How Useful are Transcendental Arguments for Critical Realist Ontology?

Abstract

this study Westphal argues roughly that when developed to their logical conclusion Kant’s transcendental proofs are in fact inconsistent with his transcendental idealism and can be used to defend epistemological realism and mental content externalism instead of transcendental idealism. Furthermore, Westphal argues that Kant’s positive arguments for his transcendental idealism are unsound. This interpretation questions the widely accepted view that Kant’s transcendental method of argumentation is tightly connected to his doctrine of transcendental idealism. I think Westphal’s argument is exciting, but do not evaluate it here. Rather, I try to show that even if Westphal’s general argument is valid, it is not relevant to the justification of critical realist ontology, for two reasons. First, Westphal argues for epistemological realism and mental content externalism, not an ontological theory about the general ontological structure of reality. 4 Critical realism is by contrast primarily a specific ontological