FOLLOWING THEIR examination of the role of external factors in the revival of international capital inflows to Latin America, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (CLR) review the policy responses available to governments.' While acknowledging the contribution of improved economic performance, their focus on exogenous influences leads them to concentrate on the dangers of "excessive" influxes of short-term funds. With market failures quite able to generate the excess, the dangers of real exchange rate appreciation, poor intermediation of large-scale flows, and the threat of rapid reversal are clear. From this perspective, CLR examine different policy options for their effectiveness either in limiting the inflows or in neutralizing their effects. This note argues that the policies discussed are misleadingly treated as alternatives when, owing to substantial differences in principle, their appropriate application would be to very different policy objectives. It is suggested here that if recipient economies are to benefit from the inflows, while managing the risks that preoccupy CLR, a sequence or combination of policies may need to be applied. Beginning with the problem of "excessive" inflows induced by market failure, those failures associated with variable government credibility in the context of counterinflationary policy may be usefully singled out. Lack of confidence in the durability of contractionary monetary policies may prevent rapid downward adjustment in domestic wages and prices. The resulting high short-term interest rates, however, may attract speculative inflows based on the judgment that, at least temporarily, the exchange rate will be maintained. Whatever their detailed merits, two of the policies discussed by CLR would be relevant in helping to sustain
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