In July 2014, the African Union (hereinafter the “AU”) adopted Protocol amending the Protocol on the African Court (hereinafter the “Amendment Protocol”), and included a provision on immunity for certain state officials. The hero-villain trend so characteristic of the international criminal justice debate is clearly on show in the debates concerning the immunities provision of the Amendment Protocol. While the African Union (hereinafter the “AU”) has consistently viewed its position on immunities as reflective of customary international law, those opposed to the Amendment Protocol and the inclusion of immunities have argued that that it is inconsistent with international law or, at best, undermines the Rome Statute. As with much of the debate related to international criminal justice, and the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the “ICC”) in particular, especially in relation to the latter’s relationship with Africa, much of the positions on both sides of the divide ignore the nuances of what is a complex area of law. In the jockeying for positions, the line between doctrinal positions and normative policy assertions become blurred (and sometimes disappearing altogether). The doctrinal question whether immunities of certain officials before international courts is consistent with modern international law is very often answered by the normative policy postulation that AU should not have included the immunities provision in the Amendment Protocol. Conversely, the normative postulation questioning the wisdom prosecution of heads of state is met by a reference to a provision in the Rome Statute. Added to the mix is very often an empirical assertion, either that a position will result in impunity or will lead to the destabilisation of a country or region. Further complicating the discourse is the resort by commentators to the political rationale or objective behind the Amendment Protocol i.e. some commentators have asserted that the Amendment Protocol, and the immunity provision in particular, was a response to the prosecutions by the ICC of African heads of state. This empirical assertion is probably true. However, whatever the motives of the AU in adopting the Amendment Protocol, any evaluation of the instrument and its provisions must be done on its merit, unclouded by the political considerations that gave rise to the instrument. This is to say, the instrument cannot be contrary to international law just because the motives of its creators were less than angelic. The purpose of this article is to try to synthesise, from the often potpourri mixture of normative, doctrinal and empirical positions often advanced in favour of preserving or excluding immunities in the Amendment Protocol, the position under international law. At the outset, and in order to exclude it from the analysis altogether, I wish to state, upfront, my normative policy position: The decision of the AU to provide for immunity of its officials sends the wrong signals about Africa’s commitment to the fight against impunity. Devoid of this normative policy question, this paper seeks to place the immunity provision of the Amendment Protocol in context of international law, including the Rome Statute. I begin in the next section by describing the various arguments that have been made both in support of the provision and in opposition to it. I then, in the section that follows, provide an evaluation of the immunities clause in the context of the international law and in light of the arguments that have been made, both in its support and opposition. Finally, I offer some concluding remarks.