Distributive Bargaining Research Articles

Bargainer characteristics in distributive and integrative negotiation.

Negotiation researchers theorize that individual differences are determinants of bargaining processes and outcomes but have yet to establish empirically the role of individual differences. In 2 studies the authors used bargaining simulations to examine the roles of personality and cognitive ability in distributive (Study 1) and integrative (Study 2) negotiation. The authors hypothesized and found evidence that Extraversion and Agreeableness are liabilities in distributive bargaining encounters. For both Extraversion and Agreeableness there were interactions between personality and negotiator aspirations such that personality effects were more pronounced in the absence of high aspirations. Contrary to predictions, Conscientiousness was generally unrelated to bargaining success. Cognitive ability played no role in distributive bargaining but was markedly related to the attainment of joint outcomes in a situation with integrative potential.

The Function of Equality Heuristic in Distributive Bargaining: Negotiated Allocation of Costs and Benefits in a Demand Revelation Context

Equality rule is often used heuristically in resource allocation. The functioning of such an equality heuristic was examined in bargaining situations where two persons negotiated how to share a common cost or how to share a common benefit between them. Based on Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it was predicted that equality heuristic would have a smaller anchoring effect on bargaining outcomes in cost-sharing than in benefit-sharing. The results of two experiments confirmed this prediction, revealing that deviation of the bargaining outcomes from equal-splitting of overall amount was actually larger in cost-sharing than in benefit-sharing. Other behavioral patterns during negotiation were also consistent with the prediction. Implications of these findings for the “demand revelation” context (Samuelson, 1954) were discussed, where negotiators have no reliable information about other person's demand/contribution level.

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THREE MODELS OF INTEGRATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING

This paper tests the fit of three models of integrative and distributive bargaining using eight hostage negotiation transcripts. Putnam (1990) argues that integrative and distributive bargaining processes are best understood through the interdependence model that emphasizes the dynamic nature in which bargainers make transitions between integrative and distributive positions. The separate and the stage models predict more stable patterns of distributive and integrative behavior. To determine the goodness of fit for these three models, this paper compares integrative and distributive strategy use among actual and simulated hostage negotiations. These hostage negotiations, obtained from the FBI and a Midwest state police organization, were transcribed and coded using a scheme designed to tap cooperative and competitive strategy use of both hostage takers and police negotiators. The data reveal that the interdependence model best fits the simulated cases. This fit is evidenced by the major shifts between integrative and distributive orientations displayed by hostage takers and police negotiators. The separate models and the stage appear to fit several features of the authentic hostage negotiation cases. The study concludes that the extent to which each model emerges depends largely on which contextual parameters dominate the interaction.

"Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining": Correction.

"Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining": Correction.

Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining.

Two experiments compared the effectiveness ofteam and solo negotiators in integrative and distributive bargaining. When at least I party to a negotiation was a team, joint profit increased. Teams, more than solos, developed mutually beneficial trade-offs among issues and discovered compatible interests. The presence of at least I team increased information exchange and accuracy in judgments about the other party's interests in comparison with solo negotiations. The belief by both teams and solos that teams have a relative advantage over solo opponents was not supported by actual outcomes. Unexpectedly, neither private meetings nor friendships among team members improved the team's advantage. Teams of friends made less accurate judgments and reached fewer integrative agreements compared to teams of nonfriends.

Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining.

Team negotiation: An examination of integrative and distributive bargaining.

Resolving Environmental Disputes: a Framework Incorporating Decision Analysis and Dispute Resolution Techniques

Resolution of public policy disputes can be enhanced both by qualitative techniques for conflict resolution and by quantitative analyses of decisions under uncertainty. We interweave the two methodologies into a framework that helps communicate and analyze existing alternatives, generate new alternatives and forge consensus plans. Decision analysis provides: (1) techniques for eliciting subjective inputs from the disputing parties; (2) a structure for clarifying and communicating all facets of the decision environment; and (3) a common decision rule (such as maximizing expected utility). Sensitivity analysis of the decision problem serves the consensus process by directing conflict resolution procedures to those aspect of the problem offering the best potential for reaching overall agreement, whether through persuasion and compromise or through gathering and incorporating additional information. The communication tools of conflict resolution enhance the decision analysis by promoting creative thinking, ensuring that the formal analysis captures the underlying interest of the parties involved, and facilitating systematic development of new alternative based on those underlying interests. We illustrate the framework by analyzing an environmental dispute in Zaire over the best policy for management of an endangered species. Using inputs that are hypothetical, but typical of actual party positions, we analyze the dispute between captive breeding advocates and the government of Zaire over management of the northern white rhino. The framework transforms unfocused party gridlock over two original policy options into a focused discussion on a few key inputs. We employ the decision-making procedure to develop several new alternative: (1) a distributive bargaining compromise between the original positions; (2) a contingency plan that exploits the parties' different beliefs about the likelihood of future events; and (3) a synthesis that takes advantage of differences in institutional objectives and capabilities to dovetail different preferences and create joint gains.

Toughness in Integrative Bargaining

This article introduces a new measure of bargaining toughness. Previous measures of toughness have been based on simple averages and are suitable for use only in situations of distributive bargaining. By contrast, the proposed measure is based on dynamical information and can easily be used in integrative bargaining scenarios. The key to defining such a measure is to utilize the feasible outcome sets of Nash (1950) and to represent the bargainer's concessions by a path in the feasible outcome set. By mathematically modeling the speed with which the bargainer concedes, it becomes possible to develop a measure of bargaining toughness that takes into account not only how much the bargainer has conceded, but how fast he or she has done so.

An application of group decision support technology in collective bargaining

An enhanced distributive bargaining model is developed to be used as the foundation model of a group-decision support system for facilitating collective bargaining. The proposed system takes into account the multiple objectives decision process and is able to handle qualitative decision variables. The implementation of the proposed system can expedite bargaining and minimize the possibility of a work stoppage.

An Application of Group Decision Support Technology in Collective Bargaining

An enhanced distributive bargaining model is developed to be used as the foundation model of a group-decision support system for facilitating collective bargaining. The proposed system takes into account the multiple objectives decision process and is able to handle qualitative decision variables. The implementation of the proposed system can expedite bargaining and minimize the possibility of a work stoppage.

Labor-Management Mediation: The Mediator in a Complex Communication Situation

Labor-management negotiations present a complex situation for mediators and negotiators. To a considerable extent, the complexities stem from the fact that at least four different types of negotiations are occurring simultaneously: distributive bargaining; integrative bargaining; intra-organizational bargaining; and attitude structuring. If the negotiations are in a public employment situation, the political environment may be a factor causing additional complexities. Mediators in such situations must fill a number of roles, all of which are related to the communication process. The authors will show how the cited factors complicate labor-management negotiations and, concomitantly, affect the mediation process. This article concentrates on the role of the mediator as a communicator in the labor-management context.

On alleviating the debilitating effects of accountability on bargaining: Authority and self‐monitoring

Prior research indicates that when a bargaining representative is held accountable by a constituency, tough, distributive bargaining is often the result and deadlocks become more probable. This study focuses upon two variables that have been hypothesized to mitigate against such debilitating effects: authority to reach agreements and self‐monitoring. The results confirmed the debilitating effects of accountability. Bargainers held accountable made more extreme initial offers, thought they were perceived to be less cooperative, took more time to negotiate, were more likely to deadlock, and were less satisfied with the outcomes than bargainers not held accountable. Authority interacted with accountability to influence straying from the group's aspiration level on initial and final offers. When accountable, bargainers with authority initially strayed further from the group's position but deviated less on their final offer than bargainers without authority. Delegated authority significantly reduced the number...

Introducing Bargaining into the Basic Marketing Course

There is a growing recognition of the need to expose marketing students to the topic of bargaining. A new win-win model of distributive bargaining and a mixed motive structure of the buyer-seller situation provides a logical framework for introducing bargaining into marketing.

Can integrative bargaining last?

M ost members of the public would characterize labor-management relations in the United States today as too adversarial. On the whole, they view labor relations simply as strikes, protracted negotiations over wages, and arms-length relationships. In bargaining theory terms; unions and employers engage in distributive bargaining: formal negotiations over a fixed set of issues between parties with clearly conflicting goals often occurring within a relationship characterized by considerable distrust. Calls for greater labor-management cooperation abound in the media. Political leaders, observers concerned about the competitiveness of the U.S. economy, and participants in the labor relations process are among those urging more cooperation between labor and management. Both the recent and earlier history of labor management relations tell us that temporary episodes of cooperation can and do occur. However, longer lasting cooperation-what can be termed truly integrative bargaining, where the parties restructure the employment relationship to focus on their joint or common interests-is harder to achieve. While the center of gravity of collective bargaining in the United States has historically been more at arms-length or distributive than integrative, there have been periods when more cooperative or integrative processes emerged. These periods, such as during World War II, in the early 1960s and again in the first half of the 1980s, were times when strong external pressures or threats required the parties to put aside confrontational tactics and focus on their common interest in meeting the external threat. However, when such pressures subsided in the past, the parties invariably returned to their mor~ traditional adversarial relationships. A reversion again can be expected to occur unless the parties use the crisis period to make fundamental changes in the underlying structure of the relationships that align their basic or long-term interests more closely, and put in place styles of management or interaction that build and sustain mutual trust. This will require broadening of traditional labor-management relationships. It will be necessary to shift the focus from formal contract negotiations and grievance handling to an organizational strategy based on employment continuity, information sharing, problem solving, and participation. Moreover, these principles must rest on a joint commitment of

Distributive Bargaining for Community Organizations: Lessons from Industrial Relations

Negotiating or bargaining is a common social process. It occurs continuously without always being formally recognized or articulated. Many of the specific and separate strategies and tactics that characterize negotiation are similarly unidentified. The object of this paper is to specify and describe key strategies and tactics for use in negotiating at the community level. Lessons are drawn from the field of industrial relations.

Testing a Behavioral Theory Model of Labor Negotiations

SummaryThe Behavioral Theory we have developed stands up well and helps us gain a better feeling for the behavioral dynamics of collective bargaining. As expected, economic variables such as bargaining power and the estimated cost and probability of a work stoppage are important determinants of bargaining behavior. Nevertheless, the variables have a differential effect on bargaining goals, with strong bargaining power and low probability of a strike contributing to both distributive and integrative bargaining, whereas high expected costs of a strike help to persuade constituents to support their negotiators (intraorganizational bargaining). Thus we see the roie of intraorganizational bargaining as an alternative to being able to obtain a better settlement from the opponents.Attitudinal structuring seems to be more closely tied to integrative bargaining than was indicated by Walton and McKersie. Furthermore, there seems to be less direct conflict between the tactics used in integrative bargaining and those used in distributive bargaining than predicted by theory. Perhaps the mixed nature of most bargaining keeps the majority of negotiators from applying all‐out distributive tactics. At any rate, strong bargaining power, constructive relationships, clear and specific statements of issues, as well as exploring them in a noncommital fashion, seem to aid both distributive and integrative bargaining.We uncovered a number of relationships which varied significantly according to the side (labor or management) and/or team role (chief negotiator or other team member) of the respondent. Although we feel they should be included in the theory of bargaining as moderator variables, and have thus included them in our model, we have only hinted at their impact in this paper.Overall, bargaining behavior and conditions seem to have as much effect on bargaining success as do the economic variables. Of course, we did not measure every possible economic variable, but neither did we examine all possible tactics. Our study confirms that collective bargaining is an interpersonal, attitudinal process as well as an economic one and that there are several distinct goals for the process. We have also demonstrated that, despite problems of locating current negotiations and obtaining an adequate rate of response, field study of the behavioral aspects of collective bargaining is feasible. We hope that investigations along this line will continue.

Multinational Negotiation Parties: The Case of the European Community

An outline and explanation are given of some of the main characteristics in the negoti ating behaviour of the European Community, and — more generally — of multi national actors at a similar level of integration. The EC is considered to be a coalition of states — more pluralistic and more complex than state actors. In this analysis focus is on the implications of pluralism. The dimension of pluralism itself is held to be relevant, first, to decision-making capacity, and, second, to the decisions produced, and — by implication — to the character and outcome of the negotiation processes. One main proposition submitted is that decision-making capacity is inversely related to pluralism of authority and structural complexity. Two main characteristics with regard to the actual decisions produced are found and discussed: First, the decisions taken usually have to be close to the position advocated by the member that feels its vital interests at stake on a particular issue, and second, very often Community de cisions are hard to modify or change. Throughout the article, the significance of the characteristics described is analysed in relation to three models of negotiation: inte grative negotiations, negotiations governed by the principle of fairness, and distributive bargaining. Finally, the author explains to what extent and how the choice of procedure might affect the conclusions arrived at.

Multinational Negotiation Parties: The Case of the European Community

An outline and explanation are given of some of the main characteristics in the negotiating behaviour of the European Community, and — more generally — of multinational actors at a similar level of integration. The EC is considered to be a coalition of states — more pluralistic and more complex than state actors. In this analysis focus is on the implications of pluralism. The dimension of pluralism itself is held to be relevant, first, to decision-making capacity, and, second, to the decisions produced, and — by implication — to the character and outcome of the negotiation processes. One main proposition submitted is that decision-making capacity is inversely related to pluralism of authority and structural complexity. Two main characteristics with regard to the actual decisions produced arc found and discussed: First, the decisions taken usually have to be close to the position advocated by the member that feels its vital interests at stake on a particular issue, and second, very often Community decisions are hard to modify or change. Throughout the article, the significance of the characteristics described is analysed in relation to three models of negotiation: integrative negotiations, negotiations governed by the principle of fairness, and distributive bargaining. Finally, the author explains to what extent and how the choice of procedure might affect the conclusions arrived at.

The effects of prenegotiation expectations on the distributive bargaining process

The level of aspiration and minimum necessary share values of negotiators were manipulated prior to bargaining sessions in a simulated bilateral monopoly. Derivations from the theory of Kelley, Beckman, and Fischer were generally supported for low level of aspiration negotiators: subjects with high minimum necessary share values had higher mean levels of demand and received more points in the settlements than subjects with low minimum necessary share values. For high level of aspiration negotiators the effects were in the opposite direction; a tentative interpretation of the latter results was presented. In general, negotiators with high levels of aspiration had higher initial demands, higher mean levels of demand and received more points in the settlements than negotiators with low levels of aspiration. These findings support Siegel and Fouraker's model. However, on closer analysis the effects of level of aspiration were limited to negotiators with low minimum necessary share values.