This essay starts from a concern that many empirical researchers undermine their rigorous empirical work by coupling it to unclear and inconsistent theory. I suggest this is because we underestimate the difficulty of achieving theoretical clarity and consistency. I illustrate the problem in detail by cataloging common ways we violate clarity and consistency in the articulation of theoretical constructs and relationships and illustrating these violations with examples from unpublished manuscripts. In addition, I draw on the management literature on theory writing as well as on the dual-process theory of cognition and the philosophy of science to identify and unpack three challenges to clear and consistent theory: the taxing cognitive effort required to turn ambiguous, associative intuition into logical arguments; the impossibility of achieving perfect clarity; and the existence of trade-offs between clarity and other valued qualities of theory, particularly generalizability. The implication is that researchers need to invest not just in empirical rigor but also, in theoretical rigor. Funding: The author’s research is supported in part by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.