Abstract

Abstract Interest in the role of casuistry and casuistical questions in Kant's Doctrine of Virtue (DV), i.e. the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals, has grown in recent years. My own position is formulated in Schuessler (2012, in German), the main thesis of which will be retained here in an updated form and with some shifts of emphasis. I hold that the casuistical questions concerning perfect duties in the DV are not intended to represent casuistry in Kant's sense. Casuistry and casuistical questions are neither equivalent in the DV nor do they serve the same purposes.

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