Diplomatic Support Research Articles

The German Overthrow of the Central Rada, April, 1918: New Evidence from German Archives

On 9 February 1918, at Brest-Litovsk, the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire) concluded an unusually favorable treaty with the government of the Ukrainian Central Rada. By its terms, in exchange for diplomatic recognition and military support against a Russian Bolshevik invasion of the Ukraine, Rada negotiators placed at the disposal of the Central Powers, but primarily Germany, a surplus of foodstuffs and agricultural products estimated at 1,000,000 tonnes. The Brotfrieden, or bread peace, as this arrangement is generally known, had three significant repercussions. First, it greatly undermined Leon Trotsky's bargaining position and obstructionist tactics, forcing the Bolsheviks to accept German terms on 3 March 1918. Second, by acquiring a rich granary, and thus no longer fearing defeat through starvation, it enabled Germany to break the iron ring of the Allied blockade. And, third, it made it impossible for the Ukraine to receive a favorable hearing or reception from the Western (French, English and American) Allies at the peace conference.

Preserving the Sheikhdom: London, Washington, Iraq and Kuwait, 1958–61

Despite the catastrophic ending of the Suez campaign of 1956 Britain remained a presence in the Middle East and continued to take an active role in the affairs of the region. Kuwait was an area of special economic importance. The conservative sheikhdom, among the richest territories in the Persian Gulf, fuelled the British economy with both oil and investment. After the violent overthrow of the Iraqi Hashemites in July 1958 and the sabre rattling of the successor government, the British were once more prepared, albeit reluctantly, to send troops to the Middle East. During this crisis, however, the government of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had American diplomatic support, only minor resistance from the Soviet Union, and even the grudging acquiescence of the Egyptian ruler. Prior to the Iraqi revolution in July 1958 that brought General Abdul Karim Qasim to power, the Iraqi government had pressed the ruler of Kuwait, Abdulla al Salim al-Sabah, to join the Arab Union, a hurried expedient to unite the Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq, which had been formed in response to the signing on 1 February 1958 of an agreement joining Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic. Like Iraq, Britain wanted Kuwaiti participation in the Arab Union. In April 1958 the British Ambassador in Beirut, Sir George Middleton, met with the Kuwaiti ruler to suggest closer relations between Kuwait and the Arab Union. Sheikh al-Sabah refused. Many Kuwaitis were ardent supporters of President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Al-Sabah claimed that the Arab Union was merely an agreement between governments, while the United Arab Republic was a genuine union of peoples.' Baghdad was unwilling to accept a Kuwaiti refusal and attempted to frighten the Kuwaiti ruler into accepting closer ties. Britain had a treaty of protection with Kuwait, signed in 1899, that guaranteed the security of the sheikhdom. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tawfiq Suwaidi, in the spring of 1958, told Sheikh al-Sabah that London now wanted to withdraw British protection in favour of Kuwaiti adherence to the Arab Union. Whitehall denied Suwaidi's assertion. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir Bernard Burrows, emphasized that his government had 'no present intention of altering its special treaty relationship with Kuwait'. Burrows also assured the ruler that London had 'at no time negotiated behind his back'.

No Eternal Friends or Enemies: British Defence Policy and the Problem of the United States, 1919-1939

Based largely on the axiom that Britain had no eternal friends or enemies, only eternal interests, British defence policy saw the list of potential adversaries change between 1919 and 1939. War against most powers was considered at one time or another, but not against the United States. Political isolation and geographic segregation removed it from British war planning. Nonetheless, the American question presented problems for British defence planners. In the 1920s, when successive American governments sought naval equality with Britain, the threat that a neutral United States might seek to break a British maritime blockade of an enemy led to hard feelings in London. But the conclusion of the London naval treaty in 1930, began a period of Anglo-American co-operation which lasted until the Roosevelt administration withdrew from internationalism into a preoccupation with domestic matters. However, in the worsening international situation by late 1937, the British, even the suspicious Neville Chamberlain, began to see American economic and diplomatic support as adjuncts to British efforts to oppose the totalitarian powers. Roosevelt reluctantly concurred, and the basis for the wartime Anglo-American alliance began to be laid as the Polish crisis of 1939 unfolded.

The Saudi conundrum: Squaring the security‐stability circle

Saudi Arabia's foreign policy during the 1990-91 Gulf war represents a watershed in the kingdom's conduct in international affairs. After long obscuring its close ties to the United States with justifications, denials, and subterfuge, the kingdom has, as one former Gulf minister remarked, 'come out of the closet' . Following upon almost 10 years of providing measured financial, diplomatic, and logistical support to its bittersweet rival, secular Arab nationalist-Ba'thist Iraq, in that country's war with revolutionary non-Arab Islamic Iran to prevent an Iraqi defeat but without victory, Saudi Arabia sanctioned the use of overwhelming US force to crush Iraqi power. After decades of juggling internal, regional, and international interests in foreign policy, the kingdom has emphasised the primacy of the regional balance of power and its relations with the United States to preserve its security in the post-Gulf war era. Saudi Arabia's Gulf war policy also represents the culmination of nearly 20 years of unprecedented Saudi foreign policy activism. The 1973-74 Arab oil embargo and oil price increase thrust the kingdom into an Arab leadership role for which it was poorly prepared. The Saudis did not have the experience, security, military capability, or institutional strength to play their new part with confidence, nor did they have the requisite enthusiasm for it. The kingdom also had to contend with regional forces from all directions. Intermittent torrents of antimonarchist secular rhetoric poured in from Syria, Iraq, Libya, and South Yemen. Pahlavi Iran was beginning its insatiable drive for modernisation and regional hegemony. The Palestinian diaspora was evolving into a more potent political element, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), which demanded of all Arab countries, particularly those well endowed with money and influence, maximalist efforts to reclaim Palestine. The kingdom was vulnerable because of its traditional political structure and conservative tendencies, its weak military capabilities, and its dependence on the United States for security in a political environment that associated the United States with Israel and held both as the Arabs' common enemies. Its 'deep pockets' enticed a swarm of extortionists who claimed their 'fair' shares in the name of Arab brotherhood. The Saudis, masquerading as Arab leaders, felt obliged to open their checkbook. In such political and economic circumstances, and as a result of them, Saudi foreign policy sought compromise and consensus. It avoided conflict that could, foremost, endanger the rule of the Al-Saud family in the Peninsula, and by the transitive principle of Arab politics, the security of the Saudi state. The abundant oil revenues of the 1970s and 1980s enabled the Saudis, more often than not, to

The Publication of Sir Edward Hyde's Consideraciones at Madrid in June 1650

In the biography of Sir Edward Hyde, his visit to Madrid between November 1649 and March 1651 has usually been neglected for the little that is known about it is largely found in the episodes recalled nearly two decades later in Book XIII of his History of the Rebellion. Yet his sojourn, for close to a year and a half, at the court of Philip IV deserves attention since during it he published anonymously in Spanish an eloquent short pamphlet defending the legitimacy of Charles II’s right to the English throne, while he denounced the Commonwealth as a tyrannical usurpation of authority without a basis in English law or the law of nations. The occasion was the unexpected murder of Anthony Ascham, the diplomatic agent of the English régime, early in June 1650 in the capital by six young English royalists. While writing in their defence Hyde presented one of the earliest examples of his case to earn diplomatic support for the exiled Charles II by the Catholic kings of western Europe and the papacy during the coming decade.

ICRC President visits the United States of America

Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the ICRC, was in Washington from 14 to 17 May 1989, accompanied by Mr. André Pasquier, Director of Operations, and Mr. Jürg Bischoff from the Press Division.Mr. Sommaruga and Mr. Pasquier were received by the President of the United States, Mr. George Bush, in the presence of Mr. Richard F. Schubert, President of the American Red Cross. The ICRC representatives conveyed their warm thanks for the financial support provided by the American authorities to the ICRC; they also expressed the hope that the contribution would be increased, given the expansion in ICRC operational acitivities in many parts of the world. There was also an exchange of views as to ratification by the United States Government of the Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions, as well as talks on humanitarian mobilization and current ICRC activities. Mr. Bush assured Mr. Sommaruga that he could count on continued diplomatic and financial support from the United States.

The Chancellor of Austria visits the ICRC

The Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria, Mr. Franz Vranitzky, visited on 2 February 1988 the International Committee of the Red Cross, where he was received by Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga, President of the institution, and several members of the Committee.In his speech of welcome, the President of the ICRC thanked the Federal Chancellor for the support that the Republic of Austria gives to the ICRC. He also recalled the fact that the large number of conflict situations in the world demands constant diplomatic support, in the interest of the victims, especially from neutral countries.

Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East

Renewed and intensified superpower competition in the Middle East and Persian Gulf in recent months has come at a time when the region is in an era of historic transformation. On a profound level it is anachronistic to see two states contend for power and influence over a region neither understands, cares for, or is likely to be able to influence more than marginally. On another level the process and result of the competition could seriously affect the autonomy and prospects of the peoples of the region. The sense of powerlessness, lack of control, and susceptibility to manipulation by outside forces have of course been increased by the jockeying for position, solicitation of diplomatic support, and request for base and access rights of the great powers. This intensified pressure for alignment, according to which local actions are interpreted in terms of the East-West competition, increases the sense of impotence of the local states which watch the game being played out over their heads. The precise relevance of this game to their needs is as shrouded in mystery as the eventual outcome is a source of anxiety. The possibility of a superpower arrangement made at their expense worries the regional powers almost as much as more pressing and immediate security threats. As small states, the regional powers' interests are local while those of their patrons are global; the possibility that their interests may be sacrificed in a wider arrangement is therefore ever present. A related concern is the possibility of conflict in the region unrelated to the region itself; if Afghanistan was a Soviet breakout from potential encirclement, it was the Arabs and Iran, and not China, that paid the costs.' Even this regional theater thus can be an arena rather than a stake in great power rivalry.

Introduction

INTRODUCTION Recently there has been a debate over whether the problems the United States faces in the Middle East are the result of misguided policies or the absence of any consistent policy whatsoever. In either case, Americans can point to few clear successes in this region, and there is a growing consensus that our entire approach to the area needs to be reassessed. The influence of the Palestinians and the Libyans, for example, has persevered or expanded despite strong opposition from the United States. More disturbingly, even our "friends" in the area appear unenthusiastic about our initiatives. We cannot seem to get theJordanians to join the Camp David process, or to draw the Saudis into our "strategic consensus," or to restrain the Israeli air force from "creating facts" just as we embark on delicate negotiations. Even our allies in NATO have balked at joining the United States in an embargo of Iran or in measures to punish the Soviets for invading Afghanistan. But the most painful failures of the American approach are in Egypt and Iran. The assassination of Sadat and the revolution against the shah not only deprived America of useful surrogates in the region, they also brought home the message that all of the local regimes through which we have tried to exert influence in the region face grave domestic problems that may limit their support for us. Of course, these failures may be seen as facets of the general deterioration of relations between the United States and the Third World in the 1970s. However, the crisis in the American approach to the Middle East has a special salience because events in this region have such an immediate impact on our quality oflife. Americans need look no farther than their wallets to be reminded of the importance of changes in the price of Libyan crude, or in the volume of arms sales to Saudi Arabia, or in government appropriations for the RDF and its maneuvers in Egypt. We cannot, therefore, be philosophical about political trends in the Middle East. The articles in this issue of the SAIS Review deal with various problems in the Middle East from a broad range of perspectives. Despite their diverse viewpoints 2 SAIS REVIEW and analyses, each of the authors raises certain fundamental questions about the conduct or orientation of U.S. foreign policy in the region. Three of these questions are so pervasive that they deserve the reader's special attention. First, is U.S. policy based on an adequate understanding of the political forces and processes at work in the Middle East? The essay by Farsoun and Wingerter suggests that American efforts to deal with the conflict in Lebanon have been crippled by a failure to comprehend the role that the Palestinians play in that crisis. The article by Wrong also criticizes the prevailing interpretations of the Lebanese civil war, but offers an analysis whose policy implications are radically different. The articles by Keddie and Sale on Iran both argue that the United States failed to recognize the social changes and political groups that eventually would overthrow the shah. But they differ over whether an exaggerated fear of local communism or the neglect of traditional social forces was responsible for this blindness. The contribution by Richardson notes that the United States has not even fully understood how European interests differ from our own in this region, or why the EEC states have kept their distance from the Camp David process. Second, has U.S. policy offered appropriate support for our allies in the Middle East? In his memoriam, Ambassador Battle joins a number of other American diplomats who have argued that Sadat's assassination might have been prevented had the United States provided him with stronger diplomatic support. Sale's article extends this critique a step further by suggesting that, whatever its volume, U.S. aid to Iran may have focused too narrowly on military supplies at the expense of economic aid. This point is reinforced by Zartman and McNamara, who argue (in very different contexts) that the economic development of countries in the region may be as important to their political stability as the security apparatuses of their states. The...

The Soviet‑Vietnamese Treaty: A Giant Step Forward

The Superpowers and their Foreign Policies In international affairs, only two superpowers, namely, the U.S. and the Soviet Union ? because of their military, technological and economic resources ? have the capacity to exercise a global presence, intervene in crisis situations and establish peace and security in every pan of the world. Their nuclear arsenal and continued development in strategic weapons assure themselves of a mutual deterrent against each other. The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and d?tente can be viewed as efforts to maintain their military balance. Thus, unless a suicidal or mad leader comes to the scene, there is little likelihood of direct conflict or war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But the interests of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, outside of their bilateral relations, are not constrained by the nuclear deterrent, SALT or d?tente. Both seek through diplomatic, economic, technical and military means, and through covert and overt actions, to maintain their global presence, create spheres of influence, support allies and friendly governments and extend their power and influence. Since the end of the Second World War, the superpowers have dominated: the state of international affairs, peace and war, crisis and stability in various regions have been a result of their relationship. The relations of the superpowers with states in the international community are linked to their national security, economic well-being and political system. These relations are tied up by alliances, treaty arrangements, economic and technical aid programmes and diplomatic support. However, the superpowers have certain priorities in terms of their commitment and their role in the defence of certain governments. These are firm and consistent in areas which are considered vital to the interests of the superpowers: these are the spheres of influence of the superpowers. For the U.S., these regions are North America and Western Europe, and the states are Israel, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. For the Soviet Union, they are Eastern Europe and the states of North Korea and Cuba. These are states which for geopolitical reasons and treaty corrimitments are considered vital and, hence, those which they are prepared to defend at all costs. The governments in these states look to either the U.S. or the Soviet Union for military protection, economic and technical assistance and diplomatic support. Many of them derive inspiration from the political and economic system of either the U.S. or the Soviet Union. The maintenance of the status quo in these regions and states is directly related to the bilateral relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. For this reason, both are constrained from extending their power and influence to the other camp, and from intervening in the internal affairs of governments in these regions and states. It is in the so-called Third World where the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union for power and influence has held promise of expansion for them. In the

The 1948 American Embargo on Arms to Palestine

The 1948 American arms embargo on Palestine and the Middle East stands in stark contrast to the general diplomatic support that President Truman extended to the nascent and fledgling Jewish state. As is well known, President Truman repeatedly countermanded State Department directives that he felt were inconsistent with his pro-Jewish-state policy.' It is enough to recall the promotion by the administration of the U.N. General Assembly's partition resolution;2 the immediate American recognition of the new state;3 the appointment of James G. McDonald as Washington's special representative to Israel in June 1948;4 and the rejection of the Bernadotte proposal to detach the Negev from

The British Government and the Oil Companies 1912–1924: the Search for an Oil Policy

The overwhelming majority of studies of the relationship between the British government and private industry in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are, in reality, merely studies of the government's policy towards industry. The attitude of private industry towards the government has been almost entirely neglected, and this has inevitably led to a distorted understanding of the relationship as a whole. It is, for example, hardly ever made explicit in the extensive literature on the growth of state intervention in the British economy that in the decades before 1914 the assault on laissez-faire was pardy led by private industry itself. This development was most noticeable overseas, where the British government became involved in commerce and trade largely in response to requests for diplomatic support from British firms faced with growing competition from continental and American commercial interests, often supported by their respective governments.

Christians for Zion, 1600-1919

(1976). Christians for Zion, 1600-1919. Journal of Palestine Studies: Vol. 5, No. 3-4, pp. 123-141.

North Korea in 1974

FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS preoccupied the attention of the North Korean leadership to an unusual degree in 1974 in response to the fundamental changes taking place in the Asian international environment. The major foreign policy goals continue to be completion of the revolution in all of Korea and promotion of socialist construction and, by so doing, contribution to the development of a world revolution. No distinction between domestic policy objectives and foreign policy objectives is entertained. Foreign policy is viewed as another instrument, or a set of undertakings, for implementing important national tasks. To increase solidarity with international revolutionary forces, North Korea must: 1) strengthen ties with the third world countries as well as socialist countries; 2) establish diplomatic relations with South Korea's allies and, if possible, cut off South Korean ties with these nations; 3) forestall South Korea's effort to develop ties with socialist countries; 4) seek membership and participation in all types of international organizations, and 5) capture the allegiance of overseas Korean residents and mobilize them for its cause. The Soviet Union and China: From the North Korean perspective, the Soviet Union and China provide assurance for North Korean independence and security. These fraternal socialist countries are the forces to be relied upon in order to neutralize U.S. and Japanese capabilities. North Korea depends on the Soviet Union and China as a springboard for its diplomatic offensive, expecting to ride on the coattails of their power and influence in the international arena. North Korea's anguish over the Sino-Soviet conflict is tempered by an awareness that it provides the country with a measure of maneuverability and it attempts, with considerable success, to maintain a neutral stance. The Soviet Union and China have so far refrained from responding to South Korea's overtures for the development of contacts. North Korea's objection is not the sole reason for their negative attitude, but it is a powerful and effective one. Whether the public positions taken by the Soviet Union and China in support of North Korea's position represent pro-forma diplomatic support or genuine feeling, is another matter. Despite North Korea's apparent and professed confidence in the loyalty of its allies-specially China, whose relationship is characterized by friendship and military unity forged and sealed in blood-Western observers claim to perceive contra-

Secession and the Right of Self-Determination: an O.A.U. Dilemma

The struggle for African independence was waged under the banner of the right of self-determination, and today African states and the Organisation of African Unity give financial and diplomatic support to the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique. Yet the same African states and the O.A.U. denounced Biafra's attempted withdrawal from Nigeria and similar struggles in Southern Sudan, Chad, and Eritrea, without reference to the possible merits of their peoples' claims to the right of self-determination. Biafran secession, in particular, was condemned as a priori detrimental to African interests: it was incompatible with the goal of African unity and would set a precedent that could lead to the further balkanisation of the continent.

Commerce, Finance, and British Diplomatic Support in China, 1885–86

Commerce, Finance, and British Diplomatic Support in China, 1885–86

The Great Powers and the Middle East

The June War of 1967 and its consequences have confirmed the United States and Russia as the chief external factors determining the future in the Middle East, as they still are in world politics as a whole. Although China and Europe may be seen as growing influences in the area, and both might become more important for different reasons during the coming decade, their effect has remained marginal, since neither are yet capable of living up to the hopes of diplomatic or military support pinned upon them by different Arab elements which regard them as potential avenues of escape from dependence upon the Soviet Union and America. For the Arabs, therefore, it has been vital to understand the nature and limits of American and Russian policy. In this they have not always been successful, even allowing for the degree to which the odds at the moment are against them and the difficulty sometimes of understanding rationally what Washington is up to.

Chinese Railways and the Townley Agreement of 1903

British financial interests in China, since 1895, had been closely linked with political and strategic considerations. As the political and financial rivalry between the European powers intensified, the link tightened, becoming increasingly essential for mutual preservation. European finance meant railways, mineral rights, arms, and support for the ailing Manchu Dynasty; it was clear to successive British governments that British political supremacy in China could not survive the passing of such important financial concessions into foreign hands. In 1898, with the international scramble for concessions at its peak, the leading representatives of British finance in China co-operated fully with the Foreign Office to gain the bulk of Chinese railway contracts and concessions. Such respectable British enterprises as the British and Chinese Corporation and the Pekin Syndicate received active diplomatic support at Peking and the encouragement of the Foreign Office in London. Short of actually negotiating financial contracts on behalf of private companies British diplomacy could do little more to improve the competitive standing of these leading British firms vis-à-vis their foreign rivals.

Transnational Strategies of Protection and Defense by Multinational Corporations: Spreading the Risk and Raising the Cost for Nationalization in Natural Resources

Multinational corporations in natural resource industries that are challenged by economic nationalists in the countries where they have their production stage can no longer count automatically on the direct diplomatic support of their home governments as they could in the days of the Big Stick or the Pith Helmet. To protect their investments, they are realizing that they may have to devise their own means for the defense of their interests. Gunboats and marines no longer respond unhesitatingly to their beck and call. And even the more subtle pressures from loans blocked, funds impounded, credits unavailable, and aid cut off require a carefully orchestrated private effort to arrange. In the study of transnational relations, the large international natural resource companies have frequently been singled out as nongovernmental actors who possess par excellence the power to carry out their own foreign policy, to form alliances and exercise influence with a scope and range that exceeds the control of the countries in which they operate.' Not all such companies need to perfect these skills in private diplomacy, however. I have shown in a prior study that vertically integrated natural resource companies in which the crucial scale factors or barriers to entry are located downstream from the production stagesuch as tropical agriculture, tin, bauxite, and iron ore-may have various opportunities to keep oligopoly control outside the reach of

Commerce, Finance, and British Diplomatic Support in China, 1885-86

Commerce, Finance, and British Diplomatic Support in China, 1885-86