Recently, scholars have developed and debated an account of the U.S. Supreme Court’s First Amendment freedom of expression agenda that connects the ideological identity of the speaker to the justices’ votes. Paralleling this discussion, others have debated whether the Roberts Court has been distinctively “pro-speech” or politically conservative in these decisions. These accounts meet in that they share a concern, explicit or implicit, for the importance of content-valid decision direction indicators. This article develops a provisional alternative to conventional and more recent indicators of ideological decision direction (or case polarity) in modern freedom of expression decisions. This “composite indicator” is constructed as a series of “INUS Conditions,” or “an insufficient but non-redundant part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result,” that takes into account the speaker, speech suppressor, and valence of the speech act identified in each free speech decision issued during the 2005–2014 terms of the Roberts Court and 1994–2004 terms of the Rehnquist Court. In other words, membership in the sets of “conservative,” “liberal,” or “undetermined” categories of Supreme Court decisions follows from the presence of multiple conditions—the type of speaker, speech act, and the partisan identity of the speech suppressor—which can be configured in multiple ways. In assessing the performance of this new concept measurement through a series of fundamental models, I find that conventional indicators may overstate the conservatism of the Court in free expression cases, and that—during the Roberts Court era—the relationship between values and votes becomes more tenuous under the composite indicator. More broadly, it is hoped that this project will encourage continued discussion across the quantitative and qualitative cultures in the course of developing accounts of judicial behavior at the U.S. Supreme Court.
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