Cyberspace Domain Research Articles

Viral Affects and Economies of Desire in Hirotaka Tobi’s “Autogenic Dreaming”

This essay provides a close reading of Hirotaka Tobi’s short story “Autogenic Dreaming,” concentrating on its nuanced engagement with the trajectory of Japanese literary sensibilities in a present marked by the decline of modern narratives of history, identity, and nation. With attention to its innovative content and form, it considers the text’s use of the theoretically limitless domain of cyberspace as a site for elaborating the possibility for literature to act in accordance with more recently emergent technologies of representation by leveraging the symbolic field of language to generate unanticipated meanings and solicit transformative encounters. Ultimately, it argues that “Autogenic Dreaming” not only offers a speculative vision of a technologically mediated future, but also speaks to the futurity of Japanese literature itself, exemplifying what might be termed an “emergent fiction” that fulfills a growing demand for literature that enables us to experience novel constellations of subjectivity, interaction, and desire.

Different Problems Require Different Solutions: How Air Warfare Norms Should Inform IHL Targeting Law Reform & Cyber Warfare

On February 19, 2018, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres claimed that he was “absolutely convinced” that “the next war will begin with a massive cyber-attack to destroy military capacity . . . and paralyze basic infrastructure.” The Secretary-General’s greatest concern, however, is that he believes “there is no regulatory scheme for that type of warfare, it is not clear how the Geneva Convention or international humanitarian law applies to it.” Although Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (AP I) targeting laws generally identify who and what States may target in war, it expressly limits itself to attacks affecting people and objects on land. But what about online? This Note discusses the limited applicability of the current targeting laws to cyber warfare. Specifically, it asks whether the land-centric AP I targeting laws adequately address cyber-attacks. It analogizes the unique features of cyber warfare to those in air warfare. Because both cyber and air warfare, unlike land combat, are fought beyond the traditional battlefield and closer to civilians, are object-prime targeting methods of warfare, and serve strategic attack objectives, AP I land-centric targeting laws cannot adequately regulate these types of warfare. This Note finds that, like airspace, the cyberspace domain is sufficiently different from land and, thus, requires specific rules similar to those provided under the laws of air warfare.

Cybersecurity: A Deep Dive Into the Abyss

AbstractCyberspace reaches all corners of human access and includes cyber-physical systems such as power grids, communication networks, industrial plants, transportation networks, ports and shipping, and a myriad of networked home appliances through the Internet of Things. One goal of this article is to engage and inform personnel in the maritime domain to help secure cyberspace from adversaries. Another goal is to provide an introductory systems view to help manage cyberspace security. We show that cyberspace is a reflection of human networks and share the advantages and flaws inherent in these human networks. Trust in this network is the missing link that prevents us from securing this network. Although this viewpoint is not an exact model, we believe it helps simplify the complexity of cyberspace and the wide variety of attacks that are possible. These goals help the average person see the big picture, and the entire system can become more robust by allowing everyone to participate intelligently in this endeavor. This article explains in a more simplistic but useful manner the domain of cyberspace, enabling better security of the ecosystem.

The War on Cyberterrorism

ABSTRACTThis article addresses the problem of international law enforcement within the War on Cyberterrorism. Hybrid conflicts have replaced the traditional ones, and new threats have emerged in cyberspace, which has become a virtual battlefield. Cyber threats - cybercrimes, cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare - are a major concern for Western governments, especially for the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The international community has begun to consider cyberattacks as a form of terrorism, to which the same measures apply. Because the term “terrorism” is ambiguous and legaly undefined, there is no consensus on a definition of the derivative term “cyberterrorism”, which is left to the unilateral interpretations of states. Pretending to consider the cyberspace domain as traditional domains, and claiming to apply IHL for the sole purpose of lawfully using armed forces in contrast to cyberterrorism is a stretch. This paper addresses the question of whether or not current laws of war and international humanitarian law apply to cyber domain, and gives some recommendations on how to tackle this issue.

Explaining Taiwan’s Cybersecurity Policy Prior to 2016: Effects of Norms and Identities

This paper implements a constructivist approach from the discipline of International Relations (IR) to investigate the interplay between international politics and cyberspace, and explains why the Taiwanese government has been relatively slow to exploit cyber warfare for national-defense purposes prior to 2016. While this paper acknowledges the technology determinist’s argument that new technology can set the direction of politics, developments in Taiwan have brought to our attention a different perspective, which is that politics can still shape the future direction and use of technology. This analysis enables us to understand, through the case of Taiwan, how politics trumps both technical decisions and the overall direction of technology. Looking closely at the case of Taiwan’s cybersecurity contributes to the broader IR literature concerning the effects of norms and identities, and extends policy analysis to the domain of cyberspace. It establishes a dialogue between the IR literature and Cybersecurity Studies, and reduces the knowledge gap in understanding Taiwan’s security policy.

Cyberspace

The transition of the warfare mentality from the conventional domains of engagement (air, land, maritime, and space) to the cyberspace domain has not been an easy one for established organizations and institutions. The battlefield, in which now speed and stealth instead of size and budget are the determining factors that provide an edge have not well for many, especially those in the military. Now they do not clearly dictate who amongst combatants have the ‘upper hand' and represent a significant paradigm shift from factors that were very good predictors of a potential outcome of military conflicts. The battles of the past were largely over territories and resources (Landscape Metrics, 2015). We see outcomes now being influenced by a broader range of factors, including politics, culture, economy, religion, and ethnicity. These new ‘pivot points' for conflict require a very different understanding and approach to achieve desired outcomes. Technology continues to be the main enabler that has transformed the battlefield and the rules of engagement from the conventional domains to cyberspace. The issue of attribution has been a huge differentiator and looms very large in cyberspace conflicts because it is very difficult to determine within a sufficient timeframe the source of an attack and to be able to respond to or prevent attacks. Now conflicts have expanded in such a way that combatants now cross all prospective levels of society from targets to attackers or perpetrators. The low cost required to provide significant damage to a desired target environment in cyberspace has been a game changer. As a result, the rules of engagement which were much clearer in conventional domains on military fronts are much more blurred due to the new realm of combatants, and as such, has changed many of the approaches and methodologies that were standard practices in traditional campaigns. In this paper, we focus on cyber conflicts and how the cultural differences of these three communities have plagued the ability to achieve a simple and coherent response against attackers and perpetrators. We pursue the relevance of trust and deterrence and their influence on ‘warfare' tactics in the cyberspace domain. We also look at culture and the ‘new norm' and how they have required consideration of new and unconventional approaches. We see how data can better inform decision makers and those responsible for designing and implementing campaigns in this new era of conflict. Our results indicate the need for a different model to work through the differences in culture if better are to be obtained by the combatants. In addition, we see that an approach that includes cyber deterrence framed in the context of active defense provides optimism on future outcomes.

MILITARY-BASED CYBER RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK FOR SUPPORTING CYBER WARFARE IN THAILAND

Information Technology (IT) Risk Management is designed to confirm the sufficiency of information security. There are many risk management/assessment standards, e.g. IS0 27005:2011 and NIST SP 800-30rev1, which are mainly designed for general organizations such as governments or businesses. Cyber risk assessment focused on military strategy has been rarely studied. Hence, this paper presents an innovative cyber risk assessment conceptual framework named “Cyber Risk Assessment (CRA)” which is extended from previous work with Military Risk Evaluation (MRE). This proposed CRA is the collection and integration of both quantitative and qualitative data. The Vulnerability Detection (VD) tools in Network Risk Evaluation (the previous studies) were used for the quantitative data collection and the focus group in the MRE (the proposed method) was used to collect qualitative data, which enhance the general risk assessment standard to achieve the objective of the research. The complexity of cyberspace domains with a military perspective is thoughtfully contemplated into the cyber risk assessment for national cyber security. Results of the proposed framework enable the possibility of cyber risk evaluation into score for national cyber security planning.

Internet of Things Service Provisioning Platform for Cross-Application Cooperation

With the development of Internet of Things (IoT), large-scale of resources and applications atop them emerge. However, most of existing efforts are “silo” solutions, there is a tight-coupling between the device and the application. The paradigm for IoT and its corresponding infrastructure are required to move away from isolated solutions towards cooperative models. Recent works have focused on applying Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) to IoT service provisioning. Other than the traditional services of cyberspace which are oriented to a two-tuple problem domain, IoT services are faced with a three-tuple problem domain of user requirement, cyberspace and physical space. One challenge of existing works is lacking of efficient mechanism to on-demand provisioning the sensing information in a loosely-coupled, decentralized way and then dynamically coordinate the relevant services to rapidly respond to changes in the physical world. Another challenge is how to systematically and effectively access (plug) the heterogeneous devices without intrusive changing. This paper proposes a service provisioning platform which enables to access heterogeneous devices and expose device capabilities as light-weighted service, and presents an event-based message interaction mode to facilitate the asynchronous, on-demand sharing of sensing information in distributed, loosely-coupled IoT environment. It provides the basic infrastructure for IoT application pattern: inner-domain high-degree autonomy and inter-domain dynamic coordination. The practicability of platform is validated by experimental evaluations and a District Heating Control and Information System (DHCIS).

Cybersecurity Firms Cyber Mercenaries?

The 21st century is experiencing the beginning of a new rebalancing of the world. Globalization, terrorism, weapons proliferation, the emerging East, and the rise of technology have resulted in shifting centers of power, the prominence of asymmetric threats, and quickly evolving warfare. In response, the United States military has undertaken a similar rebalancing to effectively meet these challenges. As the threat of conventional, World War II-style war continues to diminish, the emergence of a new battlefield, cyberspace, has taken a position equal to that of land, sea, air, and space. Arguably, cyberspace has become the fundamental stratum upon which modern warfighting capabilities are based — a state-of-the-art fighter plane is not very effective if its on-board systems and targeting network have been compromised. Beyond the empowering relationship between technology and weapons hardware, cyberspace potentially threatens the nation’s vital functions. Enemies may disable critical infrastructure, undermine logistical support, steal intelligence and communique, glean strategies, conduct industrial espionage, or wreak havoc on the civilian sector. But cyberspace is a double edged sword; just as cyberspace is a vulnerability to the United States, so is it too with all other advanced nations. Thus, it is not surprising that the United States military has created the U.S. Cyber Command to develop tactics and personnel capable of defending, attacking, and dominating the new cyberspace domain. However, the characteristics of cyberspace pose unique difficulties. In cyberspace, the best defense is a good offense. Typically, the ability to proactively defend against unauthorized access is short-lived as an adept enemy hacker can eventually find a weakness. Further, given the numerous preexisting vulnerabilities, defenses are most often reactive. Thus, agility and specialization are essential to be effective in cyberspace, both to attack and defend.In this realm, cybersecurity firms, defense contractors (collectively “PCSFs”) and state-sponsored hacker groups (“SSHGs”) have several advantages over traditional government actors, such as high specialization, quick innovation, higher pay, greater autonomy, and less accountability that make them particularly attractive for cyberwarfare. The combination of cyberwarfare and PCSFs/SSHGs is an exceptional blend of two systems almost completely unregulated by international or domestic law throughout the world. Under current domestic and international law, PCSFs/SSHGs operate in what is essentially a legal vacuum and with minimal restrictions. This Article addresses the legal classification of PCSFs/SSHGs if engaging in cyber-attacks. Part I examines the peculiarities of cyberwarfare vis-a-vis traditional war, and then discusses some recruiting advantages PCSFs/SSHGs have over the U.S. government in cyberspace. Part II outlines the distinction between cyber-crimes, cyber-espionage, and cyber-attacks. Part III discusses international and domestic law as it relates to mercenaries and the role of private defense companies in modern conflicts. Part IV analyzes whether PCSFs/SSHGs should be classified as mercenaries, ultimately arguing that PCSFs/SSHGs should be categorized as mercenaries as the law currently stands, and briefly concludes with prescribes a change to domestic law that will be able to adequately accommodate the role of private cyberwarriors. Although this Article will primarily focus on the United States’ particular position and U.S. PCSFs, many of the lessons apply globally SSHGs.

Whither cyberpower?

Since World War II, control over land, sea, air and space has been essential to projecting national power. During the past two decades, the domain of cyberspace has emerged; it is the new frontier for wielding the four instruments of power – diplomacy, information, military and economics. The pervasiveness of cyberspace supports near instantaneous action in all the domains of human power – land, sea, air, space and cyberspace. Could cyberspace be the one domain to rule them all?This paper draws on recognized theories of power in the physical world to create a lens for projecting and analyzing the future of cyberpower and cyber powers, helping clarify the nature of cyberspace and the entities that interact in cyberspace. The paper considers nation-states as well as non-state actors, and examines how they might operate, evolve and wield power in cyberspace. Also, it discusses power scenarios that may emerge in the cyberspace of the future.

Rising India: Partner in Shaping the Global Commons?

One of the major emerging U.S. security debates is the impact of rising powers on managing global commons such as the sea, air, space, and cyberspace domains. If the U.S. command of the commons was...

The Four Forces Shaping Cybersecurity

Cybersecurity was the topic in this paper. The author mention that advancing cybersecurity begins by recognizing all its aspects as a vector quantity with four distinct forces shaping its evolution. Rebranding exercise, organizational imperative, cyberspace domain, national defense priority were the forces mentioned and discussed.

Transformation of visual culture in relation to the spatial experience of postmodern flâneurs: the impact of MMORGs on contemporary Chinese cinema

The paper explores the visual impact of massively multiplayer online role-playing games that shares the same pleasures as postmodern flâneurs. As postmodern flâneurs, game players occupy multiple viewpoints as both the subject players and spectacle-spectators. The flâneurs' engagement in the simulated activities of walking, dancing, etc. begs the question of their experience and understanding of the relation between the diegetic imagery of body and the extra-diegetic implication of the players' presence in the immaterial domain of cyberspace. I argue that a strategy of de-suturing is employed in the course of the players' completion of the tasks in the virtual reality. This strategy is also seen as filmic and cinematic, which may give rise to a new tendency in contemporary Chinese cinema. Ming Ming (Susie Au, 2006) will be drawn as an example of this cinematic strategy that transforms the visual experience and literacy of the cinema.