Abstract
We contribute to the research stream emphasizing the competition between international organizations and citizens for influence over the domestic policy choices of national politicians. Drawing upon previous theoretical and empirical work on the common agency problem, we contend that the joint influence of a country’s memberships in multiple international governmental organizations (IGOs) generates consistent, unintended, disruptive effects, which reduces domestic accountability and can worsen the quality of a domestic government. Even if we assume that joining any particular IGO is beneficial for member states, the competing demands of multiple IGO memberships could undermine the quality of their governments. Our comparative, cross-national empirical findings support this theoretical expectation. Countries participating in a larger number of IGOs tend to have poorer scores on five widely used indicators of the quality of a domestic government. Future research should identify the types of policies and countries where the negative externalities of international cooperation on domestic accountability are greatest.
Highlights
We cannot fully understand politics and policymaking within countries without considering the linkages between national and international actors (Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988; Keohane 2009).In this paper, we focus on the effects of international governmental organizations (IGOs) on the quality of domestic government1
We acknowledge that the benefits from IGO membership may be necessary to address some specific problems, but we argue that the demands made by multiple international principals could make it more difficult for citizens to control domestic politicians
Though there are dissident voices, the prevailing account in the literature is that international collaboration encourages domestic politicians to adopt policies that lead to a wide variety of good outcomes, including an improved domestic government (Bauhr and Nasiritousi 2012)
Summary
We cannot fully understand politics and policymaking within countries without considering the linkages between national and international actors (Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988; Keohane 2009).In this paper, we focus on the effects of international governmental organizations (IGOs) on the quality of domestic government. Membership in multiple IGOs necessitates a trade-off between gains achieved from international cooperation and an inevitable loss of domestic accountability. To the degree that IGOs can sanction or reward policy choices of domestic politicians (agents), they compete with citizens and domestic institutions (domestic principals) to hold politicians accountable. We emphasize that such competition provides domestic politicians with greater opportunities to shirk their responsibilities, to engage in rent seeking, and to act with greater autonomy (Bourguignon and Sundberg 2007; Knack 2001; Knack and Rahman 2007; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Moravcsik 1994; Papadopoulos 2010)
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
