Doctrine Of Schematism Research Articles

Некоторые заметки о понятии и назначении теории схематизма Канта в «Критике чистого разума»

The article introduces Kant’s doctrine of schematism (Critique of Pure Reason A 137-A 147; B 176-B 187). The inclusion of the chapter on schematism in the ‘Doctrine of the Principles’ rather than the ‘Doctrine of Concepts’ is taken as a clue to distinguishing the Doctrine of Schematism from the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. This provides clarity on the function of schematism. The author conceives of schematism as something entirely new to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories, namely, as preparation for the use of categories as predicates in sentences known as the ‘Principles of Understanding’ referring to phaenomena (appearances in time and space) rather than the undetermined concept of objects in general. To support this interpretation, the author addresses main concepts of the schematism theory (for instance, those of schema, imagination, homogeneity, and time-determination) and describes the function of schematism. Imagination is presented as an instance of the function usually called “understanding” when directed towards appearances given in time and space. Understanding becomes imagination when it obeys not only the laws of logics, but also the laws of time. Homogeneity (a concept that plays an important role in the theory of schematism) is explained with reference to Tetens’s Philosophical Essays on Human Nature (1777). The explanations of concepts provided in the article are not exhaustive. They are discussed in more detail in the author’s earlier publications referred to in the footnotes. The article also discusses earlier and contemporary literature on schematism.

La funzione logica dell'immagine nel pensiero trascendentale di Fichte

In this article, the Author maintains that Fichte employs the concept of the image (Bild) in order to formulate transcendental logic as a self-grounding, self-referential and recursive thinking device. Fichte considers the image as the absolute the original and primeval concept, because it is the main generative element, the basis and the engine, as it were, of transcendental logic. However, at least at first glance, the concept of the image seems a little inadequate for developing a transcendental logic. In the first place, one may reasonably argue that traditionally it has to do with aesthetics, not logic. It seems rather odd to place it at the genetic foundational core of logic. Moreover, also the reference to Kant’s doctrine of schematism, which should be mentioned as one of the historical antecedents of Fichte’s Bildlehre, does not suffice to explain Fichte’s particular understanding of the image, which differs from the widespread concept of the image as regarding factual representations. On the contrary, Fichte’s Bildbegriff is about the idea of a circular genetic-performative mutual dependence of thinking and thought. Hence, the Author tries to answer three intertwined questions: How can the image be conceived of as a logical concept and not an aesthetic one? How can one justify the claim that the image is the generative concept of logic? How can the concept of the image meet the requirements of apriority, self-reference and self-foundation?

ESQUEMATISMO, HORIZONTE E TRANSCENDENCIA: Kant e Heidegger

ABSTRACT: The paper proposes a few steps from the reconstruction of Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's doctrine of schematism, highlighting the concepts of horizon and transcendence, as a condition of the previous function of the time in the Kantian schema of the concepts and temporality ( Zeitlichkeit ), on the schemes in ekstases fundamental ontology of Sein und Zeit . The theoretical approach follows in the first step, a phenomenological interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason , undertaken by Heidegger and the second step aims to achieve a semantic interpretation of the schema of existential in Being and Time, in light of the semantic interpretation of transcendental philosophy, taken by Loparic.