Domestic Accountability Research Articles

Domestic accountability and non-compliance with international law: Evidence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights

Domestic public preferences often shape leaders’ decisions to comply with international legal rulings. Human rights scholars usually assume these preferences favor enforcement and justice. However, just because the public supports human rights does not mean they universally support remedies ordered by international courts. What happens when leaders face competing compliance pressures from an international court and domestic public? I examine this question in the context of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, a regional human rights court that operates primarily in Latin America. I argue that non-compliance may sometimes result from democratic leaders adjusting compliance behavior according to public opinion, especially when the implicated actor is popular. In particular, I argue that compliance is a function of proximity to the next presidential election, therefore necessitating greater responsiveness to the public’s opinions, and the public’s attitudes toward the actor implicated by the ruling. I test my argument on an original dataset of all Inter-American Court rulings implicating the military. I show that if the public does not support the military, the probability of compliance increases closer to an election; however, if the public does support the military, the probability of compliance decreases. My findings suggest the importance of incorporating the public’s attitudes into existing models of compliance with international law.

Domestic Accountability Efforts in Response to the Russia–Ukraine War

Abstract Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Ukrainian authorities have faced an unprecedented surge in the numbers of alleged mass atrocity crimes committed in the areas of hostilities and parts of Ukraine’s (de)occupied territories. Eight months into the war, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine has already registered over 47,000 instances of alleged crimes, including war crimes and the crime of aggression. Ukrainian courts have swiftly delivered first verdicts in the war crimes trials signalling their willingness to deliver justice even in the midst of the raging war. This article provides a brief recap of the domestic prosecution of atrocity crimes prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. It then evaluates the progress that has been achieved by the Ukrainian authorities and judiciary in relation to the prosecution and adjudication of war crimes since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It analyses key findings of the first war crimes verdicts rendered by the Solomyanskyy District City Court in Kyiv (later modified by the Kyiv Court of Appeals with respect to the sentence) and the Kotelevskyy District Court in the Poltava region, and appraises the application of international humanitarian law by Ukrainian judges. The article concludes by situating Ukrainian domestic efforts within the larger context in closing the impunity gap for atrocity crimes against the backdrop of a broader discussion of transitional justice in Ukraine.

Domestic accountability through strategic litigation: Towards redress and reparations for Kenya's 2007-2008 post-election sexual and gender-based violence

There are a range of impediments in the pursuit of redress and reparations for sexual violence, more so in conflict and post-conflict situations. Often if accountability is sought through judicial institutions, it is through criminal proceedings. However, another option available is to file, simultaneously or alternatively, a civil and/or constitutional proceeding. In February 2013 six women and two men who were sexual and gender-based violence survivors of Kenya's 2007-8 postelection violence filed a constitutional petition. On 10 December 2020 the Kenyan High Court awarded four survivors Kes 4 million (approximately US $36 513) as general damages for the violation of their constitutional rights. This article, which is anchored on Kenya's human rights obligations, uses Kenya as a case study to examine the pursuit of domestic accountability through strategic litigation and the contribution made towards redress and reparation for survivors of sexual and gender-based violence from post-election violence. First, the author argues that the transitional justice approach in Kenya provided the foundation for the strategic litigation case. Therefore, the article provides an overview of key aspects of Kenya's transitional justice approach. Second, the author argues that to understand the significance of the strategic litigation, an understanding of the sexual and gender-based violence which necessitated the strategic litigation case is necessary. The article therefore examines Kenya's legacy of historical injustice and gross human rights abuses which played a role in the sexual and gender-based violence during post-election violence. Third, the author analyses the strategic litigation case, considering the key claims by the petitioners and the decision of the Court. Finally, the article discusses the lessons learnt and contribution made by this case. The author submits that, although imperfect, this strategic litigation was a valuable recognition and acknowledgment of sexual and gender-based violence survivors of post-election violence, contributed to reparation access and had an impact on domestic accountability as an option for redress and reparation.

Accountability and cyber conflict: examining institutional constraints on the use of cyber proxies

As state-sponsored cyber operations have proliferated, some states are outsourcing these operations to non-state cyber proxies. However, given the relative ease of outsourcing cyber operations, it is puzzling why more states are not engaged in this practice. I examine how domestic accountability institutions potentially explain this restraint in the use of cyber proxies. I argue that in cases where the incumbent is likely to be held to account for cyber operations, there is restraint in the use of proxies. Moreover, I distinguish vertical from horizontal accountability and argue that because vertical accountability mechanisms directly threaten the tenure of the incumbent if outsourced cyber operations go wrong, it has a greater constraining effect relative to horizontal accountability. I test these propositions with new data on the activities of several hacker groups and robustly confirm that accountability institutions do place significant constraints on the use of cyber proxies.

Utilising the due diligence standard to interrogate Kenya's accountability efforts with regard to survivors of sexual violence in the 2007-2008 post-election violence

SUMMARY Sexual violence is a human rights violation and is addressed under a growing number of international agreements including the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, among others. This article uses the due diligence standard, as elaborated on by the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, to interrogate Kenya's domestic accountability efforts with regard to sexual violence in the 2007/2008 post-election violence. It finds that Kenya suffered from a number of structural and systemic shortcomings that resulted in its failure to meet its obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and compensate for such acts of sexual violence perpetrated by both state and non-state actors. Key among them are a lack of well-coordinated multi-sectoral approaches to address sexual violence; human capacity gaps in the provision of medico-legal services to survivors; and systemic failures in the investigation and prosecution of sexual violence cases. The article further highlights the hope for future accountability inherent in the recent ruling in Constitutional Petition 112 of 2013 which held the state accountable for all gaps and shortcomings in responding to sexual violence during the post-election violence. The article concludes by advocating community-based multi-sectoral approaches in prevention and response to sexual violence in the Kenyan context with an emphasis on improving both human and technical capacities for provision of medico-legal services to survivors. Key words: sexual violence; human rights; Kenya 2007-2008 postelection violence; medico-legal responses to sexual violence

Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners

Why do states join wartime coalitions despite the absence of a salient threat or strong ties to the coalition leader? We argue states make unexpectedly high contributions to coalition warfare as a costly signal of their desire for a stronger relationship with the coalition leader. Conventional theories insufficiently explain why states without immediate security interests or strong ties to the lead state over-contribute relative to their capacity. Using newly compiled data on troop contributions to the war in Afghanistan (2001–2014), we find states are most likely to contribute a higher share of their armed forces when their relationship with the US has unrealized alliance potential. States with under-performing alignments leave substantial room for subsequent gains to be had from signaling their commitment to the leading coalition actor. Our finding helps explain why states risk the costs of war—casualties and domestic accountability—by participating in coalition warfare.

Prioritizing Accountability for Sexual Terrorism on the Global Peace and Security Agenda: An Assessment of the Way Forward from National Prosecutions of Sexual Terrorism by Boko Haram to Security Council Decisiveness

Twenty years after the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security and twenty-five years after the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, the prevalence of sexual violence by parties to armed conflicts continues unabated. Despite the responsibility of every State to address such crimes, conflict-related sexual violence has not been met with corresponding accountability. At the same time, national prosecutions of terrorist activities have largely focused on membership and financing of terrorist groups. Even though the majority of States have endorsed the historic 2013 Declaration of Commitment to End Sexual Violence in Conflict which provides that 'sexual violence committed in conflict must not be viewed as a lesser crime,' accountability for 'sexual terrorism' – defined in the article as conflict-related sexual violence and human trafficking utilized as a tactic of terrorism – has not garnered the same response as other terrorism crimes especially in Security Council resolutions.<br/> With the focus on Boko Haram, this article addresses the practicalities of national investigations and prosecutions in Nigeria of conflict-related sexual violence and human trafficking as acts of terrorism using Nigeria's 2011 Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) and its 2013 amendment. Although these pieces of legislation make no express provision for accountability for sexual terrorism, the article proposes interpretations of provisions in the TPA that could be utilized to investigate and prosecute sexual terrorism by Boko Haram. The article also addresses some practical challenges faced by federal prosecutors in bringing such charges to court such as evidentiary practices requiring medical corroboration and it explores possible solutions to ensure accountability. Finally, the article juxtaposes Security Council resolutions on terrorist financing with resolutions on the nexus between terrorism, human trafficking, and conflictrelated sexual violence. It observes that, adopting resolutions pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council gave terrorist financing a platform on which accountability was mandated. A similar platform has not been afforded to sexual terrorism and the article explores possible reasons. In the author's view, until sexual terrorism is given the same platform as terrorist financing, the push for domestic accountability for sexual terrorism remains a battle on an uphill road paved with good intentions.

Understanding and comparing HIV-related law and policy environments: cross-national data and accountability for the global AIDS response

Law and policy differences help explain why, as HIV-related science has advanced swiftly, some countries have realised remarkable progress on AIDS while others see expanding epidemics. We describe the structure...

Accountability Through Dialogue: The Presidencîa Aberta E Inclusiva In Mozambique

Accountability is a central feature of democracy. Governments must explain what they are doing, justify why they are doing certain things and not others. Moreover, accountability increases the likelihood of the improvement of public services if citizens have the political scope to hold politicians and administrators accountable, and potentially sanction them. Consequently, developing countries as well as the OECD-donor community have committed themselves to working towards the improvement of domestic accountability in developing countries. In many developing countries, ccountability is exercised through both formal and informal institutions. This paper summarises the results of an empirical study on accountability in Mozambique. It focuses on the Presidencia Aberta e Inclusiva (PAI, Open and Inclusive Presidency), a legally not codified institution for accountability introduced by President Armando E. Guebuza. It provides a public forum for the president to engage in a dialogue with the population and the local administrations, in combination with an ongoing process of decentralisation. This study shows that the interaction between formal and more informal institutions has a mixed influence on policymaking and democracy. Overall, there is an untapped potential to improve the PAI as an institution for accountability that strengthens formal institutions. In analysing the interplay between the PAI and formal institutions in two Mozambican provinces, we assess it to be a relatively effective monitoring instrument. • The PAI fosters a top-down logic of coherence and implementation of development policies at all state levels. In doing so, it particularly contributes to aligning development policies to the government’s strategic five-year plan. • The PAI has the potential to enhance the quality of democracy, as it offers the opportunity for the provision of accountability by different levels of the executive and a new venue for citizen participation in an environment in which other forms of participation are largely constrained. However, thus far, this potential for accountability and participation has not yet fully unfolded, because the process is dominated by the executive in processes of political decision making. • The PAI creates a structure with challenging consequences for a coherent planning and implementation process at the sub-national level. It potentially poses a threat to the development of effective independent institutions at the local level, such as district administrations, municipalities and Conselhos Consultivos (consultative councils) that are actually tasked with ensuring a coherent implementation of development policies. The PAI’s contribution to the Mozambican decentralisation process can be improved by raising awareness on the functions and responsibilities of formal institutions at the sub-national level and by more closely aligning the PAI’s follow-up process to already existing policy processes. For donors it is not recommended to directly interact with the PAI in development aid, but to focus on its effect on existing development programmes.

Too Many Cooks: Multiple International Principals Can Spoil the Quality of Governance

We contribute to the research stream emphasizing the competition between international organizations and citizens for influence over the domestic policy choices of national politicians. Drawing upon previous theoretical and empirical work on the common agency problem, we contend that the joint influence of a country’s memberships in multiple international governmental organizations (IGOs) generates consistent, unintended, disruptive effects, which reduces domestic accountability and can worsen the quality of a domestic government. Even if we assume that joining any particular IGO is beneficial for member states, the competing demands of multiple IGO memberships could undermine the quality of their governments. Our comparative, cross-national empirical findings support this theoretical expectation. Countries participating in a larger number of IGOs tend to have poorer scores on five widely used indicators of the quality of a domestic government. Future research should identify the types of policies and countries where the negative externalities of international cooperation on domestic accountability are greatest.

Transnational Parliamentarism and the Dynamics of the IPC CFSP/CSDP: Policy-making, Accountability and Cooperation

Abstract This contribution proposes a framework of transnational parliamentarism to study inter-parliamentary cooperation, and applies it to the interparliamentary conference on CFSP/CSDP. It asks to what extent the IPC’s functioning reflects its constitutive intergovernmental logic, or whether its behaviour in practice might be guided by a transnational logic, hence becoming something more than just the parliamentary mirror of an intergovernmental cooperation framework. To this end we outline three functions that are brought forward by transnational parliamentarism: policy-making, collective accountability and cooperation, and investigate to which extent these logics can be observed in the functioning of the IPC CFSP/CSDP. Applying the framework reveals a nuanced picture of an inter-parliamentary cooperation framework which to some extent goes beyond purely intergovernmental functions of domestic accountability and representation, and also includes the performance of policy-making and parliamentary cooperation functions.

Perils of development funding? The tale of EU Funds and grand corruption in Central and Eastern Europe

AbstractGiven the unprecedented scale of intergovernmental development funding and the importance of institutional quality for human well‐being, it is imperative to precisely understand the impact of development funds on corruption. In Europe, European Union (EU) Funds provide a boost to public spending in recipient member states while introducing additional corruption controls. We investigate whether EU Funds increase high‐level corruption in the Czech Republic and Hungary in 2009–2012. We analyze newly collected data from over 100,000 public procurement contracts to develop objective corruption risk indicators and link them to agency level data in the public sector. Propensity score matching estimations suggest that EU funds increase corruption risk by up to 34 percent. The negative effects are largely attributable to overly formalistic compliance and EU Funds overriding domestic accountability mechanisms in public organizations entirely dependent on external funds. The policy implications are profound: governments should reduce barriers to market entry by lowering red tape and prevent excessive concentration of funds.

Aid and good governance: Examining aggregate unintended effects of aid

Although donors generally aim to improve governance in recipient countries by various means, critics claim that the aggregate effect of large aid flows is the deterioration of governance. Aid is said to weaken domestic accountability, sustain authoritarian regimes, increase political instability, weaken government capacities, and increase corruption. Conducting a systematic search in Web of Science, this paper reviews the empirical evidence for these unintended aggregate effects of aid on the political, administrative, and judicial dimensions of good governance. It finds that the negative effects of aid on governance are much exaggerated. The aggregate effect of aid on democracy has become more positive after the Cold War, and the effect of aid on government capacity and on reducing corruption has also improved over time. Furthermore, most studies show a positive effect of aid on political stability. These findings imply that donor intentions matter: donors that are serious about their intended effects on governance are able to mitigate the possible negative unintended effects of their aid.

The Intersectionality of Domestic and Global Accountability: UNHCR and Australian Refugee Status Determination

The negative consequences for domestic accountability of a State that fails to respect its international law obligations or undermines international institutions has the potential to be a powerful stimulus for administrative justice in the domestic context, as well as for global accountability. An example of a contested area of global accountability is the lack of independent review available for United Nations High Commissioner’s (UNHCR) refugee status determination (RSD) procedures. Using Australia’s own RSD as a case study, this paper will argue that Australia’s refugee policies have implicitly contributed to an acceptance of UNHCR’s comparatively limited RSD procedural standards as a valid part of the international refugee system. In particular, the way that Australian policy has contributed to the significant workload of UNHCR and has helped to concretise UNHCR’s RSD standards as ‘best practice’ in certain circumstances must be of concern. A material cause of UNHCR’s lack of accountability in its own RSD procedures is States’ tendency to prioritise self-interest over international obligations. Accordingly, any ‘solution’ that addresses UNHCR’s lack of accountability must be done so on both a global and domestic level. For Australia, acknowledging the negative impacts of its refugee policies on its legal, political and fiscal accountability may just provide an impetus for the rejection of its subversion of traditional administrative decision-making in a way that denies access to administrative justice to a select few. In turn, such an acknowledgment could contribute to the development of better procedural safeguards for RSD at the global level.

Rule of law, corruption and democratic accountability in the course of EU enlargement

ABSTRACTWhy has the European Union’s (EU’s) promotion of rule of law (RoL) triggered different and largely surface-thin reforms across countries subject to a similar frame of enlargement in the Western Balkans (WB)? We hypothesize that the domestic (non-)enforcement of EU-promoted rules depends on the mobilization of politically autonomous constituencies of change – organized advocacy groups and autonomous state institutions – which enable democratic accountability. The empirical investigation focuses on the prosecution of political corruption as empirical foci to assessing the travails of EU-promoted rules in the domestic context. Specifically, we trace the role of (1) EU’s RoL promotion strategy, (2) political resistance and (3) domestic accountability in explaining different records of prosecution of political corruption in Albania and Croatia.

The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations: Ending Impunity Through 'Positive Complementarityy?

This Article analyzes the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations issued by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Article describes the goals, principles and procedures set forth in the Paper, and discusses key questions and dilemmas relating to how the OTP approaches these in practice. In particular, the Article focuses on the interplay and synergies between ICC preliminary examinations and accountability mechanisms at the domestic level, often referred to as ‘positive complementarity’. Such an analysis is important already because the OTP itself and many scholars alike claim that a key goal of preliminary examinations involves ‘the ending of impunity, by encouraging genuine national proceedings’. Despite the attention being afforded the concept of ‘positive complementarity’, however, only few existing studies examine the extent to which this goal is being effectively pursued by the OTP at the preliminary examination phase and how ICC preliminary examinations may affect national authorities’ commitment to domestic accountability processes and otherwise impact the scope, nature and conduct of such processes. The Article concludes that, although limited in scope, existing empirically-based studies point to a more complex picture concerning the synergies between preliminary examinations and domestic accountability processes compared to that endorsed by the OTP. Utilizing the notions of ‘hand-over’ and ‘burden-sharing’ versions of complementarity, the Article observes that both versions of complementarity may face significant challenges in practice, especially in situations where there is no or only limited political at the national level to advance accountability for the crimes under ICC scrutiny. Yet, the Article also argues that the OTP may, through its monitoring, statements and encouragement at the preliminary examination phase, advance the rule of law in national jurisdictions in other subtle ways, for example by ‘lifting’ perceptions of the seriousness of the abuses under scrutiny to a new level.

Budget Support, Budget Transparency and Domestic Accountability in Mozambique

Donors have provided foreign aid in the form of budget support in order not only to promote growth and poverty reduction but increasingly also to strengthen domestic accountability in the recipient country. Yet, despite numerous studies and evaluations, little information has been provided on how individual elements of budget support work towards domestic accountability. This article reconstructs the donors’ accountability-claim and hypothesises effects of budget support on budget transparency and domestic accountability. Evidence from empirical research in Mozambique confirms the effectiveness of budget support to improve budget transparency, and therefore supports the core accountability-claim. Moreover, the article provides insights from the demand-side, where domestic accountability institutions play an active role in the process of answerability.

Rule of Law, Corruption and Democratic Accountability in the Course of EU Enlargement

Why has the EU’s promotion of Rule of Law (RoL) triggered different and largely surface-thin reforms across countries subject to a similar frame of enlargement in the Western Balkans (WB)? We hypothesize that the domestic (non)enforcement of EU promoted rules depends on the mobilization of politically autonomous constituencies of change – organized advocacy groups and autonomous state institutions – which amount domestic accountability. The empirical investigation focuses on the prosecution of political corruption as empirical foci to assessing the travails of EU-promoted rules in the domestic context. Specifically, we trace the role of (1) EU’s RoL promotion strategy, (2) political resistance and (3) domestic accountability in explaining different records of prosecution of political corruption in Albania and Croatia.

Aid Modalities Matter: The Impact of Different World Bank and IMF Programs on Democratization in Developing Countries

Many argue that autocratic regimes allocate revenues from foreign aid with the aim of stabilizing their rule rather than serving economic and social development. However, donors often condition foreign aid on reforms in recipient states. We argue that when those conditions for reform focus on participative processes and government accountability, they positively affect democratization. We evaluate our claim based on different types of World Bank and IMF lending programs for a panel of 100 low- and middle-income countries over the years 1980–2011. Our results suggest that aid positively affects democratization when it strengthens domestic accountability mechanisms and thereby reduces its fungibility for recipients. The World Bank and the IMF’s poverty reduction strategy programs provide a notable case of this effect.

Bringing Home Rome: Explaining the Domestication of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

This paper presents an empirical analysis of domestication of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, focusing specially on African States Parties. Of the 34 current African States Parties to the Rome Statute, 12 have adopted legislation partially or fully domesticating the Statute by incorporating its complementarity and/or cooperation provisions into domestic law. The adoption of such legislation is significant insofar as it enables domestic prosecutions of the crimes -- genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity -- under the ICC's jurisdiction and/or establishes mechanisms to promote state cooperation with the Court in the conduct of investigations and the execution of arrest warrants; as such, domestication arguably represents a deeper and more significant to the ICC than simply ratifying the Statute. At the same time, explaining the variation in domestication of the Statute by African States Parties can shed light on the controversial role of the ICC in Africa, particularly the validity of widespread criticisms of the Court as biased or otherwise anti-African. To this end, this paper tests the commitment theory of state to the ICC. This theory, which was developed by Simmons and Danner (2010) to explain ratification of the Statute, posits that states with histories of recent violence and weak domestic accountability mechanisms (non-democracies) commit to the ICC to make credible commitments to domestic adversaries to ratchet down violence. I test the applicability of this theory to domestication of the Statute by African States Parties using survival analysis of quarterly data on domestication in Africa from 1998 through 2013 with approximately 1,100 observations. I find no evidence in support of credible theory with respect to domestication by African States Parties. A brief case study of ongoing efforts to fully domesticate the Rome Statute in the Democratic Republic of Congo supports my statistical findings and suggests that, rather than committing to the ICC to ratchet down violence, states commit to the Court to employ it as a legal weapon against internal adversaries.