War Doctrine Research Articles

War – Just or Justifiable? A Christian Orthodox Perspective

Being sent to the world Christianity had to determine its moral assessment of different worldly realities, war and peace among them. While the Western tradition rather early developed a just war doctrine, the East took a different path. War has constantly been perceived as evil though in some circumstances necessary and hence justifiable (but strictly speaking neither “just” nor “good”). Both the Greek Fathers and later Eastern authors and Church figures, like Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, would develop their understanding of warfare as “irrational” and an obstacle on every Christian’s path to theosis. The Russian Orthodox Bishops’ The Basis of the Social Concept is a rare example of a more elaborated theory of the justification of warfare.

The Nuclear Necessity Principle: Making U.S. Targeting Policy Conform with Ethics & the Laws of War

In 2013, Obama administration spokesmen stated that all U.S. nuclear war plans “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and seek to minimize collateral damage to civilian populations and civilian objects.” We analyze U.S. nuclear policy documents and argue that major changes must be made if U.S. nuclear war plans are to conform to these principles of just war doctrine and the law of armed conflict. We propose that the U.S. president announce a commitment to a “principle of necessity,” committing the United States not to use nuclear weapons against any military target that can be destroyed with reasonable probability of success by a conventional weapon. Such a doctrinal change would reduce collateral damage from any nuclear strike or retaliation by the United States and would, we argue, make our deterrent threats more credible and thus more effective.

The Path to Last Resort: The Role of Early Warning & Early Action

For just war doctrine to apply, the last resort requirement to exhaust all measures short-of-war must be fulfilled. Because of research and policy developments in the last fifteen years, the international community is now equipped with a richer understanding of how wars and atrocities evolve through time, improved precision about trigger points and risk factors that may accelerate that evolution, growing consensus on what prevention and mitigation steps to look for in that process, and new technologies for ascertaining these steps in order to intervene when mitigating action might deflect the escalation. It is thus argued that the responsibility of the international community to intervene in a timely and appropriate fashion has become increasingly clear and inescapable. It is further argued that the alert engagement of civil society in crafting this body of research and policy places a heavy public burden on government leaders to demonstrate that indeed all measures short-of-war have been exhausted. We now have at our collective disposal many more measures to deploy and many more witnesses to raise the alarm. Accordingly, the threshold for declaring that last resort has been reached has now become much higher.

Nuclear Weapons & Nuclear Use

While nuclear weapons were conceived to end a war, in the aftermath of their operational use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they became the central (and controversial) means to prevent a war. Nuclear deterrence formed the foundation of U.S. Cold War doctrine and the basis of an extended security guarantee to our allies. But the Cold War ended one-quarter century ago, and questions about the efficacy of deterrence, the need for nuclear weapons, and the ethics surrounding them have resurfaced as some call for further major reductions in inventory or the complete elimination of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Discussed from the perspective of a military practitioner, this essay highlights the continuing need for U.S. nuclear weapons in a global security environment that is highly complex and uncertain, and describes the means by which the credibility of the nuclear portion of the strategic deterrent is being preserved even as the role and prominence of these weapons have been reduced.

ENGAGING THE WORLD: ANTHONY LAKE AND AMERICAN GRAND STRATEGY, 1993–1997

ABSTRACTUsing recently available archival material, this article examines Lake's key beliefs and the part they had in shaping US grand strategy in the first Clinton administration. Lake operated as one of the major architects of the administration's foreign policy. His intellectual influence commenced in the 1992 presidential campaign, when he served as candidate Bill Clinton's principal foreign policy adviser, and continued through the first presidential term, reaching its most concrete manifestation in the Clinton administration's 1994 National security strategy. The article analyses Lake's ideas and his overarching concerns about national purpose, his strategic vision, and his definition of national security policy objectives using the analytical framework known as a mental map. Likewise, it considers his role in articulating a new grand strategy during a period of strategic adjustment, one in which the cold war doctrine of containment no longer applied.

China’s Emerging Indo-Pacific Naval Strategy

Although China has not formally put forward an Indo-Pacific naval strategy, the new national defense strategy of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Fighting Regional Informatized War, has changed the strategy of the PLA Navy (PLAN) from focusing on one ocean (the Pacific) to focusing on two oceans (the Pacific and Indian). As part of its mission in the far seas, the PLAN will require new blue water capabilities in the medium to long term. In short, the Indian Ocean is becoming a linchpin for China's new global naval reach. This essay argues that China is developing its military strategy for the Indian Ocean to protect and defend its economic and security interests in those waters. As a result, China's maritime presence there will only increase over time.The Indian Ocean and the Nexus of PLA and PLAN StrategiesChina's national defense strategy assists the nav y in setting service missions, development goals, and combat engagement rules. This paper includes just one conceptual guideline to shed light on PLAN activities in the Indian Ocean.1China's sixth national defense strategy, first adopted in 2004 and updated in 2015, introduced a new concept of defense, which enriched the original strategy and has immediate relevance to PLAN expansion. This does not refer merely to defense of China's geographic boundaries but also to protection of its new open-ended frontiers of national and economic security interests. It heavily factors in potential hostile scenarios against China's sea lines of communication (SLOC) through the Indian Ocean. Frontier defense entails efforts to both establish a forward naval presence and develop the long-range power-projection capabilities to sustain such a presence. This concept departs from the PLA's time-honored continental mentality in planning that had dominated previous defense strategies and favored the role of the army in the overall force structure. Although the PLA continues to maintain its homeland-based defense posture, frontier defense requires it to extend warfighting into the global commons as a way to enlarge China's strategic space. This requires the projection of new play Go posturing and the establishment of multidimensional zones, including outer space and cyberspace.2 A primary pillar for frontier defense involves the PLAN's capabilities for far-sea operations against a major sea power, and increasing the PLAN's effective combat reach into the Indian Ocean has been set as a capability criterion and medium-term objective. This is a consequence of Xi Jinping's One Belt, One Road initiative to increase connectivity to Europe through a northern land route and to Africa through a southern maritime corridor connecting China with the Middle East, which places a greater onus on the PLAN to protect China's SLOCs.Another important nexus between China's national defense strategy and naval strategy is the PLA's two war doctrines. With the prospect of a land disappearing, the country's security gravity has shifted from the western and northern land borders to the eastern coastal flank. If the PLA is dragged into a full maritime conflict in the East and South China Seas with the United States and Japan, India may take advantage by encroaching farther across the disputed Sino-Indian land borders. This is the first 1.5 scenario.3 The second scenario also involves India. If a sizeable maritime erupts in East Asia, the Indian Navy may be called on to disrupt China's SLOCs in the Indian Ocean in order to both strengthen India's position in the Sino-Indian border dispute and help U.S. operations in the Pacific. Both scenarios regard India as a potential threat. In response, the PLA's frontier defense would inevitably require the PLAN to expand its one-ocean strategy into a two-ocean strategy (the western Pacific Ocean plus the northern Indian Ocean) and thus extend its naval combat reach into the Indian Ocean rim.The Indian Ocean in the PLAN's Naval War ScenarioThe PLAN's doctrinal evolution has seen several major adjustments since 1987, each expanding its range of activities toward the far seas. …

A survey of high school students׳ views of modern war and just war principles

This article describes findings from a survey of high school students in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Florida, regarding their views of war and wartime policy. The survey is drawn from, and correlated to, elements of the Just War doctrine, a philosophical framework which forms the basis of most international law, treaties, and conventions. The survey results indicate that students tend to adhere to traditional moral norms regarding the conditions for engaging in war, but have considerable divergences from internationally-held principles regarding how a war is waged. The findings indicate that social studies instructors face impediments in helping students acquire high-level, meaningful conceptions of war as a topic of study. The article describes the necessity of moral and critical inquiry in social studies education and the value of the Just War doctrine as pedagogical tool towards that end.

Am Beginn eines ökumenischen »Pilgerwegs der Gerechtigkeit und des Friedens«. Für eine theologisch begründete, politisch verantwortliche und ökumenisch anschlussfähige Friedensethik – aus der Perspektive der Friedenskirchen

Abstract It seems that peace ethics nowadays faces new challenges because of so-called ›new wars‹, ›asymmetric conflicts‹, ›hybrid warfare‹ and ›failing states‹. Yet political reactions and peaceethical arguments still draw back on old rationales based on the putatively overcome ›just war doctrine‹. Contrary to it, the ecumenical movement has long developed the new conceptual framework of ›just peace‹, which has been continued as the ›pilgrims’ way of peace and justice‹ by the World Council of Churches. - In order to overcome the apparent lack of political alternatives, the present essay assesses this discussion critically from the perspective of Peace Churches and shows new ways towards a peace ethics which is theologically founded, politically reasonable and compatible with ecumenism.

Warum wir das Konzept des gerechten Krieges brauchen. Erwägungen aus römisch-katholischer Perspektive

Abstract This contribution first sketches the problem (of why the concept of ›just war‹ is still indispensable) by contrasting two positions representing the pros and cons of the just war doctrine. It also presents some reasons that forbid a seamless continuation of this doctrine. In a second step, the development of catholic doctrine is shown exemplified by three episcopal letters, which argue in favour of the right of self-defense and the criteria of just war as indispensable core values of the tradition and towards an integration of both within the concept of humanitarian intervention. Final considerations supplement this perspective by hinting to the inevitable tension between law and justice as well as legality and legitimacy within the context of the debate on the concept of international Responsibility to Protect.

Gentili's Ius Post Bellum and Early-Modern Peace Treaties

To Gentili falls the merit of having made the ius ad bellum a logical third part of the laws of war, after the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello. After him, most treatises on the laws of war or later, on the laws of nations, included some reflection on the subject, although few as extensive as Gentili. The integration of the ius post bellum into the laws of war caused Gentili’s concept of peace to be determined by his concept of war. It was this and the modernity of his concept of war that made for the novelty of Gentili’s doctrine of peace. Gentili broke away from the classical just war doctrine with its view of war as a unilateral instrument of justice. Building on notions from medieval and humanist civil jurisprudence, he defined war as a contest for victory between equal parties. Absent the possibility to decide who had justice on his side, war was degraded from an instrument of justice to an instrument of law enforcement through victory, without any guarantee that victory would be delivered to the just side. Victory bestowed upon the victor the right to enforce his claims and dictate the terms of peace. If there was no clear victor, then war had failed its purpose. Peace through agreement was thus a solution by double default, through the failure of man to discern justice, and through the failure of achieving victory.All this brought Gentili to distinguish two bodies of laws, which together made up the ius post bellum: the ius victoriae and the ius ad pacem. This scheme of things allowed Gentili to grant legal force to all the victor or the consent of the treaty partners decided. In this sense, Gentili gave a legal basis to the practices of the European States without – the ius victoriae – and within – the ius ad pacem – Europe. But Gentili was no positivist or consensualist. Rather than describing all the particular practices of States in making peace, he defined the general rules they ought to apply in making peace. Here he brought justice back into the equation, for its own sake as well as for the sake of making peace stable and sustainable. However, the logic of justice was more dominant in his ius victoriae than in his ius ad pacem. This is unsurprising. Under Gentili’s system, peace through agreement was one step further removed from the ideal workings of justice than peace through victory. As such, his conception of peacemaking through treaties came close to reflecting the intra-European practices of his day and age. But to some extent, Gentili also failed to grasp the current of events. Compared to the solution of the neo-scholastics, his system represented the path not taken. By distinguishing between objective and subjective justice, the neo-scholastics offered another way out of the dilemma of justice and sovereignty. Whereas in Gentili’s work, there was only one legal order and one concept of war wherein legality and justice worked together, the neo-scholastic demarche inspired another approach: that of distinguishing two separate spheres of law – that of internal and of external law, that of the natural and the positive law of nations – and two concepts of war, just war and legal war, or solemn war in the words of Grotius. It was Grotius who laid out this scheme but it took Wolff and Vattel fully to consummate it in their dual system of the necessary and the voluntary law of nations, of just war and war in due form, of just peace and peace in due form. The dualistic outlay of the system, Grotius took from the neo-scholastic tradition, but for the concept of solemn war and for his doctrine of peace treaties, Grotius took inspiration of the civilian tradition and from its two foremost, recent representatives, Ayala and Gentili. The success of the dualistic approach to war and peace can, at least in part, is explained from the fact that it answered to the practices of States in Early Modern Europe. When making war – in their declarations and manifestos of war, in their alliance treaties –, States continued to operate the language of the just war, and particular the classical just war doctrine. When making peace, all this was forgotten as States turned to the logic of solemn war, or to the Gentilian logic of war as a contest between equal parties.

Justified Drone Strikes are Predicated on R2P Norms

Traditional just war principles of going to war (jus ad bellum ) regulate the moral permissibility of a state’s resorting to armed force. Based on contemporary just war doctrine, a state can justifiably resort to war as a result of individual or collective self-defense in order to defend a state’s political sovereignty, territorial integrity, or the human rights of its people. These forms of defense (individual and collective) are a state’s inherent right. By ex tension, the U.S. declares that drone strikes can be used to stop imminent threats from abroad because doing so is consistent with a state’s inherent right self-defense. 2 However, drone strikes for that reason constitutes a violation of traditional jus ad bellum principles ( just cause and last resort) according to just war theory. In addition, and even more alarming is that conducting drones strikes into a state that the U.S. is neither at war with nor morally justified to be at war with (since that state or a non-state actor operating in that state) does not actually constitute

HOW TO END HOLY WAR

Crusaders and Muslims each applied to their conflict in the Latin East a doctrine of holy war. Although so ideological a stance toward each other would seem to preclude peacemaking efforts, some 120 treaties were signed between parties to the conflict during the two-century Latin presence in the Holy Land (1097 – 1291). Explored here is how each party overcame this incongruity between ideology and praxis and sought a “small peace,” which is temporary and practical, rather than “great peace,” which is a final settlement. Features of these peace-making efforts examined here include the temporal nature of the treaties, the need for a pretext for making peace, gestural language and public ceremonies, gift giving, meal sharing, and oath taking that demonstrate familiarity with one's opponent's beliefs. Also considered is the interplay between state and nonstate entities in peacemaking endeavors and how it reflected the balance of power in the medieval Latin arena. The article concludes with a brief consideration of the shifting historical circumstances that ended medieval peacemaking in the East.

Pakistan's Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution to an Exaggerated Threat

Pakistan has introduced a new battlefield nuclear weapon, Nasr, into its arsenal. Nasr, a short-range ballistic missile, was first flight-tested in 2011. Pakistani leaders have declared that the weapon is meant to deter India from executing its Cold Start war doctrine. The doctrine was conceived by members of India's army and its strategic community in 2004 as a solution to perceived operational shortcomings of the army in responding to major terrorist incidents involving Pakistanis. It recommends the positioning of smaller army units at the international border with the capability to rapidly invade Pakistan and occupy narrow slices of territory, while denying Pakistan the ability to anticipate the attack and to immediately assemble a counterattack force. The Cold Start war doctrine, however, has since been publicly disavowed by the Indian government, and the Indian army has not reorganized or equipped its troops in a manner consistent with the doctrine. Further, the use of battlefield nuclear weapons inside Pakistan or near the densely populated border regions could potentially cause civilian casualties in the tens of thousands. These factors should dissuade Pakistan from deploying the Nasr missile.

O Paradoxo da Macrossecuritização: Quando a Guerra ao Terror não Securitiza Outras “Guerras” na América do Sul

A tese principal deste trabalho é de que a política do governo dos EUA de guerra global ao terror lhe ofereceu a oportunidade de passar de uma lógica de securitização simples para uma de macrossecuritização no tratamento dos problemas da proliferação das drogas e da presença de guerrilhas no caso colombiano, e no tratamento dos problemas de crime transnacional, no caso da Tríplice Fronteira no Cone Sul. Em outras palavras, os problemas relacionados ao tráfico de drogas, guerrilhas e crime transnacional em ambos os lugares foram tratados menos como um processo com dinâmicas autônomas e sim subordinados à macrossecuritização que a doutrina da guerra global contra o terror impôs. No entanto, embora os Estados Unidos tenham tido algum sucesso na macrossecuritização na Colômbia e na Tríplice Fronteira, em ambos os casos há um paradoxo nos resultados emergentes das políticas norte-americanas: o éxito na macrossecuritização não corresponde necessariamente a umsucesso na securitização de processos e atores envolvidos.

Considering Alternative Nuclear Targeting Strategies

We construct an analysis framework for nuclear force structure where the ends are deterrence objectives, the ways are viable targeting strategies, and the means are nuclear forces. Deterring adversaries requires both capability and will that convinces them not to act. A country's will is perceived as credible only if the war plans and targeting strategies are consistent with a nuclear power's principles, such as the Just War Doctrine. The United States currently applies a counter-force targeting strategy; however, hardening, mobility, deceptions, and defensive systems continue to challenge the ability to target another's nuclear weapons. Alternative strategies, such as counter-economic (energy, transportation, financial center, or communications) and counter-leadership may be feasible. However, with fewer nuclear weapons, fewer targeting strategies are viable.

UN Charter Article 51 and the Right to ‘Anticipatory Self-defense’: Validity of the US Preventive War Doctrine against Al Qaeda

This article investigates whether the US war against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is a customary ‘inherent right’ under the right to force doctrine as codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. While its fool-proof nucleus covers national states inter partes relations, the provision's applicability to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is unclear, especially in cases of conflicts, where a NGO is a party in an international conflict, such as the US-Al Qaeda conflict in Afghanistan. Because Article 51's foundation is in ‘a defensive strategy,’ states that deploy military troops across borders under the cover of self-defense must notify the UN Security Council immediately and must justify their actions. The distinction between armed attack and armed defense is the most important element defining the legality of a state's conduct. However, the Article 51 inherent right of self-defense arises solely to protect against ‘armed attacks,’ and under international law, an ‘armed attack’ alone triggers the right of self-defense. This raises the question as to whether a terrorist attack undertaken by a NGO qualifies as an armed attack? What guidance do the UN Security Council resolutions of September 2001 provide to support the US claim of anticipatory self-defense, as they do not invoke the notions of war, armed attack, or military measures, as they refer only to ‘terrorist attack,’ a term that is not a defined and internationally accepted term of war?

Influence of contemporary military doctrines and strategies upon efficiency and effectiveness of military operations

The paper defines and analyses contemporary military doctrines and strategies and their influence upon efficiency and effectiveness of military operations. After the introduction, the following significant points of influence of contemporary doctrines and strategies upon efficiency and effectiveness of military operations are described: (1) concept, characteristics and types of military operations; (2) contemporary war doctrines and strategies in the world; (3) implications of military technology development and war doctrine upon financial aspects of a modern operation; (4) an example of financing the security and defensive military operations (Athena), and (5) financing the costs of the Serbian Armed Forces' contribution to multi-national operations. The last part of the paper presents short conclusions reached after the consideration of this very complex and specific topic of influence of military doctrines and strategies upon efficiency and effectiveness of military operations.

The American just war theory in the 21st century: continuity or renewal?

Normal 0 21 false false false MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 Evaluations of the American war against Iraq are split into two irreconcilable camps among war theorists. Michael Walzer, on the one hand, is basically critical of the war, saying that the threat of Saddam’s regime did not then constitute the right of self-defense of the U.S. or any other country. Jean Bethke Elshtain, on the other, believes that it is the obligation of the U.S. to defend universal values like freedom and democracy on the world-wide scale, and argues for the justification of the Iraq war. Why and how are such opposite standpoints found in the same idea of just war? This paper aims to answer this question by subdividing the kinds and traditions of war theory. In fact, the doctrine of war, which goes back more than 1,600 years to the era of St. Augustine, is the gathering of particular ideas that are joined together in their family resemblance yet still different in fundamental ways. Especially, the difference between the modern war theory and the premodern one is substantial and significant. Historically, the doctrine of war was born far earlier than the emergence of the modern sovereign state system, and has not always been suitable for it in some crucial respects. In my analysis, Walzer belongs to the modern war tradition since Grotius, while Elshtain blongs to the premodern one since Augustine. This paper first makes clear in what way the modern and premodern war traditions are different with a brief, historical overview. Secondly, it develops the distinction further by presenting a detailed analysis of the conflicting evaluations of Walzer and Elshtain over the Iraq war. Finally, this paper points out that the American war doctrine in this century has been steadily drifting from the former to the latter.

The Fog of Victory

What does victory mean today? How do we know who won the war and what does the winner win by winning? This article uses the prism of victory to view the transformation of the goals, means, and targets of war, and assesses the applicability of the conventional Just War doctrine (through the traditional laws of war) to the modern battlefield. Specifically, the article claims that the military and civilian components of war have grown so intertwined in both the conduct and ending of hostilities that the laws of war, with their emphasis on combat, are hard-pressed to offer a normative yardstick for a just modern war.

Some Observations on Gabriella Blum's 'Fog of Victory'

Gabriella Blum's brilliant article wrestles with central question of modern conflict: what does look like, and whatever it looks like, what does it mean - or, perhaps more accurately, what should it mean? This brief article seeks to address her work through lens of author's military experience. That perspective would define in Clausewitzean terms, that is, point at which a belligerent is compelled to submit his will to his opponent. As Blum points out, that seeming clarity is obscured in many modern conflicts involving non-traditional actors and warfighting methodologies. While Just War doctrine resonates in armed forces, decision to go to war is largely considered a political matter beyond military's purview. Jus in bello, however, does lie in military's realm as much depends on perception of rightness in contemporary conflicts if victory is to be obtained. Yet Professor Blum's central thesis about importance of clear goals in contemporary conflicts remains undisturbed. Her further observation that the problem of fog of extends not only to international but also to domestic civil-military relations has obvious and enduring relevance.