Division Commander Research Articles

From Oslo to Be’eri: how the 30-years-long peace delusion led to Hamas’s 10/7 massacres

ABSTRACT The failure to prevent Hamas’s slaughter of some 1,300 Israelis on 7 October 2023 – the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust – is a direct result of an emergency phone consultation three hours before the terror group’s invasion of Israel with the participation of the IDF’s and Shin Bet’s top leaders, who decided to do nothing despite acute warning signals and failed to alert the Gaza division commander and the political echelon to the imminent attack. Had they taken the minimal precautionary measures, the catastrophe would have been averted altogether. To fully understand the mindset underlying this monumental blunder requires tracing its evolution within the context of the 30-years-long Oslo peace delusion in general, and during the turbulent year preceding the 10/7 massacres in particular. That is: the substitution of a grand strategic deception aimed at Israel’s destruction for a true peace process and the attendant emasculation of the IDF’s military capabilities and combative/offensive ethos, on the one hand, and the unravelling of Israel’s sociopolitical fabric that culminated in the 2023 mass civil disobedience that enticed Hamas into action, on the other. Even Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who opposed the Oslo process from the outset and managed to neutralise its most catastrophic potential calamity – the establishment of a Palestinian state committed to Israel’s destruction in the West Bank and Gaza – failed to extricate Israel from this disastrous course and was ironically forced to bear its full brunt on 7 October 2023.

Yunan Başkomutanı Trikopis’in Esareti Üzerine

Greek General Trikopis who was the First Greek Corps Commander that had to withdraw from Afyonkarahisar wanted to unite with the General Franco’s forces, which he thought were in Dumlupınar, and to establish a new line of defence in this place. However, Trikopis tried to escape together with a part of accompanying forces by entering into a mountainous and forested area through Kızıltaş valley when the Turkish army surrounded the Greek forces in the Aslihanlar region in Dumlupınar. His aim this time was to meet with Franco in Uşak. 
 When Uşak was captured by the Turkish forces on September 1, this hope of Trikopis also disappeared. The accompanying soldiers could not adequately nourish and rest. Undisciplined behaviours also began among his soldiers. He settled on the hill with an altitude of 1155 ….. on the south of Aşağı Karacahisar village and started to take defence measures. However, the soldiers did not want to fight against the Turks. Thereupon, Trikopis got a text explaining this case prepared and received the signatures of military officers. He decided to surrender under these circumstances. He specially wanted that the person to whom he would surrender was at the rank of division commander. He surrendered to the Turkish army on 2 September 1922 at around 18.15.
 The purpose of this study is to discuss the imprisonment and captivity process of Trikopis, the Greek Chief Commander, in the light of, primarily, archival resources, press of the period, memories, and other resources. The study will reveal who captured Trikopis, his dialogues and relations especially with Mustafa Kemal Pasha and other Turkish military officials during his captivity, and his life in captivity. 
 There is no scientific study regarding the captivity of Trikopis. This research aspires to fill the mentioned gap.The research will use the techniques of history methodology including the classification, analysis, composition, criticism, interpretation, and comparison methods.

Examples of Confidential Correspondence between the Heroes of the National Struggle, 23rd Division Commander Ömer Lütfi Argeşo (Karahisar-ı Sahib Deputy) and Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Nuh Bey)

Millî Mücadele döneminde vatansever subaylar Mustafa Kemal Paşa ve Temsil Heyeti ile birlikte işgal devletlerine ve İstanbul Hükümeti’ne karşı büyük bir mücadele vermiştir. Bu subaylar arasında ki önemli isimlerden birisi de 23. Fırka Kumandanı Ömer Lütfi Argeşo’dur. Aslen İstanbul doğumlu olan Ömer Lütfi Bey gerek asker gerekse siyasetçi olarak Afyonkarahisar Sancağı için önemli faaliyetlerde bulunmuştur. Özellikle Sivas Kongresi ve seçimlere giden süreçte Millî Mücadele harekâtının örgütlenmesinde önemli çalışmalara imza atmıştır. Bu sürede 23. Fırka Kumandanlığı mıntıkasında yer alan bölgeler başta olmak üzere birçok bölgenin Sivas karargâhıyla iletişiminin sağlanmasında kilit isimlerden olmuştur. Tıpkı Temsil Heyeti gibi Ömer Lütfi Bey de Millî Mücadele’nin başarılı olabilmesi için öncelikle Müdafaa-i Hukuk merkezlerinin güçlendirilmesi gerektiği kanaatindedir. Bu nedenle mücadele yıllarında tecrübeli ve başarılı bir asker olarak hem direniş hareketlerinin örgütlenmesine yardımcı olmuş hem de halkın bu mücadelede yer alması için elinden geleni yapmıştır. Dahası İstanbul Hükümeti’nden gizlice silah ve cephanelik temin edilmesini sağlayarak Millî Mücadele’ye önemli yardımlarda bulunmuştur. Aynı zamanda halk tarafından da sevilip sayılan bir isim olan Ömer Lütfi Bey bu çalışmalarından dolayı Temsil Heyeti tarafından desteklenmiş ve 1919 seçimlerinde Afyonkarahisar’dan aday gösterilmiştir. Her ne kadar Temsil Heyeti adına meclise seçilmiş olsa da arşiv kayıtlarında askerliğin onun için mebusluktan önce geldiği görülmektedir. Bu çalışmada ATASE ve TİTE arşivleri başta olmak üzere Ömer Lütfi Bey’in hayatı, mebusluk süreci ayrıca Temsil Heyeti ile Mustafa Kemal Paşa ile yaptığı bazı yazışma örnekleri ele alınmaya çalışılmıştır.

The American Army in Germany, 1918–1923: Success against the Odds by Dean A. Nowowiejski

Nowowiejski’s new book is, in his words, “an institutional history of the United States Army in Germany after World War I” (viii). Although the author notes that the army’s Rhineland occupation was an important precedent for its much more extensive occupation duties in various nations after World War II, he does not engage the literature written by political scientists on military government or on the military’s involvement in “stability operations” (4). This book instead employs the methods of social, administrative, and political history to draw a detailed portrait of the American army’s experience in its occupation zone centered on Coblenz from late 1918 to early 1923. Topics include the march of the Third Army into the U.S. zone in late 1918, where it largely demobilized and was replaced with new units designated as the American Forces in Germany (afg); the training, social, and recreational life of afg soldiers and officers; the administrative organization of the afg and its relations with the Germans under its jurisdiction; and the political and military activities of Maj. Gen. Henry T. Allen, who served as commander of the afg, military governor of the U.S. occupation zone, and the American representative to the Inter-Allied Rhineland High Commission (iarhc).Nowowiejski emphasizes that Allen, the focus of much of the book’s narrative, was “a model commander and accomplished soldier-diplomat” (9). Uncommonly for American officers, Allen had an extensive background in political–military affairs, having served as the military attaché to Russia and to Germany, the military governor of Leyte in the Philippines, and a division commander in the World War. In the American occupation zone, Allen built a highly trained and disciplined force that garnered respect from both the Allies and the Germans. With the former, he upheld American prerogatives against French encroachments on the American zone; with the latter, “he acted in the role of benevolent military governor,” defending German rights under the Versailles Treaty and protecting German property (153). Often operating without instructions from Washington, he was an effective voice for 1920s-style American internationalism in the iarhc, working against French efforts to separate the Rhineland from German sovereignty while promoting U.S. business interests and Germany’s economic recovery from the war. To a remarkable degree, Nowowiejski argues, Allen succeeded in acting “as a balancer, protecting both the French and the Germans from their own extremes” (237).Given this argument, it is surprising that Nowowiejski spends relatively little time exploring exactly how Allen and the afg perceived and interacted with German politics. To be sure, he notes that the Americans largely relied upon the existing Prussian bureaucracy to administer civil affairs in the occupation zone and “refused to recognize the people’s committees or workmen’s councils that had taken local control during the German revolution” (149). But he is silent regarding Allen’s view of the resurgence of militaristic German nationalism after the publication of the Versailles Treaty and the rise of the “stab-in-the-back” myth explaining Germany’s defeat in the war, a central idea in German politics in the early 1920s. This is a significant issue to ignore, especially since these trends in German politics had much to do with Germany’s failure to meet its treaty obligations, including an obligation to pay the United States for the cost of the afg’s occupation of its Rhineland zone.Overall, however, this book is a useful and interesting overview of the United States Army’s inaugural effort to carry out a military occupation in Europe. Deeply researched and well-written, it contains a wealth of information sure to be helpful to any student of U.S. foreign and military policy in the early 1920s, as well as to social historians interested in ordinary American soldiers of the period.

A Fire in the Wilderness: The First Battle Between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee by John Reeves

Reviewed by: A Fire in the Wilderness: The First Battle Between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee by John Reeves Christopher B. Bean A Fire in the Wilderness: The First Battle Between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. By John Reeves. (New York and London: Pegasus Books, 2021. Pp. [xii], 270. $28.95, ISBN 978-1-64313-700-1.) Few things bring to mind the carnage of the Civil War more than the two words the Wilderness. The fierceness, casualties, horror, and inconclusiveness of that battle embody the struggle between the North and the Confederate South. In his latest work, John Reeves chronicles this most notorious battle. A Fire in the Wilderness: The First Battle Between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee focuses primarily on the interplay between the commanders of the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia. By the time the two commanders met in the woods of northern Virginia in the spring of 1864, both Grant and Lee were coming to be seen as their respective side's savior. Grant was perhaps the last chance for the North to prevent the Union from irretrievably cleaving. The Confederacy invested Lee with its hopes and dreams of independence. Without exaggeration, the fate of the United States, regardless of the outcome, rested on the shoulders of these two men when they confronted one another for the first time in the war. In sixteen chapters, Reeves recounts the ordeal of the Wilderness—although the last three chapters focus on events after the battle, including a chapter on the battle of Spotsylvania Court House. In order to spotlight the soldier's battle, Reeves follows the actions of Private William Reeves (no relation to the author), of the Seventy-Sixth New York Voluntary Infantry Regiment, and Brigadier General James Wadsworth, Reeves's division commander. As the author notes, Private Reeves's "story represented the experiences of tens of thousands of young men from all across America. … His tragic death epitomized the steep price that was paid for saving the Union" (p. 224). The author's description of these two men's actions during battle and their ultimate deaths is riveting. Through these two men, the author hits the familiar aspects of the battle—the Orange Turnpike, Orange Plank Road, Saunders Field, the conflagration in the woods—as well as the actions of the major participants, including Generals Winfield S. Hancock, Ambrose E. Burnside, James Longstreet, and, of course, Grant and Lee. Reeves is especially strong in two areas. He highlights the confusion of the battle, which was often obscured to the participants by the woods, and his description of what awaited any wounded soldier at the hands of the medical professionals is worth the read. The book's title aside, Reeves's work focuses primarily on the common soldier. His descriptions of their experiences during the battle are excellent. This focus comes, however, at the expense of fleshing out the experiences of Grant and Lee. Beyond cursory quotations and orders from Grant and Lee, the chess game that occurs between all opposing commanders in battle remains underwhelming. Furthermore, the strategic forces pressing down from Washington, D.C., on Grant and from Richmond on Lee are practically nonexistent. This reviewer can appreciate the necessity for vigilance against going down rabbit holes when doing a battlefield biography, but nothing occurs within a vacuum. Reeves's work, thus, falls short in chronicling the entirety of the Wilderness story that exists in Gordon C. Rhea's The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5–6, 1864 (Baton Rouge, 1994) and Noah Andre Trudeau's [End Page 571] Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, May–June 1864 (Boston, 1989). In closing, more well-placed maps are warranted. Without maps, a less knowledgeable reader becomes as confused following the action and whereabouts as the actual participants. Those criticisms aside, Reeves's work is a quick read and easy to understand. This reviewer highly recommends this work for any student wanting an introduction to the Wilderness. Christopher B. Bean East Central University Copyright © 2022 The Southern Historical Association

Mayor KNIL Oerip Soemohardjo dan Sejarah Kebijakan Awal Pembentukan Tentara Nasional Indonesia

Oerip Soemohardjo was appointed second lieutenant (KNIL) on October 24, 1914 with the staamboek number 77352 contained in the Sinar Djawa daily edition of October 24, 1914, having previously graduated from the Jakarta Inlandsche Officiern School. Oerip was classified as an officer respected by all groups while serving in the KNIL. During 24 years of serving in the KNIL Oerip actually almost held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel before retiring. On October 5, 1945 BKR (People's Security Agency) forces were made TKR (People's Security Army). It was to organize the TKR that the Government, which at that time was still domiciled in Jakarta, summoned Mr. Oerip, who lived as a retired Major of KNIL near Yogyakarta. Pak Oerip obtained a mandate from the Government as the Chief of General Staff to organize TKR. Lt. Gen. Oerip Soemohardjo on 12 November 1945 summoned all Division Commander and TKR regiments to attend a meeting in Yogyakarta, the new seat of the TKR Headquarters, after Jakarta was occupied by Allied troops. The main event was the election of the Great Commander. The conference was chaired by the Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Oerip Soemohardjo and proceeded smoothly, but then a tense atmosphere emerged when it was announced about an urgency that could not be postponed, forced to hold an additional meeting agenda, which was to determine / choose the candidates to be elected as the Supreme TKR Leaders

Challenges, Skepticism, and Recommendations from Police about Working in Collaboration with Supervised Consumption Services

Background The operation of supervised consumption services (SCS), programs that offer supervised locations for the consumption of drugs such as heroin, other opioids, cocaine, other stimulants, and other drugs, is contingent on cooperative relationships with police. In this manuscript, we focus on an under studied topic: how active duty police officers understand their role with respect to SCS, and their recommendations for improving relationships with these programs. Methods: During 2018, we audio-recorded and transcribed focus group discussions conducted in four police divisions with 26 police constables and 3 officers of other ranks in Toronto, Canada. Officers were asked about their roles relative to SCS, perceived training needs, and how to build cooperative relationships with SCS. We followed an iterative thematic approach to analyze the data. Results: Participants in three divisions were unclear about their roles, duties, and policy governing policing of SCS. Participants in the fourth division had received instructions from the division commander to observe a “distance and discretion policy”. However, these participants believed that developing familiarity with the new SCS, instead of keeping a distance, would be a more effective approach to building working relationships with staff, clients, and the local community. There was nearly unanimous skepticism about the willingness of SCS workers to work cooperatively with the police. These perceptions were commonly linked to previous negative experiences with harm reduction workers and, in some cases, staff at the new SCS. Several participants also linked problems in communication to fundamental differences between the philosophies or worldviews of SCS staff versus those of police. Conclusions: Building collaborative SIS-police relationships can be assisted by demystifying the operation of SCS for police, articulating policies, and working toward mutual respect.

Israel's Peacemaking under Security Challenges: Implications of a Retrospective Outlook

41 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 43, No.3, Spring 2020 Israel’s Peacemaking under Security Challenges: Implications of a Retrospective Outlook Gilead Sher* Adelaide Duckett** Israeli Involvement in Peace Processes Israel’s first conflict began as a state-in-the-making in 1947 and intensified with its establishment as a state in the War of Independence in 1948, involving all of its neighboring states of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, which were supported by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and others. The war came to an end with the 1949 armistice agreements. These established the armistice lines including the Green Line, and an end to the war, but not a formal peace as no state yet recognized the State of Israel. Conflict continued throughout the 1950s between Arab troops and Fidayeens and Israeli forces but did not escalate into full-scale war. In 1956, the Suez crisis resulted in an Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, allowing Israel to reopen the Straits of Tiran. Israel subsequently retreated from the Sinai Peninsula, only to recapture it a decade later in the Six-Day War of June 1967. *Gilead Sher is currently the Isaac and Mildred Brochstein fellow in Middle East Peace and Security at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. He was chief of staff and policy coordinator to former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, a senior negotiator at the Camp David summit and Taba talks, and a delegate to the 1994–95 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement negotiations under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. He is an IDF Colonel who served in reserve service as a brigade commander and a deputy division commander. Sher heads the Center for Applied Negotiations and is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). He is the author of The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Negotiations, 1999–2001 and coeditor of Negotiating in Times of Conflict and Spoiling and Coping with Spoilers. **Adelaide Duckett is a student at the University of Chicago working under Gilead Sher and the Center for Applied Negotiations. Attacked by five Arab states, which were supported by eight additional ones, Israel swiftly conquered the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. As a result of the war, Israel expanded its territory significantly, but the admirable victory of the 19-year-old country fighting for its life has not been translated, as of yet, into serving the core values of a Jewishdemocratic state. In an attempt to regain their lost territories, Egypt and Syria in October 1973 launched a surprise attack on Yom Kippur, the most sacred holiday in Judaism. The fighting lasted less than three weeks and ended with an Israeli victory and no major territorial changes. The end of the Yom Kippur War marked the start of the first major peace process in Israel’s history. After a summit conference in Geneva aimed at resolving the conflict collapsed with Syria’s refusal of attendance, the U.S. began acting as mediator, concluding an Israeli-Syrian Agreement on Disengagement in May 1974 and establishing a channel of communication between Israel and Egypt. Two years of indirect negotiations, punctuated by a change in Israeli leadership in the election of Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister, resulted in an interim agreement reached in September 1975. The agreement secured Israeli use of the Suez Canal, an Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai Peninsula, and the establishment of a demilitarized buffer zone between the new borders. This agreement laid the foundation for a full framework for peace reached in 1978. Following the unprecedented November 1977 visit to Israel by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, U.S. President Jimmy Carter offered to facilitate negotiations between the two nations at Camp David. Intense negotiations resulted in two documents: the Framework for Peace in the Middle East1 and the Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty2 between Egypt and Israel. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East set forth a plan for reaching a final status settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, which led the foundations 42 1 “Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle...

Soviet-Finnish War

The whole period of the Soviet Union’s existence and the first years of independence of Ukraine didnot write and talked about the military conflict in the winter of 1939–1940. The reason for the strategicdefeat of the huge Soviet Union in the war with a small Finland. In the Soviet Union, they tried to createsuch a notion as the «Soviet people,» the relocation and mixing of a large number of people throughout thespace of the USSR. Therefore, no one has ever defined participants in events by nationality or territoriallocation. Ukrainians also did not stand out. It was only when Ukraine became independent that therewas a need to determine the participation of Ukrainians in the Soviet-Finnish war and their role. Duringthe Soviet-Finnish war, the North-West front was commanded by the future Marshal and Hero of theSoviet Union, Ukrainian Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich. Future Marshal and Hero of the SovietUnion, Ukrainian Kulik Grigory Ivanovich, as Deputy People’s Commissar for Defense of the USSR,participated in the preparation of Army and Artillery Parts for the Soviet-Finnish War. The commanderof the 70th division was Ukrainian Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich. Participated in the combat operations ofthe pilot-as and Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian Kravchenko Grigory Panteleevich. Future Marshaland Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian, Moskalenko Kirill Semenovich, during the Soviet-FinnishWar, was the head of the artillery 51st Perekopskaya Rifle Division of the Odessa Military District. Thefuture Colonel-General of the Tank Army and Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian Kravchenko AndriyGrigorievich, during the war, was Chief of Staff of the 173th Motorized Infantry Division. In the threemonth conflict, nearly 40,000 Ukrainians died. Among those who fought in this war and received thehighest award – the Order of Lenin – Vasyl Petrenko from Poltava region. On the side of the USSR twodivisions participated in the war, which were completed in Ukraine. These are the 44th and 70th InfantryDivisions. The first of them fell into the environment and almost all died, trying to break away from theFinnish ring. Those who escaped were subjected to a martial law court. Division commander, chief ofstaff, chief of the police department and commissar were shot. In general, several thousand participantsin this war suffered repressions. Instructive that the Finnish side arranged the graves of the dead Sovietsoldiers. The city of Suomussalmi has a monument to the soldiers of the 44th Division, at the time whenthe names of the heroes were for gotten in the homeland.

The Accountability of Military Commander for the Forces Doing Gross Violations of Human Rights

Command responsibility occurs due to gross violation of human rights committed by subordinates under the effective control. It develops in doctrines and practices which then normatively institutionalize in International Law and National Law. In the National Law, the Command responsibility is regulated in Article 42 of Act No. 26 of 2000 concerning Human Rights Courts of State Gazette Number 208. Military Commander or a person who effectively acts as a Military Commander may be responsible for crimes that are within the Jurisdiction of Human Rights Courts carried out by forces under Command, and effective courts, and The criminal offense is a result of improper control, namely: the Military Commander or someone knows that the force is committing or has just committed a gross violation of Human Rights and that the Military Commander or someone does not take appropriate and necessary actions under his power to prevent or stop the act or to submit the matters to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. In the military organization of combat units, the composition of the military commander began with the Unit Commander, Platoon Commander, Company Commander, Battalion Commander, Brigade Commander, Division Commander and Commander of the Army Strategic Command ( Pangkostrad ) for the Kostrad ranks. In the Special Forces Command ( Kopassus ) ranks there are known General Commander ( Danjen ) Kopassus , Group Commander ( Dangroup ) and so on. For Territorial units, starting from the Military District Commander ( Danramil ), Military Regions Commander ( Dandim ), Military Resort Commander ( Danrem ) and Territorial Military Commander ( Pangdam ). The Army Chief of Staff ( Kasad ) Supervise the command ranks of the Army, including the Chief of the Navy ( Kasal ) and Chief of Staff of the Air Force ( Kasau ), and the Indonesian National Army (TNI) Commander as the command holder for all Forces, the Army, Navy and Indonesian Air Force. Keywords: Command responsibility of gross violation of human rights DOI : 10.7176/JLPG/85-13 Publication date :May 31 st 2019

The aviation of the Makhno movement (1918–1920)

The article explores the history of the air forces of the Makhno movement in a period from 1918 to 1920 during the existence of the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine (the Makhnovists) and provides a short historiographical review of the existing publications on the topic. It describes the attitude of the anarchist insurgents towards the advanced technological military equipment of the beginning of the twenty-first century and its usage in warfare. It talks about constant and persistent attempts of the rebels to capture aeroplanes as trophies, their usage for their own purposes and ways to hide or destroy them in case of adverse circumstances. The major part of the article is a narrative about the rebels’ attempts to initiate mass production of the “Farman HF. 30” aeroplanes at the “Widow Mathias & Sons” factory in Berdiansk in the spring of 1919, the characteristics of the process and general results of this activity. The number of aeroplanes produced by the factory and their distribution between the insurrectionary forces and the Ukrainian Red Air Fleet is calculated. Among other things it talks about legal problems tied to the handing of the aeroplanes to the Makhnovist 3rd Zadniprovska brigade and the 1st Ukrainian insurrectionary division. A certain part of the article is dedicated to the visit of the division commander Dybenko P. to Berdiansk tied to the problems mentioned before, the role of the “plane of anarchy” in the attack on Mariupol on March 28–29, 1919 and in the suppression of Padalko’s anti-Makhnovists putsch arranged on March 31, 1919. The author talks about different ways in which the rebels had solved the problem of the lack of aviation fuel in 1919–1920 by following a requisition practice. The article informs about the cases when the Red Army (reconnaissance air squads) was used for the benefit of the Makhnovists during their politico-military treaties with the Bolsheviks. A certain place is devoted to the description of the first flights of the insurrectionary leader Nestor Makhno. The article mentions the theme of the Makhnovists’ aviation in English fiction of the latter half of the twentieth century.

Leaders Know Who They Are, Not Just What They Do, Says Hertling

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Professional NewsFull AccessLeaders Know Who They Are, Not Just What They Do, Says HertlingMark MoranMark MoranSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:25 May 2018https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.pn.2018.6a28AbstractTrue leaders have good character, presence,and intellect that serve to inspire others, according to retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling.“Purity and civility.”Those are the values that leaders of the future will need to embody in an era when the standards of civil discourse are falling, said retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling in an address at the Opening Session of APA’s 2018 Annual Meeting last month. “We are becoming a much more divisive society,” Hertling said. He said that the professionals in our society need to “uphold values of purity and civility” at a time when civil discourse seems to be a lost value.Retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling says that sometimes mentoring involves the mentoring of older people by younger people, not the other way around.David HathcoxAs commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, Hertling led over 50,000 soldiers, cared for over 100,000 family members, and partnered with the armies of 50 countries in the European theater. He was an assistant division commander in Baghdad in 2003-2004 and later commanded the Army’s 1st Armored Division in Germany and in northern Iraq during the surge. After his retirement, Hertling was appointed by President Barack Obama and served for four years as one of 25 members of the President’s Council on Fitness, Sport, and Nutrition. He is an adjunct scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute and serves as a military analyst for CNN.After leaving the Army in 2013, Hertling was hired as a senior vice president by Florida Hospital in Orlando to observe the culture of medicine there and help develop strategies for global partnering and leadership development. In an address he gave last fall at APA’s IPS: The Mental Health Services Conference, Hertling drew on the disciplines taught in the military and codified in the U.S. Army Leadership Field Manual emphasizing the relational aspects of leadership.In his address at the Annual Meeting, Hertling said the skills of leadership—which are taught in the military as a discrete discipline—can be incorporated into medicine. “Leadership is the art of understanding motivations, influencing people, building teams, and communicating purpose in order to accomplish stated goals while improving the profession,” he said.Leadership, as defined in the Army Doctrinal Manual, consists of three attributes—character, presence, and intellect. These are codified in a phrase that is taught to young recruits: “Be. Know. Do.”“In essence, this means—Who are you? What kind of person are you? When you ask people about their career, they will go into their task accomplishments and skip over the most important part—what kind of person are you, and how do you carry yourself?”Hertling said the competencies of a leader—the ability to inspire people, develop talent, and achieve goals—derive from the kind of person that he or she exemplifies. “The competencies of leadership come from who you are, not what you do.”Following on the remarks of APA President-elect Altha Stewart, M.D., Hertling said leaders in medicine—as in other arenas—need to be culturally informed. “By the year 2030 we are going to have to be more culturally informed and understanding of people who don’t look and talk as we do,” he said. “If you look at our demographics, we are going to become more diverse as a society, not less.”Leaders are going to have to “listen more and talk less,” he continued. And they will need to cultivate the young people in the profession. “You need to get into the weeds with your young people,” he said. “It isn’t always the case that mentorship is about an older, mature person mentoring the young, immature person—sometimes it’s the other way around.”Finally, Hertling said the rising cost of health care is a problem that threatens the entire economy.“There’s a lot of talk about President Trump’s budget and the amount that is allocated to the military,” Hertling said. “The military constitutes 3.7 percent of gross domestic product. Health care accounts for 19.8 percent and is estimated to rise to 22 percent by 2020. Health care is contributing most to bankruptcies and foreclosures. If the military has to get it right with a small percentage of the budget, you in medicine will need to look for leaders to take you in a new direction.” ■ ISSUES NewArchived

Former Army Commander to Share Strategies for ‘Growing Physician Leaders’

Back to table of contents Next article Annual MeetingFull AccessFormer Army Commander to Share Strategies for ‘Growing Physician Leaders’Mark MoranMark MoranSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:8 Feb 2018https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.pn.2018.2b5AbstractLt. Gen. Mark Hertling says the principles of leadership training that have been polished by the military over decades have started to transform the culture at Florida Hospital in Orlando.Leaders can be “made.” You don’t have to be born one.Retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling says physician leadership training, modeled on the U.S. military’s model of grooming leaders, has begun to change the culture at Florida Hospital, Orlando.Karl Weisel, USAG WiesbadenThat’s the message that retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling—author of the 2016 book Growing Physician Leaders—hopes to bring to psychiatrists at this year’s Annual Meeting in New York. His presentation will follow the Opening Session on Sunday, May 6, which begins at 4:30 p.m.Currently senior vice president at Florida Hospital in Orlando, Hertling hopes to share the lessons of military leadership and how those lessons can be applied in contemporary American health care. This was the message Hertling also presented during APA’s 2017 IPS: The Mental Health Services Conference in New Orleans in October.“Leadership is leadership, no matter what profession you are in,” Hertling told Psychiatric News. “Many people think leaders are born, but in fact leaders can be ‘made’ if you learn the skills, focus on polishing them, and practice them in different situations.”Hertling is the former commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe, where he led over 50,000 soldiers, oversaw the care of 100,000 family members, and partnered with the armies of 50 countries in the European theatre. He was an assistant division commander in Baghdad in 2003-2004 and later commanded the Army’s 1st Armored Division in Germany and in northern Iraq during the surge. After his retirement, Hertling was appointed by President Barack Obama and served for four years as one of 25 members of the President’s Council on Fitness, Sport, and Nutrition. He is an adjunct scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute and serves as a military analyst for CNN.“Many groups that want to learn more about leadership listen to life coaches or speakers who have only studied or read about these things, but my experience has allowed me to get a lot of scar tissue and to learn about the intricacies of applying leadership,” he continued. “I’m studying theory and academic approaches to leadership, and it’s becoming even more clear to me why we do what we do in the Army, and how it might be done in health care.”At the IPS, Hertling said the principles of leadership are distilled in a military mantra that can be absorbed by 18-year-old recruits: “Be. Know. Do.”Be: What kind of person are you? How do you carry yourself? How do others see you?Know: What do you know about the world?Do: Competencies build trust. How do you get people to do the right thing?Over the past five years at Florida Hospital, Hertling has helped adapt the methods of “transformational leadership training” used for military professionals into a seminar on leadership attributes and competencies for health care professionals. “The chief medical officer showed an interest in the way the military taught leadership and asked me to design a program and teach it once a month. Now we have over 300 graduates of the program, and it appears to be helping the organization,” Hertling explained.Hertling said that he believes the principles of leadership can be applied to the challenge of physician burnout—a priority of APA President Anita Everett, M.D. “I am currently doing a research study to address how the elements of leadership—especially the attributes of character and intellect as they are applied to one’s chosen profession—can counter burnout,” he said. “Any individual working at a tough job in a profession is susceptible to being ‘ground down’ if he or she is not centered in the values of the chosen profession. And you are more apt to be affected if you don’t think about who you are as a person and why you are doing the things you’re doing as part of a larger professional team.” ■ ISSUES NewArchived

The monitoring technique of the soldier state in the process of psycho-pedagogical training in the organization and guard duty

The following paper deals with the problem of military personnel training for guard duty and their moral and psychological maintenance during their duty. The division commander, being responsible for the guard personnel training should have a set of techniques, ways and methods of military personnel training for duty, while the guard chief, in addition, must be able to timely detect, identify and neutralize negative effects of stress on the personality of military personnel members of the guard. Surveys with the guard personnel revealed the contradiction between the requirements to military personnel and the actual state of psychological microclimate in the guard. It is obvious that the leveling of the stress influence on the soldiers personality will have a positive impact on the psychological microclimate of the guard personnel, but it should be done without any damage to the combat mission quality. The author has found a solution and created a method of the soldier state monitoring in the organization and guard duty. The application of this method has improved the quality of combat mission execution by guard personnel.

“Serve the People” from 1944 to 2005

In 1944 Mao Zedong published a speech titled “Serve the People” to commemorate the death of an Eighth Route Army Soldier, Zhang Side, a participant in the Long March who died in the collapse of a kiln. The notion “Serve the People” is regarded as one of Mao’s most significant theoretical contributions to the understanding and application of Marxism in China. In the post-Mao era, “Serve the People” developed into one of the key words and slogans of the Communist Party in China and has significant influence both domestically and internationally. While in 2005, Yan Lianke, one of China’s foremost contemporary novelists, published a novella of the same title featuring another PLA soldier, Wu Dawang, a model soldier selected to work as a household servant for a powerful Division Commander. The political speech and the fiction have a strong interrelationship as the meaning of “serving the people” undergoes dramatic changes. By borrowing and transforming the meaning of this well-known phrase, Yan metaphorically reveals his objection to political injustice in China. This essay aims to compare and contrast these two pieces, centering on the analysis of the issues: “Who are ‘the people’?” so as to reveal Yan’s metaphoric writing strategy. The ultimate purpose of this essay is to search for further understanding of justice in a global sense. Though the novella is written in a Chinese context, its implication and significance goes beyond any particular political regime.

Jubal Early: Robert E. Lee’s “Bad Old Man.” by Benjamin Franklin Cooling III

Reviewed by: Jubal Early: Robert E. Lee’s “Bad Old Man.” by Benjamin Franklin Cooling III Bradford A. Wineman Jubal Early: Robert E. Lee’s “Bad Old Man.” By Benjamin Franklin Cooling III. (Lanham, Md., and other cities: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014. Pp. xiv, 201. $38.00, ISBN 978-0-8108-8913-2.) The name Jubal A. Early is rarely mentioned in the same refrain with other great Confederate generals, yet Benjamin Franklin Cooling III’s latest biography of Robert E. Lee’s “bad old man” calls attention to the remarkable, and often controversial, contributions of this overlooked stalwart of the Army of Northern Virginia. Early was an unlikely Confederate hero. An outspoken pro-Union Whig before the war, he actively opposed his home state leaving the Union at the April 1861 Virginia secession convention. Moreover, Early had deliberately avoided a professional army career, fulfilling his required obligation after graduating from West Point and then resigning to pursue a career in law. But after serving as a volunteer in the U.S.-Mexican War, he quickly discovered that military leadership was his calling. In the Civil War he served capably as a regimental, brigade, and then division commander in the eastern theater, rising to become one of Lee’s most reliable subordinates. Although he garnered a reputation for his strict discipline and cantankerous personality, Early distinguished himself in nearly every major battle from first Manassas through the Overland campaign. This success, however, did not follow Early once he was given an independent command in the Shenandoah Valley in June 1864. His abortive attempt to capture Washington, D.C., in July, followed by the crippling defeat at Cedar Creek in October, transitioned him from trustworthy lieutenant to disgraced pariah. Early ended the war removed from command and professionally ostracized by the Confederate leadership. The chapters examining Early’s postbellum life and remembrance are easily the most compelling and the most in need of further exploration. After the Confederate surrender at Appomattox, Early refused to submit to Yankee subjugation and fled first to Mexico and later to Canada. From his self-imposed [End Page 175] exile he published vigorously, defending the Confederate cause and his own criticized war record while attacking many of his former fellow officers. He also voraciously defended the reputation of Lee, elevating the defeated commander to near saint-like status. Early’s own personal insecurity and fanatical justification of the Confederacy’s righteousness made him one of the very first originators of the Lost Cause mythology. Even after his death, his contemporaries and historians debated his legacy and his contributions to Confederate memory. Although a slim volume (less than two hundred pages), Cooling’s book is ably constructed. But his frequent use of rhetorical questions throughout the narrative sets a tone of ambiguity, as he habitually offers, literally and figuratively, more questions than answers. His analysis presents more inference and supposition than argument or assertion. This quality by no means makes the book a disappointment. On the contrary, it instead leaves the reader longing for more. Cooling convincingly illustrates Early as far too interesting and meaningful a character not to demand further investigation into his personality and motivations, particularly the reconciliation of his many ideological contradictions and paradoxes. One hopes this commendable work will inspire a more comprehensive and much-needed biography of the belligerent yet influential “Old Jube” (p. xi). Bradford A. Wineman Command and Staff College Marine Corps University Copyright © 2016 The Southern Historical Association

THE USE OF SPOKEN LEARNER CORPORA TO DETECT PROBLEMS WITH LEXICAL ACCURACY

In June 1908, the non-Muslims’ having fun in a grove triggered the gathering of thousands of Albanians in Firzovik. The call was made by the 18th division Commander Semsi Pasha who was assigned to suppress the rebellion started by Resneli Niyazi Bey and he wanted to get the support of Albanians. After the spreading news of Austrian troops’ moving over the region, it was renounced that the number of gathering people was almost thirty thousand in a few weeks. The Ottoman Government sent the Kosovo Gendarmerie Commander Colonel Galip Bey to Firzovik to solve the problem upon seeing the increasing crowd day by day. Colonel Galip Bey who started the organization in Skopje, and also was a unionist, caused more Albanians’ coming there instead of distributing the group. Colonel Galip Bey convinced the Albanians that gathered in Firzovik to accept the need of the proclamation of the constitutionalism. A draft of a petition prepared by Colonel Galip Bey, demanding the declaration of constitutionalism in a very short time was signed by eighty people representing the crowd and was sent to Yildiz Palace. Albanians, who reported their demands with a petition to the Sultan, indicated that they swore to march on Istanbul if their request would not be accepted. In these days, Resneli Niyazi Bey’s escape to mountains with the soldiers under his command, the Committee of Union and Progress branches’ telegram to the palace for the declaration of Constitutionalism, and Albanians’ this attitude created a major impact on Abdulhamit II to declare the constitutionalism

Recalibrating U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Afghanistan is America's longest war. Thousands of U.S. troops and those from nearly 50 other countries have fought in Afghanistan against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, but it was in nuclear-armed P...

North Korea and the Opinion of Fascism: A Case of Mistaken Identity

IntroductionRecently, an opinion has been in circulation that North Korea has something to do with the aggressive, imperialistic, and ultranationalist political doctrine and movement that grew out of the dislocations of the First World War and the Great Depression, manifesting in Italy in the 1920s, assuming the super-racist form of Nazism in Germany in the 1930s, and being implemented from above in Imperial Japan. Considering that fascism is imperialistic and that its extreme right-wing politics is violently anticommunist and antisocialist, the association of national state-socialist North Korea with fascism is frankly strange.The basic reasoning behind the association is that Korea was a colony from 1910 to 1945 and that thought in the 1930s and 1940s carried over into Soviet Army-liberated northern Korea from 1945 onwards. The argument continues that many Korean intellectuals had been co-opted in the colonial-fascist era and that these individuals were incorporated into the North Korean cultural apparatus (North Korea became an independent state in 1948), leading to a fascist-rooted state ideology that celebrates race.1 The claim is superficial and impressionistic.Other than the fact that its empirical ground is insufficient, the real problem with the opinion of fascism is that it fixates abstractly on ideology (a servant of politics) and neglects the political perspective and economic structure of postcolonial North Korea. In this regard, it is necessary to briefly consider some North Korean political history; revisit the writings of the late leader Kim Il Sung, whose authority is preeminent in North Korea; and consider how fascism in action has been described in fascism studies and studies. What the evidence reveals is that the North Korean system is incompatible with fascism.Struggle against Imperial JapanAnti-Japanism and anti-fascism are two policy lines that go hand in hand in North Korea. Both constitute the locus classicus of the political regime, the legitimacy of which derives from the armed of Kim Il Sung and the anti-Japanese guerrillas, who fought the Imperial military and police in Manchuria, with some forays into Korea, from about 1931 to 1941. As Kim Han Gil's official Modern History of Korea states, the anti-Japanese struggle was poised against the Japanese imperialists, the Asian ' shock-troop' of international fascism, and their imperialist colonial system.2North Korea identifies late Imperial Japan, along with Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, as a state and holds a view of fascism that recalls the Stalininst Comintern in the 1930s. This is not surprising. Before northern Korea was liberated by the Soviet Army in 1945, Kim Il Sung, who became the leader of choice during the three-year Soviet occupation, had been a member of the Mao-led Chinese Communist Party (CCP) when it was a Comintern affiliate, a division commander in the CCP Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, and received military training in the Soviet Union, where he retreated and became a Soviet Army captain after his guerrillas were defeated in 1941.The North Korean definition of fascism is summarizable as a form of that pursues aggressive as a of delivering itself from economic crisis. The term reactionary extremely conservative or right-wing in politics, while the term imperialism refers to a type of capitalism based on the domination of monopoly capital (or finance capital) and the international system of creditor states and debtor states (that is, colonies and semi-colonies). In the specific case of the fascist tyranny and colonial plunder of imperialism, fascism manifested the following characteristics:* anticommunism* aggressive war* intensified tyranny* police information system* militarization of the economy3Kim Han Gil repeats Kim Il Sung's words from the February 27, 1936, Nanhutou Meeting that fascism was an anti-proletarian political movement that appeared in many and that the fascists employed the means of sanguinary dictatorship and aggressive war to enslave not only the peoples of their own countries but also of all humanity and to fascistize the whole world. …

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JÓZEF OLSZYNA-WILCZYŃSKI IN LATVIAN CAMPAIGN (DECEMBER 1919 – FEBRUARY 1920)

The article introduces Lieutenant Colonel Józef Olszyna-Wilczyński in the Polish and Latvian campaign conducted in winter 1920. Then, this officer commanded 3 Infantry Brigade Legions and at the same time as was Acting Commander of 1 Infantry Brigade Legions and Infantry Division, which belonged to Edward Rydz-Śmigły.During this campaign Lt. Col. Olszyna-Wilczyński commanded Grupa Przełomowa (the Breakthrough Group), which mainly carried out attacks. On 3 January he conquered Daugavpils. In the first ten days of January Gen. Rydz-Śmigły gave J. Puriņša`s Latvian Group under Lt. Col. Olszyna-Wilczyński’s command.For the Polish and Latvian campaign, conducted under very harsh conditions, he was held in high regard by the division commander Gen. Rydz-Smigly and the commander of the Lithuanian and Belarusian Front Gen. Stanislaw Sheptytsky. For conquering Daugavpils, at Stefan Dąb-Biernacki’s request, he was decorated second time with the Cross of Valour. At the beginning of February 1926, the President of the Republic of Poland permitted him to accept and wear the Latvian Cross Lacplesis (Bear Slayer) Class III.