Disengagement Bias Research Articles

Relationships of perfectionism with selective attentional engagement and disengagement biases

Relationships of perfectionism with selective attentional engagement and disengagement biases

Mechanisms underlying auditory and cross-modal emotional attentional biases: Engagement with and disengagement from aversive auditory stimuli

There has been no consistent conclusion concerning whether auditory spatial attention or visual spatial attention could be modulated by auditory aversive cues. In three experiments, we used direct aversive auditory stimuli (white noise) as cues and explored which subcomponents of attentional bias contribute to auditory and cross-modal spatial attention in unselected samples. In Experiment 1, in a dot-probe paradigm, we adopted auditory stimuli (aversive or neutral) as cues and a tick sound as target, and we set two stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) conditions: 150 ms and 500 ms. The results of experiment 1 showed that participants performed faster on congruent trials than on incongruent trials and participants exhibited an auditory emotional attentional bias to aversive auditory stimuli in 150 ms SOA condition. Subsequently, in experiment 2 and experiment 3, we employed an auditory emotional spatial cueing task using neutral and negative auditory stimuli as cues. Targets were auditory stimuli (Experiment 2) or visual stimuli (Experiment 3). The results of experiment 2 showed that participants performed faster to targets primed by negative cues than to those primed by neutral cues in valid condition; and performed slower to targets primed by negative cues than to those primed by neutral cues in invalid condition in 150 ms SOA condition. Experiment 2 revealed that speeded engagement with and delayed disengagement from aversive auditory stimuli were both present at a 150 ms SOA condition; at 500 ms SOA condition, only the former effect was present, and auditory inhibition of return was also observed. Experiment 3 produced similar results cross-modally, but cross-modal inhibition of return was not observed. In all experiments, we conclude that emotional attention can operate within the auditory modality and across sensory modalities, and that both engagement and disengagement bias contribute to auditory and cross-modal emotional attention.

The effect of bicephalic stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex on the attentional bias for threat: A transcranial direct current stimulation study.

Previous stimulation studies demonstrated that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) is involved in threat processing. According to a model of emotional processing, an unbalance between the two DLPFCs, with a hyperactivation of right frontal areas, is involved in the processing of negative emotions and genesis of anxiety. In the present study, we investigated the role of the right and left DLPFC in threat processing in healthy women who also completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). We simultaneously modulated the activity of the right and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex by applying bicephalic transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) before participants completed a modified version of the classic Posner task using threatening and nonthreatening stimuli as spatial cues. Anodal stimulation on the right DLPFC with a simultaneous cathodal stimulation over the left side induced a disengagement bias in individuals with low STAI scores and a facilitation bias in individuals with high STAI scores. Anodal stimulation on the left DLPFC with the simultaneous cathodal stimulation over the right side did not affect threat processing. The findings of the present study provided specific support to the hypothesis that unbalanced activation between left and right hemispheres with enhanced activation of the right DLPFC is critical in early top-down threat processing in healthy individuals.

Attentional bias in post-traumatic stress symptoms or anxiety

Many studies provided the existence of attentional bias in individuals with post-traumatic stress-symptom (PTSS) or students with anxiety. However, results remain unclear concerning the type of alteration (vigilance or disengagement) and specificity of attentional bias (for negative information or trauma-related information). To address these issues, 131 students completed a visual search task with a lexical decision component and clinical scales (for PTSS and anxiety). Attentional bias (vigilance and disengagement) and word valences (neutral words, negative words and trauma-related words) were controlled. Three groups were distinguished: no symptom, PTSS and anxious groups. No symptom group was characterized by facilitation in the attentional treatment for negative information. PTSS group presented a disengagement bias for negative and trauma-related information. When anxiety symptoms were associated with PTSS, in this group, it led to difficulties in vigilance. The anxious group showed difficulties only for negative words in vigilance. These data suggest that sub-clinical PTSS and anxiety symptoms altered differently information processing. These findings highlight the need for research on trauma populations and anxiety, and to pursue studies on comorbidity in PTSS.

The role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in early threat processing: a TMS study.

Previous studies demonstrated that excitatory (high frequency) offline transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) modulates attention allocation on threatening stimuli in non-clinical samples. These studies only employed offline TMS protocol that did not allow investigating the effect of the stimulation on the early stage of threat processing. In this study, the role of the right and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in early threat processing was investigated in high and low anxious individuals by means of an inhibitory single-pulse online TMS protocol. Our results demonstrated the role of the left DLPFC in an early stage of threat processing and that this effect is modulated by individuals' anxiety level. The inhibitory stimulation of the left DLPFC determined a disengagement bias in high anxious individuals, while the same stimulation determined an attentional avoidance in low anxious individuals. The findings of the present study suggest that right and left DLPFC are differently involved in early threat processing of healthy individuals.

Attention and Interpretation Biases and Attention Control in Youth with Social Anxiety Disorder

Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is associated with threat-related attention and interpretation biases. Recent research suggests that attention control abilities moderate these associations. The current study examines threat-related attentional engagement and disengagement biases, negative interpretation bias, and attention control among youth with SAD (n=71) and non-anxious youth (n=42). We further explore interactions between cognitive biases, and between these biases and attention control, in predicting SAD. Relative to non-anxious youth, youth with SAD had poorer attention control, p=.001, greater difficulty disengaging from angry faces, p=.05, and a negative biased interpretation of ambiguous social scenarios, p =.01. However, no interactions were found among these factors in relation to SAD diagnosis or symptoms. The present results add to research on cognitive biases in anxious children, emphasizing a distinct contribution of each of these cognitive mechanisms, rather than their interactional influences. Findings are discussed in relation to cognitive developmental models of anxiety.

Engaging With the Wrong People

Previous studies investigating the hypothesis that elevated social anxiety vulnerability is characterized by an attentional bias to negative social information have yielded inconsistent findings. One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that most such studies have failed to distinguish bias in attentional engagement with, and in attentional disengagement from, negative social information. It has been proposed that only one of these two possible forms of attentional bias may be associated with elevated social anxiety vulnerability, potentially giving rise to observed inconsistencies when assessment approaches have failed to dissociate them. The few studies that have sought to investigate this issue have been hampered by methodological limitations, which have compromised their capacity to differentially assess these two facets of attentional selectivity. In the present study, we employed a recently developed variant of the attentional-probe task that has proven capable of dissociating attentional engagement bias and disengagement bias, to contrast the patterns of attentional selectivity shown by participants high and low in social anxiety. Our findings reveal that elevated social anxiety vulnerability is characterized only by facilitated attentional engagement with socially negative information and not by impaired attentional disengagement from socially negative information.

Attentional control moderates the relationship between social anxiety symptoms and attentional disengagement from threatening information

Background and objectivesSocial anxiety is characterized by biased attentional processing of social information. However, heterogeneity of extant findings suggests that it may be informative to elucidate individual difference factors that modulate the processing of emotional information. The current study examined whether individual differences in components of attentional control (AC – shifting and focusing) moderated the link between social anxiety and attentional engagement and disengagement biases for threat-relevant cues. MethodsSeventy–five undergraduate students completed well-established measures of social anxiety symptoms, AC, and attentional bias for social threat information (modified probe detection task). ResultsModeration analyses revealed that at low levels of AC-shifting, increased social anxiety was associated with slower disengagement from threat-relevant compared to neutral social cues. In contrast, at high levels of AC-shifting, social anxiety was associated with faster disengagement from threat-relevant compared to neutral stimuli. Individual differences in AC-focusing did not moderate the social anxiety-attentional bias link. LimitationsCausal inferences cannot be made given the cross-sectional study design. The sample comprised individuals displaying a range of self-reported social anxiety symptoms; thus, generalizability to clinical samples remains to be established. The measurement of AC relied on subjective participant report. ConclusionsThe current findings underscore the importance of AC processes in understanding the nature of attentional bias mechanisms in anxiety.

Enhanced probing of attentional bias: The independence of anxiety-linked selectivity in attentional engagement with and disengagement from negative information

Cognitive models of anxiety posit that an attentional bias to negative information plays a causal role in elevated anxiety vulnerability and dysfunction. There has been considerable recent interest in determining whether this attentional bias reflects facilitated attentional engagement with and/or impaired attentional disengagement from negative information. We concur with the claim of investigators who have noted that the methodologies previously employed to dissociate engagement and disengagement biases are not optimal for this purpose. In the present study, we employ a novel methodology, the Attentional Response to Distal vs. Proximal Emotional Information (ARDPEI) task, which enables the discrete assessment of these two types of attentional selectivity. The findings demonstrate that facilitated attentional engagement with and impaired attentional disengagement from negative information both characterise elevated anxiety vulnerability. Further, these biases represent distinctive facets of anxiety-linked attentional selectivity. We discuss the potentially differing roles that engagement and disengagement biases may play in the development and/or maintenance of anxiety vulnerability and dysfunction.

Attentional biases toward humor: Separate effects of incongruity detection and resolution

Previous research has indicated that the comprehension of humor involves two stages: incongruity detection and incongruity resolution. However, little is known about the temporal parameters of these stages and the degree to which they influence attentional processing. In the current study, 155 participants completed a dot-probe task to examine these questions. On each trial, humor versus control, novel (incongruent but not humorous) versus control, or neutral versus neutral image pairs were presented for 300, 400, or 500 ms. A probe immediately replaced the experimental image (valid trial) or control image (invalid trial). An attentional bias toward humor and novelty by 300 ms was shown by faster probe-detection reaction times (RTs) on valid compared to invalid humor and novel trials for all three exposure times. When compared to the neutral trials, humor and novel stimuli elicited slower RTs, indicating a difficulty in attentional disengagement. An exploratory analysis found that subjective humor ratings predicted the disengagement bias at 500 ms, but not at 400 or 300 ms. These results suggest that incongruity detection biases attention by 300 ms, whereas incongruity resolution may only contribute at 500 ms.

2279 – Post traumatic stress symptoms and anxiety as attentional bias modulators in “control” population

Introduction Information processing studies, such as attentional bias, help to distinguish anxious pathologies. If Vigilance and disengagement bias have been widely demonstrated in generalized anxiety and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), their existence has not been reported in non clinical sample with or without anxiety and/or PTSD symptoms. Objectives and aims The aim of the present study was to examine the possible presence of specific attentional bias in these populations and compare them with classical bias in PTSD patients. Methods One hundred and thirty-one students completed a visual search task with a lexical decision component, and anxiety and PTSD scales. We controlled attentional bias: vigilance / disengagement and words valence: neutral / general threat-related / trauma-related. Ten PTSD patients were assessed for PTSD with CAPS and completed the same protocol. Results Among non clinical sample, four groups were distinguished: without symptom, anxious, PTSS (Post-Traumatic Stress Symptom) and, anxious and PTSS groups. Analysis of response time and error rate show different pattern of bias in each non clinical group. Considering the PTSS group response times were higher for trauma-related words, while for threat-related words, the anxious group was characterized by lower response times. Without symptom participants showed an attentional bias for negative information. Anxious and PTSS participants were characterized by a generalization of both biases. Conclusions These data reveal the existence of different types of information processing between these four non clinical groups. A putative role of anxious symptoms, in anxiety pathologies such as PTSD, on attentional bias is discussed.

There’s more to anxiety than meets the eye: Isolating threat-related attentional engagement and disengagement biases.

Threat-related attentional biases represent a basic survival mechanism. These biases include an engagement bias involving rapid direction of attention toward threat and a disengagement bias involving slow direction of attention away from threat. The exact nature of these biases in healthy and anxious individuals remains controversial because of the challenges associated with accurately isolating each of these attentional biases. Combining a cognitive attentional task with classical conditioning using electric stimulation, we created a new paradigm that makes it possible to more clearly isolate these attentional biases. Utilizing this novel paradigm, we detected both types of attentional bias and differentiated between levels of trait anxiety, in which low- and high-trait anxiety individuals showed equal levels of engagement bias, but only high-trait anxiety individuals showed impaired disengagement from threat.

Attention Bias to Threat in Anxiety-Prone Individuals

There is considerable controversy around the factors influencing the attentional biases involved in anxiety, controversies pinpointing to the role of trait anxiety (TA) in these biases. Previous studies have disregarded psychophysiological factors, such as cardiac vagal control, from the relation between TA and attention biases to threat, though cardiac vagal control serves as a proxy of attention regulation. By using a spatial cueing task, the present correlational study examines cardiac vagal tone as a moderator of the relation between TA and attention biases to threat. Cardiac vagal tone was indexed by high-frequency heart-rate variability (HF-HRV) and recorded, at baseline, from participants with high trait anxiety (HTA, N = 34) or low trait anxiety (LTA, N = 40). Our data indicate that HF-HRV significantly moderates the relation between TA and disengagement bias, but does not moderate the relation between TA and engagement bias. Extended analysis on the significant moderation showed that HF-HRV moderated the relation between TA and disengagement bias in the case of the participants with mean to low HF-HRV values. This was not the case for the participants with high values of HF-HRV. Our results suggest implications for redefining groups at risk for anxiety disorders, as well as future considerations of the cardiac vagal tone in attention bias research.

Threat engagement, disengagement, and sensitivity bias in worry-prone individuals as measured by an emotional go/no-go task

Background and objectives The goal of the present study was to investigate a threat engagement, disengagement, and sensitivity bias in individuals suffering from pathological worry. Methods Twenty participants high in worry proneness and 16 control participants low in worry proneness completed an emotional go/no-go task with worry-related threat words and neutral words. Results Shorter reaction times (i.e., threat engagement bias), smaller omission error rates (i.e., threat sensitivity bias), and larger commission error rates (i.e., threat disengagement bias) emerged only in the high worry group when worry-related words constituted the go-stimuli and neutral words the no-go stimuli. Also, smaller omission error rates as well as larger commission error rates were observed in the high worry group relative to the low worry group when worry-related go stimuli and neutral no-go stimuli were used. Limitations The obtained results await further replication within a generalized anxiety disorder sample. Also, further samples should include men as well. Conclusions Our data suggest that worry-prone individuals are threat-sensitive, engage more rapidly with aversion, and disengage harder.

PA.08 Investigating the role of attentional disengagement bias in the tendency, ability and persistence of worry

AimsIndividuals with Generalised Anxiety Disorder have an attentional bias towards threatening information. It is not known whether this results from facilitated engagement (faster orientation) or delayed disengagement (shifting attention away)...

P01-169 - Investigating the role of attentional disengagement bias in the tendency, ability and persistence of worry

IntroductionIndividuals with Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) have an attentional bias towards threatening information. It is not known whether this results from facilitated engagement (faster orientation) or delayed disengagement (shifting attention away) from threat. Recent research has developed a new methodology designed to modify attentional disengagement from threat.ObjectivesUsing this paradigm, the present study assessed the causal role of attentional disengagement from threat and its impact on worry.MethodTwenty-four university students scoring below 56 on the Penn-State-Worry-Questionnaire were randomly assigned to either threat disengagement training, or non-threat disengagement training. Training was assessed using threat and non-threat test-trials. All participants then completed a novel worry task, assessing tendency, ability and persistency of worry. The hypothesis was that training to disengage from threat rather than non-threat stimuli would affect tendency, ability or persistence of worry.ResultsAccuracy and test-trial reaction-time data indicated disengagement training was successful; compared to the non-threat disengagement group, the threat disengagement group had faster reaction-times for non-threat valence test-trials, experienced marginally non-significantly more negative intrusions during active worry, and found it significantly more difficult to worry, when required to engage solely with worry without interruption in the worry task.ConclusionIt is possible to manipulate attentional bias to disengage from threat information, leading to fewer negative thought intrusions during active worry and increased difficulty in engaging solely with worry, thus suggesting that impaired disengagement has a causal role in the ability to worry.