IN APRIL 1987, a judge in a San Diego court heard a case against a woman, Pamela Stewart Monson, whose baby was born braindead after she ignored her doctor's warnings about her behavior and its potential effects on the fetus. Her doctor had warned her to refrain from street drugs and sex and to seek medical care in case of vaginal bleeding. But prosecutors charged that on the day she delivered, she took amphetamines, had sex with her husband, and didn't call paramedics until twelve hours after bleeding began. Her son was born brain-dead with amphetamines in his system. The judge's decision to throw out the case is perhaps less significant than the fact that criminal charges were brought against the mother in the first place.' Cases like this raise important ethical, legal, and medical questions about personal responsibility in an era of increasing knowledge concerning health risks, about the moral and legal liability of parents who ignore the advice of their doctors when their actions result in death or serious deformities for their newborns, and about the duties of doctors toward patients who ignore their advice. Ultimately, lawmakers must design policy which confronts questions about the kinds of protection to which the fetus is entitled, if any, and the means for reconciling the interests of mother and fetus when they clash. In the Roe v. Wade decision, the Court avoided direct confrontation with some of the most difficult issues surrounding fetal responsibility. It provided a time frame, specified by viability, which limits the extent of state interference with the maternal right to privacy. But the Court did not and could not address a host of related policy issues. For example, it did not specify exactly what constitutes compelling state interest in the rights of the fetus. It did not indicate the obligations the mother has, if any, to the fetus if she chooses not to abort.
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