Disasters In India Research Articles

Democracy and Technology by Richard E. Sclove

TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 531 more information to know that they have needs, though such infor­ mation may aid efforts to demand an official response. The ques­ tions remain: What would constitute an appropriate response? How can technoscience operate as a resource in contexts where science is not able to “clean things up”? How can technoscience continue its work when reliance on conventional categories of cause and ef­ fect seems insufficient? How can technoscience continually acknowl­ edge its own potential both as a social resource and as a mechanism for legitimating environmental devastation and social deprivation? Kim Fortun Dr. Fortun, an assistant professor in the Department of Science and Technology Studies at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, is a cultural anthropologist whose work has focused on the legacy of the Bhopal disaster in India and the United States. Democracy and Technology. Richard E. Sclove. New York: Guilford Press, 1995. Pp. xiv+338; figures, notes, bibliography, index. $42.00 (hardcover) $18.95 (paper). Richard Sclove’s book rests on the following moral syllogism: Polit­ ical decisions ought to be made democratically. Technological deci­ sion-making is a form of political decision-making. Therefore, tech­ nological decisions ought to be made democratically. Both the strengths and weaknesses of this insightful but exasperating book grow out of such moralistic and largely ahistorical reasoning. Democracy and Technology is divided into three unequal parts. Part 1, at fifty pages, defends the premises of Sclove’s moral syllogism. One chapter provides—with reference to recent work in science, technology, and society studies—a useful overview of the ways in which technology constitutes politics. Another offers a restatement ofBenjamin Barber’s theory of “strong democracy.” Putting the two views together—that technology constitutes politics and that good politics is strongly democratic—leads to the thesis that technology ought to be democratized. Having made his argument, Sclove pro­ ceeds to act on it. Part 2, one hundred pages long and the heart of the book, spells out in some practical detail a series of nine “design criteria” for democratic technologies. The first, concerned with the promotion of democratic community, states: “Seek a balance among communitarian/cooperative, individualized, and transcommunity technologies. Avoid technologies that establish authoritarian social relations” (pp. 62 and 98). The second, concerned with develop­ ment of the democratic person, states: “Seek a diverse array of flex­ ibly schedulable, self-actualizing technological practices. Avoid meaningless, debilitating, or otherwise autonomy-impairing techno­ logical practices” (pp. 83 and 98). 532 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE These first and most general criteria both have approximately twenty-page chapters devoted to them. The remaining seven supple­ mentary criteria are grouped into three chapters. Criteria three and four reject ideologically loaded and inequality-enhancing technolo­ gies. Five, six, and seven promote cosmopolitan decentralization. Eight and nine support anthropocentric environmentalism and technological flexibility. None of these “idealistic” moral maxims is left at the abstract level; all are fleshed out with abundant examples. Part 3, at another hundred pages, indicates strategies for getting from the “here” of a not very democratic technology to the “there” of a strongly democratic technological politics. One prefatory chap­ ter admits that the kind of strong democracy Sclove espouses re­ quires that the design criteria he proposes be accepted only provi­ sionally and remain “contestable.” Another rejects the economic marketplace as coming anywhere close to providing for strong dem­ ocratic participation in or influence on technological decision-mak­ ing. Then Sclove devotes one chapter to examples of how people could effectively participate in research, development, and design activities—with special references to the handicapped, women, the third world, and children. But the longest single chapter, almost half this third part of the book, is devoted to eleven categories of things to be done to realize Sclove’s strong participatory goals. Do commu­ nity inventories of technological impacts. Cut back on TV use and lower the workweek to provide more time for political activity. Get foundations and the government to support, and institute citizen sabbaticals to pursue, democracy and technology research. And so on. Sclove’s numerous practical insights are nevertheless frustratingly yoked to a rationalistic democratic moralism with roots in JeanJacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. Nothing will work without the...

The south Manchester Accident Rescue Team and the earthquake in Iran, June 1990.

BMJ 1991;302:1521-3 On the night of 20 June 1990 an earthquake struck the northwestern provinces of Iran. The huge scale of the disaster was apparent immediately?it was thought to be at least similar to that of Armenia in December 1988. The South Manchester Accident Rescue Team (SMART) was included as part of the aid package offered by the disaster unit of the Overseas Develop? ment Administration on behalf of the United Kingdom. The dispatch of the team and its equipment was delayed when the Red Cross in Geneva stated that foreign medical aid was not required. Clarification was sought by the disaster unit from the British interests section of the Swedish Embassy in Tehran. The response to a telex from the Fontmell Group on Disaster Relief to the head of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO), however, was confirmation that the ministry of foreign affairs in Tehran was ready to receive the team. We made our own travel arrangements, and the account was settled by the Overseas Development Administration. Although we had been ready to go 12 hours after the earthquake, we left for Tehran on Tuesday 26 June. The pooled experience of the team already encom? passed the Bradford fire, the Air India disaster, the Manchester Airport fire, the gas explosion at Chelubynsk in the Soviet Union, the Armenian earth? quake, and the Lockerbie air disaster.13 To meet its local responsibilities the team has identified suitable doctors and nurses and trained them in disaster management. Members are well known to each other, and the social cohesiveness of the group is essential to its success. The team selected for Iran included four women, three of whom were nurses. They wore Islamic dress throughout the stay, starting when we boarded the Iran Air flight in London. The medical specialties represented were accident and emergency medicine, general surgery, plastic and reconstructive surgery, anaesthetics, and intensive care. The experiences of Armenia and Chelubynsk have enabled the team to identify the essential equipment for this work and the quantities required and the whereabouts of the equipment within the South Manchester Health Authority. Requisition numbers have been listed and circulated to relevant departments. One phone call to the duty stores manager activates the mobilisation of our equipment. A similar process secures the personal medical kits and drugs from the pharmacy department. Such a system ensures that our equipment and supplies are part of district supplies and therefore constantly turned over. Products will not expire on the shelf between trips, nor will resources be wasted by lying unused. This is important: there is no budget for this work. If another country asks for help and the foreign office agrees then the cost is refunded in full, but there is no money for preparation, which must be funded from within existing resources. The same applies to preparing for disasters at home. SMART is a registered charity. We assume the host country has nothing, not even basic dressings, and that international medical aid will not make it to the front line in time?and not at all unless accompanied all the way by doctors who can use it. It was policy at that time for SMART to send a 10 person team to work five days continuously on site, excluding rest and travel, with equipment for treating up to 100 patients. The team is self sufficient in food, water, surgical equipment, dressings, and drugs. The travel to the scene is tiring and the work is stressful. After five days on scene exhaustion, both mental and physical, will be established. This will reduce the effectiveness of the team and increase the risk to the patients who they have come to treat. It is extremely difficult to turn your back on large scale suffering and a strict rule to disengage after five days must be accepted by the team before leaving Britain. After appropriate rest the team is fit to return to its NHS work. A series of

An integrated and pragmatic approach: Global plant safety management

The Bhopal disaster in India in 1984 has compelled manufacturing companies to review their operations in order to minimize their risk exposure. Much study has been done on the subject of risk assessment and in refining safety reviews of plant operations. However, little work has been done to address the broader needs of decision makers in the multinational environment. The corporate headquarters of multinational organizations are concerned with identifying vulnerable areas to assure that appropriate risk-minimization measures are in force or will be taken. But the task of screening global business units for safety prowess is complicated and time consuming. This article takes a step towards simplifying this process by presenting the decisional model developed by the authors. Beginning with an overview of key issues affecting global safety management, the focus shifts to the multinational vulnerability model developed by the authors, which reflects an integration of approaches. The article concludes with a discussion of areas for further research. While the global chemical industry and major incidents therein are used for illustration, the procedures and solutions suggested here are applicable to all manufacturing operations.

Isolation of methylcarbamoyl-adducts of adenine and cytosine following in vitro reaction of methyl isocyanate with calf thymus DNA

Methylisocyanate (MIC) is the direct-acting acylating compound involved in the Bhopal, India disaster which occurred on December 3rd, 1984. The accidental release of MIC resulted in at least 2000 deaths, thousands of injuries and exposure of at least 200 000 people to varying amounts of MIC. We have studied how MIC reacts with 2′-deoxyribonucleosides at pH 7.0 and 37°C for 1 h. MIC acylates exocyclic amino groups resulting in the following methylcarbamoyl (MC) adducts: N 6-MC-Ade (0.5% yield) and N 4-MC-dCyd (6%). No adducts were detected with dThd and dGuo. UV, NMR and mass spectrometry were employed to spectroscopically characterize these adducts. MIC was reacted with calf thymus DNA (pH 7.0, 37°C, 1 h) and yielded N 6-MC-Ade (0.3 nmol/mg DNA) and N 4-MC-dCyd (2.0 nmol/mg DNA). The inability of others to observe genetic mutations by MIC in Salmonella and Drosophila is consistent with the exocyclic adducts at N 4 of Cyt and N 6 of Ade where normal hydrogen bonding can occur after rotation of the methylcarbamoyl group anti to the Watson-Crick side of the molecule assuming that MIC binds to DNA within the intact cell.

India: The Leadership Crisis

Optimists and pessimists have both been wrong about India if 1968 is to be taken as a year illustrative of the Indian political system. Developments during the year did not evidence a strengthening of democratic processes, yet neither has increasing political instability reached the point where a basic reordering of the political framework seems imminent. Groping toward new or altered political patterns is underway as political forces continue to react to the changed circumstances engendered by the loss of Congress dominance in the February 1967 elections. What is most notable about the past year is the failure of personal or institutional leadership to emerge in response to the altered political landscape. The tall leaders who achieved independence and guided India through the two decades since 1947 are gone. Similarly, some centralizing forces manifested through both party and governmental channels have perceptibly weakened.' A relatively sophisticated brokerage system of group alliances, in which all political parties participate, has not prevented an unprecedented degree of political instability at the state level. And the Union government has been characterzed as our functioning anarchy and nonGovernment.2 As 1968 ended, four states of Northern India containing approximately one-third of the country's population were under President's Rule. Serious political problems also confronted Madhya Pradesh, Haryana and Kerala, while stability in the rest of India was present only in comparative terms. Resiliency or muddling through, nonetheless, remains a hallmark of Indian politics and government. Congress Party weaknesses are matched in equal measure by the lack of cohesion in non-Congress groupings. Neither political paralysis nor authoritarian rumblings have resulted. Political crises are yet to be equated with disaster in India. Any emphasis on the fluidity and lack of leadership in the political system, however, should not obscure the constants or ordering factors that continue to provide basic strength. First and most elementary is a majority party in parliament which has enabled the Congress ministry to provide at least mini-

Current Events: Disaster in India

Current Events: Disaster in India