically important version of the view, recently defended by Thomas Nagel, Susan Wolf, and others, that there exists a fundamental fragmentation of value – that the ‘cosmos of duty is reduced to chaos,’ in Sidgwick's words. In this paper, I consider and reject the leading interpretations of Sidgwick's Dualism, and propose an alternative reading. I conclude by offering what I hope is a plausible but Sidgwickian way out of the Dualism.

IV—The Dualism of Practical Reason

IV—The Dualism of Practical Reason

Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason

Sidgwick's dualism of practical reason

Sidgwick and the Dualism of Practical Reason

Sidgwick and the Dualism of Practical Reason

Notes

Previous article FreeNotesPDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 33, Number 2Jan., 1923 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.33.2.2377423 Views: 2 Citations: 1Citations are reported from Crossref Journal History This article was published in The International Journal of Ethics (1890-1938), which is continued by Ethics (1938-present). PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Gary Ostertag, Amanda Favia E. E. Constance Jones on the dualism of practical reason, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29, no.22 (Apr 2020): 327–342.https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2020.1749828

Rational Hedonism

Previous articleNext article FreeRational HedonismE. E. Constance JonesE. E. Constance Jones Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Volume 5, Number 1Oct., 1894 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/intejethi.5.1.2375508 Views: 515 Citations: 2Citations are reported from Crossref Journal History This article was published in The International Journal of Ethics (1890-1938), which is continued by Ethics (1938-present). PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Gary Ostertag, Amanda Favia E. E. Constance Jones on the dualism of practical reason, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29, no.22 (Apr 2020): 327–342.https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2020.1749828Mary Ellen Waithe, Samantha Cicero E. E. Constance Jones (1848–1922), (Jan 1995): 25–49.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1114-0_2