Divine Hiddenness Research Articles

Meeting Face to Face: C.S. Lewis's Till We Have Faces and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness

C. S. Lewis's Till We Have Faces is, among other things, a meditation on and response to divine hiddenness. The theme of hiddenness stretches throughout the work, and Orual's accusation against the gods centers precisely on the silence of the gods. Accordingly, Lewis gives a number of responses to the problem of divine silence or hiddenness in the novel. In this paper, I explore Lewis's engagement with divine hiddenness by comparing his framing of the problem, and his responses given, to divine hiddenness in modern philosophy of religion: the argument of J. L. Schellenberg and his responders. I argue that at least two of Lewis's responses in Till We Have Faces are similar to those found in this literature, despite predating Schellenberg's argument by almost fifty years, and that a third response, though different, is an important though often neglected response today.

Seeing the Face of Christ

The problem of the hiddenness of God has at least two kinds: an experiential and an intellectual problem. Despite differences, a solution to either would require some account of how God is personally known. Yet for the Christian tradition, God is known in the man Jesus Christ. I suggest, then, a Christological reformulation of the hiddenness argument, and proceed to offer an account of how Christ is known. With special attention to the ecclesiology of Gregory of Nyssa, I offer an account of knowing Christ in the church. I then explore this as a response to the problems of divine hiddenness, and anticipate a considerable objection to my response.

Divine hiddenness and the problem of no greater goods

John Schellenberg argues that God would never withhold the possibility of conscious personal relationship with Him from anyone for the sake of greater goods, since there simply would not be greater goods than a conscious personal relationship with God. Given that nonresistant nonbelief withholds the possibility of such relationship, this entails that God would not allow nonresistant nonbelief for the sake of greater goods. Thus, if Schellenberg is right, all greater goods responses to the hiddenness argument must fail in principle. I argue that there are good reasons for thinking that greater goods responses do not, for the above reason, fail in principle.

Agnosticism II: Actions and attitudes

AbstractWithin contemporary philosophy, practical consequences of agnosticism about the existence of God have mostly been discussed on the margins of other topics—such as the nature of faith or the problem of divine hiddenness. The aim of this article is to present the existing views on the practical upshots of suspending one's judgment on God's existence, briefly discussing the way in which agnosticism relates to practical atheism, non‐doxastic faith, fictionalism, apophaticism, and spiritual inquiry.

Does “Divine Hiddenness” Neutralize the Problem of Evil? Is Process Theodicy More Adequate? A Constructive Process Critique of Paul Moser’s Proposals

Abstract This article critically engages Paul Moser’s “Divine Hiddenness Response” to the problem of evil—an approach to have recently come out of traditional free-will theism. I begin with identifying the initial common ground between Moser’s thought and process theology that arguably coincides with what can be called the “Four Noble Truths of Christianity. “ However, when confronted with the problem of evil that threatens the credibility of these truths, Moser offers an epistemic strategy to address this threat without modifying the classical concept of omnipotence and without having a full-explanation theodicy. I will argue that, far from helping the situation, this approach exacerbates it and is therefore strongly undesirable. In addition, Moser’s assumption of the absence of an adequate theodicy is unjustified in light of the demonstrable merits of process theodicy in accomplishing what omnipotence-preserving approaches cannot do—defusing the defeaters to Christianity’s Four Noble Truths effectively. Thus, it is desirable and, in the absence of better options, epistemically obligatory that omnipotence be modified and replaced with a version of God’s perfect power that is more coherent and evidence-based, and is also in line with a significant strand within the Bible.

Being and Time-less Faith: Juxtaposing Heideggerian Anxiety and Religious Experience

AbstractIn Heidegger, fear reveals the thing to be feared in a fuller way than theory can. However, anxiety is distinct from fear, for while fear is directed towards a specific thing within the world, anxiety is anxious about existence itself, disclosing the totality of Being. A similar method could be applied to faith. Arguably, faith is a mood; a feeling of trust in the divine that can be phenomenologically consistent and overwhelming. However, faith is not necessarily directed towards a specific object within the world. One cannot point and say: “God is right there!” Indeed, attempts to do so through miracles, teleology or dialectics have been roundly critiqued by the Western tradition. But then what is this mood of faith disclosing if not something within the world? Perhaps, like anxiety, faith is not revealing an object within the world, but the world as a totality. Since God—at least the God central to much of the Judeo-Christian tradition—is not a being but Being itself (or in some formulations is actually ‘beyond being’), God therefore cannot be disclosed in the world as an object but has to be disclosed as that which is transcendently beyond it. Such a conclusion does not simply flee the realm of the everyday, but derives from, and legitimates, basic descriptions of religious experience. Specifically, Judeo-Christian descriptions of (1) divine providence, (2) happiness/ joy, (3) the eschatological ‘not yet’, and (4) Divine Hiddenness. This paper will argue that appropriating Heidegger’s phenomenological method in his discussions of fear/anxiety and applying them to Judeo-Christian descriptions of faith thus leads to a radically different ontology from that of Heidegger himself, offering a renewed basis for religion that contrasts the nothingness revealed by anxiety with the divinity revealed by faith, challenging us to weigh for ourselves which mood is more swaying.

The Hiddenness of God by Michael C. Rea

Reviewed by: The Hiddenness of God by Michael C. Rea Mark Mattes The Hiddenness of God. By Michael C. Rea. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. xiv + 198 pp. This book presents Notre Dame theologian Michael Rea's 2017 Gifford Lectures, dedicated to apologetics and sponsored by the [End Page 232] University of Aberdeen. Rea addresses the topic of divine hiddenness. Surprisingly, no mention is made of Luther even though hiddenness is a hallmark of Luther's theology. Instead, the author takes up hiddenness from the perspective of philosophical theology and explores matters such as the ambiguity of the evidence for God's existence, the obscurity of God's presence when people suffer, and the feeling of abandonment which some believers at times experience. For Rea, such realities are not grounds for atheism. Rea cites the example of Mother Theresa who as an adolescent claimed to have enjoyed intense, loving, and reassuring encounters with God but once she began her work with the impoverished in Calcutta felt abandoned by God. Rea notes that Friedrich Nietzsche would be apt to call out such divine hiddenness as cruelty. In contrast, throughout the book, Rea contends that such hiddenness is neither an injustice nor an anomaly but instead a natural result of God living out God's own life (6). He believes that we tend to inflate analogies such as a parent's love for a child with God's love for individuals. No doubt there is some truth in these analogies, but they have their limits. Given that "helicopter parenting" (my image, not Rea's) is the model some use for parenting, we should have some suspicions. Rea believes that an investment in such personalistic imagery can lead to unwarranted expectations about God's love. We do well to consider that the Bible portrays a continuum between personalistic imagery for God and God's utter transcendence. We too should honor that continuum instead of largely singling out the personal side in divine-human relations. If we could do that, we would not be trapped into affirming that divine hiddenness must somehow contribute to a wider good but could accept the ambiguities and complexities of the relationship between God and people (8). Since God transcends human experience, God eludes our ability to grasp conceptually. Honoring such transcendence, Rea feels that God can both perfectly love the world and, at times, be hidden. We should not impose creaturely standards of human parental love onto God. Conversely, divine transcendence does not rule out the human ability to speak about God, at least to some degree (50). [End Page 233] To know God's love, which Rea secures in the coming of Christ, we need revelation and not merely our own speculation about God. For that reason, we should acknowledge that perfect divine love is not grounded in human idealizations of love to the utmost degree (69). It should instead be viewed in how it is concretely given in Christ—a view not so different from Luther's. Additionally, though, Rea claims that God has his own goals for himself about which we are not privy. The scriptures do insist that God loves humans; but the overall biblical portrait of God is one of a personal being who has, in addition to an overwhelming interest in human good, a strong interest in living as God doing as God pleases. (75) As we see in Job, the Bible gives voice to lament when God fails to meet human expectations. No theodicy per se is expressed in Job, other than that God himself validates Job's complaint. Indeed, "validating protest can be an important way in which God shows love to those who occupy the perspective of the protester" (157). Obviously, Lutherans would highlight that God is hidden not just because he is not always understood but that he even at times intentionally hides himself so that we walk by faith, not sight. God is also hidden in the cross, a theme not so readily explored by Rea. If God is manifest as for us, then that revelation is best done in preaching. Much of Rea is not merely a cerebral exercise but also invested in spirituality. Luther's...

Theodicy of Divine hiddenness: Posing the question

Skeptical theologians widely discuss J. L. Schellenberg’s approach in which he demonstrates how epistemic skepticism of skeptical theology leads to Divine hiddenness. Although this experience is obviously close to that of godforsakeness (a strictly religious experience), nevertheless the experience of Divine hiddenness can lead to the denial of the theistic component of skeptic theism, and, accordingly, to the destruction of theism (Schellenberg himself adopts an atheistic position). In our article, we examine the causes of atheistic tendencies within skeptic theism and offer a proposal to preserve the theistic core of skeptic theism. We use the analysis of theodicy of the Book of Job (the concept of O. M. Nogovitsyn is the basis for the interpretation of the book) to indicate the possible cause of this atheistic tendency. A way to overcome the internal conflict of skeptic theism lies not in denying the agnostic component of the experience of the hidden God, but in maintaining the distinction between the name of God and God himself. The name of God reveals a particular truth about God, but it is essential to understand that God is different from his name. God appears to Job and presents himself as an absolute precedence, or a total other — different in relation to his own names.

God, Suffering, and Disability: A Trinitarian Theodicy of the Cross by Mary Schaefer Fast

Reviewed by: God, Suffering, and Disability: A Trinitarian Theodicy of the Cross by Mary Schaefer Fast Adam Morton God, Suffering, and Disability: A Trinitarian Theodicy of the Cross. By Mary Schaefer Fast. Lanham: Lexington Books/Fortress Academic, 2019. 205 pp. People with disabilities suffer, as do those who love and care for them, and contemporary Christianity is rarely attuned to this suffering. These assertions form the starting point for Mary Schaefer Fast's [End Page 474] theological proposal, which aims to provide a theodicy that locates God in the midst of suffering and presses Christians toward the full inclusion of persons with disabilities. To this end, she draws on various models of disability, theodic approaches, Luther's theologia crucis, and efforts to outline a pneumatology of the cross. The first chapter discusses terminology and models of disability with an eye toward the question of suffering. The author settles on what she terms a "quadrilateral model," seeking to combine existing medical, social, cultural, and limits-based understandings of disability. This move is made in recognition not only of the multifaceted nature of disability, but also of the complex nature of suffering. Chapter two assesses four major approaches to theodicy, those of Augustine, John Hick, Gregory Boyd, and John Swinton. Fast evaluates these approaches by multiple criteria, sifting them for elements responsive to her disability model and conception of suffering, and looking towards her eventual Trinitarian framework. Noteworthy is the engagement with Swinton, whose "practical" approach to theodicy refuses speculative questions about evil or divine justice, and instead seeks a pastoral approach that can result in healing. Chapter three examines Luther's theology of the cross, especially through the Heidelberg Disputation, and considers its usefulness for providing an honest, uncompromising answer as to God's presence in suffering. Alongside Luther, the author considers two of his contemporary interpreters in Douglas John Hall and Jürgen Moltmann, in order to consider divine solidarity in suffering and, following Moltmann, to reject divine impassibility wholesale. Chapter four extends the previous chapter by way of a discussion of the Spirit's role in the cross event. The pneumatological contributions of Lyle Dabney, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, and David Courey are examined in this light. These elements come together in the fifth chapter, which articulates an explicitly Trinitarian, cruciform theodicy in response to the suffering of persons with disability. As with many efforts in constructive theology, the journey is instructive even if the destination remains far off. Fast's careful assessment of her sources, especially those engaged in theodicy, is admirable, while her reassembling [End Page 475] of disparate parts into a new whole at times appears schematic or ambiguous. Fast, in her handling of Luther, elides all divine hiddenness with the hiddenness of the cross. While careful to distinguish God's presence in all human suffering from that union and share in the Triune life granted to faith, she nevertheless characterizes this universal presence as "gracious love" (162), neglecting any account of suffering as related to divine hiddenness, and so falls prey to a version of the glory-seeking optimism she rightly decries in the church and American society. For Fast, not only the Son but also the Father and the Spirit are co-sufferers; and suffering itself is transformed (via a questionable reading of the 20th Heidelberg thesis) into a window for recognizing God's loving presence. Nevertheless, Fast's refusal of traditional theodic approaches and questions, and her focus on practical response—particularly, on how those who suffer from disability might hear the Word proclaimed and share in the fellowship and consolation of the church—commends her work to an audience capable of steering around a few missteps. Those with an interest in a Lutheran contribution to the theology of disability, or looking to break out of the stale categories of theodicy, may find her work particularly helpful. Adam Morton Holy Trinity Lutheran Church Lancaster, Pennsylvania Copyright © 2020 Johns Hopkins University Press and Lutheran Quarterly, Inc.

Does “Divine Hiddenness” Neutralize the Problem of Evil? Is Process Theodicy More Adequate?

This article critically engages Paul Moser’s “Divine Hiddenness Response” to the problem of evil—an approach to have recently come out of traditional free-will theism. I begin with identifying the initial common ground between Mosers thought and process theology that arguably coincides with what can be called the "Four Noble Truths of Christianity. ” Howevery when confronted with the problem of evil that threatens the credibility of these truths. Moser offers an epistemic strategy to address this threat without modifying the classical concept of omnipotence and without having a full-explanation theodicy. I will argue that, far from helping the situation, this approach exacerbates it and is therefore strongly undesirable. In addition, Moser’s assumption of the absence of an adequate theodicy is unjustified in light of the demonstrable merits of process theodicy in accomplishing what omnipotence-preserving approaches cannot do—defusing the defeaters to Christianity’s Four Noble Truths effectively. Thusy it is desirable andy in the absence of better optionsy epistemically obligatory that omnipotence be modified and replaced with a version of God’s perfect power that is more coherent and evidence-based, and is also in line with a significant strand within the Bible.

Luther and Some Lutherans on Divine Simplicity and Hiddenness

Luther and Some Lutherans on Divine Simplicity and Hiddenness

God hidden from God: on theodicy, dereliction, and human suffering

A number of theologians and philosophers have found theodical value in the theme of divine solidarity with human suffering. To further develop this theme, I examine what it would mean to assert that Christ on the cross participated in a representative sample of human suffering. Particular attention is paid to Christ’s cry of dereliction. I argue that if God through Christ identified with the very worst kinds of human suffering on the cross, then the cry of dereliction should be interpreted as indicating an epistemic break between God and Christ, and not merely an attentional disruption. According to this account, Christ’s death cry expressed his temporary inability to grasp the significance of his passion and death. In this way, Christ on the cross suffered the full effects of divine hiddenness, thus sharing with horror-sufferers the experience of meaning-negating suffering.

Divine Hiddenness and the Concept of God

John Schellenberg’s version of the divine hiddenness argument is based on a concept of God as an omnipotent, morally perfect, and ontologically perfect being. I show that Schellenberg develops his argument in a way that is inconsistent with each of these aspects, from which it follows that the argument in question proves to be unsustainable.

Pascal's Wager ed. by Paul Bartha and Lawrence Pasternack

Reviewed by: Pascal's Wagered. by Paul Bartha and Lawrence Pasternack Daniel Collette Paul Bartha and Lawrence Pasternack, editors. Pascal's Wager. Classic Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. Pp. xv + 335. This volume intends to offer contemporary philosophers and philosophy students a comprehensive introduction to the reception, readings, and influence of Pascal's Wager historically and today. The text is divided into three sections: the Wager's historical context and influence (Part I), critical engagements and appraisals of the Wager argument (Part II), and new discussions of the Wager in light of contemporary developments about probability, utility, and belief (Part III). In the Introduction, readers will discover a helpful primer to decision theory and infinite utility, an excellent aid for those unfamiliar with conversations beginning in Part II. A feature rather than a flaw of contemporary analysis is a series of Pascalian Wagers that look different from Pascal's Wager. These readings raise valuable philosophical questions in their own right, and have birthed fruitful discussions in decision theory, utility, and infinite probability. However, the Wager's extraction raises some complexities, which the editors admirably acknowledge. In an effort to respect the distinction between Pascal's Wager and its extractions, Part I provides several chapters on the context and influence of the Wager. However, if the goal is to offer historical and contextual accounts, these chapters largely fall short, paying little attention to recent scholarly developments. [End Page 755] The clearest attempt to contextualize the Wager is William Wood's "The Wager and Pascal's Theology." This chapter nicely draws attention to Pascal's intellect/will distinction and the roles each plays in belief. Wood also offers a persuasive defense of Pascal's grace paradox: Pascal authors a religious apology in spite of his predeterminist soteriology (Paul Moser also addresses this problem). Still, it is surprising that the theology of Saint-Cyran (Jean du Vergier de Hauranne, who brought Jansenism to France) is neglected, as is Pascal's complicated relationship with early modern and ancient philosophers. Wood's engagement with Pascal's minor works is found wanting, limiting the discussion to "Writings of Grace." It is difficult to arrive at a contextual account of Pascal's Wager, theological or otherwise, without considering these factors. Part I has two notable exceptions. The first is Paul Moser's engagement with divine hiddenness. While this chapter is better suited for Part II, it is an insightful contribution; Moser does this volume justice by bringing attention to often-neglected themes in Pascal's work. The second highlight is Adam Buben's chapter. The Wager we are familiar with today (and that Pascal likely intended) did not appear, as we know it, in the earliest editions of the Pensées. Discussions of the Wager's reception need to take this editorial flaw into account. Buben's chapter is careful enough to be sensitive to factors like this one. He also offers a lens for viewing Pascal more existentially: the impact Pascal has on Kierkegaard and Nietzsche accentuates his views on death and finitude motivating the Wager. This triangulation proves insightful to all three philosophers. Part II of this book gathers several popular objections to the Wager, most importantly Alan Hájek's. What this part lacks in novelty—most of the articles, or their equivalent, are already published elsewhere with few innovations—it makes up in convenience. This section will be particularly helpful for a new student of philosophy. Part III deals with the afterlife Pascal's Wager takes in contemporary scholarship. This part does not stretch existing scholarship significantly, but those interested in learning more about contemporary decision theory or infinite utility will find it useful. Susanna Rinard, in particular, offers a compelling discussion of challenges that arise from wagering under idealized Bayesian analysis—real human beings rarely are certain of all logical truths, have thought of all possible theories prior to evidence, or have "precise, real-valued credence" in every possible proposition (278). She contends that, since most philosophers usually assume these are not limits or rational defects, it is rational to gamble with imprecise credence in God's existence as well. Overall, the volume has some curious editorial decisions. Daniel...

On the Axiology of a Hidden God

The axiological question in the philosophy of religion is the question of what impact, if any, God’s existence does (or would) make to the axiological value of our world. It has recently been argued that we should prefer a theistic world where God is hidden to an atheistic world or a theistic world where God isn’t hidden. This is because in a hidden theistic world all of the theistic goods obtain in addition to the experience of atheistic goods. I complete this line of argument by showing that theistic goods do (or could) indeed obtain in a world where God hides. In doing so I indirectly argue against proponents of divine hiddenness arguments such as J.L. Schellenberg. The correct answer to the axiological question turns out to be a solution to the problem of divine hiddenness.

Predicting Divine Action

This article sets out a formal procedure for determining the probability that God would do a specified action, using our moral knowledge and understanding God as a perfect being. To motivate developing the procedure I show how natural theology – design arguments, the problems of evil and divine hiddenness, and the treatment of miracles and religious experiences as evidence for claims about God – routinely appeals to judgments involving these probabilities. To set out the procedure, I describe a decision-theoretic model for practical reasoning which is deontological so as to appeal to theists, but is designed not to presuppose any substantive moral commitments, and to accommodate normative and non-normative uncertainty. Then I explain how judgments about what we probably ought to do can be transformed into judgments about what God would probably do. Then I show the usefulness of the procedure by describing how it can help structure discussions in natural theology and a-theology, and how it offers an attractive alternative to ‘skeptical theism’.

Religious Disagreement and Divine Hiddenness

Religious Disagreement and Divine Hiddenness

Public Conversion, Private Reason, and Institutional Crisis

Following the 2018 Pennsylvania grand jury report, which detailed the sexual abuse of clergy members, many have questioned the value of personal institutional commitment to the Catholic Church, preferring instead more individualistic expressions of faith. Alongside the sex abuse crisis, the age of free information makes the Church’s epistemology appear antiquated. This article explores the individualistic versus community-based practice of Catholicism, drawing a distinction between private conversion versus public conversion. The article offers a defense of public conversion, arguing it explains the rationality of conversion and offers a solution to the problem of divine hiddenness. Using details from her own faith journey, Sullivan explores why God graces us with less perspicuous knowledge, causing subluminous conversions, as opposed to the more glaring, which leads to luminous conversions. Sullivan suggests that we obtain knowledge of God by loving one another, which takes place in the framework of the institutional Church. She subsequently uses this Church-making theodicy to offer five ideas about how we might engage the Church institutionally as Catholic philosophers.

God and Interpersonal Knowledge

Recent epistemology offers an account of what it is to know other persons. Such an approach holds promise for illuminating several issues in philosophy of religion, and for advancing a distinctive approach to religious epistemology. This paper develops an account of interpersonal knowledge and clarifies its relation to propositional and qualitative knowledge (section 1). Section 2 considers the possibility of our knowledge of God and God’s knowledge of us, and compares the present account of interpersonal knowledge with important work by Eleonore Stump on “Franciscan” knowledge. Section 3 examines how interpersonal knowledge may figure in liturgical practice, in diffusing the problem of divine hiddenness, and in motivating a novel understanding of divine love. Finally, section 4 explores the possibility of epistemic injustice arising from dismissal or neglect of our religious testimony to one another, or of divine testimony to humanity, focusing specifically on the import of interpersonal knowledge.

The axiological solution to divine hiddenness

AbstractPhilosophers have recently wondered whether the value impact of the existence of God on the world would be positive, negative, or neutral. Thus far discussions have distinguished between the value God's impact would have overall, in certain respects, and/or for particular individuals. A commonality amongst the various positions that have been taken up is to focus on the goods and drawbacks associated with both theism and atheism. Goods associated with atheism include things like privacy, independence, and autonomy. I argue that it is better overall and for everyone to prefer a hidden God to no God. This is because it is possible to experience many of the goods attributed to atheism if God is hidden even if they do not really obtain, while also gaining many of the additional goods connected to theism. This amounts to a new solution to the problem of divine hiddenness: God might hide in order to increase or maximize the axiological value of the world.