Disarmament Policy Research Articles

Measuring the Impact of Regional Defense-Space Expenditures

CONSIDERATIONS of the impact of changes in the volume and composition of expenditures by the defense and space agencies will be misleading if they ignore the regional component. In considering disarmament, traditional monetary and fiscal policy responses produce an effect which is nationwide in scope. Such policies may not be of much help to states and communities, such as California or Wichita, whose economies are heavily dependent upon defense expenditures. In addition, shifts in the regional pattern of these expenditures can produce similar stresses in local economies. A major problem in this connection has been the measurement of the defense-space expenditure impact in a region. Aside from an induced impact operating through regional consumption and business investment functions, the impact on income and employment can be divided into two components: (1) the direct impact through prime contract awards to firms, and (2) the indirect or inter-industry impact through subcontracts and purchases of supplies by prime contractors. While there have been some attempts to measure the direct impact, little work has been done which also accounts for the indirect impact. This paper reports on an effort to measure both the direct and indirect impact of defense-space expenditures on the manufacturing sector of the Los Angeles-Long Beach Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). The task is an empirical one. Hence, we shall briefly review some of the various techniques of measurement and present the results of a short-cut method to measure the impact on Los Angeles manufacturers. Empirical Difficulties Almost all approaches to the measurement of the regional impact of defense-space expenditure involve variations of an input-output framework.1 Unfortunately, given the present state of data availability, they are not operational, at least without extended research effort. National data from the 1947 table, while useful, are somewhat out of date.2 Regional data are all but nonexistent. Pending the development of more adequate data, some short cuts need to be examined. In the search for short cuts, it is useful to keep in mind what the gross flows data of an interregional input-output table reveal. Row information reflects where sales are made in terms of industries, final demand sectors, and regions. Column information indicates the source of inputs from other industries both inside and outside of the region. Short cuts, essentially, involve something less than the complete cross-check of independent estimates of the row and column entries. Most regional input-output studies, in fact, get these estimates sometimes from row information and sometimes from column information, but rarely from independent estimates of both. A column-oriented approach, which has a good deal of appeal, simply traces down the subcontractors. There is some evidence to suggest, as an order of magnitude, that half of a specific defense or space program prime contract is subcontracted.3 It would seem that tracing down a few layers of subcontractors would account for most of the impact. Unfortunately, this is not the case. When a prime

Disarmament Policy and the Pentagon

Disarmament Policy and the Pentagon

Ideology in Soviet disarmament policy

Ideology in Soviet disarmament policy

Images of United States Disarmament Policy in the International Disarmament Negotiating System

gates of nations play defined roles. These participants hold images of the ability and willingness of the major military powers to disarm. These images, whether objective or distorted, constitute one of the factors to be studied in the complex disarmament process. But images of the United States disarmament policy process held by individual diplomats are not often expressed in public statements. The materials presented in this brief paper represent only the beginnings of an attempt to obtain information through confidential interviews. The tentative suggestions which follow have been drawn both

Issues of Peace and War: Canadian Attitudes on Disarmament and Defense Policy

Issues of Peace and War: Canadian Attitudes on Disarmament and Defense Policy

Issues of Peace and War: Canadian Attitudes on Disarmament and Defense Policy

Issues of Peace and War: Canadian Attitudes on Disarmament and Defense Policy

Stable Deterrence and Its Limits

HERE WAS A HAPPY TIME, not too long ago, when the major dialogue on national arms policy was between the armers and the disarmers. The issue, at least in much of the public's mind, was whether the nation ought to pursue a policy of negotiated comprehensive disarmament or one of national preparedness. There were those who believed that all arms races must eventuate in war, and those who believed that military superiority was the best guarantee of peace. But in recent years, this easy dichotomy has given way to a far more complicated picture. Both the armers and the disarmers have become increasingly sophisticated, and as a result have divided into a welter of sub-factions, each advocating a national security policy differing only slightly from that of its neighbor on the arms policy continuum. Though this fragmentation has led to a disconcerting muddying of the polemic waters, it must be viewed as a healthy and encouraging development. And even if one can hardly contend that the vast verbal and intellectual gap between the tough and the soft has been completely bridged, we are certainly moving in that direction. As a consequence, it is now more possible to engage in vigorous and meaningful discourse rather than to restrict ourselves to the vacuous and loaded exchanges of soft-on-communism or warmonger.

The Influence of Congress in the Formulation of Disarmament Policy

In Congress and throughout the country, we have failed to readjust our thinking about disarmament to accom modate the fact of international life that two great powers have the present capability of destroying civilization. Congres sional influence over disarmament policy, for good or bad, has and will be great. The influence of the Senate is important because of its veto power over treaties. The House of Rep resentatives must appropriate funds to make a treaty effective. Common sense and history strongly indicate that Senate mem bers should at least be named as advisers to the delegation at Geneva. Owing in part to staffing deficiencies and in part to lack of funds, congressional knowledge of the United States position on disarmament is poor. Few in Congress know or care about weaknesses in the United States position at Geneva which it would be within the power of Congress to improve. The Disarmament Agency is short staffed, due to appropria tion cuts as well as to statutory security requirements. Advice and consent is needed, if only to help the agency avoid political pitfalls in its relations with Congress. Constructive, intel ligent criticism by Congress, on and off the record, can and must be increased. The incentive for Congress to be construc tive rather than destructive must come from the grass roots of public opinion.—Ed.

Stabilizing the Military Environment

Ever since President Eisenhower broached the “open skies” proposal in 1955, American “disarmament” policy has given prior emphasis—apart from diplomatic and propagandistic purposes—to the objective of stabilizing the military balance of power, as distinguished from the traditional objective of abolishing or reducing the arms that sustain that balance. So Secretary of State Herter on February 18, 1960, described the first goal of America's disarmament policy as creating “a more stable military environment” by reducing the risk of war resulting from a surprise attack launched by miscalculation or from the promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons production. And so on May 25 President Eisenhower took the occasion of the U-2 incident to reiterate the urgent need for an international agreement providing mutual assurance against surprise attack; and on September 22, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly, proposed a United Nations surveillance body to permit nations to prove to each other that they are not preparing to launch a surprise attack.If stability is the objective, then arms control policy is clearly the logical complement rather than the antithesis of defense policy. Yet in the absence of an overall strategy of stability, linking arms control with military strategy, the two may work against each other. Thus in the context of recent developments in missile technology, stabilizing the military environment requires the American government to make a basic decision, not only about arms control, but about the whole strategy of deterrence, lest its concern for providing mutual assurance against surprise attack conflict with its reliance upon a nuclear response to discourage a wide range of aggressions.

Stabilizing the Military Environment

Ever since President Eisenhower broached the “open skies” proposal in 1955, American “disarmament” policy has given prior emphasis—apart from diplomatic and propagandistic purposes—to the objective of stabilizing the military balance of power, as distinguished from the traditional objective of abolishing or reducing the arms that sustain that balance. So Secretary of State Herter on February 18, 1960, described the first goal of America's disarmament policy as creating “a more stable military environment” by reducing the risk of war resulting from a surprise attack launched by miscalculation or from the promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons production. And so on May 25 President Eisenhower took the occasion of the U-2 incident to reiterate the urgent need for an international agreement providing mutual assurance against surprise attack; and on September 22, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly, proposed a United Nations surveillance body to permit nations to prove to each other that they are not preparing to launch a surprise attack.If stability is the objective, then arms control policy is clearly the logical complement rather than the antithesis of defense policy. Yet in the absence of an overall strategy of stability, linking arms control with military strategy, the two may work against each other. Thus in the context of recent developments in missile technology, stabilizing the military environment requires the American government to make a basic decision, not only about arms control, but about the whole strategy of deterrence, lest its concern for providing mutual assurance against surprise attack conflict with its reliance upon a nuclear response to discourage a wide range of aggressions.

Discussion: Disarmament, Sanctions and American Policy

Discussion: Disarmament, Sanctions and American Policy