Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Research Articles

Trust but verify: How to get there by using next-generation nuclear verification and warhead dismantlement techniques

ABSTRACT The next generation of arms control agreements may require verification technology with enhanced specificity to achieve new, ambitious objectives. A short list of these goals includes further reductions of strategic weapons, the inclusion of all nuclear weapons – whether they be deployed or non-deployed, strategic or non-strategic – and nuclear warhead dismantlement, among others. Further, depending on the political dynamics, less intrusive on-site inspections may also be an objective. In some cases, verification measures employed for decades may be sufficient. In others, physics can play a key role in overcoming verification concerns, as well as allay some of the international and domestic political concerns involved.

Simulation of explosive detection based on APT-TOF for verifying nuclear warhead dismantlement

Authentication of the explosives in nuclear warheads is a key point for the global nuclear disarmament. In this paper, a detection method of the explosives in nuclear warheads based on API-TOF (associated α particle imaging - time of flight) is proposed. First, the basic principles and current research situation of API-TOF are introduced. Second, a numerical simulation platform of the detection method of the explosives in nuclear warheads based on API-TOF was established, and a numerical simulation study of the feasibility of this method was carried out. The research results show that, this method can detect the nuclides of 12C, 14N and 16O of the explosive in the nuclear warhead in 15 min, and reconstruct the carbon-oxygen number ratio and nitrogen-oxygen number ratio of the explosive accurately, and reconstruct the spatial distribution of the explosive nuclei with the explosive profile clearly discriminated in the reconstruction image. From the simulation results, the detection method of the explosive in the nuclear warhead based on API-TOF is confirmed.

Reconstruct fissile material mass of pit based on activation effect of explosive and neural network

Future international nuclear disarmament may involve the dismantlement of nuclear warheads. In nuclear warhead dismantlement verification, the mass information of the fissile material in the pit is an important attribute of nuclear warheads, and can be used to verify that the nuclear warheads demanded by the nuclear disarmament treaty have indeed been dismantled. In this paper, a method of reconstructing the fissile material mass of the pit based on the activation effect of the explosive and the neural network is proposed, and may be applied in the future nuclear warhead dismantlement verification. Firstly, the number and average abundance of 14C produced by the neutron activation reactions in the explosive inside the nuclear warhead was calculated based on the Monte Carlo numerical simulation. Secondly, it is found that the spatial distribution of the 14C abundances in the explosive is closely related to the fissile material mass of the pit through the numerical simulation. Then, neural networks were established to reconstruct the fissile material mass of the pit through the training. The testing results show that, the fissile material mass of the pit can be reconstructed accurately based on the activation effect of the explosive and the neural network, and the reconstruction precision is better than 10%.

Verified Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement: An Analysis and Methodology for Facility Assessment

Effective verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement is an endeavor for which a solution is widely sought, but also one which poses numerous challenges, such as protection of information and safety and security of warheads and components. Some or all of these challenges could be influenced by the nature of the hosting dismantlement facility. We have developed a systems engineering approach for use in assessing this aspect of the dismantlement verification problem. We have used the methodology to evaluate which of four broad classes of facilities would be most favorable for verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads: a nuclear warhead facility engaged in active stockpile work, a nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work, a converted industrial facility, and a purpose-designed dedicated dismantlement facility. The analysis is based on the level of challenge involved in implementing verified dismantlement, with respect to five key areas: Verification, Confidentiality, Safety, Security, and Compatibility with the overall nuclear warhead reductions regime. Using our method we find the option of the existing nuclear warhead facility not currently in use for active-stockpile work to be most favorable. On initial consideration, a dedicated dismantlement facility turns out to be the least favorable. This outcome is related to Compatibility and depends on the importance of making a dedicated dismantlement facility available in the same time frame as an existing nuclear warhead facility. If this criterion is relaxed, the dedicated dismantlement facility instead becomes the most favorable option. Verification, Confidentiality and Security have less impact on the overall outcome.

A physically cryptographic warhead verification system using neutron induced nuclear resonances

Arms control treaties are necessary to reduce the large stockpiles of the nuclear weapons that constitute one of the biggest dangers to the world. However, an impactful treaty hinges on effective inspection exercises to verify the participants’ compliance to the treaty terms. Such procedures would require verification of the authenticity of a warhead undergoing dismantlement. Previously proposed solutions lacked the combination of isotopic sensitivity and information security. Here we present the experimental feasibility proof of a technique that uses neutron induced nuclear resonances and is sensitive to the combination of isotopics and geometry. The information is physically encrypted to prevent the leakage of sensitive information. Our approach can significantly increase the trustworthiness of future arms control treaties while expanding their scope to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads themselves.

Determining age of high-explosive to support nuclear warhead dismantlement verification

The future international nuclear disarmament may involve the dismantlement of nuclear warheads. After the dismantlement of a nuclear warhead, the separated explosive needs authentication that it comes from the dismantled nuclear warhead. In this paper, the Monte Carlo numerical simulation method was used to study the feasibility and result of determining the source of the explosive by analyzing the nuclide abundances of the explosive and determining the age of the explosive (calculated since the explosive was placed in the nuclear warhead). First, the JMCT software was used to analyze the nuclei produced by the neutron reactions in the explosive of the nuclear warhead. As a result, it was found that 14C is the most promising to be used to determine the source of the explosive. Second, the relationships between the average abundance of 14C and the age of the explosive, the spatial distribution of the 14C abundance in the explosive were calculated by using the JMCT software. Finally, it is found that, compared to the WgPu warheads (nuclear warheads with weapons-grade plutonium cores), the 14C abundances of the explosives of the WgU warheads (nuclear warheads with weapons-grade uranium cores) are much lower (the ages of the explosives are the same), and it is more difficult to measure the latter; for the WgPu warheads with the structures based on Model 3 and Model 4 (the warhead models employed were proposed by Steve Fetter), it can be determined that whether the separated explosives come from the dismantled nuclear warheads or are common ones (or the fake ones prepared by the verified party) after the dismantlement of the nuclear warheads by measuring the 14C abundances in the explosives (including the average abundances and the spatial distributions of the abundances) and determining the ages of the explosives, which realizes the source authentication of the explosives.

International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Laying a foundation for future arms reductions

ABSTRACTToday’s international political environment is not favorable for establishing new arms control agreements, but history demonstrates that arms control opportunities can arise quickly. When opportunities arise, however, they will be accompanied by verification challenges for which nuclear and non-nuclear states alike must prepare now. In particular, new approaches must be developed to verify the dismantlement of nuclear warheads – a task never before undertaken. In order to identify technical challenges associated with nuclear disarmament verification, as well as procedures and technologies that might address those challenges, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the US State Department – through a project known as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) – are engaging collaboratively with more than 25 countries to build global verification expertise. The IPNDV has completed a first phase of work, which focused on monitoring and verification objectives, on-site inspections, and technical challenges and solutions. It has now embarked on a second phase of work, which will seek to deepen understanding of the verification options identified in the first phase, begin to test some of those options, and extend the partnership’s work beyond the core of nuclear weapon dismantlement. At a highly contentious moment for global security, the IPNDV stands out as a model of effective international collaboration.

Scaling the Nuclear Abolition Mountain: Is the United Nations up to the Task?

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. Five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, delivered to the East–West Institute conference on The United Nations and Security in a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, United Nations, 24 October 2008. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11881.doc.htm. 2. Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Vol 1 Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, adopted on 28 May 2010. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20%28VOL.I%29. 3. UN Resolution 1 (1), Establishment of a commission to deal with the problem raised by the discovery of atomic energy, adopted without a vote on 24 January 1946. 4. Most recently UNGA Resolution 65/76, which calls for the commencement of negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention and which was adopted on 8 December 2010 with a vote of 133 in favour, 28 against and 23 abstaining. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com10/gares/A%20RES%2065%2076.pdf. 5. See Joint Statement by President Obama and President Medvedev, 1 April 2009. “We committed our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world …” http://www.fpif.org/articles/obama_and_medvedev_on_nukes; and the Joint Statement by President Obama and Prime Minister Singh of India; 8 November 2010. “The two leaders affirmed that their countries’ common ideals, complementary strengths and a shared commitment to a world without nuclear weapons give them a responsibility to forge a strong partnership to lead global efforts for non-proliferation and universal and non-discriminatory global nuclear disarmament in the 21st century.” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india. 6. NATO Strategic Concept, adopted 19 November 2010, “We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm. 7. See, for example, the US Nuclear Posture Review, April 2010, p 47: “The long-term goal of U.S. policy is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons”, “The United States should … Set a course for the verified elimination of all nuclear weapons”, http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf. 8. See UK–Norway Initiative: Research into the Verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement, http://www.norway-un.org/NorwayandUN/Selected_Topics/Disarmament/UK-Norway-Iniatitive-Research-into-the-Verification-of-nuclear-warhead-dismantlement. 9. See Eliminating Nuclear Threats – A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, Final Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Section 6.3, Rethinking other justifications for retaining nuclear weapons, available at: http://www.icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/default.htm and http://www.icnnd.org/Reference/reports/ent/part-iii-6.html#justification. 10. See Will a Nuclear Weapons Convention mean a different international security system? in Securing our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, IPPNW, 2007. http://icanw.org/files/sos.pdf. 11. ‘Advancing nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament’, resolution adopted by consensus at the 120th IPU Assembly, 10 April 2009. http://www.ipu.org/conf-e/120/120-1.htm. 12. Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see footnote 2). 13. See A Global Law to Ban Nuclear Weapons, Middle Powers Initiative, June 2011. http://www.middlepowers.org/pubs/Global_Law.pdf. 14. See, Security Without Nuclear Deterrence, Commander Robert Green, Royal Navy (Ret'd), Ashton Media and the Disarmament and Security Centre 2010; Elements of a Nuclear Disarmament Treaty, BARRY M. BLECHMAN and ALEXANDER K. BOLLFRASS (EDITORS), The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2010; Securing our Survival, see footnote 10; and the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, UN Document A/62/650, http://inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap_old/mNWC_2007_Unversion_English_N0821377.pdf 15. See footnote 1. 16. Speech by Manmohan Singh to International Conference ‘Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons’ held in Delhi on 9–10 June 2008. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/manmohan-singh-on-nuclear-disarmament-2600.html. 17. See note 5. 18. See note 16.

Energy department: Nuclear warhead dismantlement ahead of schedule

Energy department: Nuclear warhead dismantlement ahead of schedule

A proposed approach for monitoring nuclear warhead dismantlement

Two novel approaches for monitoring nuclear warhead dismantlement have been developed by the Applied Monitoring and Transparency Laboratory at Los Alamos National Lab. These approaches were recently demonstrated at Pantex and in the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) at the Nevada Test Site. The systems used to demonstrate these concepts are called the Integrated Facility Monitoring System (IFMS) and the Magazine Transparency System (MTS). IFMS is intended as a limited chain‐of‐custody system for monitoring dismantlement operations, while MTS can be used for short or long‐term storage (and possibly the transport) of nuclear weapons, components, and materials. Both IFMS and MTS possess a number of the attributes required for an effective START III regime including negotiability, simplicity, good confidence and transparency, minimal invasiveness, limited needed for the presence of foreign personnel or hardware inside nuclear facilities, protection for classified information, and no compromise of domestic nuclear security and safeguards. Additional testing of these approaches under realistic conditions will improve the chances that such systems could be used effectively in future arms control agreements.

Prohibiting nuclear weapons: initiatives towards global nuclear disarmament

The world now stands at a precarious nuclear fork in the road with the following characteristics: the Nuclear Left Path is characterized by continued vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons with the danger being that any nation (or terrorist group) that wants such weapons, and can afford them, will eventually secure them; the Nuclear Right Path prohibits all nuclear weapons and leads ideally to global nuclear disarmament where the threat of nuclear war is minimized. The article is concerned with several initiatives that could be taken in order to follow the Nuclear Right Path and perhaps achieve global nuclear disarmament. The Nuclear Right Path requires a commitment of leadership from the US to vigorously promote new initiatives that seek to reduce, and perhaps totally eliminate, all nuclear weapons from Earth. These include, but are not limited, to the following: multilateral, phased reductions in strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems; complete cessation of all flight tests of long-range missiles; a global nuclear warhead dismantlement plan with effective economic incentives; a firm commitment from all nations to stop producing missile materials for nuclear weapons. Besides Russia, the key nation in future negotiations to reduce nuclear weapon arsenals is China which faces unique challenges in providing for its burgeoning population and who stands today at the threshold of economic superpower status.

Verified elimination of nuclear warheads

No nuclear warheads have yet been eliminated by treaty. This paper examines possibilities for verified dismantlement and elimination of nuclear warheads as called for by possible future nuclear disarmament treaties. After warheads have been removed from missiles, the INF treaty allows each country to retain them, without restrictions.1 According to present expectations similar conditions will apply to the START treaty now under negotiation to reduce numbers of Soviet and American deliverable strategic ballistic missile warheads by half. Nevertheless, given recent advances in cooperative methods verification, as well as progress in technical capabilities of detection and monitoring, it is reasonable to hope and expect that dismantlement of nuclear warheads, not just the means for their delivery, will be called for sometime in the future. This possibility has prompted a number of studies.2 The principal focus of this paper is on procedures to verify that warheads specified by treaty for elimination are, in fact, completely dismantled, their components rendered useless for construction of new warheads, and the contained fissile materials placed under international safeguards or disposed of in such a manner as to make them unusable in weapons.