Dual-channel Green Supply Chain Research Articles

Dual-channel green supply chain management with eco-label policy: A perspective of two types of green products

The deterioration of the ecological environment has prompted new requirements for the development of the supply chain. People urgently need to solve the problems of building a green supply chain and formulating reasonable environmental policies. This research considers a green supply chain management problem that includes both retail and direct channels. The government sets a product green standard and offers an environmental subsidy to the manufacturer. Only when the product satisfies the standard can the manufacturer obtain an eco-label. In this study, we focus on two types of green products with different green technologies. This paper is dedicated to revealing the impact that this eco-label policy has on different products. Using game theory and mathematical programming methods, we obtain the optimal prices in the two channels, as well as the optimal green standard and subsidy. By analyzing the results, we find that a growing green standard can increase the environmental benefits of development-intensive green products continuously. However, it is not always good to set increasing green standards for marginal cost-intensive green products. Therefore, the performances of the two types of products are different. These findings allow the manufacturer and the retailer to design suitable strategies for different products. Moreover, these findings also provide guidance to the government when implementing an eco-label policy.

A hybrid circular economy - Game theoretical approach in a dual-channel green supply chain considering sale’s effort, delivery time, and hybrid remanufacturing

The circular economy (CE) and the marketing activities are the key subjects to attract the market share in today’s complex supply chain. Here, dual selling channels, the online delivery time, and the distributor sales effort are considered as marketing activities to attract the customers. Moreover, in order to meets the economic and environmental principles of the CE, three responsibilities to ease the carbon emission, as approaches for the return on investment, are devised, including investment in the green production, the cap and trade regulation, and the hybrid remanufacturing via both the manufacturer and the distributor under the technology license. This such complex supply chain needs to determine the equilibrium amounts of the distinguishing elements, including the pricing strategy, remanufacturing approaches, delivery time, and sales effort to abate the conflicts between the members, and consequently, to enhance the economic and CE objectives of the supply chain (SC). In order to obtain the equilibrium decision makings, three game theoretical approaches, including the manufacturer-Stackelberg game (SM), the distributor-Stackelberg game (SR) and the Nash game (N) are employed. The interaction between the game sequences and the remanufacturing process is the key purpose of this paper to not only maximize the profit of SC but also to enrich the CE and marketing goals of this research. The outcomes presented that the SM game, where the manufacturer remanufactures most of the defected products which are collected via the distributor, is the best game strategy to improve the profits of both the distributor and the manufacturer, and also to enhance the other distinguishing elements. In addition, in the SR game, when most of the returns remanufacture via the distributor under the manufacturer license, it not only maximizes the profits of members but also lead to the improvement of the distinguishing elements. In the Nash game, however, there is a conflict between the members about the remanufacturing process, which reduces the SC profit in this game as compared to other ones.

Pricing decisions in a dual-channel green supply chain with product customization

This paper studies a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. Product customization is taken into consideration. The manufacturer sells customized products through his online direct sale channel and sells standard products through both an online direct sale channel and a traditional retail channel. In the reverse supply chain, three modes of collecting used products are considered: via the manufacturer, via the retailer or via both the manufacturer and the retailer simultaneously (joint collecting mode). Three pricing models are proposed accordingly to analyze the optimal decisions of supply chain members. Through model analysis and computational studies, we find that the retailer collecting mode is most effective for the overall supply chain. The price of the customized product is almost not affected by the collecting modes.

Pricing strategies in a dual-channel green supply chain with cannibalization and risk aversion

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a single manufacturer offers the standard product through a direct online channel and an inaugural green product through a traditional physical store (regular) channel. The manufacturer invests in a greening effort to produce green products by incorporating environment friendly features. These green products are offered to customers at a higher price in coordination with a downstream retailer. Standard (non-green) products, however, do not possess the enhanced green features and are offered by the manufacturer at a discounted price to customers using a direct channel. In this paper, we develop dual-channel supply chain (DCSC) coordination models for a more generalized case where the manufacturer and retailer are assumed to be risk averse. The risk aversion is modeled using a popular measure, namely, the mean-variance criterion. Further, the proposed DCSC coordination models enhance the existing DCSC coordination models in the literature, by allowing varying proportions of the market share associated with the traditional regular and online channels in lieu of fixed proportions. This is achieved by utilizing the price differentiation tool from revenue management for effectively segmenting the proportion of expected market share of the regular and online channels as a variable instead of a fixed value. In the proposed model for decentralized channel coordination, the manufacturer decision variables include price differentiation, wholesale price for greening products, and pricing in the direct channel along with the greening effort investment. Unlike manufacturer, the retailer plays the role of the follower within a leader-follower framework and decides on the retail price of the green products sold through the regular channel. For the integrated channel, the manufacturer determines the pricing for green and standard products in addition to the greening effort in a monopoly. The study also explores the supply chain coordination under revenue- and cost-sharing contracts for the dual channel supply chain. The models are unique since they capture the effects of demand cannibalization or demand leakage, which affects the supply chain revenue maximization due to price differentiation. A detailed numerical experimentation is carried out to investigate the impact of the risk-aversion, demand leakage, and market uncertainty on the performance of supply chain coordination.

A retailer promotion policy model in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel green supply chain

In supply chain research, it is essential to consider factors related to carbon emissions due to global climate change. In this paper, we examine a dual-channel green supply chain consisting of one manufacturer leader and one retailer follower where there are direct channel and retailer channel, formulating the corresponding centralized and decentralized model Compared with single-channel supply chain, the retailer is at a disadvantage due to the existence of the direct channel. A retailer promotion policy, as a kind of common activity in the operation of supply chain, is proposed to make the retailer more competitive, and the performance of the supply chain under the promotion strategy is examined. Finally, sensitivity analysis of the retailer’s sales effort is conducted to investigate influence of the retailer’s effort level on the incremental change in total profit of the supply chain.

Pricing and greening decisions in a three-tier dual channel supply chain

This paper addresses the problem of optimal and coordinated decision making for a three-tier dual-channel green supply chain (SC). In the investigated SC, the manufacturer produces a good with an arbitrarily green level and sells it to the distributor. The distributor has two choices: (1) selling product through a direct e-channel, or (2) selling product to a retailer. Demand in both e-channel and retail channel depends on price and green level of the product. The manufacturer, the distributor, and the retailer decide on the green level of product, the price in e-channel, and the retail price of the product, respectively. The problem is investigated in three different decision-making structures. At first, the open triad and the closed triad decision structures are analyzed and optimal decisions for all SC members are extracted. This study contributes to the literature by developing a coordinated, environmentally friendly decision model for a multi-tier dual-channel SC structure. According to the findings, compared to the open triad, the closed triad structure is profitable for the SC at the expense of one or more members, who will thus not adopt it. Secondly, a mathematical programming model, labeled as transitional model, is proposed to achieve coordination. The transitional triad guarantees the manufacturer's profit, while keeping customer prices lower and greenness higher than the open triad. The numerical studies and sensitivity analyses show that the proposed model not only is profitable for all SC members, but also increases green level of the product and reduces prices in both the e-channel and retail channel.

Pricing policies for a dual-channel green supply chain under demand disruptions

Abstract Nowadays, considering the growing tendency of companies toward e-commerce as well as green production, disruption management in such chains requires more consideration from the academic societies. This paper, for the first time, investigates the demand disruption management in a dual-channel supply chain producing and selling green products. We examine the pricing and greening issues for a dual-channel green supply chain when the market demand is disrupted. The investigated supply chain is composed of one manufacturer being responsible for producing green products, and one retailer. We solve this problem in centralized and decentralized cases under consistent pricing policy and compare the results of the two cases. In the decentralized scenario, a Stackelberg game approach is proposed in order to model the interactions between the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we investigate the value of knowing of demand disruptions. We obtain that when a demand disruption occurs, the original production quantity which is determined based on the predicted demand will have some robustness in both centralized and decentralized dual-channel green supply chains. We also provide some numerical analyses. The results reveal that increased market scale caused by a disruption, lower greening cost and lower level of customers' loyalty to the retail channel are not only beneficial for the supply chain, but also bring more enhancements to the greening level of green products. Moreover, the centralized scenario under demand disruptions leads to achieve the products with a higher green degree compared to the decentralized scenario. In addition, results reveal that when the disruption increases the market scale, or when the greening cost decreases, the optimal prices will be increased in both decision-making structures.

Pricing and coordination strategies of dual-channel green supply chain considering products green degree and channel environment sustainability

ABSTRACTTo study the pricing and coordination problem of dual-channel green supply chain (DGSC) considering products green degree and the distinctive of channel environment sustainability, a DGSC with one manufacturer and one retailer is chosen as the study object, here, the manufacturer sells products through the direct channel and the retailer sells products by the traditional channel. Then, the market demand is revised considering products green degree and the channel environment sustainability. Based on these, effects of products green degree and the level of channel environment sustainability on supply chain members’ pricing strategies are analysed in both decentralised and centralised models, meanwhile, the effects of the cross-environmental-sustainability sensitivity coefficient on pricing strategies also are analysed. A new two-part compensation contract is proposed to coordinate the DGSC. Results shows that effects of the products green degree on pricing strategies in both decentralised and centralised models are same; however, its effects on supply members’ benefits are different. Influences of the level of channel environment sustainability on supply chain members’ pricing strategies and benefits in both decentralised and centralised models are different. Meanwhile, when the compensation fee meet a certain range, the two-part compensation contract can coordinate this supply chain.

A Game Theoretic Approach for Improving Environmental and Economic Performance in a Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain

In this paper, we investigate economic performance and environmental performance of a dual-channel green supply chain (GSC). Given that most relevant literature still focus on the descriptive aspect of GSC, we adopt game theoretic approach rather than qualitative analysis method to address the following problems: (1) How can the integration of environmental and economic sustainability goals be achieved in GSC? (2) What is the impact of customer environmental awareness on the green level and profitability of the GSC? (3) How does the market demand changes in the presence of the online direct channel in addition to the traditional one? We establish four game models, which are decentralized scenario, centralized scenario, retailer-led revenue-sharing scenario and bargaining revenue-sharing scenario. In the decentralized scenario, participants in a GSC make individual decisions based on their specific interests. In the centralized scenario, the GSC is regarded as a whole and the participants make collective decisions to maximize the overall profit of the GSC. In addition, in the two revenue-sharing scenarios, revenue-sharing contracts as the important profit coordination systems are set up and the revenue-sharing ratio is determined either by the retailer or through bargaining. Moreover, the cost of green product research and development, customer environmental awareness and price sensitivity are also taken into account in the four scenarios. By comparing and analyzing the four game models, we recommend the two revenue-sharing scenarios as the optimum choice and improving green awareness as a feasible strategy to achieve the integration of economic and environmental goals of the GSC. Additionally, we find that online sales has become a major distribution channel of the GSC.

Decision-Making in Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain Considering Market Structure

With the increasing awareness of environmental protection among consumers, green products are increasingly favored by the general public. The rapid development of e-commerce has increased the channels for consumers to contact and purchase green products. In this paper, consumers’ perceived differences in product greenness among different channels are considered and three models of manufacturer-dominated Stackelberg game, retailer-dominated Stackelberg game and Nash equilibrium with equal power are constructed based on the difference pricing between online and offline channels. Also, the results of dual-channel structure are compared with those of single-channel respectively. The results show that when the green R & D costs are relatively high, manufacturers and retailers are motivated to compete as channel leaders, but for the entire supply chain, Nash’s decision-making can improve product greenness and profitability of the supply chain. When green R & D costs are low, manufacturers’ profits are higher under asymmetric power supply chains and lowest under vertical Nash decisions. Under the three kinds of power structure, product greenness and manufacturer’s profit are higher than single channel under dual-channel structure. The comparison of retailer’s profit in dual channel and single channel depends on green R & D costs.

Pricing policies of a competitive dual-channel green supply chain

This study examines a dual-channel supply chain in which the manufacturer makes green products for the environmental conscious. We discuss the pricing and greening strategies for the chain members in both centralized and decentralized cases using the Stackelberg game model under a consistent pricing strategy. Furthermore, we compare the results of the single channel and dual-channel supply chains. We obtain that when the greening cost is greater than a threshold, the manufacturer does not open direct channel. However, when the degree of customer loyalty to the retail channel and the greening cost satisfy certain conditions, the dual-channel green supply chain does exist. Interestingly, we find that the retail price in the centralized green supply chain is higher than that in the decentralized supply chain, which contrasts with the result of ‘double marginalization’. We also propose a contract to coordinate the decentralized dual-channel green supply chain. Finally, extensions of consistent pricing strategy are discussed and different results are achieved. Our main contributions are that we introduce e-commerce into green supply chain management and obtain pricing and greening strategies for chain members.