Dominican Fathers Research Articles

Divinization: A Study in Theological Analogy

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXIX JANUARY, 1965 No.1 DIVINIZATION: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ANALOGY SANCTIFYING GRACE, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the light of glory: these are finite perfections intrinsic to a creature, and as such they are infinitely below God. At the same time they make the creature to whom they are given mysteriously but really divine, lifting it to the supernatural plane of God's own life. This is the fascinating and baffiing mystery of divinization, in which a finite gift endows a creature with the proper beauty of the uncreated God.1 Saint Thomas has given a humble, reverent, profound explanation of this mystery. A vigorous Thomist tradition, stemming from the great commentators Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, has repeated this explanation, delved into it, and 1 Thus St. Augustine says: " factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus " (PL 39: 1997) and St. Leo says: "Agnosce, 0 Christiane, dignitatem tuam; et divinae consors factus naturae, noli in veterem vilitatem degeneri conversatione redire" (PL 54: 19~). 1 KEVIN F. O'SHEA shown that its true greatness lies in giving a synthesis, perfect " pro modulo nostro," of the finite and infinite aspects of the divinizing gifts. Writers like Ambrose Gardeil and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange have made us familiar with this teaching. Through them we are accustomed to the cardinal distinction of the Thomist theory of divinization: the divinizing gifts are materially classified in a finite category of being, but at the same time they are formally defined as participations of the Deity itself. The possibility of this distinction depends on an analogous application of the Thomist doctrine of transcendental relatives to the supernatural order: the divinizing gifts, though collocated in a finite category of being, are transcendentally relative to the depths of the Divine Being, are consequently formally divine, and communicate properly divine perfection to the creature to whom they are given.2 In recent years some writers have been contending that this traditional Thomist theory exaggerates the finite aspect of these supernatural gifts at the expense of their infinite aspect. For Thomism confessedly makes these gifts supernatural and divinizing only as participations of the Deity, not as communications of the Deity in the fullness of a union that is more intimate and complete than participation. The sources of divine revelation, to the minds of these theologians, seem to speak of a higher and more wonderful divinization than that which Thomism ascribes to these gifts, a divinization which is absolutely and totally infinite because it is the entire gift of God Himself to the creature. While the Thomists would, they say, place the accent on finite grace, they would place the accent on the infinite gift of God Himself. Dazzled by the beauty of this intuition of a divine communication, they have tried to • The Thomist commentators treat this problem either in their tract on Grace (concerning the essence of sanctifying grace) re I-II, q. 112, or in their tract on the beatific vision (concerning the essence of the light of glory) re Ia, q. 12. In more recent times this problem is raised in Thomist works of fundamental theology dependent on Garrigou-Lagrange. The modern commentary of J. M. Ramirez, O.P., De Hominis Beatitudine, 3 vols., Salamanca-Madrid, 1942-1947, remains a classic source. DIVINIZATION: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ANALOGY 3 explain it in terms of a unique causality called " quasi formal causality" or" pure formal causality," thinking that God Himself is the unparticipated formal Act of the creature thus perfected . They have then tried to find this superior causality in all the divinizing gifts of grace and glory, thus equating divinization and supernaturality with it, and unifying the explanation of all "grace" under this aspect.3 Traditional Thomism has not viewed this proposal without sympathy. Saint Thomas, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas and the Masters of the modern Thomist school have known a divinizing gift which is not by way of participation, which is totally infinite, which is God Himself as the very...

The Act of Faith According to St. Thomas: A Study in Theological Methodology

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXIX JULY, 1965 No.3 THE ACT OF FAITH ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY EOKING THROUGH the works of Thomas Aquinas in their historical order, a reader quickly senses an increasing profundity in the saint's thinking. This maturing process one would naturally expect. But in what precisely does such maturity consist, when apparently the same conclusions are reached in both the early and the late works? Critical studies of Thomistic texts are, at least implicitly, efforts to answer this question. And one point continually emerges from a comparative analysis of texts: though Thomas' doctrine remains essentially constant, his way of approaching a problem changes from one work to another. Thus, in cases where Aquinas seems to reach the same conclusions and even to formulate them in essentially the same words, it is worthwhile examining carefully the arguments he uses. For it is possible that a different type of reasoning will change the ,sense or import of the conclusion. 239 240 TAD W. GUZIE The three Thomistic treatises on faith are instances of texts that contain essentially the same doctrine. The Commentary on the 8entences (1254-56), the De Veritate (125659 ), and the Summa Theologiae (II-II, 1271-72) show Aquinas making very few changes in his conclusions regarding the act of faith. But ·even a cursory glance at the internal arrangement of the three treatises reveals a striking change in approach. The structure of the Commentary on the Sentences 1 is of course largely dictated by Peter Lombard's treatise. Thus, taking up the problem of faith, Thomas first handles everything that touches ·the nature of faith as an act and as a virtue. His second question discusses the relation of faith to charity. He finally approaches the object of faith, finishing with an analysis of the principal articles of faith and some questions concerning the explanation of these truths to the faithful. 1 In III Sent., dist. 23-25. Distinctio 23 [q. 1 De virtutibus in generale] q. 2 De fide Utrum convenienter Apostolus definit fidem De actu fidei (3 aa.) De subiecto fidei (3) Utrum fides sit virtus (2) Utrum fides sit prior aliis virtutibus q. 3 De formatione fidei per caritatem (9 aa.) Distinctio 24 a. 1 Quid sit obiectum fidei (3) a. 2 Qualiter se habeat obiectum fidei ad nostram cognitionem (3) a. 3 De merito et laude fidei (3) Distinctio 25 q. 1 De definitione articulorum De articulo secundum se (3) Utrum convenienter articuli distinguantur in symbolo q. 2. De explicatione fidei De necessitate explicationis (4) Quantum ad quae oportet esse fidem explicitam (4) T.EDll AOT OF FAITH AOOORDING TO ST. THOMAS 241 In the De Veritate,2 there is ·a slight shift among the first questions. Quid sit credere now precedes quid sit fides, and an sit virtus comes before quid sit subiectum eius. The new order is more logical: the simple act before the habit, and the an est before the quid est. For the rest, the De Veritate is quite parallel to the Sentences. There are three questions on the relationship between faith and charity. Then, in Article 8, the problem of the object of faith is raised; and the last four ·articles take up various problems similar to those discussed in the last articles of the Sentences. Taken as a whole, the De Veritate is characterized by less of the intricate organization of questions that is found in Sentences; principal problems are highlighted, and many details are confined to the answers to the objections. But the 'OVer-all structure remains unchanged, and faith as a virtue still provides the basic point of reference for the treatise. A sharp contrast is at once noticed in the Summa.8 Thomas begins now with the object of faith, which was among the last of the questions discussed in the earlier works. In the course of ten articles, he treats everything • De Veritate, q. 14. Art. 1 Quid sit credere 2 Quid sit fides S Utrum fides sit virtus 4...

Paul Tillich’s Existential Philosophy of Protestantism

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.. VoL. XXVIII JANUARY, 1964 No.1 PAUL TILLICH'S EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY OF PROTESTANTISM IN RECENT years the Christian community has been blessed with an increasingly urgent sense of the unity of Christ's church. This has created a special interest in Protestant theology and led to an ever increasing number of irenically oriented studies. Such work has contributed much by pointing to the authentically Christian content of Protestant theologies, from the discussion of which one might hope for an improved unity of belief. There remained, nevertheless, an important reservation to a fully sympathetic and fruitful dialogue, for it was observed that true ecumenism can be expected as a result of discussions, such as those on justification, only when the meaning attached to such terms as God, creature, sin, and new being, has been, if not agreed upon, at least understood.1 Most fundamentally, 1 Juan Alfaro, S. J., "Justificacion Barthiana y Justificacion Catolica," Gregorianum , XXXIX (1958), pp. 757-69; Henri de Lubac, S. J., " Zum katholischen Dialog mit Karl Barth," Dokumente, XIV (1958), pp. 448-54. 1 GEORGE F. MCLEAN this demanded an appreciation of the philosophical position which stood as their presuppositions or predeterminants; and there, lay a new level of divergence. Among Protestant thinkers these positions were generally those of recent philosophies reflective of man's contemporary dilemma, whereas among Catholic thinkers they were of a more traditional philosophy reflective of the rich insights of classical philosophy. With the opening of Vatican II, however, this difference more than ever before has been shown to be one of complementarity rather than competition. "The Council," said Pope Paul VI, " will build a bridge toward the contemporary world. . . . The Church looks at the world ... with the sincere intention ... not of condemning it but of strengthening and saving it." In this project the Protestant philosophical insight into man's contemporary religious dilemma becomes an indispensable element in any solution, and does so in a way which opens a dimension of ecumenism sufficiently profound to contribute to all others. For this reason the study of the basic religious philosophy of America's foremost Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich, takes on a special importance. His thought is contemporary, reflecting the modern dichotomy of subject and object in the manner of the existentialist movement. It is ·also Protestant, stressing the corruption of man and his distance from the Creator. The investigation of these facets of Tillich's philosophy will proceed by three stages. First, it will consider his evaluation of the nature and extent of the elements of individuation and participation in relation to previous forms of Christianity. Then it will analyse his conciliation of these two aspects in a philosophy which is religious, Protestant, and contemporary. Finally it will evaluate his contributions both in themselves and in relation to Catholicism. It can be hoped that the study of this recent adaptation of Protestantism to the contemporary scene will shed light on two matters of great interest and urgency. One is the nature of the religious problem expressed in present day thought. The TILLICH'S EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY OF PROTESTANTISM 3 other is the nature of the religious system which can answer these demands. Both contributions should be of assistance to all in understanding that faith which was given for all days even unto the consummation of the world. I. NORMS FOR RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHIES Paul Tillich is much concerned with the relation between subject and object. His concern extends from its contemporary modality to its fundamental nature. There has been a general consensus of opinion that the great tragedy of recent times has been the subjection of man to the objects he produces. Man is seen to be reduced to the state of an impersonal object.2 We will be able to follow the analysis of this contemporary situation more completely below. For now, it is sufficient to note that it is a pressing manifestation of the fundamental polar relation of self and world, subject and object. Tillich considers this to be the basic ontological structure because it...

The Mysteries of Christ and the Sacraments

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoviNCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXV JANUARY, I96~ No. I THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAl\1ENTS W HETHER they agree with him or not, theologians must acknowledge Dom Odo Casel, 0. S. B., as a . primary influence in the development of contemporary sacramental theology. The fascination that his theory exercises, even if only as a catalysing agent, is made evident in the ever-growing bibliography which by now must have outpaced all but the most leisured theologian.1 Because of Dom Casel's unwillingness to express himself in Scholastic terms, theologians have experienced a certain uneasiness in dealing with his theories. To speculative arguments advanced against . his po~ition he invariably reverted to the authority of Tradition and explained with untiring patience that all difficulties could be overcome if the critics understood the presence of the his1 Th. Filthaut, Die Kcmtroverse uber die Mysteritmlehre, Warendorf, 1947 (French tr., Paris-Tournai, 1954) gives an account of the first reactions to Case!. For more recent developments cf. J. Gaillard, "Chronique de liturgie,'' Revue Thomiste 57 (1957). pp. 510-551. I COLMAN E. o'NEILL torical mysteries which he proposed was sacramental. His followers adopt the same appeal. Few theologians have succeeded in suppressing their conviction that the human actions of Christ, being essentially sucessive and therefore temporal, cannot be made present in their historical reality several hundred years after the event. At the same time, few theologians have failed to be impressed by easel's undoubted insight into the fact, attested to by Tradition, that the sacraments are not independent, self-sufficient sources of grace but are essentially related to the mystery of Christ into which they introduce the believer. All serious contemporarysacramental theologians have made and are still making, attempts to express the insight in traditional Scholastic terms. Until recently, the principal sponsors of modifications of Casel's theory were more or less external to the Thomistic school: SOhngen,Warnach, Monden and others. In the last few years, however, a version of the mysterypresence theory has been proposed by Thomists, their number apparently growing, claiming to find it in the pages of St. Thomas himself. In this article we wish to examine the new theory as developed in the works of its principal proponents, evaluate its claim to be Thomistic, and, finally, propose an alternative, more securely based, we believe, on Thomistic principles, if further removed from the ideas of Maria Laach. I. New Thomistic theory. Rejecting the possibility of presence of the historical mysteries , some Thomists think to find in St. Thomas' teaching on the instrumental efficacy of the mysteries of Christ a clear basis for asserting a certain presence according to an element of the mysteries which is supra-temporal. Fr. H. E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., while referring to the eagerlyawaited second volume of his work on the sacramental economy of salvation for a full treatment of the matter, confidently gives a preview of his position as pertaining to· his historical survey of St. Thomas' teaching.2 Since the mysteries of Christ, he • H. E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., De sacramentele keilseconomie, Antwerp, 1952, pp. 161 f. THE MYSTERIES OF CHRIST AND THE SACRAMENTS 3 states, when elevated by God, participate in the divine power by reason of the instrumental power (virtus instrumentalis) communicated to them, they become " interior mysteries " and thus contain an element which transcends time (perenniteitsgehalte ) .3 Since the divine creative action is eternal, giving to effects not merely their substance but also their place in time and space, the historical acts of Christ in the days of his flesh can, therefore, according to their perenniteitsgehalte, efficiently produce gracetoday.4 The sacraments receive this supratemporal -action of the mysteries and apply it to man. Christ in heaven is not excluded from this action. "The sacraments are not, therefore, new actions of Christ, but the mysteryactions of the Christus historicus, which, according to their supra-temporal content, are still the present actions of the Christus gloriosus." 5 This we take to mean that the virtus instrumentalis, communicated to Christ on earth, preserves...

The Philosophical Assumptions, Implicit and Explicit, of Arnold J. Toynbee’s Philosophy of History

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoviNCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoJ.. XXV APRIL, 1962 No.2 THE PHILOSOPffiCAL ASSUMPTIONS, IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT, OF ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE'S PffiLOSOPHY OF ffiSTORY INTRODUCTION 0 NE of the most characteristic elements in the worldview of contemporary man is the consciousness of historical time. Over and above the consciousness of physical time, shared by all rational creatures, the accelerated .social transformations of the last two centuries have given the man of today a peculiar awareness of the workings of the time process mhumart institutions. It is for this reason that our age shows an unprecedented interest in the historical sciences. It is natural enough, therefore, that certain minds should turn to " meta-historical " studies as they have been· called, philosophical interpretations of man's historical .process as it has been revealed by the labours of Palaeontology, Anthropology , Archaeology, and History. Among these studies, the work of Arnold Toynbee is outstanding.1 1 The present study is based upon Prufeaaor Toynbee'a principal work, A· Study of Hiato'I"'J (London: Oxford University Press) as published in 1955 (2nd Edition 201 JOHN THORNHILL Toynbee's essay, it should be emphasised, is not formally an historical work, but presupposes the labours of History properly so-called. The relationship between History, in the strict sense, and an interpretation of the historical process such as Toynbee has undertaken may be understood if their formal objects are compared. (Evidently, they are concerned with one and the same material object.) The formal object of History is the inteUigibility of the past, inaofar as it remains particularized, in the individualized historical situation.2 Meta-historical studies, on the other hand, seek an .understanding of the inteUigibility of the historical process which passes beyond the (}(Y(WTete historical situation to the universal laws and principles which are realized in the historical process. _ The intellectual light employed by the historian-his historical wisdom, one might say-is not necessarily expressed in universal philosophical principles, rathJ;!r it shows an affinity with prudential knowledge, intuitively comprehending a concrete situation. It is, in brief, a cultural affinity withthe object considered, with the ethos and outlook of the period under consideration; 8 only indirectly, therefore, would the historian employ the habit of philosophy. An interpretation of the historical process, on the other hand, precisely because it is seeking an understanding of the historical process's intelligibility in itself, must invoke as its light the principles of the intelligibility of all reality, namely principles arising from phi~osophical reflection. for Vols. I-VI); 1st Edition for Vols. "'11-X). In a number of briefer works Toynbee has presented various important aspects of his theoiy in essay form. This theory, however, is found in its entirety in A Sttuly of Hiatory. • The object of genuine historical scholarship is not, however, the superficial factual chaos of the newspaper but a deeper attaining of reality, in which the events of the past present an order, a hierarchy of significance, a pattern of casual relations. The worth of historical study will be measured by the extent to which it has comprehended this reality, and revealed the order which is to be found in it. Outstanding among recent studies on the nature of history u; the work of H. I. Marron, De la Ctmnaiaaance Hiatorique (Louvain, 1954). Cf. p. 47. . 8 It is the merit of Marron's work; just cited, to have established once and for all the importance of this aspect of historical method. ·Cf. Toynbee. ·A.. op. cit., pp. 287, 86, 66, 102, etc; ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE's PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY ~08 It was only to be expected, therefore, that Arnold Toynbee's study of history, begun according to an empirical method- · Professor Toynbee constantly calls his work an " empirical study" 4-soon takes on a genuinely philosophical character. In his comparative study of history, the brilliance of Toynbee's powers of induction is recognized by even the most outspoken of his critics. There can be no doubt that induction has a real part to play in a comparative study...

A Thomistic Analysis of the Concept of Repression

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXV OCTOBER, 196~ No.4 A THOMI$TIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF REPRESSION A KEY idea in the theory of psychoanalysis is the idea of repression, the concept of a dynamic and unwitting expulsion of certain images, ideas and affects from the consciousness of the mind. From one point of view, repression is invoked to account for the existence of unconscious thoughts and motivations; from another, it is conceived as a primary agent of neurotic states and of behavior which is more or less pathological; and from still another, it it allotted an important role in normal psychological growth and development. From any of these points of view, it is a phenomenon worthy of close study. The evidence concerning repression is tqday so varied and extensive that its existence can no longer be reasonably doubted. Nevertheless, the concept has not been universally accepted by psychologists, outside of the psychoanalytic schools, and possibly to some extent because there are still problems to be solved in understanding precisely what repressiOn Is. 468 464 MICHAEL STOCK It is not likely that many descriptions of repression will be found in text books of scholastic psychology, and this is unfortunate . The psychoanalytic investigations and descriptions of repression are, after some years of refining and re-defining, worthy of serious attention. This present article will attempt to summarize the salient features of the theory of repression, and show how it might fit into a scholastic development of psychology, and, in particular, into the psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas. I. DEsCRIPTION oF REPRESSION FROM PsYcHOANALYTIC LITERATURE . A. The General Idea of Repression. Repression belongs generically to the category of psychological reactions which in psychoanalytic literature_ are called mechanisms of defence. The context in which mechanisms of defence are discussed is mental anguish, which is variously termed mental pain or psychological tension or anxiety. Given a state of mental distress, distinct from physical pain, the mind might adopt, or perhaps we should say, experience, a psychological response whose aim is to escape from the disagreeable situation. The various psychological respon!les (about ten are generally recognized) are the mechanisms of defence, among which repression holds a unique place. There are many ordinary kinds of responses which people might employ to diminish mental distress. They might try to work it off, or to dist:.;act themselves with pleasures, or go to sleep, or talk it over with a friend-these are not mechanisms of defence. The term is restricted to largely spontaneous and indeliberate psychological reactions which work almost like reflexes (hence the term ' mechanism ') and which in fact succeed in one way or another in overcoming mental pain. One of the more commonly recognized mechanisms of defence is projection. By this reaction, a person who is experiencing a disagreeable feeling of hatred for another, escapes the sense of guilt by attributing the hate to the other; he begins to believe A THOMISTIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF REPRESSION 465 that he is hated. Another defence mechanism is reaction formation : a person overcomes disagreeable feelings of hate by overcompensating expressions. of kindness and benevolence, and vehement protestations (to himself and others) of his good will. A third mode of defending against an unwanted feeling of hate towards another is to turn it against oneself, to let it expend its force in self-recriminations. All of these mechanisms have one thing in common-they distort a feeling or attitude and make it unrecognizable to its possessor. Repression, which is like them in being an attempt to escape a disagreeable feeling, differs in its mode of operation. It does not distort 11 feeling, image or idea; it simply expels it from consciousness. It is crucial to the concept of repression to understand that it does not annul or annihilate the feeling or idea that it expels. It simply removes it from the sphere of awareness. It is a negating action vis-a-vis internal perception, a blocking off or inhibiting of consciousness concerning some mental phenomenon . The phenomenon persists afterwards in...

God’s Eternal Law

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXIII OCTOBER, 1960 No.4 GOD'S ETERNAL LAW AFTER St. Thomas lays down his definition of law in general , he proceeds to discuss the various kinds of law in particular. Chief among these, as their source and origin, is the eternal law of God. First he shows that the eternal law exists and then he investigates its nature. His proof that there has existed a law in the mind of God from all eternity is rather different from what we might expect. If it exists, it is evident that we cannot have intuitive knowledge of its existence, for no one can see what is in the mind of God but God Himself and the blessed in heaven, who enjoy the face to face vision of the divine nature.1 In this life, we can only reason to its existence from the things that we see around us, just as we reason to God's existence from the visible things around us. In fact, the final proof that St. Thomas gives for the existence of God, ex gubernatione rerum,2 is, as we shall see later, also a proof for the existence of the eternal law. 1 I-II, q. 98, a. ~- • Ibid., I, q. !t, a. 2. 497 498 JOSEPH COLLINS This is not the approach to the eternal law that we might have expected. We might have thought, for instance, that he would argue from the existence of human law to the divine law or that he would have argued from the existence of the natural law to the existence in the mind of God of a transcendent law which is the origin and explanation of all other laws. We might have expected him to adopt that line of argument because he teaches that natural law is a participation in the eternal law and positive laws, civil and ecclesiastical, are valid as laws only insofar as they are derived from the eternal law. When we examine the position a little more closely, we can see why he did not adopt that line of argument. It would have been tantamount to assuming what he wished to prove. That would certainly be so if he had argued from the natural law. For, the natural law is not really different as law from the eternal law. It is the eternal law as received in us. He approaches the problem from another angle altogether. He starts from something that is self-evident 3 and which is itself an effect of the eternal law, namely, God's government of the world. That the universe is governed by God, we gather from the wonderful order and harmony that reign, not only amongst things, but also amongst the multitudinous and vastly complex activity of things. The lower orders of being serve the higher, and all in their proper place and in their various ways conspire to promote the good of the whole universe. To direct and guide the works of creation towards this goal demands, as St. Thomas points out elsewhere,• a supervising intelligence and governing hand, which is the mind and hand of God. That is particularly so, when we consider that a large portion of the total universe is without reason and of itself cannot see the goal towards which it unconsciously moves. The alternative is to say that the unity and harmony of the universe are altogether due to chance, and such an explanation is ruled out by its own intrinsic impossibility. • Self-evident on the supposition that God exists. • Op. cit., I, q. lOS, a. 1. GOD's ETERNAL LAW 499 God's government of the universe, however, is only the execution in time of what his providence ordained from all eternity. His argument, then, is this: if there existed from all eternity in the mind of God a detailed scheme for bringing each individual creature to the goal for which it was created, that presupposes a still more comprehensive plan in the mind of God for bringing the whole of creation...

The Human Activity of the Word

HE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXII APRIL, 1959 No.2 THE HUMAN ACTIVITY THE WORD HE WORD was made :flesh, and dwelt amongst us!' 1 By these words the Holy Spirit has revealed to us not only the mystery of the Incarnation, but also the mystery of the human life of the Incarnate Word. By these words we realise that the human life and the human love of Jesus Christ are the human life and the human love of the divine Person of the Son God; and we are led to see the human activity of Christ, a personal and proper activity of the Word, an activity in which the Eternal Father and the Holy Spirit do not properly share, an activity, which, in a singular and exclusive sense, belongs to the Person of the Word. Recent discussion has raised questions of no little importance in penetrating this aspect of the human activity of our Saviour. H we wish to enter into the meaning of this mystery, we must determine the precise way in which the human activity, the human life, and the human love of Christ belong exclusively to 1 John, 1:14. 143 144 KEVIN F. O'SHEA the Person of the Word. In attempting this precision, theologians have asked: Is the exclusive attribution of this activity to the Word anything more than a simple relationship? Is there not rat~er a physical communication of the divine Person of the Word, and of it alone, to this activity? Could such a communication of the Word be thought of, not so much as a static and inert conjunction with the human activity of Christ, but rather as an active, dynamic influence exercised by the Word over this activity? If this were so, could we go on to say that the Person of the Word was the sole ruling, governing, and dominating power over this activity, and its only ultimate source? Is the human activity of Christ a radiation and a reflection of the exclusive personal beauty of the Word, a movement and an energy stemming from and produced by the Word alone? These questions are full of meaning for the theologian of the Incarnation. They may open new vistas for many who instinctively wish to center their spiritual lives on the Person and the virtues of the Redeemer. Above all, they come close to the fundamental mysteries of our faith, those of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and they demand a solution which the faith that seeks understanding will ever strive to find. The present study is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of the problem. It will aim principally at three things: to elaborate the issues involved in the problem itself, indicating an avenue for fruitful investigation; to show the harmony existing between the dogmas of the Trinity and Incarnation as contemplated by St. Thomas Aquinas, detailing the application to our question; and to recall and develop an often forgotten element in St. Thomas' teaching on the Incarnation by which most of the positive and inspiring values in the above questions can be maintained in full vigour. These three points will be presented in the three parts of this study: I. The problem of the dynamism of the Word. II. The mystery of the presence of the Word. m. The concept of pure formal actuation by the Word. THE HUMAN ACTIVITY OF THE WORD 145 I. THE PRoBLEM OF THE DYNAMISM OF THE WoRD. The question The issues we raised above may be summed up in this brief formula: does the Person of the Word exert on the human activity of Christ, a causal influence which is exclusive to Himself , divine, physical and active? Let us explain these terms. We speak of the Person of the Word. It is of faith that Christ the Man is the Person of the Word made flesh,2 and that He is a true Agent and Operator through His human nature.3 The Incarnate possesses a human activity. By this human activity we understand every single operation...

Sense Consciousness According to St. Thomas

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDIToRs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JoSEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXI OCTOBER, 1958 SENSE CONSCIOUSNESS ACCORDING TO ST. THOl\fAS No.4 A concept of consciousness would seem to be an Integral part of a theory of knowledge as well as a crucial element in any theory of human nature. Our capacity to know ourselves is necessarily bound up inextricably with the question of our capacity to know in general, and in turn underlies many such problems as those of self-realization and the validity of self-criticism, the nature of psychological personality, the foundation of ethics and morality, and other related points. Traditionally accepted as an evident object of psychological study, both by philosophers and early empirical psychologists, the notion of consciousness began to suffer a certain diminution in the latter half of the nineteenth century, until in some schools of thought its reality came to be wholly denied. At the same time, through the influence of psychoanalysis, the 415 416 MICHAEL STOCK important role of the unconscious mind was made strikingly manifest, and the question of the respective influence of conscious and unconscious motivation became a central issue in psychology and ethics. At the present time, with the reality of consciousness generally accepted again, and some of the early over-statements of the force of the unconscious somewhat modified, the time seems ripe for an extensive investigation of the relationships obtaining between the conscious and unconscious spheres of men's minds. In this context, it seems useful to state more fully the ideas on consciousness held by St. Thomas, not only because his insights are hound to be of value in discussing current problems, but also because such doctrine should be explicitly understood if many of the implications of Thomistic psychology and moral theology are to be fully appreciated. Certainly many aspects of the doctrine of consciousness have been treated in one form or another, but, so far as I know, there is no complete and exhaustive statement. In working towards such a statement, it seems useful to sketch first, as in general outline, a broader conspectus of the points which will have to be raised and solved before an integral statement can be offered. For the sake of analysis, the matter may be divided under three main headings; the questions of strictly sense consciousness, the questions of purely intellectual consciousness, and the questions of intellectual reflection on the senses. Our immediate purpose here is to raise and discuss some of the problems involved in sense consciousness. By way of preliminary notes, some of the ambiguity which attaches itself to the notion of consciousness should be removed. In common usage, consciousness often means nothing more than knowledge, for instance, when we ask someone whether or not he was conscious of some noise or sight. For St. Thomas, however, consciousness always had a note of cognitive complexity about it; it was knowJedge as applied to something.1 1 " Nomen enim conscientiae significat applicationem scientiae ad aliquid; unde conscire dicitur quasi simul scire." De Ve:rit., q. 17, a. l; cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 18; ll Sent., d. ~4, q. ~. a. 4. SENSE CONSCIOUSNESS ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS 417 In the moral order, it was knowledge applied to deliberate actions as they measured up to or failed to measure up to rules of reason and Faith; what is today called conscience. This moral consciousness was necessarily founded on psychological consciousness, which, in its strictest sense, was knowledge of knowledge, or the awareness of an act of knowledge. It thus involved two elements-an apprehension of some knowable object and a separate cognitive realization that that object was apprehended. By extension, however, the word " consciousness " could be used to signify the things of which one has consciousness, that is, the things known which are known to be known.2 By extension, again, in another direction, consciou~ ness may signify the·act of being aware of other psychological states or operations besides those which are cognitive, that is, the actual awareness of emotions, feelings, performances and the like. Under this...

The Role of the Recipient and Sacramental Signification

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XXI JULY, 1958 No.3 THE ROLE OF THE RECIPIENT AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION I INTENTION AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION IT is the teaching of the Church that, in the measure that it is possible, the subject must have an intention of receiving a sacrament, under pain of invalid reception. The purpose of this article is to investigate in the light of St. Thomas' teaching the precise ontological connection between this intention and the sacrament. It will be maintained that in virtue of his intention and (in the sacraments othe:r than baptism) his baptismal character the subject intervenes in the sacrament as a material instrumental cause-a mode of causality that is to be found only in the sacraments which are not merely efficient causes but also, and primarily, signs of faith. No such explicit conclusion is to be found in St. Thomas; but it is, as it appears, indicated in his teaching that the char257 ~58 COLMAN O'NEILL acter is a participation in the priesthood of Christ and as such reducible to the category of instrumental power. The Thomistic commentators, with one exception, make little attempt to explain the instrumentality of the baptismal character. The exception is John of St. Thomas who developed so fully the symbolic concept of the sacraments. It is in dependence on the notion that a sacrament is a sign, and therefore in dependence on the first principle of St. Thomas' sacramental theology, that he explains the character. Before developing this line of thought an examination must be made of the explicit teaching of St. Thomas on the part played by the subject in the sacraments. Commentary on the "Sentences" In the preliminary discussion on the sacraments in general no question or article is devoted to analyzing the acts of the subject in :relation to the sacrament. This is a matter that St. Thomas reserves for treatment when he is dealing with those sacraments that are perfected only when they are used. The article on the constitution of the sacraments speaks of " use " and its :relation to the essence of the sacrament; but it is clear from the context that it is question of administration.1 More precise ideas are formulated in the discussion on baptism . Distinguishing two effects of the sacrament, grace and the character, St. Thomas says that, although the second is given whether or not the will of the subject is disposed for the first, even it demands " some desire of :receiving the sacrament ." 2 It is to be noticed that, in conformity with the outlook of the Sentences, it is the connotation of causality that here predominates in the notion of sacrament and it is in this framework that the matter is solved. The same immediate recourse to the demands of causality as a principle of solution is to be 1 IV Sent., d. l, q. 1, a. S, ad 2. • Ibid., d. 4, q. S, a. 2, sol. 1: "Duplex est effectus baptismi. Primus qui est res et sacramentum, sci!., character. Et quia character non imprimitur ad praeparandam voluntatem ut aliquid bene fiat cum non sit habitus sed potentia . . . ideo hunc effectum voluntatis indispositio non impedit, dummodo aliqualis sit voluntas sacramentum recipiendi." THE RECIPIENT AND SACRAMENTAL SIGNIFICATION 259 found in sol. 2 of this article and in the article on the constitution of the sacrament.3 The part played by this desire of receiving the sacrament is formulated explicitly when the question is answered: Whether an intention or act of will is required in the subject of this sacrament: In baptism the subject receives two things, the sacrament itself, and the effect of the sacrament. But for receiving these two things there is no need for the intervention of any causality on the part of the recipient. Nothing more is required than the removal of any obstacles; obstacles, that is to say, which consist in opposition of the will to either of the two things mentioned.4 The same teaching is repeated in positive terms in the following article: The soul...

The Totality of Society: From Justice to Friendship

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDIToRs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XX JANUARY, 1957 No.1 THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY: FROM JUSTICE TO J;~RIENDSHIP UMAN society has become for the modern world a very complex reality, far too intricate for the mind of any one man to know thoroughly. Consequently, it is rarely understood in its totality, in the basic structure that makes up its unity. Some know this phase, some that. Yet, the basic structure of society can be grasped since man can reflect on his experience and therefore can know the means and ends of his in the city. In reality, there are many ways to discover the basic totality of society, but perhaps the clearest way open for such a comprehension is by means of an analysis of the various aspects of law as it was set down and understood by St. Thomas Aquinas. It would be also possible to begin with the notion of justice, or of the common good, or of friendship ; but these problems, as we shall see, are one; the starting point alone is different. In this analysis, the most striking 1 JAMES V. SCHALL thing to note about the treatment of St. Thomas is that, within the context of the problem as he saw it, he implicitly, if not actually, uses the political definitions and distinctions between state and society and their functions which have become such an important part of the thought of such excellent thinkers as R. M. Maciver, Jacques Maritain, Ernest Barker, J. T. Delos, and Johannes Messner.1 In treating of law, Aquinas uses several ideas and terms which shall serve as our basic outline. Here, however, let it be clear that we do not wish to treat of the essence of law. This writer accepts the Thomistic doctrine as the true one consistent with rational psychology and ethics; that is, " an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated." 2 Rather we wish to inquire about law as it exists in a society, what it commands, what it does, what effects it has. The most fundamental truth about human law is that it deals only with external, human acts.3 These external acts must be ordered in such wise that the temporal peace and tranquillity of society be maintained. This is accomplished by regulating and prohibiting anything that could distu:rb the conditions of concord in society. St. Thomas calls this peaceful order the end of human law. "For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity o£ the state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition of the state." 4 Here it is necessary to inject some thoughts on terminology, for SL Thomas when dealing with the essence of law maintains in several in1 Cf. R. M. Maciver, The Modern State (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), esp. pp. l-22, and passi11;1,; Jacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), ch. 1; Ernest Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford, 1952), pp. 42 ff.; J. T .. Delos, 0. P., La Societe lnternationale (Paris, 1929), ch. 1; J. Messner, Social Ethics (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), bk. 3. 2 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 90, a. 4. 3 Ibid., q. 98, a. I; q. 91, a. 4. • Ibid., q. 98, a. 1. THE TOTALITY OF SOCIETY stances that the end of law is the common good.5 His idea seems to be this, that the principle according to which these external acts are regulated is the objective order of just relations without which a society cannot at all exist. Consequently, when speaking of the end of the law as the common good, he means the common good as a final cause by which particular external acts can achieve their end. ". . . Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final...

Newtonian Antinomies Against the Prima Via

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XIX APRIL, 1956 No.2 NEWTONIAN ANTINOMIES AGAINST THE PRIMA VIA T HE proof of God's existence from motion in the universe, as originally proposed by Aristotle 1 and as later presented by St. Thomas,2 was intended to be understood by physical scientists. The terms in which it was couched were technical terms with clearly defined meanings, and their application was straightforward and rigorous. Yet the proof, for all its technical elegance, no longer convinces the scientific mind. By and large, its terminology is unintelligible to modern scientists , and as a consequence the argument is now commonly :rejected as having no scientific importance or validity. There are many possible explanations for this enigma, most of them reducible to the patent equivocation in the use of the word " science " through the past three centuries. Prior to the ' Physics, Book Vll. 2 Summa Theologiae, I, q. ~. a. 3. 151 152 W. A. WALLACE seventeenth century, science .was commonly understood as a body of certain and evident knowledge known to be true through causes. Physical or natural science was further considered as having two maip. parts: a fundamental or generalized part, dealing with the common features of natural things presupposed to other studies, and a specialized part in which detailed investigation was made of the various types of natural things. The Galilean~Newtonian revolution drastically affected this understanding; it placed the accent on intensive specialized investigation, minimized the search for causes, and in its place substituted~ methodology based largely mi. mathematical· correlations .3 From that time· until the present day, the meaning of the term " science " has still not crystallized, but the prevailing modern opinion places the emphasis on specialized investigation using a uniform postulational procedure that engenders only probable kno\vledge. Thus' c'ausality, certitude and truth are no longer the hallmark o..f science. Moreover, there is no fundamental or generalized study of physical reality prior to detailed experimental work. Such considerations, if they are thought of at all, are usually relegated to the broad field of philosophy, and they are not regarded as essential to the intellectual equipment of the scientist. The prima via, or the proof of God's existence from motion, is refractory to the modern mind· simply because it is based upon these fundamental, generalized concepts that are no longer considered a. part of science and hence are not taught to scientists. And the situation is further complicated by the fact that modern specialized terminology frequently employs the same terms as pre-Galilean science, but with more restricted meanings than these terms enjoyed in the traditional funda- , I mental understanding. Thus the modem- scientist finds considerable ambiguity in the classical .statement of the demonstration , and this constitutes an almost insurmountable barrier to his acceptance of its conclusion. 8 E. F. Caldin, "Science and the Map of Knowledge," Blackfriara, XXXVI (1955) • /)68-569. NEWTONIAN ANTINOMIES AGAINST THE " PRIMA VIA " 153 Yet there is a ray of hope for one who would reinstate the prima via to its rightful place as a classical scientific demonstration . Oddly enough, this springs from the very man whose genius distracted later generations from becoming interested in the fundamental science of nature that rigorously establishes the demonstration, namely, Sir Isaac Newton. Being at the beginning of a new line of thought, Newton appreciated the terminology of his predecessors and properly formulated his own contribution so as not to be misunderstood by his contemporaries . But, as frequently happens, the scientists who are now most indebted to Newton are generally unacquainted with his original works, and thus have lost contact with this valuable part of his writings. They miss the point of the very title of his main contribution, the :fJ1athematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, possibly because they are unaware of any other principles with which Newton might be contrasting the ones he there proposes. Even worse, in some instances they misrepresent his teachings, and use their own misconceptions to argue against the premises of the prima via. This situation has given rise to the...

The Unitive Principle of Marian Theology

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH Publishers: The Thom.ist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XVIII OCTOBER, 1955 No. 4 THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF MARIAN THEOLOGY BEFORE the end of the last century there were very few theological works treating all of Marian Theology as a separate unit. The Spanish Jesuit, Father Bover, writes that the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception was the signal for a tremendous growth not only of Marian piety, but also the Mariological science.1 Previous to this period of Mariological history, doctrines concerning the Blessed Virgin were usually treated as an integral part of Christology. Also a great deal of theological literature was devoted to particular Marian problems, such as the Immaculate Conception. A few exceptions are to be found, for instance, the Mariological writings of St. Albert the Great and St. Bonaventure, but as a general rule the exclusively Mariological works came into being at the begining of this 1 Bover, S. J., Sinteais organica de la Mariologia, p. S. 443 444 PAUL MAHONEY century. This, being the age of specialization, such a development is quite understandable. Theological specialization is rather common today; this is the age of Mariology, Ecclesiology and other such special studies of doctrine. With this development of Mariology, the theologians have naturally attempted to build the tract as an organic whole. Consequently the problem of a primary Mariological principle has been of great concern to the Marian theologian. The prime principle is the foundation and the unifying element of any systematic and scientific treatment of a subject. Science, we must remember, is not a mere collection of facts, but rather it is the organization of these facts into an intelligible whole, the indication of a relation of one fact upon another. In Theology the positive theologian may be quite content to find the facts in the sources of revelation, but the speculative theologian demands that a logical order be established among these facts of faith. So quite naturally the speculative Mariologist has sought a prime principle for his tract. Some have asserted that there is no one prime principle in Mariology, rather the whole tract can be reduced to two irreducible principles; the Divine Maternity and Mary's association in the Redemptive activity of her Son.2 Yet, others claim that one Marian doctrine or the other serves the purpose of a primary principle. Some of these propose the doctrine of the New Eve, which is a biblical-patristic analogy indicating Mary's association in the Redemption. The vast majority, who hold to but one Mariological principle, favor the Divine Maternity as the seminal and fundamental doctrine of the tract. We do not intend to examine in detail each of these opinions, but rather to seek out the principles of solution for the problem. However, there are certain necessary points that must be first looked into: namely, the nature of Mariology, its relation to Theology and the nature of a theological principle. Once having arrived at the principles of solution, we will consider the two principal Marian doctrines in the light of these principles. • Roschini, Mariologia, tom. I, pp. 324-337. Father Roschini gives a complete p1·esentation of all the opinions offered in solution of the problem. THE UNITIVE PRINCIPLE OF MARIAN THEOLOGY 445 1. THE NATURE OF MAru:OLOGY According to the classic Aristotelian-Thomistic method of arriving at the knowledge of the nature of a subject, one must proceed from the more known to the less known. Thus time and time again in the Summa Theologiae the Angelic Doctor begins his investigation of a subject with its nominal definition and ends with the real definition. ,Having established the real definition, he points out the logical consequences which necessarily follow. This is the method which we will here utilize in the investigation of t4_e nature of Mariology. The word, Mariology, quite obviously is derived from the Greek words: Ma.p£a and A.6yo~. Their latin equivalents are Maria and sermo, and in English, Mary and discourse. An investigation of these two words will shed much light upon the nature...

Sacramental Graces: Modes of Sanctifying Grace

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH·Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XVIII JULY, 1955 SACRAl\IENTAL GRACES: l\IODES OF SANCTIFYING GRACE No. 8 MANY Thomistic theologians have seen in the theory of John of St. ThQmas that sacramental graces are modes of sanctifying grace, a satisfactory explanation of the nature of sacramental grace. It does not seem, however, that there has been a satisfactory solution to the problem of integrating this theory into the Thomistic sacramental synthesis as a whole. While John of St. Thomas undoubtedly saw that his doctrine of modality was related to the sacramental principles laid down by St. Thomas, nowhere does he directly explain this relationship. Nor in the whole of his philosophical and theological treatises is there to be found more than a passing reference to the nature of modes. As a result, many adherents to the modal doctrine of sacramental grace have accepted it principally on his authority. Our purpose is to propose a doctrine on modes with suf311 812 ROBERT REGINALD MASTERSON ficient clarity to demonstrate that the distinct modes which constitute sacramental graces must result from the instrumental efficiency of the sacraments-that is, we shall attempt to show that the different instrumental causes of grace which are the sacraments must produce distinct modes in the sacramental effect which is grace. In this solution the existence of a distinct mode in sanctifying grace granted sacramentally is traced to the instrumentality of the disjoined instrument, the sacrament. The diversi,ty of these sacramental modes is accounted for by the external signification of the sacrament which determines the instrumentality of each sacrament. Thus, both the existence and diversity of the sacramental modes are established and the theory is seen as the logical culmination of St. Thomas' teaching concerning sacramental signincation and causality. The first part of this work is a textual study of St. Thomas' writing concerning sacramental grace. This will enable the reader to see clearly the development and progress of the sacramental teaching of the Angelic Doctor. This consideration is necessary for an understanding of the difficulties involved and also for a true evaluation of the proposed solution. The rejection or acceptance of the modal theory of sacramental grace must ultimately be based upon its success or failure as a solution which safeguards the known teaching of St. Thomas regarding sacramental grace. The main portion of the article is devoted to establishing the principles upon which the modal theory of sacramental grace is based, namely, that diverse instruments cause diverse modes in: the effect produced by the principal efficient agent; and, that the sacraments are diverse efficient instruments. The first principle demands 1) an exposition of the nature of modes which will indicate how a modification of the efficiency of the principal cause necessarily diversifies the mode of the effect; then, ~) a treatment of efficient instrumentality with emphasis upon the manner in which ·this instrumentality modifies the efficiency of the principal agent. The last part of the article is SACRAMENTAL GRACES: MODES OF SANCTIFYING GRACE 818 directed to an exposition of the second principle: the sacraments are diverse instruments. It contains 1) an explanation of the teaching of St. Thomas regarding the efficient instrumentality of the sacraments, including a reply to the more important objections raised against this doctrine. Since, however , it.is the form of the instrument which limits the efficiency of the principal agent and hence diversifies the mode of the effect, this section 2) also sets forth the nature of sacramental signification as the formal and limiting principle of the sacramental 'instrument. I. SACRAMENTAL GRACE IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS Nominal Definition of Sacramental Grace. In the broadest meaning of the term all the effects gratuitously bestowed by God upon the recipients of the sacraments may be called sacramental graces. These would includ~ sanctifying grace, the special grace which is an effect proper to each sacrament, and lastly, the character. According to the more common usage, however, sacramental grace is distinguished from the character and refers to the primary sacramental effect, sanctifying grace as including the grace ordained to...

The Doctrine of God in Personalism

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRovINCE OF ST. JosEPB Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XIV APRIL, 1951 No. 9l THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN PERSONALISM I T HEISM has an obvious significance for any philosophical system which claims to uphold the intrinsic value of finite persons. Historically, the Christian' teaching on the inestimable value of the human person has been closely linked with the theistic conception of God, through the doctrine of man's final end. Personal immortality, and the existence of a personal, Infinite God have been the foci around which Christian thought on this matter has revolved. The notion of God as creative and provident, with the consequent concept of man's personal destiny, was decisive in the formulation of a Christian Personalism. A decisive advance was thereby accomplished on the Greek conception of man and the universe. The necessitarianism of Greek metaphysics, and the lack of a doctrine of creation, prevented the Greeks from ever formulating a comprehensive philosophical explanation of 161 16~ JOHN A. CREAVEN the world and man, and rendered impossible the task of building up a religious world-view which could be validated by philosophic principles. " When Greek philosophy came to an end," says Gilson, " what was sorely needed for progress in natural theology was progress in metaphysics." 1 And, as Gilson remarks, when such progress was made by the fourth century, A. D., it was made wholly and decisively under the influence of the Christian religion. It is but natural, therefore, that the many systems recently competing for favor under the rather elastic title of "Personalism " have, for the greater part, a strongly theistic flavor. Such systems unanimously find in the person the ultimate unit of reality. and agree on giving a primary place· 1)o the doctrine of personality. But the lesson of history is that any attempt to found the value of the human person independently of any relation to a transcendent, personal God is doomed to failure. No true Personalist can, then, afford to neglect the claims of Theism and natural theology to a place in his ..system. Hence the strongly theistic flavor of most forms of Personalism, indicating that they are in this matter, though often unconsciously, the heirs of the Christian tradition. One can scarcely fail to notice the insistence with which the problem of God returns in the successive issues of The Personalist.2 This theistic bias has been strengthened through the strong influence that has been exercised, historically, on Personalism by the current of thought known as "Personal Idealism." s The group o1 British philosophers who were protagonists of this doctrine represent a vigorous reaction, within idealism, against the Absolutism and monism of German Hegelianism. Combating the pantheistic 1 E. Gilson, God and Phuosophy, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941, p. 87. "Published by the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. 8 R. Metz regards this school as a part of the Neo-ldealist movement (Cf. A Hundred Years of British Philosophy, pp. 880-898). Among the typical representatives of the school he lists A. S. Pringle-Pattison, J. Seth, W. R. Sorley, and H. Rashdall. While their general positions present many similarities, there is no rigid, systematic unity; their writings represent a general attempt often not very original, to strike a compromise between Absolutism and extreme pluralism. Cf. infra for an evaluation of their attempt. THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN PERSONALISM 168 tendency of Hegel, they defended the personal character of God, and the individual value of the human person. Hegelian panlogism had rendered impossible even a modified pluralism, by its merging of human and divine consciousness in an unique, universal Self. The personal idealists strove to establish the value of :finite personality, by restoring it to the epistemological setting in which it had been envisaged by Kant.4 Such attempts served as a wholesome reaction against the Hegelian Absolutism and the Neo-Hegelianism of Bradley, Bosanquet and Green. Still, the general positions reached were often' unsatisfactory from the theistic standpoint.5 And, in so far as they purported to safeguard :finite personality, their doctrines . were fr_equently, from the metaphysical...

Fatima: The Rosary and the Heart of Mary

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XIII OCTOBER, 1950 No.4 FATIMA: THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY FATIMA is a name of light and hope for all those souls who are striving for the kingdom of God. The Basilica of Our Lady of the Rosary, with its tall, white tower rising up over the hill, is as a lighthouse in this turbulent hour of the world. The hours of history sometimes can be very long. This present hour, so tremendous, is still the same which thirty years ago obliged Our Lady, Mother of God and men, miraculously to appear in order to give us a message of salvation. The evils of humanity not only persist but are increased. But she also, invisibly present, persists in her eagerness to help us. Her saving watch-words still retain their full vigor and are awaiting fulfillment. We ourselves wish to help make known and accomplished those things most insistently recommended by her, that. is, the practice of the Rosary and the devotion to her Immaculate Heart. This is the second time that we have attempted this, 453 454 MARCELIANO LLAMERAS for as early as July, 1944, we presented a study concerning the value and relationships of the two devotions in the HispanoPortuguese Assembly, celebrated in Fatima by the Spanish Mariological Society.* In the same place where our heavenly advocate appeared as Our Lady of the Rosary and besought veneration and reparation for her maternal Heart, we attempted to explain, in the light of sacred science, the causes of her requests. Why, we asked, are these devotions petitioned? What titles of excellence, or of efficacy, make them so commendable ? Why is it Our Lady of the Rosary who beseeches devotion to her Heart? Is it perhaps because they constitute one and the same devotion, since it would be unfitting to separate them, or is there a great advantage in uniting them? What natural connection exists between them? Today, we again respond not only on account of the occasion of Our Lady's message, but also because the message itself is conformed to a value and to a permanent connection between the Rosary and her Heart, which merit a more attentive study. The Rosary is a means of perennial efficacy for transfusing into our souls the evangelical spirit. For it is not only consubstantial with the Gospel, but it is a gospel in action: a popular evangelical program of faith, morals, and Christian piety. It is, at the same time, a constant revelation of the Heart of Christ and of the Heart of His divine Mother. For the Rosary unceasingly proposes for the loving commemoration of souls the great accomplishments of Their love, which are the mysteries of the redemption. Without a doubt this is the divine reason for Fatima, for Our Lady knows very well the theology of her Rosary and of her Heart. Thus, by way of serving her maternal intentions, we wish to reflect upon her the little that our limitations will permit. To this end we shall recall first the history of the Rosarian and Cordimarian revelations of Fatima. Then we shall consider the value or efficacy of both devotions and their mutual * This study was published in Estudios Marianos, IV, Madrid, 1945, pp. 341-410, under the title: " La Devocion a! Immaculado Corazon de Maria y el Santisimo Rosario." It has been especially adapted by the author for publication in English. FATIMA: THE ROSARY AND THE HEART OF MARY 455 connection or dependence, with the consequences which derive from all this. I. THE RosARY AND THE HEART oF MARY IN THE APPARITIONS OF FATIMA We shall begin our study by recalling the Rosarian-Cordimarian message of Fatima which was delivered during the apparitions and was contained in the recommendations of the heavenly visitor and in the conduct and testimony of the children. The message itself, as understood by its best interpreters , will be the final proof of our doctrine concerning the compenetration of the two devotions. Being desirous of historical authenticity we shall limit ourselves...

St. Thomas and Christian Perfection

THE T OMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EmToRs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XIII JANUARY, 1950 No. l ST. THOMAS AND CHRISTIAN PERFECTION OR some time, much controversy has raged over a question which is certainly of no small importance in the spiritual life. According to some authors, the whole of the spiritual life, throughout aU its different grades, is essentially a unity, while others bring forward grave reasons to prove that what has come to be known as the " ascetical way " is completely distinct from the so-called " mystical ways." 1 There is no need for us to undertake here an investigation into the reasons for these two opinions; it will be sufficient to point out the gradual separation of the sciences of asceticism and mysticism , not merely from each other, but also in many cases from dogmatic theology. Thus, asceticism has come to be regarded as an a priori science, while mysticism derives its main prin~ ciples a posteriori, depending as it does on experiences rather than on speculation. However strong the motives for this separation may have been, the direct consequences have not 1 See, for example, the Conclusions of the Carmelite Congress, Madrid, 1928. 1 DAVID L. GREENSTOCK been altogether happy, because one direct result of it has been that the true dogmatic aspect of Christian perfection has been widely ignored. The very word " perfection " has come to be applied almost exclusively to the higher mystical states, while some authors have even gone to the extent of denying the application of it to the essential elements of the spiritual life, such as sanctifying grace, and its accompanying virtues and Gifts of the Holy Ghost.2 It has long been the opinion of the present writer that such an attitude is by no means the traditional one in the Church, and that this famous controversy may find an amicable solution, which will be conciliatory to both opinions, in the traditional doctrine as presented by St. Thomas Aquinas. A study of Aquinas' teaching confirms this view. In the first place, his description and analysis of perfection show quite clearly that the possession of sanctifying grace, with its accompanying virtues and gifts, implies not merely a perfection, but the essential perfection of the Christian life. Also, the controversy which we have mentioned takes on a new aspect when it is viewed in the light of two distinctions which occur frequently in the writings of the Angelic Doctor. The spiritual life can be considered in two ways, i. e., either as it is in itself, or as it exists in the individual. H we consider that life as it is in itself, or in the abstract as it were, then it is undoubtedly a unity, since it is not subject to the laws of divine. providence or predestination, but merely to the ontological laws of its own essence. In this sense we can not speak of two or more distinct " ways " of· perfection, one ordinary and the other extraordinary , since every single development or manifestation of grace is contained in the ontological essence of that great gift, just as a tree is contained in its seed. However, when we come to consider this spiritual life of grace not as· it is in itself or in the abstract, but :rather as it is found in the concrete and in the individual soul possessing it, 2 C{. A. Farges, The 0Tdinary Ways of the Spiritual Life, pp. 44-45 (London: Burns and Oates, 1927). STo THOMAS AND CHRISTIAN PERFECTION then a very different picture presents itself to our view, and we have now to apply another distinction used by Aquinas, namely, that between what is essential to that life, and that which is accidental to ito On applying this distinction we find in all individual souls one element which is common to all who possess this life of grace, and also another element which is undoubtedly particular to the individual in questiono On considering this particular element, we find that in this sense the spiritual life is in no sense a unity, since there are...

No Place for Rain

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EmToRs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XII OCTOBER, 1949 No.4 NO PLACE FOR RAIN HE western world has nearly come to the conclusion that hell is probably unpleasant. At least the previews of the last fifteen years have shaken us out of a smug dismissal of the possibilities of hell. No amount of evidence can move any man to an admittance of the certainties of hell, since hell, like heaven, is a supernatural thing that must be believed until the doors swing open for the investigator who demands first hand evidence. Still, the previews are as convincing as intrinsic evidence can be in such a matter. For in these past fifteen years whole nations have adopted the habits of hell as first principles of personal and national activities. Injustice, and its inevitable climax of hatred of God, have been paraded with pride and praised for their obvious and immediate successes. Until recently, we have taken injustice rather lightly, perhaps because we have thought of it in terms of disparate acts of burglary or business acumen. When it appeared on the stage of the world as a fixed habit, a vice, men found it hard to 397 398 WALTER FARRELL believe their eyes; surely, such stark evil could not walk nakedly through the lives of men shamelessly, without embarrassment , with no attempt at secrecy. It took the unmistakable evidence of concentration camps, murder kitchens, dying testimony of hulks of battered eyewitnesses who testified with their bodies as well as their words, to convince the men of the West that the foulness of this vice was poisoning the world that had been Christian. But this, as we learned in the slow way of incredulous men, was only a beginning; the kindergarten level of the science of evil was initiated in Nazi Germany. The graduate level was reached only after the world writhed in agony from its contacts with the tots who had learned so quickly and so eagerly. Now the western world is slowly coming to realize that the masters have taken over behind the Iron Curtain, with no intention of limiting their fundamental principles of injustice and hatred to the territory already besmirched by the soot from the fires of hell. We are shocked by flagrant injustice, superabundant even for vicious goals. Political slavery, police terrorism, mock trials cluttered with the harvest of torture, murder, imprisonment, flagrant and barefaced falsehood, nations disappearing under our very eyes and human beings by the thousands snatched into a mysteriously evil oblivion; these things have shaken us badly. Such extremes go beyond any assignable purpose except sheer malice. The hand we lift in protest is, we notice, trembling ; for such loathsomeness does more than turn the stomach of a man. We are not yet looking through the open doors of h~ll; but the preview is almost too much for us. It is a badly needed comfort to look about the part of the world still left to us and breathe its air deeply. Here, thank God, things are different. Every detail of the comparison of the two worlds is flattering, and we begin to think of ourselves as angels of light girding for battle with the powers of darkness. Almost, we thank God that we are not as the rest of men. Here is a battle of absolute fundamentals, a basic opposition of love and justice to hatred and injustice; and we are on the side of NO PLACE FOR RAIN 399 the angels. So we begin to muster our forces, particularly our moral forces since this is ultimately a moral battle. At this point our vigorous righteousness begins to ooze away. Not that we are any less revolted by the reign of the vice of injustice; but we are bewildered by the paradoxical condition of the world of the West. That flattering uprightness, so long considered a kind of inheritance, fares badly when we bring it out of the shadow of assumptions into the pitiless glare of close scrutiny. Perhaps our mustering of forces will have to be much...

Beauty in Aquinas and Joyce

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XII JULY, 1949 No.3 BEAUTY IN AQUINAS AND JOYCE JAMES JOYCE is one of the very few modem artists to quote St. Thomas Aquinas as an authority on esthetic philosophy. Many times, in the esthetic theory presented in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the name Aquinas recurs. The purpose of this essay is to appraise Joyce's pronouncements on the beautiful, using Thomism as a toqchstone. The existence of the beautiful, in terms of the fundamental epistemological problem of realism and idealism, has disturbed esthetic philosophers from Plato to Croce. Does beauty exist in the mind, or does it exist in nature? Is beauty a logical being, a concept; or is it a real being, an extra-mental phenomena ? Or perhaps it is both a product of nature and a product of mental activity. The last of these suggests the traditional solution the Scholastics have accorded this problem of the locus of beauty. They assert beauty is both a physical and a psychical fact. The French neo-Thomist, Maurice de Wulf, viewing esthetic ~61 FRANK L. KUNKEL experience in the light of this objective-subjective interpretation , says the beautiful does not ". . . belong exclusively to things, as the Greeks thought, nor to the subject alone who reacts. and enjoys, as some contemporary philosophers maintain. But it is as it were midway between object and subject, and consists in a correspondence between the two." 1 Leonard Callahan summarizes the whole Thomistic position as follows: " Beauty is not a simple but a complex notion; not an absolute , but a relative conception. In its entirety it exists neither as a physical nor as a psychical fact; it is neither wholly in the object, nor wholly in the subject, but the result of an intimate connection of both object and subject. In fine, beauty is a quality of a work of art or of an object of nature, which by reason of its adaptation to the perceptive faculties of the subject, can arouse a feeling of admiration in him who contemplates it." 2 This dual aspect of the beautiful is clearly indicated in the writings of St. Thomas, as will subsequently be shown. While the unity of the esthetic experience must be insisted upon, it will be advisable to consider its two aspects separately. A choice presents itself at this point between two approaches which cannot be simultaneously presented though they are closely interwoven. Should an analysis of the ontological qualities of beauty be given at the outset, or should the psychological aspects be considered first? Since being is prior to being known, the extra-mental and ontological elements of the beautiful will be considered first, and then the perceptive and emotive characteristics will be analyzed. "Beauty is in the object according to the perfection of its being, the proportion of its parts; and in a metaphysical sense, all things which are, are beautiful." 3 Hence, the three conditions assigned to it by St. Thomas: "For beauty three things are requisite. In the first place, integrity or perfection, for whatsoever things are imperfect , by that very fact are ugly; and due proportion or con1 Maurice De Wulf, Mediaeval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1922), p. 186. • Leonard Callahan, A Theory of Esthetic According to the Principles of St. Thomas Aquinas, Baltimore, 1927, p. 29. • Mortimer Adler, Art and Prudence, New York, 1987, p. 88. BEAUTY IN AQUINAS AND JOYCE fl63 sonance; and again effulgence: so bright colored objects are said to be beautiful." 4 The condition of integrity requires that an object of beauty have a positive fullness, completeness, and a richness of perfection . Integrity or perfection is to be understood not in a moral sense but in its primary ontological meaning, so that an object of beauty is perfect when it lacks no essential parts or elements. "The importance of this factor in arousing a sense of beauty is evidenced by everyday experience. An aspect of nature which suggests incompleteness and imperfection, such as a barren field, leaves us cold and indifferent. The...

What the Modern Man Should Not Believe

THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoVINCE OF ST. JoSEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. VoL. XI JULY, 1948 WHAT THE MODERN MAN SHOULD NOT BELIEVE No.3 UNDER the heading, "What The Modem Man Can Believe," there appeared in the November Atlantio Monthly an article by Rufus M. Jones, the principal thesis of which was: We must readjust faith to discovered facts. The present article is an examination of that thesis. The pivotal point of Mr. Jones' thesis is that what he terms the " Copernican Revolution " necessitates a complete re-evaluation of the traditional faith. " Every aspect of our religious faith must be rethought, reconstructed, and adjusted to the demonstrated facts which this Copernican Revolution forces upon our minds." Consequently, the whole urgency of Mr. Jones' argumentation is based upon the supposition of this " Copernican Revolution, which came in the dawn of the Renaissance, [and] was one of the most staggering blows at the dQminant faith of the western world that has ever been leveled lJ.77 278 PIERRE CONWAY against it in the long undeclared warfare between science and religion." It is the uncritical acceptance of such suppositions that has caused a sort of " Iron Curtain " to fall upon the Middle Ages, that has caused many moderns to reject the ancient faith before they have even. heard it. Because of them the modern man dares not seek the truth farther back than the Renaissance. But now the precarious position of western civilization has sent serious thinkers on a desperate inventory of wisdom through the ages. In this search for whatever is solid and durable, whatever inay prove a guarantee of survival, it is more necessary than ever to rend now this " Iron Curtain," to be .willing to face the facts even at the price of cherished illusions. There is nothing to fear from the truth. So let one not be afraid to look, for once, at the Middle Ages as they really were, and the ancient faith, as it really is. Today it is no longer a mere academic luxury but a vital duty in the interests of man's heritage of wisdom, to re-examine the picture of the medieval world as Mr. Jones so persuasively draws it. One must indeed, as Mr. Jones urges, be prepared to sacrifice·beguiling fantasies for uncompromising facts, which, if they exact a readjustment of one's beliefs, are nonetheless a salutary revision in the direction of a truth which is full of hope, ever new and ever living. Since Mr. Jones is engaged in the serious task of evaluating the basis of one's approach to God, his reconstruction of. medieval thought should be approached, not as a well-written and imaginative essay, but with the studious intent of uncompromisingly winnowing the wheat from the chaff. Upon what concept of the universe did the so-called "Copernican Revolution " come stealing in at the dawn of the Renaissance? In Mr. Jones' words," Slowly, through centuries of imaginative thinking and speculation, ... it had become a settled conclusion that the earth was the c.enter around which everything else in the visible universe revolved. This earthcenter for which everything else was created was thus obviously the focus of interest...and attention of whatever divine beings WHAT THE MODERN MAN SHOULD NOT BELIEVE 279 there were above it." But are we quite sure that in the Middle Ages the earth was the center of the universe and the focus of divine interest? What did Aristotle, whose thought was predominant in the pre-Copernican world, have to say about the matter? "They [the Pythagoreans] hold that the most important part of the world [universe], which is the centre, should be most strictly guarded, and they name it, or rather the fire which occupies that place, the ' Guard-house of Zeus,' as if the word ' centre ' were quite unequivocal, and the centre of the mathematical figure were always the same with that of the thing or the natural centre. But it is better to conceive of the case of the whole heavens as analogous to that of animals, in which the centre of...