Doctrine Of Virtue Research Articles

Kant on Self‐Legislation as the Foundation of Duty*

AbstractDuties to oneself are central to Kant's moral thought. Indeed, in his Lectures on Ethics, he claims that they “take first place, and are the most important of all” (LE: 27:341). Despite this, Kant is not clear about what they are or why they are ‘the most important.’ What is it for a duty to be owed to oneself? And in what sense do such duties ‘take first place’? I answer these questions: a duty to oneself is a self‐legislated duty, and they ‘take first place’ in that all ethical duties are, fundamentally, duties to oneself. Based on a close reading of Kant's “Apparent Antinomy” regarding duties to oneself in The Doctrine of Virtue §§1–3, I argue that Kant holds that (1) a duty is owed to its legislator, and (2) all duties are self‐legislated. I then argue that this interpretation is further supported by Kant's understanding of the Categorical Imperative as a “principle of autonomy” in the Groundwork (G: 4:433). I conclude by offering an interpretation of the Categorical Imperative on which even though all duties are ultimately owed to oneself, there remains an important sense in which some duties are owed to others as well.

Kant and the smallpox inoculation

Smallpox was an endemic, very contagious disease which caused a high mortality rate during the age of enlightenment. In order to counter act this epidemic, smallpox inoculation was developed. This technique consisted in the inoculation of infected pus taken from a sick person into a healthy one in order to prevent the risks of natural smallpox infection. It was in this context that a German doctor in charge of inoculation wrote to Kant twice in 1799, and again in 1800, to ask him if inoculation was morally permissible. Kant wrote a draft of an answer, but it was never completed or published during his lifetime. These drafts provide elements of an answer that he nevertheless refused to give explicitly in the Doctrine of Virtue (1797) where the question of the morality of inoculation remained unanswered.

А. Пинзани. Кантианский аргумент в пользу универсального базового дохода = A. Pinzani Towards a Kantian Argument for a Universal Basic Income / пер. с англ. А. В. Нехаева

The paper defends that it is possible to offer a Kantian argument for justifying the introduction of Universal Basic Income (UBI). It first briefly presents Philippe van Parijs’ argument for UBI based on the concept of real freedom for all. In doing so, it will focus on its general structure and central insight, without entering too much into other issues like the economic feasibility of UBI. It second briefly presents Kant’s concept of external freedom and especially focuses on some of its components to assess whether there is some closeness to van Parijs’ concept of real freedom. It further considers whether UBI is not only compatible with a Kantian position, but can be justified from such a position because it represents a tool for concretely realizing external freedom as presented in the Doctrine of Right and for attaining the ethical ideal of virtuosity presented in the Doctrine of Virtue.

Kant and the Balance of Moral Forces

In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant draws an analogy between the physical forces of repulsion and attraction and the moral forces of respect and love. I argue that we should interpret this passage as endorsing a moral version of the balancing argument from his natural philosophy. There, Kant argues that purely repulsive and attractive bodies respectively face problems of total dispersion and collapse. I argue that purely respectful and loving humans respectively face analogous problems of total moral dispersion and collapse. I conclude by drawing some significant implications of this moral balancing argument for contemporary theorizing about moral interactions, relationships, and communities.

Virtue, Wide Duties, and Casuistry. On why there is aDoctrine of Methodin Kant’sDoctrine of Virtue

AbstractThis paper deals primarily with theDoctrine of Method(DM) of Kant’sDoctrine of Virtue. First, I present an overview of theDM(1.1) and an explanation of how it is possible to teach virtue (1.2). Second, I address the following issues: Why is aDMnecessary at all (2.1)? How does theDMrelate to what Kant calls casuistry (2.2)? I will argue that wide duties have two essential characteristics: They command the right kind of moral motivation in terms of a moral maxim, and they allow for latitude. The fact that wide duties command the right kind of motivation leads to theDM; the latitude of wide duties, however, leads to casuistry. To unfold this interpretation, it must also be shown that both imperfect and perfect duties are wide duties.

Self-Knowledge and the Opacity Thesis in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue

AbstractKant’s moral philosophy both enjoins the acquisition of self-knowledge as a duty, and precludes certain forms of its acquisition via what has become known as the Opacity Thesis. This article looks at several recent attempts to solve this difficulty and argues that they are inadequate. I argue instead that the Opacity Thesis rules out only the knowledge that one has acted from genuine moral principles, but does not apply in cases of moral failure. The duty of moral self-knowledge applies therefore only to one’s awareness of one’s status as a moral being and to the knowledge of one’s moral failings, both in particular actions and one’s overall character failings, one’s vices. This kind of knowledge is morally salutary as an aid to discovering one’s individual moral weakness as well as the subjective ends for which one acts, and in this way for taking up the morally required end of treating human beings as human beings. In this way, moral self-knowledge can be understood as a necessary element of moral improvement, and I conclude by suggesting several ways to understand it thereby as genuinely primary among the duties to oneself.

О принципе составления канона Ямвлиха

Iamblichus of Chalcis, one of the most prominent Neoplatonists of the third – fourth cen­turies AD, introduced a list of twelve principal Plato’s dialogues that should have been com­pulsory studied by his disciples. This list was called the Canon of Iamblichus. However, the survived Iamblichus’ writings contain no information on the Canon; and later Neopla­tonists provide very scant mentions on the subject. It is the sole anonymous manuscript of the sixth century that counts twelve dialogues in the Canon and lists each of them match­ing with the hierarchy of virtues. Nonetheless, Iamblichus seems to be less interested in the doctrine of virtues. Moreover, given the hierarchic order of virtues, one cannot ex­plain why ‘political’ virtues correspond to the Gorgias and not to the Statesman or the Re­public. To discover the reason for selection of particular Plato’s dialogues for the Canon, I analyzed the general assessments of the dialogues by later Neoplatonists. The analysis re­veals that every of the first ten dialogues contains a particular mythological story with a featured character, who plays the role of a Demiurge. The collected evidence argues that the principal selection criterion for Iamblichus was the mythologic kernel of each dialogue. Moreover, Iamblichus’ Canon presupposes that the first ten dialogues form a common mythological narrative, a kind of an integral meta-myth of Plato’s philosophy.

Kant on Moral Feeling and Respect

AbstractAlthough in his earlier ethical writings Kant explains the concept of moral feeling, inherited from the British sentimentalists, as a peculiar feeling of respect for the moral law that functions as an incentive for moral actions, the Doctrine of Virtue seems to add complexity to the issue. There, Kant discusses two similar aesthetic predispositions, moral feeling and respect, whose relationship to the feeling of respect is far from clear. This article offers a much needed elucidation of the relationship between these three concepts. In the first part, I show that Kant, in the writings before the Doctrine of Virtue, transforms the British sentimentalists’ construal of moral feeling into that of the feeling of respect as the sole moral incentive. In the second part, I argue that, although in the Doctrine of Virtue Kant distinguishes, for a specific reason, between the aesthetic predisposition of moral feeling and that of respect, they are both ultimately identical to the feeling of respect. The conclusion is that nothing of substance changes between Kant’s earlier thinking and his views in the Doctrine of Virtue; for Kant there is just one feeling that properly deserves the name of moral feeling, the feeling of respect.

The Morals of Life Shown by Bharathidasan in Pisiranthaiyar’s Play

Pisiranthaiyar was a poet of Sangam period. He was very friendly with King Kopperuncholan. He was a devotee of Pandyan Idudai Nambi. He gave advice and political virtue to the king and earned the respect of Pandyan. Pisiranthaiyar lived in a town called 'Pisir' in Pandya country. Bharathidasan has created this drama in the twentieth century with his imaginative poetry, centering on the friendship of the devotees. During the Sangam period, the doctrine of virtue had a great influence on the society. Social life is structured through this religion. Ancient Tamil society was enriched by urban civilization. Tamil civilization was one of the pioneer civilizations of the world before this civilized way of life was built. The education seen in the people and the poets during the Sangam period makes clear the knowledge of the Tamil people. Sangam period is built on individual morality, political virtue, chivalry, arts etc. The types of food that prevailed during the Sangam period, the philosophy of nature, astronomy, mentalism, solvency, commerce, water management, life rituals etc. are the aspects of life. In Pisiranthaiyar’s play, Bharathidasan takes the life of that time in the context of the 20th century for the social development of Tamil people and building the values of life for the upliftment of the Tamil society. In the life of a Tamilian, culture, art, education, and valor are combined, hospitality, kindness, chastity, justice, friendship etc. are mixed in the life of the ancient Tamilians, and Bharathidasan has designed his concept that these values of life should be incorporated in the contemporary environment as well. This review is structured on a qualitative approach. This article examines the living norms of the Tamil people in the context of Pisiranthaiyar's era and the living norms mentioned by Bharathidasan.

Paul on Humility

Paul on Humility

Kant, casuistry and casuistical questions

Abstract Interest in the role of casuistry and casuistical questions in Kant's Doctrine of Virtue (DV), i.e. the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals, has grown in recent years. My own position is formulated in Schuessler (2012, in German), the main thesis of which will be retained here in an updated form and with some shifts of emphasis. I hold that the casuistical questions concerning perfect duties in the DV are not intended to represent casuistry in Kant's sense. Casuistry and casuistical questions are neither equivalent in the DV nor do they serve the same purposes.

The fate of autonomy in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals

ABSTRACT The idea of autonomy, presented as Kant’s main achievement in the Groundwork and the second Critique, is hardly present in the ethics of the “Doctrine of Virtue”. Against Pauline Kleingeld’s recent interpretation, I argue that this does not amount to a disappearance of the Principle of Autonomy, but to an important development of the notion of autonomy. I first show that Kant still advocated the Principle of Autonomy in the 1790s along with the thought of lawgiving through one’s maxims. I then argue that the role of autonomy in Kant’s later ethics has a different focus than in the previous works, which requires to connect autonomy with autocracy. Conversely, in the “Doctrine of Virtue”, autocracy, which Kant had employed before as an independent notion, is construed as a new layer of autonomy. What Kant there calls subjective autonomy is thereby considered as reason’s self-government in the maxims of each rational agent.

칸트 덕론에서 덕의무의 성격과 의의

칸트의 『도덕형이상학』의 덕론에 대한 논의는 의무윤리 체계 내에서 전개되는 칸트의 덕론 자체에 대한 탐구에서부터 상반되는 경쟁이론으로 여겨지는 덕윤리와의 비교에 이르기까지 여러 맥락에서 전개되고 있다. 본 연구는 칸트의 덕론이 가진 기본 성격을 파악하고 이러한 성격이 칸트윤리학 내에서 그리고 덕윤리적 논의에서 어떤 의의를 갖는지 고찰한다. 이를 위해 먼저 칸트 덕론의 핵심 개념인 덕의무(a duty of virtue)의 의미와 성격을 살펴보고 칸트가 이 개념을 생각하는 이유가 동기화에 있으며 유덕한 사람에게 의무로부터의 행위는 도덕적 목적을 위한 행위가 된다는 것을 밝힌다. 그리고 덕의무를 통한 칸트의 동기화방식이 우리가 어떻게 의무로부터 행동하게 되는지 그리고 의무로부터 행동한다는 것이 구체적으로 무엇을 의미하는지를 해명해줌으로써 의무로부터의 행위라는 도덕적 동기의 요구가 직면하는 비판들에 대응할 방안을 제공한다고 주장한다. 나아가서 덕의무를 통해 규범적 정당화에 근거한 동기화를 추구하는 칸트의 방식은 아리스토텔레스적인 덕윤리의 동기화방식이 직면하는 규범적 정당화의 문제를 피해갈 가능성을 보여준다는 점에서 덕윤리적 시사점을 가진다고 주장하며 이러한 가능성을 덕의무를 수행하여 수립되는 목적의 준칙과 덕윤리의 덕규칙을 비교하면서 살펴본다.

Do We Need a Metaphysics of Morals?

This paper argues that Kant’s project of a metaphysics of morals represents a normative ideal grounded on the core ideas of Enlightenment. In the first section, it analyzes Kant’s concept of metaphysical principles of morals by establishing a connection between a metaphysics of morals and Kant’s concept of metaphysics in general and of metaphysics of nature in particular. It then discusses what is metaphysical in the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. In its last section, it tackles the question of whether a non-metaphysical reading of Kant’s doctrines of right and of virtue is desirable if we want to remain faithful to Kant’s Enlightenment project.

Kant's doctrine of Virtue and Teaching Ethics

Kant's doctrine of Virtue and Teaching Ethics

Kant Felsefesinde Hukuk, Kamusallık ve Yurttaşlık

Kant’ın hukuk teorisinin, onun eserleri arasında, özellikle de üç Kritik’e kıyasla, daha az ilgi gören bir alan olduğunu söylemek yanlış olmaz. Oysa Ahlak Metafiziği’nin ilk bölümü tümüyle bu alana ayrılmıştır. “Hukuk Öğretisi” başlığını taşıyan ve hukuku ahlak yasası zemininde pratik aklın a priori ilkelerinin iki alanından biri (diğeri “Erdem Öğretisi”dir) olarak tesis eden bu bölüm, kendi başına ele alındığında, hukukun Kant felsefesindeki ayrıcalıklı yerini fark etmemiz için yeterli olmayabilir. Ancak bu öğretiyi ve aslında ona bir giriş niteliğinde olan “Teori ve Pratik” diye anılan yazıyı siyaset, tarih ve hukuku konu alan diğer kısa yazılarla, özellikle de bu yazılara damgasını vuran refleksif yargılarla ilişkilendirerek okuduğumuzda, hukukun, insanın akıl sahibi ve ahlak yasasına tabi bir varlık olarak kendini, yani özgür varoluşunu gerçekleştirmesi için ne denli vazgeçilmez bir alan açtığını fark ederiz. Bu çalışma böyle bir okumaya dayanarak Kant’ta hukuk öğretisinin, bu öğretide ortaya konan kamusallık ilkesi ve yurttaşlık anlayışının, ahlak felsefesi ve özgürlük problemi açısından merkezi bir öneme sahip olduğunu göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

El concepto de amistad en Kant

La investigación sobre la cuestión de la amistad en Kant es muy reciente y escasa. Sin embargo, es un tema que él mismo ubicó como conclusión de la doctrina de la virtud, lo cual le concede cierto protagonismo. En este trabajo se defiende que la aproximación kantiana a la amistad, tal y como se desprende del análisis de los textos de la Metafísica de las costumbres, y de las Lecciones de ética, presenta virtualidades que conectan particularmente con nuestra sensibilidad contemporánea y, lejos de ser un tema marginal en su ética, representa uno de sus momentos culminantes.

도덕적 목적이론으로서 칸트의 덕론

칸트는 『도덕형이상학』에서 의무인 동시에 목적인 것을 덕의무라고 하고, 덕의무를 다루는 덕론을 도덕적 목적이론으로 설명한다. 본 논문에서는 칸트의 덕론에서 목적이 하는 역할을 통해 도덕적 목적이론으로서 덕론이 가지는 성격을 고찰하고 덕론이 칸트윤리학 체계에서 어떻게 이해되는지를 고찰한다. 이를 위해 먼저 덕의 개념을 살펴보면서 덕이 도덕적 목적을 선택하고 추구하는 결의와 능력임을 보이고 이러한 목적의 가능성과 작용을 살펴본다. 그리고 목적과 동기의 관련성을 탐색하면서 목적의 실천적인 역할과 덕론이 가지는 도덕적 동기이론으로서의 성격을 확인한다. 도덕적 동기이론으로서 덕론에서 목적은 의지와 감정의 결합에 작용하며 의무로부터의 행위는 도덕법칙에 대한 맹목적인 복종이 아니라 이성적 존재의 자유로운 자의에 따른 수행으로 드러난다. 나아가서 가치에 관련되는 목적의 이론적 역할을 살펴보고 의무론에 근거한 가치이론으로서의 덕론에서 결과가 고려되는 방식을 확인한다. 이러한 고찰을 통해 도덕적 목적이론으로 제시되는 덕론은 이성적 자연존재의 도덕성을 다루는, 도덕적 동기이론이자 도덕적 가치이론으로서의 역할을 한다는 것을 규명한다.

Несбывшийся спор об этикотеологии

Написанная в жанре антикритики статья делает попытку взвесить основательность критических замечаний А.Г. Мясникова о противоречиях в структуре аргументации Кантом его «постулата бытия Божия», в связи с учением о добродетели и счастье/блаженстве. В этой связи, останавливаясь на вопросе о характере доктрины о высшем производном благе в «Основоположении к метафизике нравов» и о сущности процедуры этической универсализации по Канту, в статье проясняется, что спор кантоведов не состоялся, поскольку аргументы оппонента не затрагивают проблемы, поднятой в критикуемом тексте. Разбор возражений на «этические нескладности» в обосновании морального аргумента, приводит к тому же итогу: Критический пафос оппонента обращен не на анализ реконструкции обоснования «постулата бытия Божия», но только на мои замечания по поводу этого обоснования, представляющиеся поэтому оппоненту предвзятым поиском «нескладностей» в этической доктрине Канта, а не специально в этикотеологии. Аргументация против соображений, мотивированных кантовской этикотеологией, в сферу собственно этикотеологии не вступает, поскольку сферу теологии оппонент считает вненаучной. В заключение в статье формулируется аргументированное возражение на мнение оппонента, якобы Христос Евангелий дарует ученикам и исцеляемым блаженство в этом мире. Если же высшее благо евангельской морали односоставно, то и вопрос о соотношении кантианства и христианства предстает совсем в ином виде.

Hacia una normativa para la protección del medio ambiente principiada por el idealismo trascendental de Immanuel Kant

Esta es una propuesta de inclusión de los deberes ambientales en la Doctrina de la Virtud y la Doctrina del Derecho de La metafísica de la moral de Immanuel Kant. Toma la forma de una indagación sobre la posibilidad de recurrir al idealismo trascendental como guía para determinar deberes éticos y jurídicos ambientales y contribuir a la sistematización de una nueva deóntica ambiental. Desde el principio general del imperativo categórico, se deducen aquí cuatro principios especiales de ética ambiental y tres principios especiales del derecho ambiental, con la intención de proponerlos como criterio direccionador de nuevas normas referentes al medio ambiente.