Disconfirmatory Evidence Research Articles

Impaired belief revision yet intact information seeking in positive schizotypy: A modified task of bias against disconfirmatory evidence

Cognitive models of delusions emphasize the role of bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE) in maintaining false beliefs, but sources of this tendency remain elusive. While impaired information integration could be an explanation for this tendency, the lack of information seeking motive could also result in disregard for new evidence once a (false) belief is formed. The role of information seeking in the association between psychosis-proneness and belief inflexibility has not been investigated in the context of a social interpretation task. In this study, we modified the Interpretation Inflexibility Task (IIT), which assess bias against disconfirmatory evidence in interpersonal contexts, to permit assessment of information seeking by allowing participants to skip seeing increasingly disambiguating information (in the form of pictures at varying degrees of degradation). A robust regression analysis was conducted to examine whether increasing severity of positive schizotypy is associated with more frequent skipping of later trial stages, to examine information seeking. Controlling for the number of pictures seen by participants, a robust mixed effects analysis was conducted to investigate the associations of positive schizotypy, trait anxiety, and the emotional valence of the scenario with a measure of belief revision. Participants higher in positive schizotypy did not opt out of seeing disambiguating information more frequently, p = 0.65, ß = 0.04; despite this, they still exhibited heightened belief inflexibility by rating the lures and true explanations as equally plausible, p < 0.001, ß = -0.32. These results suggest that bias against disconfirmatory evidence in positive schizotypy is unlikely a result of reduced information seeking, leaving impaired information integration as a more likely source.

Overturning Children's Misconceptions about Ruler Measurement: The Power of Disconfirming Evidence.

Children have persistent difficulty with foundational measurement concepts, which may be linked to the instruction they receive. Here, we focus on testing various ways to support their understanding that rulers comprise spatial interval units. We examined whether evidence-based learning tools-disconfirming evidence and/or structural alignment-enhance their understanding of ruler units. Disconfirming evidence, in this context, involves having children count the spatial interval units under an object that is not aligned with the origin of a ruler. Structural alignment, in this context, involves highlighting what a ruler unit is by overlaying plastic unit chips on top of ruler units when an object is aligned with the origin of a ruler. In three experiments employing a pre-test/training/post-test design, a total of 120 second graders were randomly assigned to one of six training conditions (two training conditions per experiment). The training conditions included different evidence-based learning principles or "business-as-usual" instruction (control), with equal allocation to each (N = 20 for each condition). In each experiment, children who did not perform above chance level on the pre-test were selected to continue with training, which resulted in a total of 88 students for the analysis of improvement. The children showed significant improvement in training conditions that included disconfirming evidence, but not in the structural alignment or control conditions. However, an exploratory analysis suggests that improvement occurred more rapidly and was retained better when structural alignment was combined with disconfirming evidence compared to disconfirming evidence alone.

Increasing survey response rates: Framing international students as potentially vulnerable and hard-to-reach

In this qualitative study, I worked with international students to understand how researchers can increase response rates to international student experience surveys. I explicitly framed international students as a potentially vulnerable and hard-to-reach population, and then considered barriers associated with vulnerable populations and research participation. To answer my research questions, I interviewed 14 students who each self-identified as an international student and were enrolled at a public South-Atlantic university in the United States. I analyzed the qualitative data by conducting thematic analysis and determined there are three underlying concerns that influence survey response: feeling unheard, unknown intentions, and impersonal connections. The disconfirming evidence and limitations with this study’s research design suggest areas for future research, though I also illustrate how the findings can begin to inform the design and administration of international student experience surveys.

Does disconfirmatory evidence shape safety-and danger-related beliefs of trauma-exposed individuals?

ABSTRACT Recent accounts of predictive processing in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) suggest that trauma-exposed individuals struggle to update trauma-related hypotheses predicting danger, which may be involved in the etiology and maintenance of this disorder. Initial research supports this account, documenting an association between trauma-exposure, impaired expectation updating, and PTSD symptoms. Yet, no study to date has examined biased belief updating in PTSD using a scenario-based approach. Objective: Here, we examined the predictive processing account among trauma-exposed and non-trauma-exposed individuals using a modified Trauma-Related version of the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence task. Method: The task presents both danger-and safety-related scenarios highly relevant for trauma-exposed individuals. For each scenario, participants viewed several explanations and rated their plausibility. Their ability to update their initial interpretation following new-contradictory information was assessed. Results: Preregistered analyses did not reveal any significant findings. Based on indications that our sample may not have been sufficiently powered, we conducted exploratory analyses in an extended sample of participants. These analyses yielded a significant association between reduced belief updating and PTSD symptoms which was evident for disconfirming both safety and danger scenarios. However, the effect sizes we found were in the small-to-medium range. Conclusion: Although preliminary, our current findings support initial evidence that individuals with higher PTSD symptoms show a higher resistance to update their beliefs upon new disconfirmatory evidence. Our results should be interpreted cautiously in light of the extended sample and the limitations of the current study.

Are depressive symptoms linked to a reduced pupillary response to novel positive information?-An eye tracking proof-of-concept study.

Depressive symptoms have been linked to difficulties in revising established negative beliefs in response to novel positive information. Recent predictive processing accounts have suggested that this bias in belief updating may be related to a blunted processing of positive prediction errors at the neural level. In this proof-of-concept study, pupil dilation in response to unexpected positive emotional information was examined as a psychophysiological marker of an attenuated processing of positive prediction errors associated with depressive symptoms. Participants (N = 34) completed a modified version of the emotional Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) task in which scenarios initially suggest negative interpretations that are later either confirmed or disconfirmed by additional information. Pupil dilation in response to the confirmatory and disconfirmatory information was recorded. Behavioral results showed that depressive symptoms were related to difficulties in revising negative interpretations despite disconfirmatory positive information. The eye tracking results pointed to a reduced pupil response to unexpected positive information among people with elevated depressive symptoms. Altogether, the present study demonstrates that the adapted emotional BADE task can be appropriate for examining psychophysiological aspects such as changes in pupil size along with behavioral responses. Furthermore, the results suggest that depression may be characterized by deviations in both behavioral (i.e., reduced updating of negative beliefs) and psychophysiological (i.e., decreased pupil dilation) responses to unexpected positive information. Future work should focus on a larger sample including clinically depressed patients to further explore these findings.

Geopolitics on a Jersey

Throughout the past two decades, elite sports, especially soccer, have seen an onslaught of lucrative investments by authoritarian states. Media outlets have branded these investments as “sportswashing,” while contemporary scholars have adapted soft power theory to sports in order to measure the geopolitical implications of these state-backed investments. 1 However, scholarship intersecting sports and soft power is limited to a broad, transnational scale, and primarily focuses on the diplomatic efficacy of mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup and Olympics. Therefore, this paper attempts to fill a gap in the literature and measure the soft power gains from a sports sponsorship on a regional level. More specifically, this paper analyzes Gazprom’s sponsorship of German soccer club FC Schalke 04 to determine if the state-backed sponsorship successfully increased Russia’s soft power among FC Schalke fans. With minimal scholarship in this area, I draw from social psychology theory to develop a unique and nuanced causal mechanism to measure soft power gains from a sports sponsorship. I then apply this causal mechanism to my FC Schalke case study and test two distinct hypotheses in order to identify soft power indicators from Gazprom’s sponsorship. I first examine FC Schalke club politics to determine whether Schalke fans experienced a ‘good-will effect’ towards Gazprom and Russia, then track voting data from four Bundestag elections to measure if this ‘goodwill effect’ became a motivating bias for pro-Russia political behavior among the FC Schalke constituency. With both confirming and discon-firming evidence for pro-Russia bias among Schalke fans, my ultimate soft power implications are ambiguous. However, this paper still provides a more nuanced mechanism to measure soft power as a result of a sports sponsorship and illuminates the need for future studies to further measure the geopolitical implications of sports investments by authoritarian regimes.

Better than expected? Predictors of coping with expectation violations in the communication about death and dying.

End-of-life (EOL) communication is often avoided, especially among young adults. Negative expectations concerning EOL conversations with relatives or significant others are one major reason. To investigate how best to violate negative expectations concerning EOL conversations by identifying predictors of coping with expectation violations in this context. Vignettes describing expectation violations in the context of EOL communication were presented to a sample of 261 university students. In a first experiment, the credibility of the expectation-disconfirming information was manipulated. In a second experiment, the valence of the disconfirming evidence was manipulated. As outcome measures, the subjective likelihood of two different responses to the expectation violation was assessed: (1) ignoring the disconfirming evidence (immunization) and (2) changing expectations (accommodation). Overall, participants experiencing a worse-than-expected event showed more immunization [F(1, 257) = 12.15, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.05], while participants experiencing a better-than-expected event showed more accommodation [F(1, 257) = 30.98, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.11]. Participants with higher fear of death [F(1, 257) = 12.24, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.05] as well as higher death avoidance tendencies [F(1, 257) = 17.16, p < 0.001, ηp = 0.06] showed less accommodation in response to a better-than-expected event. In general, young adults appear to update their expectations quickly in response to unexpectedly positive experiences in the context of EOL communication. However, individuals with higher fear of death and higher death avoidance tendencies appear to be at higher risk of maintaining negative expectations despite disconfirming evidence.

Hasty decision making and belief inflexibility in the more delusion prone? A modified disambiguating-scenarios paradigm assessing cognitive biases implicated in delusions.

Contemporary models of psychosis imply that cognitive biases such as the jumping to conclusions (JTC), the bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), and the liberal acceptance (LA) bias play a role in the pathogenesis of delusions. Most of the studies investigating the role of cognitive biases, however, have been conducted with socially neutral or abstract stimuli and have assessed patients with established psychoses. For the present study, we aimed to concurrently investigate multiple biases (i.e., the JTC, BADE, and LA biases) in a community sample with a new paradigm using more socially engaging stimuli. A large sample of participants (N=874) recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk was subdivided into two groups based on the frequency of their psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) according to the positive subscale score of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE) and matched based on major demographics variables, resulting in two equally sized groups called High-PLE (at least 2 SD above the mean) and Low-PLE (maximum 0.5 above the mean; n=46 for each group). Using a modified version of the written-scenarios BADE task, which emphasized social interactions between agents embedded in the scenario, participants rated the plausibility of response options in the face of new information. In line with previous findings, the High-PLE group demonstrated the JTC, BADE, and LA biases. That is, the members of this group made more decisions after the initial piece of information, were less likely to revise their beliefs in light of new information, and provided higher plausibility ratings for implausible response options compared to the Low-PLE group. Results corroborate prior findings suggesting that the JTC, BADE, and LA biases may be contributing factors in delusional ideation and that metacognitive biases extend to social situations.

The two sides of corporate social responsibility and the quality of internal control audit opinions

Although corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities provide a strong signal of management integrity, the involvement of the client in irresponsible CSR should alert the auditor to the risk of material misstatement. Framing management integrity assessments by relying on responsible CSR activities can lead to auditors' unintended alignment with their clients' preferred outcomes. Motivated by the increasing frequency of clean internal control opinions (ICOPs) regarding clients that subsequently misstate, we explore whether auditors' overreliance on responsible CSR influences the quality of ICOPs. We find that clients' CSR involvement is associated with fewer adverse ICOPs, but this CSR effect is asymmetric because it is only explained by responsible CSR activities and not by irresponsible CSR activities. Importantly, the ‘good side of CSR’ is associated with fewer adverse opinions being issued to misstated clients. Additional analyses show that only irresponsible CSR activities increase the risk of financial misstatements. Our findings provide support for the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's warning that certain conditions inherent in the audit environment, such as the assessment of management integrity, can lead to auditors unconsciously favouring confirming evidence (represented by responsible CSR activities) instead of relying on disconfirming evidence (represented by irresponsible CSR activities) that could raise issues about management's integrity and ethical commitment.

Delusion-like beliefs and data quality: Are classic cognitive biases artifacts of carelessness?

There is widespread agreement that delusions in clinical populations and delusion-like beliefs in the general population are, in part, caused by cognitive biases. Much of the evidence comes from two influential tasks: the Beads Task and the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence Task. However, research using these tasks has been hampered by conceptual and empirical inconsistencies. In an online study, we examined relationships between delusion-like beliefs in the general population and cognitive biases associated with these tasks. Our study had four key strengths: A new animated Beads Task designed to reduce task miscomprehension, several data-quality checks to identify careless responders, a large sample (n = 1,002), and a preregistered analysis plan. When analyzing the full sample, our results replicated classic relationships between cognitive biases and delusion-like beliefs. However, when we removed 82 careless participants from the analyses (8.2% of the sample) we found that many of these relationships were severely diminished and, in some cases, eliminated outright. These results suggest that some (but not all) seemingly well-established relationships between cognitive biases and delusion-like beliefs might be artifacts of careless responding. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

A reconsideration of the economic decline of the British aristocracy 1858–2018

Abstract Historical accounts of the British aristocracy argue its economic decline was owed to anachronistic characteristics, declining land values, and inheritance taxes. We find disconfirming evidence based on the hereditary peerage's probates 1858 to 2018, showing: decline only began after World War I; no links between aristocratic wealth and farmland prices; and a greater role for tax avoidance with respect to inheritance taxes. Aristocrats also followed the rich with their share of wealth dwindling over the 20th century. Together, these arguments suggest the British aristocracy detached economic interests from status characteristics enabling them to persist more effectively than previously thought.

A Bayesian predictive processing account of Othello syndrome in Parkinson’s disease

ABSTRACT Introduction: Although delusions in Parkinson’s disease (PD) are rare, when they occur they frequently take the form of “Othello syndrome”: the irrational belief that a spouse or partner is being unfaithful. Hitherto dismissed as either a by-product of dopamine therapy or cognitive impairment, there are still no convincing theoretical accounts to explain why only some patients fall prey to this delusion, or why it persists despite clear disconfirmatory evidence. Methods: We discuss the limitations of existing explanations of this delusion, namely hyperdopaminergia-induced anomalous perceptual experiences and cognitive impairment, before describing how Bayesian predictive processing accounts can provide a more comprehensive explanation by foregrounding the importance of prior experience and its impact upon computation of probability. We illustrate this new conceptualisation with three case vignettes. Results: We suggest that in those with prior experience of romantic betrayal, hyperdominergic-induced aberrant prediction errors enable anomalous perceptual experiences to accrue greater prominence, which is then maintained through Bayes-optimal inferencing to confirm cognitive distortions, eliciting and shaping this dangerous delusion. Conclusions: We propose the first comprehensive mechanistic account of Othello syndrome in PD and discuss implications for clinical interventions.

Relationships between cognitive biases, decision-making, and delusions

Multiple measures of decision-making under uncertainty (e.g. jumping to conclusions (JTC), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), win-switch behavior, random exploration) have been associated with delusional thinking in independent studies. Yet, it is unknown whether these variables explain shared or unique variance in delusional thinking, and whether these relationships are specific to paranoia or delusional ideation more broadly. Additionally, the underlying computational mechanisms require further investigation. To investigate these questions, task and self-report data were collected in 88 individuals (46 healthy controls, 42 schizophrenia-spectrum) and included measures of cognitive biases and behavior on probabilistic reversal learning and explore/exploit tasks. Of those, only win-switch rate significantly differed between groups. In regression, reversal learning performance, random exploration, and poor evidence integration during BADE showed significant, independent associations with paranoia. Only self-reported JTC was associated with delusional ideation, controlling for paranoia. Computational parameters increased the proportion of variance explained in paranoia. Overall, decision-making influenced by strong volatility and variability is specifically associated with paranoia, whereas self-reported hasty decision-making is specifically associated with other themes of delusional ideation. These aspects of decision-making under uncertainty may therefore represent distinct cognitive processes that, together, have the potential to worsen delusional thinking across the psychosis spectrum.

Reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population: A longitudinal study.

Reasoning biases have been suggested as risk factors for delusional ideation in both patients and non-clinical individuals. Still, it is unclear how these biases are longitudinally related to delusions in the general population. We hence aimed to investigate longitudinal associations between reasoning biases and delusional ideation in the general population. We conducted an online cohort study with 1184 adults from the German and Swiss general population. Participants completed measures on reasoning biases (jumping-to-conclusion bias [JTC], liberal acceptance bias [LA], bias against disconfirmatory evidence [BADE], possibility of being mistaken [PM]) and delusional ideation at baseline, and delusional ideation 7 to 8months later. A greater JTC bias was associated with a greater increase in delusional ideation over the following months. This association was better described by a positive quadratic relationship. Neither BADE, LA nor PM were associated with subsequent changes in delusional ideation. This study suggests that jumping-to-conclusions predicts delusional ideation in the general population but that this association may follow a quadratic trajectory. While no other associations turned significant, future studies with shorter temporal distances may shed further light on the role of reasoning biases as risk factors for delusional ideation in non-clinical samples.

Correction to “Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence”

Correction to “Countering conspiracy theory beliefs: Understanding the conjunction fallacy and considering disconfirming evidence”

Postracial Presumptions: The Supreme Court’s Undoing of the Voting Rights Act through Racial Ignorance

ABSTRACT To warrant the weakening of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Supreme Court’s conservative majority has actively manufactured ignorance of racism in the realm of voting. Through an analysis of majority opinions in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), Abbott v. Perez (2018), and cases concerning states’ antivoting fraud restrictions, I demonstrate how considerable evidence of racial discrimination is deemed to fail the standard of proof imposed by the court. I offer the term postracial presumption to account for how dominant publics are empowered to reason as if the United States was beyond race, to employ postracial premises to warrant judgments for which there is insufficient evidence and, indeed, for which there is considerable disconfirming evidence. The essay demonstrates how presumption and proof burdens can be critical tools in the study of postracism and is suggestive of how racial ignorance cannot simply be rectified by more proof.

Editorial—The truth is out there: The psychology of conspiracy theories and how to counter them

Editorial—The truth is out there: The psychology of conspiracy theories and how to counter them

Belief Inflexibility and Cognitive Biases in Anorexia Nervosa-The Role of the Bias against Disconfirmatory Evidence and Its Clinical and Neuropsychological Correlates.

The aim of this study was to explore, in a sample of patients with a diagnosis of AN, the ability to question their first impression and, in particular, the willingness to integrate their prior ideas and thoughts with additional progressive incoming information. A total of 45 healthy women and 103 patients with a diagnosis of AN, consecutively admitted to the Eating Disorder Padova Hospital-University Unit, underwent a broad clinical and neuropsychological assessment. All participants were administered the Bias Against Disconfirmatory Evidence (BADE) task, which specifically investigates belief integration cognitive bias. Acute AN patients showed a significantly greater bias toward disconfirming their previous judgment, in comparison to healthy women (BADE score, respectively, 2.5 ± 2.0 vs. 3.3 ± 1.6; Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.012). A binge-eating/purging subtype of AN individuals, compared to restrictive AN patients and controls, showed greater disconfirmatory bias and also a significant propensity to uncritically accept implausible interpretations (BADE score, respectively, 1.55 ± 1.6 and 2.70 ± 1.97 vs. 3.33 ± 1.63; Kruskal-Wallis test, p = 0.002 and liberal acceptance score, respectively, 1.32 ± 0.93 and 0.92 ± 1.21 vs. 0.98 ± 0.75; Kruskal-Wallis test p = 0.03). Abstract thinking skills and cognitive flexibility, as well as high central coherence, are neuropsychological aspects positively correlated with cognitive bias, in both patients and controls. Research into belief integration bias in AN population could enable us to shed light on hidden dimensional aspects, facilitating a better understanding of the psychopathology of a disorder that is so complex and difficult to treat.

Bayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories

ABSTRACT Several philosophers and psychologists have characterized belief in conspiracy theories as a product of irrational reasoning. Proponents of conspiracy theories apparently resist revising their beliefs given disconfirming evidence and tend to believe in more than one conspiracy, even when the relevant beliefs are mutually inconsistent. In this paper, we bring leading views on conspiracy theoretic beliefs closer together by exploring their rationality under a probabilistic framework. We question the claim that the irrationality of conspiracy theoretic beliefs stems from an inadequate response to disconfirming evidence and internal incoherence. Drawing analogies to Lakatosian research programs, we argue that maintaining a core conspiracy belief can be Bayes-rational when it is embedded in a network of auxiliary beliefs, which can be revised to protect the more central belief from disconfirmation. We propose that the (ir)rationality associated with conspiracy belief lies not in a flawed updating method, but in their failure to converge toward well-confirmed, stable belief networks in the long run. This approach not only reconciles previously disjointed views, but also points toward more specific hypotheses explaining why some agents may be prone to adopting beliefs in conspiracy theories.

Bayesian belief protection: A study of belief in conspiracy theories

ABSTRACT Several philosophers and psychologists have characterized belief in conspiracy theories as a product of irrational reasoning. Proponents of conspiracy theories apparently resist revising their beliefs given disconfirming evidence and tend to believe in more than one conspiracy, even when the relevant beliefs are mutually inconsistent. In this paper, we bring leading views on conspiracy theoretic beliefs closer together by exploring their rationality under a probabilistic framework. We question the claim that the irrationality of conspiracy theoretic beliefs stems from an inadequate response to disconfirming evidence and internal incoherence. Drawing analogies to Lakatosian research programs, we argue that maintaining a core conspiracy belief can be Bayes-rational when it is embedded in a network of auxiliary beliefs, which can be revised to protect the more central belief from disconfirmation. We propose that the irrationality associated with conspiracy belief lies not in a flawed updating method, but in a failure to converge toward well-confirmed, stable belief networks in the long run. This approach not only reconciles previously disjointed views, but also points toward more specific descriptions of why agents may be prone to adopting beliefs in conspiracy theories.