MY QUALIFIED argument for fatalism drew some impassioned protest.' Such arguments have disturbed philosophers since the days of St. Augustine and Boethius; since, in fact, men first took seriously the idea of divine omniscience and, with this, the idea that all truth is timeless. Few nowadays consider divine omniscience the cornerstone of all that we cherish, but the suggestion that some propositions about the future may be as yet not true and as yet not false, but will in time be made true or made false by men's acts, is generally received as though it were an attack upon reason itself. The fundamental error made by all my critics consists of treating some or all the expressions is within my power to do E, is possible that shall do E, and I am able to do E as synonymous. They clearly are not. It is often possible that shall do something that it is not within my power to do-for example, inherit a fortune. It is sometimes possible that shall do something that am unable to dofor example, compose a good sonnet. And am often able to do something which, in the absence of some condition necessary for doing it, it is not within my power to do-for example, am able to play the piano, but it is not within my power to do so in a room that contains none. It is this last confusion that is at the root of all our troubles. All three critics point out that one is often able to do something, even in the absence of some condition-past, present, or future-necessary for its accomplishment. Thus, one might be perfectly able to swim, even though he is not near a lake, or able to lift a weight, even though he does not exert the necessary effort, or able to administer more spanks to his child than he will be provoked to administer, and so on. This is all perfectly true. Indeed, to assert otherwise would be to involve oneself in a sort of absurdity that can be elicited as follows. Let us suppose, to use my own example, that my issuing a certain order is, under prevailing conditions, sufficient for the occurrence of a naval battle tomorrow. In that case, the occurrence of that battle tomorrow is a necessary condition of my prior issuance of that order. But it cannot be a necessary condition of my being able to issue that order-for if it were, then it would follow that my mere ability to issue