ABSTRACT Since entering Kosovo politics in 2013, the Serb List (SL) monopolized political representation in the Kosovo Serb community. This study addresses dual questions of why a dominant party emerged within a distinct ethnic community in 2013, and how it monopolized representation. I argue that a dominant party was strategically developed to coordinate preferences and reduce intra-communal opposition, allowing representatives to participate uncontested in Kosovo’s institutions. The dominant party constrained political pluralism and constituent engagement in the intra-ethnic arena, allowing for freer bargaining in the inter-ethnic arena. Findings from an in-depth case study of the SL demonstrate the SL was formed to curb in-group opposition to negotiated settlements and coordinate disparate political factions in distinct ethnic enclaves. It monopolized political representation by coopting parallel structures of patronage and administration, moderate parties and elite cadres, and coercive mechanisms previously deployed to enforce ethnic closure. The outcome demonstrates that dominant parties can remedy problems of consociational representation, but at the cost of intra-group competition.