Abstract
World Trade Organization dispute settlement has evolved away from the concise process originally imagined to one where panels languish for years. This is to the detriment of lesser-developed states that do not have the resources that allow for access. In this article, I perform a multivariate analysis to explore the relationship between a state's legal capacity and the length of trade disputes. Controlling for selection bias, I find that the legal capacity of both of the involved parties contributes to longer disputes. The relaxed time expectations in this process favor the inclusion of developed states and exclude those without the resources necessary to carry out what has become the normal dispute process.
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