Domestic Coalitions Research Articles

Subprime catalyst: Financial regulatory reform and the strengthening of US carbon market governance

AbstractThe 2008 financial crisis has had an important, but neglected, impact on carbon market governance in the United States. It acted as a catalyst for the emergence of a domestic coalition that drew upon the crisis experience to demand stronger regulation over carbon markets. The influence of this coalition was seen first in the changing content of draft climate change bills between 2008 and 2010. But the coalition's more lasting legacy was its role in shaping the content of, and supporting, the passage of the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd–Frank bill) in July 2010. Although that bill was aimed primarily at bolstering financial stability, its derivatives provisions strengthened carbon market regulation in significant ways. This policy episode demonstrates new patterns of coalition building in carbon market politics as well as the growing links between climate governance and financial regulatory politics. At the same time, the significance of these developments should not be overstated because of various limitations in the content and implementation of the Dodd–Frank bill, as well as the waning support for carbon markets more generally within the US since the bill's passage.

The Gold Standard at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: Rising Powers, Global Money, and the Age of Empire (review)

Reviewed by: The Gold Standard at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: Rising Powers, Global Money, and the Age of Empire Kenneth Mouré The Gold Standard at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: Rising Powers, Global Money, and the Age of Empire. By Steven Bryan. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. 288 pp. $50.00 (cloth). Alan Milward lamented fifteen years ago that studies of the adoption of the gold standard in less developed countries were "almost entirely lacking" and posited that politics and diplomacy had likely been more important than economic logic in shaping their decisions to adopt the gold standard.1 Steven Bryan's new book is a welcome addition to the work focusing on experience outside the European core to the gold standard world. Bryan examines the context and the public debates for and against the adoption of the gold standard in Japan and Argentina in the 1890s. As developing economies on the periphery, their perspective on international monetary standards and behavior provide an essential counterbalance to Eurocentric assumptions. Argentina depended heavily on trade with Britain and was vulnerable to changing world prices for agricultural exports. Japan was more advanced industrially, emerging from the semicolonial status imposed by trade treaties since 1859. A large share of its export trade went to countries with silver standard currencies. The depreciation of silver and the rivalry between gold, silver, and bimetallism as world standards made the gold standard a better prospect to provide exchange-rate stability, but trade considerations and access to international finance played a major role in decisions regarding whether and when to adopt [End Page 228] the gold standard and at what exchange rate. The international position of each country influenced domestic coalitions of interest in terms of exchange rate, trade partners, and capital flows. Bryan follows earlier authors who stress the accidental nature of the classical gold standard,2 giving attention to the 1890s as a "third phase" in the global expansion of the gold standard. (England linked its currency to gold in 1717, key European countries and the United States adopted the gold standard in the 1870s, and developing countries followed in the 1890s.) In both countries, concern for national prestige, currency stability, trade advantage, and access to foreign loans factored into the debate on gold standard adoption. Bryan's analysis and argument are framed to challenge authors who claim that the gold standard marked a late nineteenth-century triumph of international trade and free markets, as a historical parallel and precedent for the veneration of free markets and globalization at the end of the twentieth century. Not so, Bryan cautions. Adherence to the gold standard was not the success of English theories advocating free trade and a night watchman state. Countries joined the gold standard for nationalistic reasons in an era of protectionism, industrial competition, and increasing nationalism. The ideas of Friedrich List and Alexander Hamilton dominated policy discussions, not the classical liberalism of free trade and minimal government. The gold standard needs to be understood for its national, not its international, character (p. 32). In each country, national and sectoral interests structured the public debate on whether to adopt the gold standard. In Argentina, the gold standard advocates were industrial and agricultural exporters worried by the rising value of the Argentinean peso. Fixing the value to gold was advocated as a means to fix the peso at a low level to stimulate exports. The strongest opposition came from partisans of English theory, free trade, and laissez-faire, who saw the proposed currency stabilization as "not a true gold standard" but rather as devaluation and "robbery." The main architect of the gold standard policy, Carlos Pellegrini, sought to promote Argentinean industrial development through protectionism, government support for key industries, and monetary expansion. It was not just the gold standard but also undervaluing the peso to preserve an export advantage that motivated Pellegrini and his allies. In combination [End Page 229] with protectionist measures the gold standard would promote exports and national industrial development. In Japan the gold standard was less controversial. It was accepted as a fundamentally conservative measure to increase Japanese industrial and military power through export growth and access to foreign loans...

Regulatory regime change in Turkish banks: Reactive or proactive?

This paper examines the positive contributions made toward restructuring the regulatory framework of Turkey's banking and financial sectors prior to and post the 2000–2001 financial crisis. Drawing on a framework initially developed by Onis and Senses (2007, 2009) and further referred to by Onis (2009, 2010) it argues that financial reforms undertaken by the Turkish government would not have been successful without the strong support of domestic coalitions. While the external pressures put on the Turkish government from the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank and the European Union for financial reforms were necessary to kick start the reforms as a reactive process, these pressures on their own may have served only the interests of financial business elites at the expense of the broader stakeholders. Empirical data for the study was collected from documentary analysis of key financial institutions and interviews with twenty major Turkish regulatory agents and other stakeholders. The paper then discusses how the perceptions of these stakeholders are embodied into, and have influenced, regulatory regime change in Turkey from a reactive state to a more proactive one.

How Wars End. By Dan Reiter. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. 320p. $65.00 cloth, $26.95 paper. - Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War. By Elizabeth A. Stanley. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009. 408p. $60.00 cloth.

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‘Indigenous peoples' rights’ as a strategy of ethnic accommodation: contrasting experiences of Cordillerans and Papuans in the Philippines and Indonesia

In Southeast Asia, the use of ‘indigenous peoples’ as a category for ethnic accommodation has had mixed results. Cordillerans and Papuans pursued dual strategies, sometimes casting themselves as ‘nations’, other times as ‘indigenous peoples’. While Cordillerans obtained rights as indigenous peoples, Papuans failed. Both obtained concessions during constitutional talks but only Cordillerans obtained recognition and rights as indigenous peoples. Cordillerans used linkages to the international indigenous rights movement and successfully lobbied the Constitutional Commission; electoral incentives were also key to the adoption of subsequent legislation. Conversely, Papuans were given concessions but not rights as indigenous peoples because, along with other indigenous groups, they were closed off from constitutional reform talks and lacked a strong network to put pressure on the state. This article shows that domestic coalitions in conjunction with the international indigenous rights movement might only succeed through effective framing during critical junctures of constitutional change when states are vulnerable.

The Europeanisation of social policies in Portugal

This article analyses how three different instruments of European social policy have been implemented in Portugal. I claim that the reasons for compliance rest in the combination of a favourable context created by a strong European legacy in domestic policies, with the convergence between the European pressure and the domestic policy agenda in policy arenas, whose characteristics facilitate policy change. I make the case that there is no dualism between a politicisation and a socialisation approach to the Europeanisation of domestic public polices. When compliance occurs, both mechanisms are present. Responses to European pressures reflect both the introduction of new incentive structures and the creation of new patterns of social relations. This is particularly true for European social policies. Those resources have a delayed effect by formatting policy arenas and giving meaning to certain incentives and providing a social context in which pressures are perceived to be cost-effective and legitimate. There is no relation between a priori convergence capacity of European policy instruments and their de facto effectiveness − the distinctive traits of each is central to understand the extent to which EU policy initiatives mobilise domestic coalitions, which prove decisive for the resistance of policy innovation.

Combating Financial Crisis: Building Super-Structures of International Financial Regulation

The architecture of international financial regulation consists of structures built through a number of crises. Subsequent to Bretton Woods, the world witnessed the globalization of finance which highlighted the increased risks which follow in cross-border financial activity. National regulators started to develop cooperative solutions to mitigate these cross-border risks. Nascent and informal regulatory structures were formed by organizations of national regulators and standard setters such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In the wake of the Latin American debt crisis and East Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, these structures started to take on a more Byzantine form. The various groupings of industrialized states such as the G-7, G-8, G-10 and G-20 and Financial Stability Forum, together with international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank started to play a larger role in international standard setting. The current financial crisis (the “Crisis”) provides another opportunity to reexamine existing structures of international financial regulation. It has provoked intensified calls for increased international cooperation in the regulation of international finance on a number of hierarchical levels and with respect to a variety of substantive issues. Broadly, this paper examines the prospects for such cooperation. First, it seeks to examine the structural aspects of international financial regulatory reform in the wake of the Crisis. It reviews ongoing efforts at constructing international financial regulatory structures in the form of the G-20 through the Financial Stability Board and in the EC. It argues that three distinct kinds of integration are taking place through these efforts: horizontal integration between various international financial institutions; cross-sectoral integration between different sectoral regulators having to collaborate to formulate cross-cutting norms; and vertical integration between actors of different hierarchies which set standards with different degrees of binding-ness and specificity. Second, this paper discusses the prospects for continued international cooperation in the wake of the Crisis. This section examines prevailing theories of international financial cooperation as well as political economy theories of economic crisis. It is argued that prospects for continued international cooperation rest on two factors. Foremost, the opportunity for international cooperation presented by the Crisis rests on whether domestic interest groups and coalitions have re-aligned themselves in favor of regulatory structures which are more stringent. If so, this re-alignment should point toward international cooperation to building structures of international financial regulation which provide higher standards of regulation and/or more enhanced enforcement or compliance mechanisms. Next, it is also argued that international financial reform is highly dependent on the domestic politics of dominant states. In other words, the viability of international cooperation is dependent on the extent in which domestic interest groups and coalitions in dominant states have re-aligned themselves in favor of higher standards of regulation. Third, this paper takes a closer look at the three kinds of integration that are taking place and examines their implications for international cooperation. Finally, this paper concludes by examining some policy options for the creation of structures of international financial regulation.

State Preferences and Institutional Feedback: CAP and European Integration

Through the examination of the interplay between the deepening process of European integration and the domestic politics of EU member states, this article seeks to show how the former affects the latter and ultimately leads to the reshaping of EU members’ preferences over time. The two cases examined here (agricultural policy preference shifts in France and Germany during the MacSharry reform negotiations) illustrate that European integration over time generates institutional feedback in which European policies become not just outputs but also major inputs of the political process of EU member states.The critical factor in this preference change is the domestic policy coalition shift, which is provoked by positive expectations regarding the national benefits to be gained from deeper integration.

International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Causes of Compliance with International Law

Compliance with international law is always dependent upon a domestic political decision to engage in the behavior that constitutes compliance. This article articulates the importance of the interdependence between home state domestic politics and foreign state domestic politics in determining compliance. International legal commitments allow the formation of domestic coalitions between those who will benefit by their own state’s compliance with the international legal rule in question, and those who will benefit from other states’ compliance with the international legal rule. The theory developed in this paper is based on established approaches to international relations in the political science literature, in particular the “liberal” theory of international relations associated with Andrew Moravcsik, the two-level game theory approach associated with Robert Putnam, and the “second image reversed” approach associated with Peter Gourevitch. The two extensions of these approaches made in this article, (i) from international relations more broadly to international law, and (ii) from adherence to compliance, raise some questions, and bear some important fruit. These extensions help to illuminate the problem of compliance. This article extends the rationalist approach to compliance with international law into the domestic politics of the target state. The model advanced in this article allows the formalization and contextualization of a variety of factors that have heretofore been viewed alone as explanatory variables in the decision to comply. Policy makers can use this model as an analytical template by which to assess whether their counterparties would comply with any undertakings they may make.

Paths to peace: domestic coalition shifts, war termination and the Korean War

Paths to Peace begins by developing a theory about the domestic obstacles to making peace and the role played by shifts in states' governing coalitions in overcoming these obstacles. In particular, it explains how the longer the war, the harder it is to end, because domestic obstacles to peace become institutionalized over time. Next, it tests this theory with a mixed methods approach-through historical case studies and quantitative statistical analysis. Finally, it applies the theory to an in-depth analysis of the ending of the Korean War. By analyzing the domestic politics of the war's major combatants-the Soviet Union, the United States, China, and North and South Korea-it explains why the final armistice terms accepted in July 1953 were little different from those proposed at the start of negotiations in July 1951, some 294,000 additional battle-deaths later.

Turkey's War at Home

Turkey is now more polarized than at any other time since the left–right violence that engulfed the country during the 1970s. As Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) have lurched from one crisis to another over the last two years, the domestic coalition that brought them to power has fractured. In an effort to satisfy different constituencies, AKP has jettisoned prudent reformism in favour of ad hoc policies. If its Western partners do not act, Turkey will drift away from the United States and Europe in the powerful undercurrents of populism, nationalism and authoritarianism.

The Equifinality of War Termination

The authors’ theory contributes an alternative domestic politics pathway to traditional bargaining models of war termination. In bargaining models, the rational updating process that produces an overlapping bargaining space can develop a significant lag, which extends the war beyond a logical ending point. The authors posit that a change in the domestic governing coalition is often necessary to kick-start this updating process once it has become bogged down through preference, information, and entrapment obstacles. The authors demonstrate that domestic coalition shifts are a critical path to peace, using survival analysis techniques on Bennett and Stam’s (1996) war-level data set of wars (1862-1990) and a new belligerent-level data set of wars (1945-2006). These tests show that because war policies can become institutionalized over time, there is a very strong link between coalition shifts and war termination.

International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand Theory of Compliance with International Law

Abstract Compliance with international law is always dependent upon a contemporaneous domestic political decision to comply. This Article articulates the importance of the interdependence between home-state domestic politics and foreign-state domestic politics in determining compliance. International legal commitments allow the formation of domestic coalitions between those who will benefit from their own state's compliance with the international legal rule, and those who will benefit from other states' compliance with the international legal This Article extends the rationalist approach to compliance with international law to the domestic politics of the target state. The theory developed in this Article builds on established approaches to international relations in the political science literature, in particular the liberal theory of international relations associated with Andrew Moravcsik, the two-level game theory approach associated with Robert Putnam, and the second image reversed approach associated with Peter Gourevitch. This Article extends these approaches (i) from broader international relations to international law and (ii) from adherence to compliance. The model advanced in this Article allows the formalization and contextualization of a variety of factors that up to now have been viewed in isolation as explanatory variables in the decision to comply. Policymakers can use this model as an analytical template by which to assess whether their counterparties would comply with any undertakings they may make. [A] prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would damage him, and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant. Niccolo Machiavelli1 Applied to relations between nations, [the] bureaucratic politics model directs attention to intra-national games, the overlap of which constitutes international relations. Graham Allison2 I. INTRODUCTION If international law is to be a useful tool of international cooperation, we must know more about its social effects: its ability to cause states to take action that they would not have taken, or to refrain from taking action that they would have taken but for the existence of the international law Greater understanding of the effects of international law will allow more efficient allocation of diplomatic and analytical resources toward international law that will resolve international problems and will reduce uncertainty that may result in under-use of international law as a tool of cooperation. However, greater understanding will require greater particularity of analysis. This Article proposes a social scientific theory of compliance with international law that focuses attention on the domestic politics underlying a state's decision to comply with a particular international legal It develops further a preference -based model that describes the internal mechanisms of state compliance with international law, building on work in political science by Dai, Gourevitch, Moravcsik, Iida, Milner, Mo, Putnam, and others who have been instrumental in developing a two-level game-based theory of international cooperation. That political science literature focuses on cooperation in the form of adherence to a rule. Except for the work by Dai, however, the literature does not examine the subsequent issue of compliance with the The two extensions of this work made in this Article - from broader international relations to international law, and from adherence to compliance - help to illuminate the problem of compliance, and provide a social scientific, positive approach to compliance. Most prior social scientific theories of compliance with international law take the structure of the state's aggregate utility function as a given and evaluate the circumstances under which the threat of retaliation, or perhaps the fear of reduced reputation or reduced opportunities for future cooperation, would provide incentives for compliance. …

Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?

AbstractModels of trade policy often depend on the efficient aggregation of individual preferences. While much of the recent empirical work on trade focuses on whether domestic coalitions form along class or sectoral lines, the process of preference aggregation itself remains understudied. In democratic countries, voting is typically assumed to be an unproblematic mechanism for aggregating preferences, but such an assumption may be misleading when the salience of trade policy is low or heterogeneous throughout the electorate. Using data from a survey of 36,501 potential voters in the 2006 U.S. midterm congressional elections, this article explores the salience of trade policy for voters as a whole and for populations predicted to be most affected by changing trade patterns. The article offers an estimation of trade policy salience based on the degree to which voters held Senate incumbents accountable for their 2005 vote on the Central American Free Trade Agreement, relative to roll call votes on other issues of the day. The article finds trade policy salience to be relatively low in terms of stated importance, in voters' knowledge of their representatives' policy positions, and in its effect on voters' propensity to vote for the incumbent. The low salience of trade policy, particularly among highly affected groups, calls into question voter-driven models of trade policy.

Ending the Korean War: The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace

Bargaining models of war suggest that war ends after two sides develop an overlapping bargaining space. Domestic mechanisms—domestic governing coalitions, a state's elite foreign policy decisionmaking group, and their role in ending interstate war—are critical in explaining how, when, and why that bargaining space develops. Through preference, information, and entrapment obstacles, wars can become “stuck” and require a change in expectations to produce a war-terminating bargaining space. A major source of such change is a shift in belligerents' governing coalitions. Events in the United States, China, and the Soviet Union during the Korean War illustrate the dynamics of these obstacles and the need for domestic coalition shifts in overcoming them before the conflict could be brought to an end.

Success in slow motion: The Europeanization of Romanian child protection policy

This paper analyzes the influence of the European Union (EU) through a qualitative case study of child protection policy in Romania. This is a particularly tough case for the growing “Europeanization” literature. Prior research has called attention to several factors that promote Europeanization, including the presence of a pro-reform domestic coalition, the clarity and consistency of the EU’s own legislative targets, a state’s own prior involvement in the setting of European standards, a strong consensus among EU member states backing the European position, and strong non-European support for EU initiatives. According to these propositions, Romanian child protection seemed to provide a worst case scenario for Europeanization, as initially none of these conditions held. And yet the paper shows that substantial Europeanization occurred anyway. We argue that the EU experienced a very slow start with Romania but that it cultivated an opposition that responded to EU initiatives when that opposition took power. Moreover, the EU found three “workarounds” to the obstacles just noted: it asserted legislative targets it did not possess itself, invented new policy tools, and drew protection for its most controversial policy from another international organization, the ECHR. Our central theoretical claim is that external pressure requires internal accommodation in order to have lasting effects. The claim has important implications for the diffusion and conditionality debates.

WTO Accessions: The Story So Far

AbstractDrawing on his thirteen years of experience as a Counsellor in the Accessions Division of the WTO Secretariat, Peter Milthorp describes accession as consisting of 'government-to-government negotiation, conducted at two mutually interactive levels'. The multilateral negotiations among the acceding country and the collective WTO membership correspond to Putnam's Level I; while the bilateral negotiations between the acceding country and individual members to agree on market access commitments require domestic bargaining and coalition building, and provide evidence of Putnam's Level II schema. Milthorp argues that the most arduous negotiations fall upon the government of the acceding country (that is, Level II), as it must develop a focused yet flexible negotiating mandate, implement economic reforms that may cause short-term hardship to some previously protected sectors, and ensure that negotiations progress steadily — all in order to retain political support for ratification. For accession negotiations to reach the end-game, negotiators must thus engage in both international and domestic diplomacy to create a balanced package that is acceptable to both WTO members as well as domestic stakeholders.

Review: A Shattered Peace

A SHATTERED PEACE Versailles 1919 and Price We Pay Today David A. Andelman Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2008. 326pp. US$25.95 cloth (ISBN 978-0-471-78898-0)No peace settlement in modern history has provoked more widespread controversy than Paris peace treaties of 1919. For much ofthe 20th century, historians and policymakers alike have debated extent to which Paris peacemakers of 191 9 should be blamed for subsequent breakdown of international order. The condemnation of Versailles began immediately after signing of treaty. John Maynard Keynes, himself a junior member of British delegation to Paris, famously argued that victors provoked German hostility by pursuing an unnecessarily vindictive settlement, while Woodr ow Wilson's friend and advisor in Paris, Edward Mandell House, admitted in his diary that the treaty is bad and should never have been made.Almost 90 years after conclusion of treaties of Versailles, St. Germain, and Trianon, matters no longer seem so stark and straightforward. Few people would dispute that treaties were a diplomatic disaster, offending vanquished and many of those smaller aspiring nations that had joined allied war effort in an attempt to gain recognition as independent states. Yet much of literature on Paris peace treaties over last 15 years has complicated picture of western ill will with a heightened recognition of highly limited scope of action that western policymakers had in face of nationalist expectations in their home countries after four years of uninterrupted bloodshed on a historically unprecedented scale. Thanks to inspiring works such as Margaret MacMillan's Peacemakers (2001), Zara Steiner 's The Lights That Failed (2005), and Manfred Boemeke's The Treaty ofVersailles (1998), we know a great deal about obstacles and constraints faced by key policymakers, Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, and Georges Clemenceau, as well as divergent national war aims and shifting domestic coalitions that shaped final treaty document. Confronted with tough realities of building a new world order from ruins of 19thcentury diplomacy, peace treaties constituted no more and no less than minimal consensus on which key players could agree.At same time, historians have begun to acknowledge that peacemakers' efforts to reconstruct wartorn Europe were not altogether unsuccessful. The League of Nations in particular, often charged with responsibility for failing to prevent rearmament and outbreak of Second World War, certainly made substantial contributions in fields of healthcare, drug control, economic cooperation, labour legislation, and laws to prevent illegal trafficking of women. Its work foreshadowed aspects of European and global cooperation that are usually described as emerging after Second World War, both in terms of policy content and impact that members of League's secretariat had on post- World War II institutions such as United Nations, European Community, World Health Organization, International Court of Justice, and International Labour Organization.David Andelman's new account ofVersailles and its aftermath certainly strikes a more sombre tone. …

A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft

When can economic sanctions and incentives achieve important political objectives? Why do they often fail? We propose a political theory of economic statecraft, arguing that the success of economic statecraft does not depend on the magnitude of its economic effect. Instead, it succeeds when the economic pain or gain it engenders translates into political costs or opportunities. We argue that the political effects of economic signals will depend on a variety of international and domestic political factors, the most important of which is the target state’s level of stateness, comprised of three components: autonomy, capacity, and legitimacy. When economic statecraft motivates key domestic coalitions to push for policy change, high stateness enables target state leaders to resist their calls and defy the sender. Conversely, when economic statecraft convinces target leaders that they ought to comply with the sender’s demands, high stateness enable them to overcome domestic opposition to compromise. To evaluate the usefulness of our theory, we employ a plausibility probe, testing our approach against three leading alternatives (the realist, economic liberal, and domestic conditionalist approaches) with case studies of Western economic incentives to Hungary and Romania after the Cold War and Indian sanctions against Nepal in the late 1980s. The literature on economic statecraft suffers from two important limitations. First, despite Baldwin’s (1985) observation that various forms of economic statecraft follow a similar logic and Hirschman’s (1980) assertion that economic incentives influence states because of the possibility they create for future economic sanctions, the existing literature treats economic sanctions and economic incentives as analytically distinct. Second, much of the literature consists of a rather sterile debate about whether economic sanctions or incentives can achieve important foreign-policy objectives, with less attention to the more policy-relevant issue of when and under what conditions economic statecraft can achieve these goals (Blanchard and Ripsman 1999).

Protecting Free Trade: The Political Economy of Rules of Origin

The design of rules of origin in free trade agreements (FTAs) arouses spirited lobbying campaigns that mostly escape public attention. This article argues that the domestic groups generally most favorable to FTAs differ in their preferences over rules of origin: industries with large returns to scale favor strict rules of origin to gain scale economies in an FTA, while industries with multinational supply chains prefer lenient rules of origin to accommodate offshore procurement. An econometric analysis of rules of origin in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) finds tougher rules of origin the higher the external trade protection and the larger the returns to scale, and more permissive rules of origin the greater the involvement in foreign sourcing. The results suggest that rules of origin may be critical to building domestic coalitions for FTAs. Industry preferences toward rules of origin therefore have important implications for the politics of FTA ratification.