Doctrine Of Transcendental Idealism Research Articles

The World According to Kant: Appearances and Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism

Anja Jauernig here addresses with great scholarship and philosophical insight a central issue in the interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason: ‘The project of this book is to develop a comprehensive account of Kant's theoretical views in his theoretical critical philosophy or, perhaps more accurately, of the ontological implications of his theoretical critical philosophy. More specifically, my aim will be to sort out Kant's views on the nature of appearances, the nature of things in themselves, and the relation between them as presented and hinted in the Critique of Pure Reason…and associated writings’ (p. 1). This project, she thinks, is of more than historical interest, as Kant's ontological position, ‘critical idealism’, has great philosophical merit and may very well be in its main lines true (a thesis she does not claim to demonstrate in this book, though a sequel to it is planned). In taking this stance, she sharply dissents from the view, most closely associated in Anglo-American analytic philosophy with Peter Strawson, that Kant's transcendental idealism must either be rendered innocuous or disregarded altogether. ‘…Strawson's two-world reading of transcendental idealism, and his claim that Kant's more valuable philosophical insights can, fortunately, be “disentangled” from the doctrine of transcendental idealism, inspired legions of Kant scholars to either follow him in setting transcendental idealism to one side—or engage in the business of saving Kant from his bad reputation by devising readings that do not present him as a two-world theorist after all…’ (p. 24).

Reclaiming Naturalized Critical Realism: Response to McWherter

ABSTRACTThis article responds to McWherter’s detailed critique of my assessment of Roy Bhaskar’s method of transcendental argumentation in chapter four of my Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (2013). I begin by describing some naturalist ontological and epistemological views defended in my book, thereby showing that my naturalist challenge to the original version of critical realism is not only methodological (or metaphilosophical) but also substantial. I also indicate that this point is effectively downplayed in McWherter’s framing of the debate in terms of competing metaphilosophies. I then consider how the doctrine of transcendental idealism is presupposed in Kant’s transcendental deduction and question the consistency of McWherter’s various descriptions of Bhaskar’s transcendental arguments. Finally, I provide detailed responses to McWherter’s objectives to my views. My conclusion is that naturalized critical realism is a more coherent and scientifically viable position than the neo-Kantian version of critical realism defended by McWherter. Nevertheless, I think that there is enough overlap between original and naturalized critical realism to regard the latter as a revised and elaborated version of the former.

II-Some Persistent Presumptions of Hegelian Anti-Subjectivism

Like many other recent Hegelian accounts, Stephen Houlgate's severe critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy contends that, in contrast to Hegel, Kant's Critical system, especially because of its doctrine of transcendental idealism, presupposes a subjectivist and therefore inadequate position. On the basis of a moderate interpretation of Kant's idealism and his general Critical procedure, I defend Kant from the charge of subjectivism, and also give an account of how subjectivist interpretations in general can arise from a series of understandable misunderstandings of difficult passages in Kant's first Critique.

A New Kantian Solution to the Third Antinomy of Pure Reason and to the Free Will Problem

AbstractThe goal of this paper is to articulate a new solution to Kant's third antinomy of pure reason, one that establishes the possibility of incompatibilist freedom—the freedom presupposed by our traditional conceptions of moral responsibility, moral worth, and justice—without relying on the doctrine of transcendental idealism (TI). A discussion of Henry Allison's “two‐aspect” interpretation of Kant's TI allows me both to criticize one of the best defenses of TI today and to advance my own TI‐free solution to the third antinomy by appeal to a thesis of epistemic modesty based on Paul Guyer's realist interpretation of Kant's theory of experience. According to this interpretation, the a priori forms of our sensibility and understanding are not forms that the mind imposes on a material whose real properties are unknowable to us but are instead forms that limit or filter the kinds of things we can experience and know. In particular, being causally determined is a real feature of things as they are in themselves, but the necessity and universality of our deterministic claims are relative, restricted to the objects of possible experience. Consequently, though a causally determined event cannot be free, the necessity and universality of determinism does not entail that free events (choices) cannot exist but that they cannot constitute objects of possible experience. After arguing that freedom is possible, I outline an argument for the reality of freedom, based on the requirements of morality. Finally, I argue that my view, though opposed to metaphysical naturalism, is consistent with scientific realism and methodological naturalism.

How Useful are Transcendental Arguments for Critical Realist Ontology?

this study Westphal argues roughly that when developed to their logical conclusion Kant’s transcendental proofs are in fact inconsistent with his transcendental idealism and can be used to defend epistemological realism and mental content externalism instead of transcendental idealism. Furthermore, Westphal argues that Kant’s positive arguments for his transcendental idealism are unsound. This interpretation questions the widely accepted view that Kant’s transcendental method of argumentation is tightly connected to his doctrine of transcendental idealism. I think Westphal’s argument is exciting, but do not evaluate it here. Rather, I try to show that even if Westphal’s general argument is valid, it is not relevant to the justification of critical realist ontology, for two reasons. First, Westphal argues for epistemological realism and mental content externalism, not an ontological theory about the general ontological structure of reality. 4 Critical realism is by contrast primarily a specific ontological

The religious meaning of transcendental idealism

In his doctrine of transcendental idealism, Kant distinguishes things in themselves from appearances, ascribes the ordering of appearances to man and concludes that his knowledge is limited to their order. The second and the third of these hypotheses are epistemological by nature, and are related to each other through a general idea that man can know only what he has himself created. The division of reality, on the other hand, has not only an ontological, but also a religious meaning: while things in themselves are created by God, appearances are a creation of man. To understand this distinction, one should discern the way Kant viewed the relation of man to God. To do this, however, one should investigate the way Kant's critical philosophy has developed from his early writings.

Three Remarks on the Interpretation of Kant on Incongruent Counterparts

In recent times, a number of authors have systematically criticized Kant's 1768 ‘proof’ of the reality of absolute space. Peter Remnant may have been the first do to so, but many others have since joined him, either challenging the argument itself or showing how relationist conceptions of space can account for incongruent counterparts just as well as absolutist conceptions. In fact, Kant himself abandoned his main conclusion soon after publication, favouring instead the doctrine of transcendental idealism. I do not see how the 1768 proof can be saved, nor will I defend it here. However, in dismissing it some critics seem to have gone too far, and either failed to fully acknowledge Kant's contribution, or attributed to him thoughts he is unlikely to have had. Kant's treatment of incongruent counterparts in his Dissertation of 1770 has also met strong opposition. In particular, his claim that the difference between a pair of incongruent counterparts cannot be apprehended by means of concepts alone has been taken to be a mathematical falsehood. Indeed, incongruent counterparts have been shown to be mathematically distinguishable, with no intuitions needed for that purpose.

Value and idealism

This paper is concerned with the attempt to base a general theory of value on an idealist metaphysics. The most explicit and fully developed instance of this approach is, of course, found in Kant, on whom I shall concentrate, though I will also suggest that the account I offer of Kant has application to the later German idealists. While the core of the paper is devoted to commentary on Kant, what I thereby wish to make plausible is the idea that Kant's endeavour to base a general conception of value on an idealist metaphysics is of contemporary, not merely historical, interest. Specifically, my suggestion will be that a correct understanding of what is demanded by our ordinary, pre-philosophical grasp of value shows there is reason to think that something along the lines of Kant's transcendental idealism (or, like absolute idealism, developed from it) is required for a fully adequate metaphysics of value. Essential to the case I will make is a distinction between Kant's moral theory and his broader account of value, my claim being that, whether or not Kantian moral theory is ultimately dependent on any metaphysics, the broader conception of value to be found in Kant cannot be detached from his doctrine of transcendental idealism.

Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy

Ivan Soll has remarked that entire program and conception of philosophy depended upon refuting Kant's limitation of reason.' But while Soll discusses Hegel's attempts in this regard, he admits he has not attempted to corroborate or criticize Hegel's interpretation of Kant.' Soll is not alone here, for even with the great renewal of interest in Hegel today,3 there has been surprisingly little critical discussion of Hegel's treatment of Kant, especially with regard to the difficult core of that treatment, namely, the rejection of the two central components of Kant's theoretical philosophy: the transcendental deduction of the categories and the doctrine of transcendental idealism. There have been a few helpful discussions of this subject recently,4 but none has given a systematic account of the distinction between these two crucial components in Kant's own view and of the general nature and ground of Hegel's treatment of the distinction. In the following sections, I first offer such an account (in section I) and then distinguish and evaluate Hegel's three types of objections to Kant's deduction (in sections II-IV) and his three types of objections to Kant's idealism (in sections V-VIII). I argue these objections all fail because of a closely related set of errors, errors which are understandable because they concern some of the most

Incongruent Counterparts and The Intuitive Nature of Space

Kant's views on space and time changed during his life, and reflected at various times his pre-occupation with Newtonianism, and Leibnizian relationalism, before reaching maturity in the doctrine of transcendental idealism. His discovery of the synthetic a priori nature of geometrical propositions made some radical transformation of these earlier views necessary, although Kant had already recognised their inadequacies before the critical synthesis had been accomplished. The conflicting pulls of Newton and Leibniz—neither of whose theories were ever totally abandoned—and the concern with the false dichotomy of logic and experience, each played their part in shaping the critical theory of space and time as presuppositional forms. The history of Kant's thinking on space in particular is highlighted by the argument from incongruent counterparts, which seemed to occupy Kant as a problem, though not always as a paradox, throughout the vicissitudes of his thinking on space. More important, the argument is, at the very least, a supplementary proof of the a priori and intuitive nature of space. 1