Duration Of Disputes Research Articles

Intraspecific Competition and Mating System Dynamics in Freshwater Fish: Insights from a Field Study in Kalaburagi, India

This comprehensive study investigates the behavioral dynamics of freshwater fish across diverse water bodies in Kalaburagi, India. Focusing on prominent species such as Rohu, Catla, Mrigal, Common Carp, and Snakehead, the research elucidates key morphometric characteristics, territorial behaviors, and responses to environmental variables. Morphometric analyses reveal species-specific traits, with Rohu and Catla exhibiting larger mean lengths and unique morphological features. Territorial behaviors, observed in the number of territories, duration of disputes, and aggressive displays, unveil distinctive strategies among the studied species. The correlation between fish density and aggression levels provides valuable insights into intraspecific competition within different habitats. Courtship rituals, with behaviors, durations, and unique characteristics, shed light on the reproductive strategies of each species. Factors influencing mate selection, such as body size, coloration, and spawning site preferences, play a crucial role in shaping mate preferences. Environmental variables, including water temperature and pH levels, showcase correlations with aggressive behaviors and courtship intensity. These findings emphasize the sensitivity of fish behaviors to variations in habitat conditions, highlighting the interconnected dynamics within freshwater ecosystems. Exploring different aquatic habitats—Rivers, Ponds, Streams, Reservoirs, and Wetlands—the study further reveals variations in water temperature, pH levels, and dissolved oxygen levels. This holistic approach provides a nuanced understanding of how environmental factors shape the ecological niches of freshwater fish in Kalaburagi. This study contributes valuable insights into the behavioral ecology of freshwater fish, emphasizing the importance of species-specific adaptations and habitat variability.

Discussion Papers - Ciarb at Uncitral Working Group III: Efficiency, Decisions, and Decision-Makers

These Discussion Papers are published to coincide with the commencement of UNCITRAL Working Group III's Phase III examination of potential reforms to the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) system. In Phase I, the states identified numerous areas of concern in the ISDS system. In Phase II a consensus was reached that reforms to the ISDS system are desirable. WG III's mandate in Phase III is to develop relevant solutions to the areas of concern identified in Phase I. The issues identified fall under three main themes: efficiency, decisions, and decision makers. Efficiency encompasses concerns surrounding the cost and duration of disputes in ISDS. Decisions refers to the consistency, accuracy, predictability, and validity of the awards rendered in ISDS. Decision makers refers to the arbitrators themselves; who they are and how they are appointed. The purpose of these discussion papers is to present a basic overview of the issues under discussion in each thematic area and to show the varying and often opposing views that delegates must consider. These papers are designed to inform rather than persuade and to provide a starting point for meaningful conversations on ISDS reform among CIArb stakeholders.

An Analysis of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) Dataset, 1816–2001

This research note discusses a five-year examination of the original coding work of the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) project. After strictly applying MID coding rules, we recommend dropping 251 cases (or over 10% of the dataset), as either we were unable to find a militarized incident in the historical record or the dispute appeared elsewhere in the data. We found evidence linking 75 disputes to other cases, and we could not identify 19 cases in the historical record. Among the remaining disputes, we recommend major changes (changes in dispute year, fatality level, and participants) in 234 disputes and minor changes in 1,009 disputes. We use this article to examine the potential impact of our suggestions on existing studies. Though we identified several systematic problems with the original coding effort, we also find that these problems do not affect current understandings of what predicts the onset of interstate conflict. However, estimates in our replications of three recent studies of dispute escalation, dispute duration, and dispute reciprocation all witness substantial changes when using corrected data—to the point of reversing previous conclusions in some cases.

Centralization versus Decentralization of Legislative Production and the Effect on Litigation: A Case Study

Abstract This paper presents an empirical investigation into the effects on the duration of disputes of the coordination externalities that arise from the decentralization of laws and regulatory power from the state to the regions. To this aim we consider Italy, whose territory is divided into twenty regions, using a dataset derived from 800 judgements pronounced by the Italian regional administrative courts over eight years, from 2000 to 2007. The most important result of our research is that in sectors where European legislation prevails, and lower coordination externalities are observed, we find a shorter duration of disputes, whilst in economic sectors more exposed to decentralized legislation, with greater coordination externalities, disputes tend to have a longer duration.

Centralization Versus Decentralization of Legislative Production and the Their Effects on the Disputes Duration

This paper investigates empirically the effects of the coordination externality due to decentralization of laws and regulations power from the state to the regions on the disputes duration. To this aim we refer to Italy, whose territory is divided in twenty regions, using a data set covering eight years, since 2000 to 2007, regarding eight-hundred judgements pronounced by the Italian regional administrative courts. The most important result of our research is that in sectors where the European legislative prevails, and lower coordination externalities are observed, we find a shorter duration of disputes. Rather, in sectors of economy more exposed to decentralized legislation, and relevant coordination externalities, disputes tend to have a greater duration.

The Influence of Legal Capacity on WTO Dispute Duration

World Trade Organization dispute settlement has evolved away from the concise process originally imagined to one where panels languish for years. This is to the detriment of lesser-developed states that do not have the resources that allow for access. In this article, I perform a multivariate analysis to explore the relationship between a state's legal capacity and the length of trade disputes. Controlling for selection bias, I find that the legal capacity of both of the involved parties contributes to longer disputes. The relaxed time expectations in this process favor the inclusion of developed states and exclude those without the resources necessary to carry out what has become the normal dispute process.

Centralization Versus Decentralization of Legislative Production and the Effect of Each on the Duration of Disputes

This paper is an empirical investigation into the effects of coordination externality, due to the decentralization of laws and regulating power from the state to the regions, on the duration of disputes. To this aim we refer to Italy, whose territory is divided into twenty regions, using a data set covering eight years, from 2000 to 2007, regarding eight-hundred judgements pronounced by the Italian regional administrative courts. The most important result of our research is that in sectors where the European legislation prevails, and lower coordination externalities are observed, we find a shorter duration of disputes. In sectors of the economy more exposed to decentralized legislation, with the relevant coordination externalities, disputes tend to have a longer duration.

Factors Determining the Duration of Legal Disputes: An Empirical Analysis with Micro Data

This paper attempts to shed light on some factors determining the duration of disputes. To this aim a unique database is used, accounting for eight hundred judgments rendered by the Italian Regional Administrative Courts from 2000 to 2007. Our findings confirm that normative complexity hampers a rapid solution and show that social capital may contribute to reduce the duration of disputes. The number of judges does not appear to be the main variable to explain the time needed to obtain a judgment of the first rank. Finally, the observed differences in duration may also be explained by referring to their topic.

The Factors Determining the Duration of Legal Disputes: An Empirical Analysis with Micro Data

This paper attempts to shed light on the legal and social factors determining the duration of disputes. To this aim a unique database is used, accounting for eight hundred sentences pronounced by the Italian Administrative Courts, collected at a regional level, covering the period from 2000 to 2007. The empirical part of this study was performed, together with better known approaches, using the survival econometric model that, up to now, had not been applied to studying the duration of legal disputes. The findings of our research are many. It is confirmed that normative complexity hampers a rapid solution of controversies. Law suits with a duration of over the average time leads to a doubly negative effect. Firstly, the stock of the pending suit is increased. Secondly, the State is liable to pay damages for the excessive duration of the legal dispute. The indicator of social capital shows a negative correlation with the slowness of justice. The number of judges does not appear to be relevant to explain the time needed to obtain a sentence of the first rank. Finally, the different objects of dispute may contribute to explain the differences in average duration observed. Although the analysis regards Italy only, the methodology developed here could be applied in similar analyses for other countries or groups of nations.

A duration analysis of environmental alternative dispute resolution in Japan

The use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to solve environmental disputes is expected to increase in the near future. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the effectiveness of environmental ADR empirically. However, the majority of empirical literature of environmental ADR provides merely descriptive case studies. Using a large micro-level database from Japan, this paper identifies the characteristics of pollution disputes addressed by ADR and correlates those characteristics to the duration of disputes. Using the strike analysis for reference, we estimate the standard duration models of environmental ADR. The analyses demonstrate that pollution disputes involving health damage are resolved promptly. Air pollution problems affecting multiple households are also expeditiously resolved. Moreover, we find that representative actions prolong the settlement of environmental disputes.

The Influence of International Organizations on Militarized Dispute Initiation and Duration1

We argue that international organizations decrease the duration of international conflicts by mitigating commitment problems and encouraging combatants to cease hostilities more quickly. Empirical analyses of militarized interstate dispute duration (1950–2000) reveal that increasing shared international organization (IO) participation reduces the length of disputes, even after accounting for selection into international conflict. We also find that international organizations designed to mitigate commitment problems decrease dispute duration, while IOs capable of reducing information asymmetries do not influence dispute length.

Normative complexity and the length of administrative disputes: evidence from Italian regions

The aim of this paper is to study the effects of normative complexity on delays in justice. In particular, a unique database was used, created by reading eight hundred sentences pronounced by the Italian Regional Administrative Courts of first instance (Tribunali Amministrativi Regionali), located in each of the 20 regions in Italy, between 2000 and 2007. After a preliminary analysis of the data, regarding the duration of disputes, their objects and other relevant variables, an econometric study was performed to verify whether the length of administrative disputes may be explained, together with other causes, by the complexity of the legal system. The indicator used as a proxy of normative complexity was developed in previous studies in this field. Different kinds of models were used and specifications performed to render the empirical results more robust. The outcome of the analysis appears to support the idea that normative complexity may be a burden on the activity of courts, and that this could contribute to explaining the slowness of justice proceedings.

WTO Dispute Settlement as a Tool for Conflict Management

The effect of courts arises through process and precedent. First, the process of selecting cases to escalate in the legal venue reveals information about the preferences of defendant and complainant. A third party arbitrator and multilateral membership adds international obligation and reputation as new leverage for compliance. Second, a formal dispute mechanism may have broader impact if the adjudication of one case leads to other countries reforming policies. This paper examines WTO dispute settlement to assess the role of courts to solve disputes and prevent future incidents. The effectiveness of WTO dispute settlement as a process for resolving specific disputes is tested with statistical analysis of an original dataset of potential trade disputes coded from U.S. government reports on foreign trade barriers. Evidence shows that taking a dispute to legal forum brings policy change and reduces dispute duration in comparison with outcomes achieved in bilateral negotiations. Whether these cases also prevent future disputes is more challenging to evaluate. The paper explores the possibility of precedent effects through analysis of the time trend in frequency of complaints filed by all members from 1995 to 2009.

Patent thickets, courts, and the market for innovation

We study how fragmentation of patent rights and the formation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) affected the duration of patent disputes, and thus the speed of technology diffusion through licensing. We develop a model of patent litigation which predicts faster settlement when patent rights are fragmented and when there is less uncertainty about court outcomes, as was associated with the “pro-patent shift” of the CAFC. We confirm these predictions empirically using a data set that covers patent suits in U.S. district courts during the period 1975–2000. Finally, we analyze how fragmentation affects total settlement delay, considering both the reduction in dispute duration and the increase in the number of patent negotiations.

Governments, Partisanship, and Foreign Policy: The Case of Dispute Duration

Do variations in partisanship and political outcomes among democratic states affect the duration of militarized interstate disputes? To answer this question, the author develops a model of partisan competition derived from the government failure literature. The author argues factors associated with government failure determine the ability of governments to contend with the domestic political costs of militarized disputes, specifically the duration of those disputes. The author tests his expectations using hazard analysis on a dataset of 20 democratic governments and militarized disputes between 1945 and 1992. The results suggest the outcome of party competition in the form of a government’s sensitivity to the potential political costs of conflict is an important part of the conflict process. The author concludes that differences in domestic political outcomes influence the duration of militarized interstate disputes. Governments that are politically more secure in their tenure engage in longer disputes. Alternatively, governments that are more vulnerable have significantly shorter disputes. In addition, because government partisanship contributes to vulnerability, it also affects dispute duration, with governments of the left engaging in shorter disputes, while governments of the right fight longer disputes.

Testing Competing Institutional Explanations of the Democratic Peace: The Case of Dispute Duration

Drawing upon two alternative versions of the institutional explanation for the democratic peace, we suggest competing hypotheses about the relationship between democratic political institutions and the length of dispute participation. One set of hypotheses originates in the argument that because of the bargaining arrangements internal to democratic states, disputes between democratic states will necessarily be drawn out, so that in the time that it takes to secure the domestic political base for war, diplomats have time to find nonwar solutions. A second set of hypotheses, derived from the selectorate argument about how institutions shape the behavior of leaders who want to remain in power, leads to the expectation that selection effects over which disputes to participate in make disputes between democracies shorter than disputes between pairs of other types of states. Using a Weibull survival model we analyze data on the length of Militarized Interstate Disputes during the period 1816 to 1992; we find clear support for the selectorate explanation. Two ancillary hypotheses from the selectorate argument are also tested and supported by the data.

In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes

This paper develops a theoretical argument linking time and the timing of conflict management efforts to dispute duration. We test competing hypotheses on conflict data drawn from disputes in the post-1945 period. Our analysis demonstrates that the effects of mediation vary substantially over the course of a dispute. Specifically, we note that mediation has a curvilinear relationship with time and the ending of disputes. Mediation efforts that occur soon after disputes begin have the best chance of reducing expected future dispute duration. Following this initial period, subsequent mediation efforts lead to longer rather than shorter disputes. After a long period, mediation again leads to shorter rather than longer disputes. We also find that there should be consistency in the mediators used to manage a conflict rather than shifting personnel to interject new ideas.

Accounting for censoring in duration data: An application to estimating the effect of legal reforms on the duration of medical malpractice disputes

Using a sample of medical malpractice insurance claims closed between 1 October 1985 and 1 October 1989 in the USA, we estimate the impact of legal reforms on the longevity of disputes, via a competing risks model that accounts for length-biased sampling and a finite sampling horizon. We find that only the 'English rule'-a rule which requires the loser at trial to pay all legal expenses-shortens the duration of disputes. Our results for this law also show that failure to correct for length-biased sampling can incorrectly imply that the English rule lengthens the time needed for settlement and litigation. Our estimates also suggest that tort reforms that place additional procedural hurdles in the plaintiff s' paths tend to lengthen the time to disposition. Here, correction for a finite sampling horizon substantially changes the inferences with regard to the eff ect of this reform on duration.

The Duration of Industrial Disputes in Australian Mining and Manufacturing

Using a unique dispute‐level database of industrial action in Australian mining and manufacturing industries, this paper investigates the determinants of the duration of industrial action. For the first time in the Australian literature, the duration of individual disputes is analysed within a hazard function framework that estimates conditional settlement probabilities over the duration of the dispute. Further, the analysis is conducted for both strikes and non‐strike forms of industrial action such as bans on working overtime. A range of parametric and semi‐parametric specifications are estimated in order to determine the sensitivity of the results to alternative econometric techniques. The duration of both strikes and work bans are found to be affected by a range of factors, including the state of the labour market, industry characteristics, past union experiences and the cause of the dispute. The conditional settlement rate of both strikes and bans are found to be upward sloping, implying that the longer that a dispute has already lasted, the more likely that it is to end. However, failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity results in bias toward declining conditional settlement rates.

Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns

Militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war. The new dispute data set generated by the Correlates of War project contains information on over 2,000 such disputes found to have occurred in the period 1816–1992. As in the earlier version of the data set, the participants, start and end dates, fatality totals, and hostility levels for each dispute are identified, but the newer version disaggregates this information for each participant and provides additional information about the revisionist state(s), type(s) of revision sought, outcome, and method of settlement for each dispute. A preliminary analysis of the data shows some interesting empircal patterns. Contagion and a slight upward trend are found in the frequency of disputes at the system level. The duration of disputes appears to be positively associated with the level of hostility reached and the number of states involved, and disputes appear to have a feud-like character. The single most important factor found to increase the fatality level of a dispute is the number of states that join after its onset. However, most disputes begin and end as one-on-one confrontations, and this tendency is stronger in the current period than in the past. An examination of dispute escalation reveals that many disputes begin with uses of force rather than less intense threats or displays of force and that states joining an ongoing dispute raise the likelihood that the dispute will reach higher levels of hostility. With respect to the settlement of disputes it was found that the longer a dispute continues, the higher the likelihood of some settlement, either negotiated or imposed, being achieved, althogh there is a discernable trend away from such settlements over the period studied. A related trend was found with respect to the outcome of disputes as stalemate has become a much more likely outcome in the present than in the past.