SCHMID, W. Thomas. Plato's Charmides and Socratic Ideal of Rationality. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. xi + 225 pp. Cloth, $59.50; paper, $19.95--In this book Schmid holds that traditional and ideal of moderation is enough of an established fact that Charmides can be held up against it to make distinctions and similarities which will then provide for necessary reference for interpreting drama Plato uses in dialogue. The Preface and section I define cultural setting in which ancient Greek ideal of sophrosune was situated (p. 2). Here Schmid defines complex political and setting of ancient Greece out of which dialogue is to be interpreted and thereby sets stage for drama and speech of dialogue as a whole. Once this is done, to relate definitions to traditional (p. 20) of sophrosune in section 2 Schmid simply adumbrates his formulation of definitions of dialogue. He, accounting for his methodological approach (p. vii) of defining ideals, holds that examining what Charmides and then Critias say in regard to them, Socrates examines ideal as it was and came to be understood in ancient Greek, especially ancient Athenian history (p. 21). Thereby Schmid contends that the definitions are intended to represent multi-dimensional meaning of that moral ideal, and also to represent way in which it was superseded, in Athenian life, by a very different of thought (p. 21). This mode of thought, Schmid contends, was advocated by Socrates and involves of serf to reason (p. 43). In section 3 Schmid analyzes highpoint (p. 40) of or definition that serves to organize dialectical structure of dialogue as a whole (p. 40), that is, definition of sophrosune as the of what one knows and what one does not know (167a7). Schmid argues here that there are two different conceptions of the of knowledge at work at 165b3-167a8. One is that of Critias which constitutes a form of cognitive and moral vice (p. 42) other is that of Socrates which involves of self to reason (p. 43), characterized by Socratic ideal of rationality. Furthermore, Schmid holds that Socrates' conception of sophrosune pre-supposes self- and other-relations mediated by values of reason, not emotions of self-assertion or appetite (p. 56). Schmid reminds one here that these differences are brought out only indirectly and that one needs to consider role of drama and speech in dialogue, as formulated in Preface and section 1. In section 4 Schmid examines both positive and negative aspects of Socratic ideal of rationality by which Socrates' elenchus (his method of education he employed [p. 13]) sought to purge Athenians of their fever of wisdom, and bring them to a state of cognitive moderation of what they knew and what they did not know (p. 64). Schmid also examines here relation between dialectic and concept of soul (p. 62). With both these concerns Schmid argues that the subject matter of Socrates' questions reflects central value in his interlocutor's self-understanding, while that self-understanding itself determines, at least to some extent, meaning of conceptions examined in inquiry (p. 65). Moreover, regarding this, Schmid holds that one of chief contentions of his book is to show that the Charmides teaches that this preference, this choice, depends on interlocutor himself, and that volitional dimension of self-knowledge cannot be eliminated, but is inherent in process of elenchus inquiry (p. …